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ABSTRACT
 
The main goal of this research is to analyze how Egypt defined its national 
interest during the course of its modern history, since the termination of the 
monarchy in the country in the year 1952. As well it identify how it used its foreign 
policy as a pivotal middle power in the middle east region to promote this interest 
throughout these years with a special focus on the foreign policy after two 
25th 30thconsecutive revolutions in the of January 2011 and of June 2013, until this 
recent moment.  
The objective of this research is achieved through the conduction 
of a comprehensive and detailed assessment for the Egyptian foreign 
policy over the past six decades. It will examine external relations of the 
country since the founding of the first republic, until the establishment of 
the third republic under the current president Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, the 
second elected president in a row, which succeeded in ending the Muslim
brotherhood regime in the country.
This research will particularly focus on the changes that took 
place in the Egyptian foreign policy in the aftermath of the Arab spring
uprisings that erupted in the Middle East region in the year 2011. The
Egyptian revolution that toppled the 30 years old Mubarak regime, aspired 
at accomplishing the principles of freedom, dignity and social justice 
within the Egyptian society. The demands of this revolt have concentrated 
on achieving internal reforms essentially; it did not mention foreign policy
in relation to the demands of the protest groups. 
The Egyptian revolution of 2011 has embraced its own 
characteristics as its pacific and peaceful nature, despite all the attempts of 
the ruling systems for branding rebellions with violence. However, the 
most important feature of this uprising is that the young people and the 
middle class represented its basic fuel for its outbreak, in contrast to many
expectations and mental images for these two categories, as it was 
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believed that poor classes would have mobilized this revolution. This 
belief came to many people as they thought that the young people in Egypt 
are unable to induce any kind of change in the country. On the other hand, 
the technology and communications revolution played a key role in the 
process of mobilization and preparation for revolutions not only in Egypt 
but also in the various Arab countries. 
The Arab spring revolutions had influenced the domestic and the 
foreign policy dynamics not only in Egypt but also in the whole Middle 
East region. In the case of Egypt, the most important variable that resulted 
from this revolt is the effect that the public opinion created on the 
country's foreign policy engagements for the first time in the modern 
history of Egypt. In addition, it emphasized the strong bond or connection 
between the internal and external policies of the country. On the other
hand, the 2011 revolution exposed the accumulating problems that led to 
the deterioration of the country's status both domestically and externally. 
The other crucial variable that resulted from the Arab spring
revolutions not only in Egypt but also in all the states that have been hit by
this wave of protests is the arrival of the political Islam groups to power in 
those countries with different formularies. As for the case of Egypt, it is 
worth to mention that the Muslim Brotherhood group which, is considered 
as the origin of the notion of political Islam in the Middle East and Arab 
region, came to power in 2012. Thus, President Mohamed Morsi was the 
first democratically and freely elected president in the history of the 
country. 
Certainly, it was expected that the Muslim Brotherhood regime
would embark on pursuing a foreign policy that would match with their
own ideological orientations and beliefs. However, this regime could not 
do so in the anticipated formula, as it was faced by the special nature of 
the Egypt that imposes certain approach on any regime in its foreign 
policy conduction throughout the history. In other words, determinates as 
history, geography and demography of Egypt have always played a strong
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role in the defining its external movements in such a way that would 
achieve the national interest of the country, away from any creeds. 
In this framework, the research will tackle the majority of the 
Egyptian foreign policy occurrences and decisions as well the circles of 
relations that shaped this policy throughout the five regimes, which ruled 
the country since 1952, since the establishment of the first republic in the 
country. It will investigate how the different regimes extended their
actions and deeds in relation to the foreign policy to work for the national 
interest of the country from their point of views or sometimes to serve the 
reinforcement of their regimes. Furthermore, the research will have a
special focus on the one-year rule of the Muslim Brotherhood during
which they tried to impose their ideas and principles on the Egyptian 
society a matter that was completely rejected by the people who took the 
streets again in 2013 to topple their regime. This popular revolution 
managed to overthrow president Morsi and paved the way towards the 
establishment of the third republic in the country. 
Through a simple comparison of both revolutions of 2011 and 
2013 consecutively, it could be noted that the foreign policy was also not 
on the top priorities of the latter, as the domestic demands were
fundamental for this uprising. Moreover, the two revolts are characterized 
by their non-exporting character or quality, in other words the Egyptian 
revolutions in general never tried to spread its notions outside its borders. 
Yet, the Arab spring itself had a sort of domino effect that struck most of 
the neighboring countries, but with different degrees.
The research will also deal with the Egyptian foreign policy under 
the current Egyptian regime of President Abdel- Fattah Al-Sisi who came 
30thinto power after the popular revolution June, 2013 that ended the 
Islamic rule in the country. Since the inauguration of the third republic
after being elected in 2014, the current president started to undergo a
number of adjustments on both levels, domestically and externally to 
recover the country's image in front of the whole world. The current 
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Egyptian regime in same time aimed at recovering Egypt's external 
relations with all the countries of the world, especially with those of 
interest of Egypt, in a trial to correct the serious mistakes that have been 
committed during the brotherhood regime, where they strengthened their
ties with the states and groups that match with their political identity. 
The analysis of the foreign policy of the Muslim Brotherhood
reveals that it was not proficient enough to take the lead in a key country
like Egypt. This lack of competence and experience might be attributed to 
the fact that they were a group that has been working secretly and banned 
for long periods of time under the consecutive regimes since their
establishment in the year 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood regime tried to 
extend relations with the circles of interest and allies for Egypt namely the 
Gulf States and Russia. However, they failed to secure ties with them 
owing to the divergence in the main beliefs and values between both sides, 
as they are contemplated as the origin of all the terrorist groups that 
emerged during the last three decades.
This investigation in a part of it will tackle the effect or 
implications of the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt on its 
own future on the domestic level. As well it will embark upon the 
prospect of the notion of political Islam in general and of the Islamic 
political forces in the region after the collapse of the group in Egypt. 
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Resumen
 
El objetivo principal de esta investigación es analizar cómo Egipto definió
su interés nacional durante el curso de su historia moderna, desde la terminación
de la monarquía en el país en el año 1952. También identifica cómo utilizó su
política exterior como una potencia central en la región del Medio Oriente para 
promover este interés a lo largo de estos años con un enfoque especial en la
política exterior después de dos revoluciones consecutivas en el 25 de enero de
2011 y el 30 de junio de 2013, hasta este momento reciente.
El objetivo de esta investigación se logra a través de la realización de una
evaluación completa y detallada de la política exterior egipcia durante las últimas
seis décadas. Examinará las relaciones exteriores del país desde la fundación de
la primera república, hasta el establecimiento de la tercera república bajo el actual
presidente Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, el segundo presidente electo consecutivo, que 
logró poner fin al régimen de Hermandad Musulmana en el país.
Esta investigación se centrará en particular en los cambios que tuvieron
lugar en la política exterior egipcia a raíz de los levantamientos de la Primavera 
Árabe que estallaron en la región de Oriente Medio en el año 2011. La revolución
egipcia que derrocó al régimen de Mubarak de 30 años, aspiró a cumplir los
principios de libertad, dignidad y justicia social dentro de la sociedad egipcia. Las
demandas de esta revuelta se han concentrado en lograr esencialmente reformas
internas; No mencionó la política exterior en relación con las demandas de los
grupos de protesta. 
La revolución egipcia de 2011 ha abrazado sus propias características
como su pacífica y la naturaleza pacífica, a pesar de todos los intentos de los
sistemas de gobierno para marcar las rebeliones con violencia. Sin embargo, la
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característica más importante de este levantamiento es que los jóvenes y la clase
media representaron su combustible básico para su brote, en contraste con
muchas expectativas e imágenes mentales para estas dos categorías, ya que se
creía que las clases pobres habrían movilizado esta revolución. Esta creencia
llegó a muchas personas, ya que pensaban que los jóvenes en Egipto son
incapaces de inducir cualquier tipo de cambio en el país. Por otro lado, la
revolución de la tecnología y las comunicaciones tuvo un papel clave en el
proceso de movilización y preparación de las revoluciones, no sólo en Egipto,
sino también en los diversos países árabes.
Las revoluciones de Primavera Árabe han influido en la dinámica 
doméstica y de la política exterior no sólo en Egipto, sino también en toda la
región del Oriente Medio. En el caso de Egipto, la variable más importante que
resultó de esta revuelta es el efecto que la opinión pública creó sobre los
compromisos de política exterior del país por primera vez en la historia moderna
de Egipto. Además, hizo hincapié en el fuerte vínculo o conexión entre las
políticas interna y externa del país. Por otro lado, la revolución de 2011 puso de
manifiesto los problemas acumulados que condujeron al deterioro de la situación
del país tanto a nivel nacional como externo. 
La otra variable crucial que resultó de las revoluciones Primavera Árabe
no sólo en Egipto, sino también en todos los estados que han sido golpeados por
esta ola de protestas es la llegada de los grupos políticos islámicos al poder en los
países con diferentes formularios. En cuanto al caso de Egipto, vale la pena 
mencionar que el grupo de la Hermandad Musulmana, que es considerado como
el origen de la noción de Islam político en Oriente Medio y la región árabe, llegó
al poder en 2012. Así, el presidente MOHAMED MORSI fue El primer
presidente elegido democráticamente y libremente en la historia del país. 
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Ciertamente, se esperaba que el régimen de Hermandad Musulmana se 
embarcaría en la consecución de una política exterior que coincida con sus
propias orientaciones y creencias ideológicas. Sin embargo, este régimen no
podría hacerlo en la fórmula anticipada, ya que se enfrentó a la naturaleza especial
de Egipto que impone cierta aproximación a cualquier régimen en su conducción
de la política exterior a lo largo de la historia. En otras palabras, los determinantes
como la historia, la geografía y la demografía de Egipto siempre han
desempeñado un papel importante en la definición de sus movimientos externos
de tal manera que lograría el interés nacional del país, lejos de cualquier credo.
En este marco, la investigación abordará la mayoría de los sucesos y
decisiones de la política exterior egipcia, así como los círculos de relaciones que
conformaron esta política a lo largo de los cinco regímenes que gobernaron el
país desde 1952 desde la creación de la primera república en el país. Investiga
cómo los diferentes regímenes extendieron sus acciones y acciones en relación
con la política exterior para trabajar por el interés nacional del país desde su punto
de vista o, a veces, para reforzar sus regímenes. Además, la investigación se
centrará especialmente en la regla del año de la Hermandad Musulmana durante
lo cual trataron de imponer sus ideas y principios a la sociedad egipcia, un asunto
que fue completamente rechazado por las personas que volvieron a tomar las
calles en 2013 para Derribar su régimen. Esta revolución popular logró derrocar
al presidente Morsi y allanó el camino hacia el establecimiento de la tercera
república en el país. 
A través de una simple comparación de las dos revoluciones de 2011 y
2013 consecutivamente, cabe señalar que la política exterior tampoco estuvo en
las prioridades de este último, ya que las demandas internas fueron fundamentales
para este levantamiento. Por otra parte, las dos revueltas se caracterizan por su
carácter no exportador o calidad, es decir las revoluciones egipcias en general
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nunca trataron de difundir sus nociones fuera de sus fronteras. Sin embargo, la
Primavera Árabe en sí tenía una especie de efecto dominó que golpeó a la mayoría
de los países vecinos, pero con diferentes grados.
La investigación también tratará de la política exterior egipcia bajo el
actual régimen egipcio del presidente Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi que llegó al poder
después de la revolución popular el 30 de junio de 2013 que puso fin al gobierno
islámico en el país. Desde la inauguración de la tercera república después de ser
elegido en 2014, el actual presidente comenzó a experimentar una serie de ajustes
en ambos niveles, tanto interna como externamente para recuperar la imagen del
país frente al mundo entero. El actual régimen egipcio en el mismo tiempo tenía
como objetivo recuperar las relaciones exteriores de Egipto con todos los países
del mundo, especialmente con los de interés de Egipto, en un juicio para corregir
los graves errores cometidos durante el régimen de Hermandad Musulmana,
Relaciones con los estados y grupos que coinciden con su identidad política.
El análisis de la política exterior de la Hermandad Musulmana revela que
no era lo suficientemente proficiente como para tomar la iniciativa en un país
clave como Egipto. Esta falta de competencia y experiencia podría atribuirse al
hecho de que eran un grupo que ha estado trabajando en secreto y prohibido
durante largos períodos de tiempo bajo los regímenes consecutivos desde su
establecimiento en el año 1928. El régimen de la Hermandad Musulmana trató de
extender las relaciones con Los círculos de interés y aliados para Egipto, es decir,
los Estados del Golfo y Rusia. Sin embargo, no lograron establecer vínculos con
ellos debido a la divergencia de las principales creencias y valores entre ambas
partes, ya que se contempla como el origen de todos los grupos terroristas que
surgieron durante las últimas tres décadas.
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Esta investigación en una parte de ella abordará el efecto o las
implicaciones de la caída del régimen de la Hermandad Musulmana en Egipto
sobre su propio futuro en el ámbito doméstico. También se embarcará en la
perspectiva de la noción del Islam político en general y de las fuerzas políticas
islámicas en la región después del colapso del grupo en Egipto.
Objetivos del estudio:
Objetivo principal:
El objetivo principal de esta investigación es evaluar la política exterior egipcia
y su papel en la región del Oriente Medio durante las últimas seis décadas, hasta
el actual régimen, con especial referencia a las transformaciones de la política
exterior tras la revolución árabe de primavera de 2011.
Objetivos instrumentales:
- Analizar el papel de Egipto como un poder central en la región de Oriente
 
Medio.
 
- Examinar el comportamiento de los países revolucionarios en general con una
 
mención especial al caso egipcio.
 
- Evaluar los determinantes de la política exterior egipcia, así como las tendencias
de esta política a lo largo de los diferentes regímenes desde la época de Nasser
pasando por la de Sadat hasta Mubarak.
- Determinar los factores internos y externos que condujeron a la erupción de la
revolución egipcia después de 30 años del régimen de Mubarak.
- Estudiar las transformaciones y desafíos que enfrenta la seguridad nacional
egipcia antes y después de la Primavera Árabe.
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- Investigar la reforma de la política exterior bajo el régimen de la Hermandad
Musulmana que entró en el poder por primera vez en la historia del país, así como
sus orígenes y su papel en la escena política egipcia desde su creación en el año
1928.
- Explorar las principales razones del estallido de la revolución del 30 de junio de
2013 que puso fin al gobierno de la Hermandad Musulmana en Egipto, así como
de la política exterior del actual régimen egipcio y sus esfuerzos para recurrir al
papel del país en la región.
- Hipótesis:
- Para el desarrollo de esta tesis, se han iniciado una serie de supuestos. Estas
suposiciones se aplicarán a lo largo del curso de la investigación, de tal manera
que se refutan o afirman de la siguiente manera:
- -Egipto es un poder central en la región del Oriente Medio que siempre ha estado
en el liderazgo de la región, a pesar de los reveses que han enfrentado al país
durante muchas fases de su historia. Estos factores como la geopolítica, la
historia, el poder militar y demográfico, así como su poder blando son los activos
del Estado egipcio que influyeron en la forma en que los sucesivos regímenes han
conducido la política exterior, para servir a los intereses nacionales del país.
Asimismo, y debido a su peso en la región, se podía observar fácilmente que
cualquier cambio o transformación que afectara a Egipto afectaría a todos los
estados vecinos de la región.
- - Los determinantes mencionados anteriormente, así como los desafíos que
enfrenta el Estado egipcio, especialmente en los últimos años, habían impuesto
cierto desempeño o conducta a cualquier régimen gobernante
independientemente de la ideología o las creencias del régimen. Por ejemplo, el
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grupo de la Hermandad Musulmana cuando llegaron al poder en el país en 2012, 
por primera vez en su historia, trataron de implementar su propia política exterior
según su dogma. Sin embargo, no pudieron hacerlo y el presidente MORSI se vio
obligado a llevar a cabo una política exterior que sirva para resolver los problemas
del país en ese período de tiempo. 
- El fracaso de la experiencia de la Hermandad Musulmana en Egipto, podría
representar un gran desafío para todos los grupos del Islam político en toda la
región del Oriente Medio que están afiliados al grupo principal en El Cairo. En
otras palabras, lo que sucedió en Egipto tendrá un impacto negativo en el futuro
de la noción de Islam político, no sólo en Egipto sino también en Oriente Medio
y la región árabe.
- La política exterior es un mero reflejo de la política interna y de las situaciones
internas. En este marco, cabe señalar que la revolución de enero de 2011 fue una
consecuencia directa o resultado de los problemas internos del régimen de 
Mubarak, a saber, el debate sobre la herencia de la presidencia a su hijo menor
Gamal, que entró en la escena política en el Como parte del Partido Democrático
Nacional (PND). Además de muchos otros desafíos como la grave situación
económica y las altas tasas de desempleo, así como el estancamiento de la vida
política en el país.
- A lo largo de la historia se podría argumentar fácilmente que la política o las
relaciones exteriores egipcias siempre girarán en torno a cuestiones o círculos
centrales, que se consideran la columna vertebral de las políticas exteriores
egipcias, particularmente en este período actual. Por ejemplo, las conexiones con
los países de la cuenca del Nilo para asegurar su cuota de agua, y la causa
palestina que se considera como el pilar principal para la seguridad nacional
egipcia.
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- La restauración del papel de liderazgo en la región requerirá que se emprenda
principalmente reformas internas a todos los niveles, política, social y
económicamente, para sacar al país de sus problemas. Esta vía fue iniciada por el
régimen actual bajo Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi que inició una serie de
reestructuraciones en el país, para lograr este objetivo.
- Estructura de la tesis doctoral:
- Capítulo 1: la tesis propone comenzar con un marco teórico global enfocado en
los factores principales y constantes que tienen un efecto determinante en la
conformación de la política exterior en el Oriente Medio teniendo en cuenta la
geografía, la seguridad, el entorno ideológico y Las consideraciones económicas
y sociales.
- Además, este capítulo incluirá la evaluación del comportamiento de los estados
revolucionarios y las etapas de las revoluciones, así como la política exterior
egipcia posrevolucionaria. Además, este análisis abarcó arrojar luz sobre el papel
de Egipto en la región como un poder central, a través de un examen en
profundidad y un estudio de la naturaleza de las potencias tanto centrales como
medias.
- Capítulo 2: este capítulo implica un examen de la política exterior del presidente
Gamal Abdel Nasser, que tomó el poder en 1954, después de la revolución del 23
de julio de 1952 que puso fin a la monarquía en Egipto y allanó el camino hacia
el establecimiento de El primer sistema republicano en la historia del país.
Además, este capítulo abarcará una evaluación de las incidencias y políticas clave
del ex presidente, así como los círculos de política exterior. Esto incluirá, por 
ejemplo, estudiar la política del nacionalismo panárabe, la política de no
alineación, así como los acontecimientos que representaron importantes puntos
de inflexión en la historia del país y la región del Oriente Medio y tal vez el
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mundo como la crisis de Suez, Y la guerra de desgaste. Es más, este capítulo
arrojará luz sobre las relaciones del régimen de Nasser con las superpotencias en
esa época los Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética, así como con el continente
africano.
- Capítulo 3: En este capítulo se investiga tanto la política interna como la política
exterior del presidente Anwar Al-Sadat, que llegó al poder después de la muerte
de Nasser en septiembre de 1970, en un momento muy difícil de la historia de
Egipto, después de la ocupación de la Península del Sinaí por Israel durante la
guerra de 1967. El capítulo abordará las medidas que ha tomado el régimen de
Sadat a nivel nacional para consolidar su régimen, así como sus relaciones
exteriores que utilizó para prepararse para la guerra de octubre de 1973 a través
de la cual Egipto recuperó sus territorios ocupados. El capítulo abordará también
el efecto más importante de la guerra mencionada, es decir, la conclusión de los
acuerdos de Camp David, que allanaron el camino hacia el acuerdo bilateral de
paz entre El Cairo y Tel Aviv y, consecuentemente, un nuevo episodio en la
historia de Egipto. El capítulo también discutirá las consecuencias o los impactos
de la reconciliación con Israel sobre la política exterior egipcia con el aislamiento
del país de su medio árabe durante casi una década y una reorientación de la
política exterior del país desde el este hacia el oeste.
- Capítulo 4: este capítulo investigará la política exterior bajo el Presidente 
Mubarak que tomó el poder en 1981 después del asesinato de Sadat por los grupos
islamistas. En este marco, examinará los pasos que Mubarak tomó para regresar
al mundo árabe y recuperar su liderazgo en la región. En este sentido, el capítulo
profundizará en eventos importantes como la participación egipcia en la guerra
del Golfo de 1991 y la contribución activa a la solución del conflicto árabe-
palestino. Además, el capítulo se ocupará de los círculos de la política exterior 
egipcia que se centraron en recuperar el equilibrio en las relaciones con todas las
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potencias del mundo, con especial atención a las relaciones con los Estados
Unidos y la Unión Europea, que florecieron durante su era.
- Capítulo 5: este capítulo explorará los orígenes de la revolución de enero de
2011, con una referencia especial a los cambios internos que tuvieron lugar
durante la última década del gobierno de Mubarak que podrían considerarse como
las causas directas de la erupción de tal levantamiento. Además, el capítulo
investigará el desarrollo de los movimientos sociales y políticos en Egipto desde
1952, que desempeñó un papel fundamental en la movilización de las fuerzas
revolucionarias en la revolución de enero. Además, investigará las relaciones
exteriores de Egipto durante el período de transición posterior a la revolución del
25 de enero, así como las reacciones internacionales hacia el levantamiento y la
dimensión de la política exterior en la revolución del 25 de enero. Asimismo,
abordará los desafíos que enfrentan Egipto y la región de Oriente Medio antes y
después de la ola de primavera árabe.
- Capítulo 6: este capítulo estudiará los orígenes del grupo de la Hermandad
Musulmana y su historia de establecimiento. Además, discutirá las relaciones
exteriores de Egipto desde la elección del presidente Morsi en junio de 2012, y
las disposiciones para las elecciones presidenciales y el establecimiento del brazo
político del grupo de la Hermandad Musulmana, el Partido de la Libertad y la
Justicia (P L J). Además, examinará el impacto relativo de las presiones
económicas, internacionales y políticas sobre la política exterior del gobierno
egipcio y determinará si la orientación islamista de este gobierno ha causado
cambios significativos en la conducción de la política exterior egipcia. Destacará
los cambios en la política exterior egipcia. Esta sección dedica especial atención
a la postura del gobierno de Morsi sobre el tratado de paz egipcio-israelí, las
relaciones con los estados del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG)y los
vínculos con el otro poder regional como Irán y Turquía, así como las relaciones
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con las superpotencias, a saber, Estados Unidos y Rusia . Finalmente, investigará 
los impactos de la caída de la Hermandad Musulmana en sus propias perspectivas
y el efecto del descenso del grupo de la Hermandad Musulmana sobre el futuro
de las fuerzas políticas del Islam en la región del Medio Oriente.
- Capítulo 7: este capítulo se concentrará en los esfuerzos de Egipto para 
restablecer su papel vital en la región, como un acto de equilibrio entre sus
obligaciones domésticas e internacionales durante el período bajo el régimen del 
actual presidente Al-Sisi que asumió el poder en 2014 después La revolución
popular del 30 de junio de 2013. Explorará el impacto de las presiones internas,
internacionales, políticas y económicas sobre la ejecución de las iniciativas de
política exterior de Egipto.
A raíz de un examen preciso de la política exterior egipcia en el transcurso de su
historia moderna desde el establecimiento de la primera república con especial
atención a esta política exterior después de dos oleadas revolucionarias
consecutivas. Podría afirmarse, debido a los supuestos de la investigación, que
Egipto siempre ha sido un poder central en la región de Oriente Medio,
independientemente de los aislamientos y las guerras que han enfrentado al país
a lo largo de su historia.
A pesar de estos contratiempos, ningún otro estado, ni en el mundo árabe ni en
toda la región del Medio Oriente, ha podido tomar la iniciativa de la región u
ocupar el lugar de Egipto como líder de la región. A este respecto, cabe señalar 
que desde la conclusión del tratado de paz con Israel en marzo de 1979, y tal vez
antes de esta incidencia durante los años cincuenta y sesenta. Egipto comenzó a
ser desafiado por muchos rivales de sus países vecinos que trataron de reemplazar
su papel en la región, o convertirse en grandes potencias regionales como Arabia 
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Saudita, Siria, Irak, Qatar y Turquía, así como Irán. Sin embargo, todos estos
intentos fueron considerados al final de fiasco y decepción incluso si algunos
países lograron desempeñar este papel por un tiempo o temporalmente, pero hasta
ahora, ningún otro país fue capaz de reemplazar el papel egipcio de forma 
permanente.
Por otra parte, también podría afirmarse de acuerdo con las suposiciones de este
estudio y después de una evaluación en profundidad que cualquier cambio o
transformación que afectó a Egipto definitivamente afectaría a todos los estados
vecinos de la región de una manera u otra. Debido a esto, la mayoría de los
regímenes árabes, especialmente en la región del Golfo, están preocupados por
las alteraciones que han tenido lugar en el país durante los últimos años desde la 
ola de Primavera Árabe hasta este momento. Estos sistemas monárquicos estaban
inquietos, ya que creían que su seguridad nacional se pondría en peligro si la
agitación e inestabilidad en Egipto se prolongaba. Egipto es considerado la
primera línea de defensa de la seguridad nacional del Golfo, su santuario es parte
indivisible de la seguridad nacional egipcia. Además, estas monarquías árabes
estaban preocupadas de que la ola de transformaciones que azotaran a los países
vecinos y encima de ellos El Cairo causaría perjuicio a sus regímenes
gobernantes.
Por estas razones, se podía discernir claramente que los países árabes del Golfo
eran reacios a apoyar la revolución de Enero de 2011; También se sintieron
incomodados con la llegada del régimen de la Hermandad Musulmana al poder
en El Cairo durante las elecciones presidenciales de 2012. Por lo tanto, estas
capitales árabes estaban renuentes a conceder cualquier tipo de ayuda al régimen
islámico, y cuando la revolución popular 2013 que derrocó este régimen, por lo
que las monarquías árabes estaban entre los principales partidarios del nuevo
gobierno egipcio.
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Por otro lado, se asumirá otra hipótesis tras este análisis claro de la política
exterior egipcia, que es la fuerte relación entre la política exterior y la política
interna. En la actualidad, las relaciones exteriores se llevan a cabo como una
diplomacia de doble filo. En otras palabras, los acontecimientos internos afectan
a los asuntos exteriores y viceversa. Las cuestiones internas son tan importantes
para el comportamiento de la central de poder central que puede definir el alcance
de, o limitar, su enfoque a cualquier cuestión clave en su región. La estabilidad
doméstica de un poder central puede ser tan influyente como su poder económico
y militar en sus políticas, proyección y papel de liderazgo en sus regiones.
En consecuencia, se pudo observar a través de esta investigación que el papel
principal de Egipto en la región ha estado fluctuando durante los últimos sesenta
años, de acuerdo con su poder económico, militar y blando, entre otros factores. 
Por ejemplo, durante la era de NASSER, Egipto tenía gran y mayor influencia en
el nivel de la política exterior no sólo en el mundo árabe sino en el ámbito
internacional en comparación con los períodos sucesivos de SADAT y Mubarak.
Este asunto puede atribuirse a muchos elementos como el aumento de los
problemas internos en los niveles económico y social, así como la falta de apoyo
popular a algunas decisiones de política exterior.
Desde esta perspectiva, el posrevolucionario Egipto deberá incluir y asegurar la
participación pública en el establecimiento de un nuevo discurso de política
exterior. Esto es crucial para una visión nueva y coherente, simplemente porque
en las últimas décadas ha habido una fuerte división entre la élite gobernante y
las calles árabes en la comprensión y el acercamiento a los principales temas de 
política exterior en Oriente Medio.
Una vez más, se ha afirmado otra importante suposición en este estudio, es que
los determinantes, así como los desafíos que han enfrentado el Estado egipcio
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especialmente en los últimos años, habían impuesto cierto desempeño o conducta
a cualquier régimen gobernante a pesar de la ideología o Creencias del régimen.
Por ejemplo, cuando llegaron al poder en Egipto en 2012, por primera vez en su
historia, el grupo de la Hermandad Musulmana trató de poner en práctica su
propia política exterior según sus ideologías y creencias.
Sin embargo, no pudieron hacerlo y el Presidente Morsi se vio obligado a llevar
a cabo una política exterior que sirviera para resolver los problemas apremiantes
del país en ese período, especialmente los económicos. Por esta razón, el régimen
islámico comenzó a acercarse a los Estados árabes del Golfo ya potencias
internacionales como el poder como Rusia, independientemente de las diferencias
de dogmas e ideas entre los regímenes gobernantes de ambas partes, en un intento
de obtener ayuda financiera y militar para consolidar su Y la situación interna.
Además, a pesar de estas disimilitudes, el régimen de la Hermandad Musulmana 
se dio cuenta de que perseguir una política exterior que concuerde con su filosofía
no sería factible en un país clave como Egipto.
La suposición final que también se afirmará implica el restablecimiento del papel
de liderazgo de Egipto en la región, asunto que requerirá el embarcarse 
principalmente en reformas internas a todos los niveles políticos, social y
económicamente para sacar al país de sus problemas. Esta vía había sido iniciada 
por el actual régimen que inició una serie de grandes reestructuraciones y
megaproyectos en el país, para lograr este objetivo.
Además, vale la pena mencionar que el desafío más importante que realmente 
podría ocupar el Estado egipcio en el momento presente es tratar de construir una
nueva democracia; Un país económicamente próspero, una forma de sacar al país
de su crisis económica y apoyar su estabilidad interna. En este sentido, el Estado
egipcio puede maximizar sus beneficios de sus enormes recursos como la 
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ubicación sin precedentes en el corazón del mundo, el enorme poder demográfico
y militar en la región y por encima del poder blando con su modelo cultural que
siempre ha influido en todo el Mundo árabe. Estos recursos, si se usan
correctamente, Egipto podría ser un verdadero poder capaz de enfrentar los
desafíos regionales.
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Introduction
 
For several centuries, Egypt has been a focal station and spot in 
not only the Middle East region, but also it also served as a bridge between 
the Arab world and Europe as well as with Asia and Africa. Its 
geographical location amid two seas and continents as well as its 
dependence on the Nile River has governed and influenced its connections 
with its neighboring countries. During the course of history, Egypt has 
played an important and influential role in the region. 
Among the raison d'être for such significant task or responsibility 
is the fact that Egypt has enjoyed both a comparatively homogenous 
population as well as a strong and longstanding experience of statehood. 
Its capacity to grasp other cultural influence while in the same time 
maintaining its specific character have led Cairo to benefit from specific
awareness of both national identity and of national interest in addition to 
the understanding of wider cultural, religious and political contexts. 
What's more, the institutional stability and geostrategic importance have
evidently affected Egypt's relations.
The eminence of Egypt's role was predominantly highlighted in 
the last century, specifically in the post-independence epoch until the late
seventies that coincide with end of Nasser's era. Under the latter's 
presidency Cairo had a pivotal role not only in the Middle East but also in 
Africa and Asia. Egypt took the lead in the nonaligned movement, as it
supported the liberation movements in occupied Arab and African states; 
as well, it championed the Palestinian – Israeli conflict.  
Likewise, Egypt was instrumental in promulgating the ideology
of pan-Arabism in the Middle East region that influenced not only the 
country's foreign policy but also the foreign policy of other Arab nations. 
Egypt's defeat in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 that led to the loss of 
Egyptian and Arab territories, represented a turning point in its role as a
regional leader, and a player in the international arena. This defeat 
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negatively affected the status of Egypt in the Arab world, as it was a real 
surprise that shaken the confidence in Nasser's ideas and notions.
In the aftermath of the 1973 war that Sadat launched against
Israel to get back its lost territory, the United States took the initiative to 
patron a peace agreement between Cairo and Tel-Aviv. The conclusion of 
the camp David agreement which was deemed by the majority of Arab 
states as a separate and unilateral peace with Israel denoted the 
commencement of an era of isolation of Egypt from its Arab arena, a
matter that placed a great deal of constraints on its foreign policy. Even 
though the rupture between Cairo and its Arab nations did not take such 
long time to be repaired, yet its role and weight in the region had been 
heavily affected. 
In other word, Geopolitics has always played a key role in 
shaping the foreign policy of Egypt, since it inhabits such a strategic 
position as a land bridge between both the African and Asian continents, 
as well as, a link between two principal waterways, the Mediterranean Sea
and the Indian Ocean via the Red sea and the Suez Canal. Similarly, its 
security is connected to the control of the Nile River, on whose waters its 
survival depends. Therefore, it has tried to maintain its historical ties with 
Sudan and has sought agreeable relations with the Nile basin countries. 
Throughout its history, Egypt had struggled to secure the land bridge to 
Asia, which has always been route of potential conquerors. Egyptian 
rulers have conventionally tried to project their power into Syria and 
peninsula of Arabia, they were often in rivalry with other powers in – 
Anatolia- Turkey nowadays, or the Euphrates River valley -nowadays Iraq.  
Yet, in the present, Israel, located on Egypt's border is perceived as a
threat to Egyptian security. 
Likewise, Egypt has always been considered as a politically
strategic state. For instance, during Nasser's era Egypt was potentially at 
the center of three "circles," the Arab the Islamic and the Africa. Egypt 
viewed itself as a major player in Africa and, beyond that, was long a
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prominent mover and shaker in the wider Third World camp and a key
promoter of nonalignment and neutralism. This geopolitical weight and 
import made it an object of interest to the world powers, and when Egypt 
was strong enough. This matter allowed Egypt since Nasser, to play the 
great powers against each other and earn political support as well as 
economic and military assistance from all parts. Even the Egypt of 
Mubarak was able to take advantage of its strategic importance in to 
mediate in issues as the Arab Israeli conflict and to be as a safeguard 
against Islamic political activism thus gaining political support and 
economic aid from both the West and the Arab world. 
Moreover, a second constant that modeled the Egyptian foreign 
policy was its Arab-Islamic character. Without a doubt, Egypt had an 
extended pre-Islamic heritage that gave it a distinctive identity, yet in 
periods as the British occupation it was able to develop apart from the 
Arab world, Egypt's national identity was never merged in the identical 
Arabism. In other words, Egyptians were shaped by their own distinct 
geography, history, dialect, and customs, but then again the content of 
their identity is undeniably Arab-Islamic.
Egypt is indivisibly a part of the Arab world, as it considered as 
the largest Arabic-speaking country as well as the intellectual and political 
center to which the whole Arab world looked at during the modern history. 
Also, it is the center of Islamic civilization, its Al-Azhar University is the 
oldest Islamic religious institution and reference in the whole Islamic 
world. Regardless the opinions of a segment of the Westernized Egyptian 
upper class from time to time perceive Egypt as Mediterranean or 
pharaonic. 
Certainly, Egypt look at itself as the leading light of the Arab 
world, for the heavy burdens it bore in defense of the Arab cause and the 
Arab-Islamic identity was a that has been used as great asset by Egyptian 
leaders, who were well acknowledged and appreciated in the whole Arab 
world. this prestige shored up of the status of the ruler domestically, and 
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entitled Egypt to the Arab aid, and granted credibility to Egypt's capability
to define a joint Arab policy, consequently increasing the country's 
strategic weight and credence in world affairs.
Additionally, the leadership position that Egypt possessed 
reflects the fact that it was a natural part of the inter-Arab power balance, a
matter which predictably embroiled in rivalries that negatively affected the 
solidarity and consolidation of the Arab world. For instance, in the 1950s, 
modernizing, nationalist Egypt's challengers were traditional pro-Western 
as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, while and its main ally was Syria. Yet, in the 
1970s, an alliance that included Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia headed the 
Arab world in its hunt for peace; however when Sadat concluded a
separate peace with Israel, Damascus turned to be Egypt's main adversary. 
After all, Egypt's foreign policy was pulled in poles apart by the 
ideals of anti-imperialist and non-alignment from the other side and the 
augmenting dependency for economic reasons on the other side. Egypt had 
a long extended history of occupation, especially European imperialism, a
matter which produced an intense sense of anti-imperialism and a hunt for
dignity, particularly under Nasser, who boosted a powerful national pride
among Egyptians. Egypt's national ideal was to be independent of both 
east and west, and to be a strong prosperous state. Yet, as a poverty­
stricken developing country, it could not do without huge amounts of 
military assistance and economic aid from the advanced economies and 
the great world powers. Such dependency had its heavy costs and threats 
to national independence. The problem of dependency could be minimized 
by diversifying aid sources, a policy that Nasser adopted to achieve a
balance between East and West, to receive aid from both sides. 
Moreover, the increased American support for Israel after the 
June 1967 War put Egypt in such a crucial situation to be more dependent 
on the Soviet Union for military aid, but this dependence was, in part, 
balanced by growing financial aid from the Arab oil states. But by the late
1970s, when Sadat chose to count on the American administration's 
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diplomacy to help him to regain Egyptian territories from Israel, his 
relations either with the Soviet Union and the Arab world faded, a matter
which led the country into heavy economic and military dependency on 
the Washington. 
When Mubarak came to power after Sadat's death, he tried to 
regain the balance to the Egyptian foreign policy through restoring the 
relations with the country's Arab circle. As well, he maintained Cairo's 
commitments concerning the peace treaty signed with Israel in 1979, and 
to its relations with the United States. He extended relations with the 
majority of the world's countries, yet he neglected the African prospect for
instance. Despite his foreign policy realizations, yet he encountered a
number of problems on the domestic level, a matter that led to the eruption 
of the January 2011 revolution, influenced by the Tunisian revolution that 
took place only one month earlier, which kicked off a wave of uprising
across the Arab world.
This upheaval created a number of challenges not only to the 
Egyptian foreign policy, but also to the entire Middle East region. On the 
Egyptian level, the most important conversion that happened is 
represented in the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood group to power in the 
country for the first time in their history and in Egypt's history. The
Islamic regime embarked on a foreign policy that goes with their
ideologies and dogmas, so it reinforced its relations with countries as 
turkey and groups like Hamas. 
Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi 
and his group in the form of the guidance office and their political party
the Freedom and Justice party, committed serious mistakes on the 
domestic levels when they tried to take control of the institutions of the 
country to achieve some benefits for the group. As a result, huge popular
30thuprisings took the streets all over the country on June , 2013 only one
year after arrival to power. 
55 | P a g e 
   
 
   
 
   
    
    
  
     
 
  
     
      
 
     
   
  
  
    
   
    
  
  
   
   
  
    
   
      
   
     
 
This revolution managed to ouster president Morsi from the 
presidency, to inaugurate a new chapter in the modern history of Egypt, 
with the establishment of the third republic after the election of the current 
president Abdel- Fattah Al Sisi in June 2014. From its part, the present 
Egyptian regime since taking the power in the country endeavored to 
restore the image of the county in front of the world and to regain its role
in the Middle East region. In addition, president Al-Sisi embarked upon a
number of domestic reforms and mega projects to take the country out of 
its economic crisis.
Relevance of the study: 
The importance of such a study is clearly highlighted when 
dealing with the foreign policy of a country like Egypt with all the fullness 
of the weight of Arab, regional and international, which means in the end a
wide and complex network of international relations, and active diplomacy
and effective. The increasing importance of this research is underscored 
and becomes critical as it shed the light on the Egyptian foreign policy and 
role of such pivotal power in Middle East in this very important moment in 
the history of Egypt and the entire region. In my opinion, this study about 
the Egyptian foreign policy after the Arab spring is considered really
important and novel as it deals with a brand new topic that very few or 
nearly no scholars have tackled before. However, the newness of the 
theme was faced some limitations in the form of the lack of enough 
resources, especially in the parts dealing with current foreign policy of 
Egypt, in which I used mainly reports and statements of both the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian Presidency. 
Such a study is considered necessary owing to the fact that the 
available scholarly work on the topic of Egyptian foreign policy in general 
is scarce and if found it would not be solely focused on Egypt's, but rather
on the foreign policy of the middle eastern countries on the whole in most
cases. This piece of evidence was highlighted before by many specialized 
scholars in the field of Middle East and Egyptian politics namely the well­
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known Egyptian academic Bahgat Korany who mentioned this actuality in 
many of his books.
The underlying principle of this study comes from the fact that 
there is a lack of academic research on Egypt as a middle-sized power in 
the Middle East region and for its foreign policy. Some works about Egypt 
as a middle power were published, but they only dealt with only one
component of Egyptian foreign policy in terms of middle power 
diplomacy.
Objectives of the study:
Main Objective: 
The main objective of this research is to assess the Egyptian 
foreign policy and its role in the Middle East region during the last six
decades, until the present regime, with special reference to the foreign 
policy transformations in the aftermath of the Arab spring revolution of 
2011. 
Instrumental Goals:
- Analyze the role of Egypt as a pivotal middle power in the Middle East 
region. 
- Examine the behavior of the revolutionary countries in general with 
particular mention to the Egyptian case. 
- Assess the determinates of the Egyptian foreign policy, as well as the 
trends of this policy throughout the different regimes since Nasser's era
passing through Sadat's until Mubarak. 
- Determine the domestic and external factors that led to the eruption of 
the Egyptian revolution after 30 years of Mubarak's regime. 
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- Study the transformations and challenges that faces the Egyptian national 
security in before and after the Arab spring. 
- Investigate the reshaped foreign policy under the Muslim Brotherhood
regime that came into power for the first time in the history of the country, 
as well as its origins and its role in the Egyptian political scene since its 
establishment in the year 1928.     
30th - Explore the main reasons for the outbreak of the June , 2013 
revolution that ended the rule of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, as well
as the foreign policy of the current Egyptian regime and its efforts to resort 
the country's role in the region.
Methodology of the research
The study we present has been developed through three phases of 
research that have gradually brought us closer to the conclusions that 
ended and gave meaning to this piece of work. These phases are more
practical than theoretical and they are based on the index of work that we
present in the preliminary draft of the thesis. 
Phase 1:  the bibliography collection phase:
This phase includes search of all data and references that could be
of interest for this research. This part of the study does not include the 
selection of texts and references that were actually used in the 
investigation, but it is merely a rough accumulation of information. This 
search has been basically, done in libraries, magazines, newspapers and 
periodicals as well as internet. 
Phase 2: selection of information phase: 
In this phase of the investigation, a study and good analysis of the 
data produced by the search for information will be conducted, in order to 
select the data that have the same objective of the research.
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Phase 3: elaboration of the thesis:
It involves the beginning of the writing of the research, after the 
preparation of the all material that will be used in the thesis, according to 
index that is agreed upon with the director of the thesis. This phase is the 
one that requires more work, dedication and time. In the first place, we
will start with the theoretical framework that will involve shedding the 
light on the role of Egypt in the region as a pivotal middle power, through 
an in-depth examination and study for the nature of both pivotal as well as 
middle powers. In addition, this analysis will involve the evaluation of the 
behavior of revolutionary states and the stages of revolutions as well as the 
Egyptian Post-Revolutionary Foreign Policy.
Phase four: Conclusion of the thesis:
This phase involves the recapitulation of everything done so far. 
It is the moment in which the researcher expresses his conclusions and 
consequently his opinion about  the studied topic. 
Methods:
The methodology of this study will combine a number of 
approaches, between the descriptive, analytical and the comparative
methods. For instance, the descriptive method will be widely used in the 
parts that deals with the determinates of the Egyptian foreign policy and 
how they played a key role in the shaping of this policy. As well, this 
method will be the part that tackles the contemporary challenges that faces 
the Egyptian national security after the Arab spring wave that hit the 
majority of the states in the region in the beginning of 2011. In addition to 
the transformations that took place in the Middle East in the wake of the 
Arab spring. 
Moreover, the comparative method will be utilized widely
throughout the research especially in the parts that involve the 
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investigation of the Egyptian foreign policy during the different regimes 
that ruled the country all the way through its modern history since the 
establishment of the republican system in Egypt. In this context, the light 
will be shed on how each regime had established its own circle of relations
with the outside world according to its interest. During the course of these
parts, the difference in the approach of each system concerning its external 
connections will be easily noticed.
What is more; the analytical method will be also embarked upon, 
a couple of times, the first one when it comes to the exploration of both the 
roots of the January 2011 revolution in Egypt, and their development 
during Mubarak's era. As well, this investigation technique will be applied 
while discussing the origins of the 2013 popular uprising that overthrew 
the one-year Muslim Brotherhood regime in the country. Furthermore, 
this analytical approach will also be operated, whilst dealing with both the 
regional and domestic changes affecting Egypt before the Arab spring, in 
addition to the analysis of the effect of the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt on the forces of political Islam in the whole Middle East region. 
The study will be of a qualitative nature, not a quantitative one, 
and that is to say, it will put emphasis on words and the analysis of data 
and events, and discourses rather, than collection of numbers. In this 
manner, it is worth mentioning that this qualitative methodology focuses 
on the interactions among different individuals, actors and events.  
This study will include comprehensive literature review of the 
pivotal states and middle power concepts, with a special reference to the 
role of middle-sized states in the world politics in general. As mentioned 
above, the qualitative data collection techniques will be used in this work. 
This research methodology involves the utilization of primary sources as 
well as relevant literature. For that reason, books, published articles, and 
conference papers, alongside with newspapers editorials, documents from   
the Egyptian ministry of foreign affairs as well as universities and think 
tanks publications will be examined throughout the course of this 
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investigation. Moreover, official statements and documents from the 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian presidency as well
as the State Information Service that are related to the topic will be
considered. 
Contrariwise, in every research, as mentioned above there might 
be certain points of weakness, and in this study, the most prominent weak 
spot or limitation is the shortage of comprehensive literature and resources 
that tackle the Egyptian foreign policy generally and after the Arab spring
specifically(1). yet, in my point of view the most significant assets and 
strengths in this research would be the extensive and broad consultation of
the Arabic literature, in view of the fact that Arabic is the main language
both in the region and in the case study country, Egypt. Thus, using
Arabic journals, books and newspaper articles added up new dimensions 
and richness to the study.
In addition, some interviews were carried out with a number of 
the prominent Egyptian foreign policy figures. For instance, an interview 
with Former Foreign Minister the Secretary General of the league of Arab 
states his Excellency Mr. Ahmed Abou Algheit was carried out in June
2016, while another one was conducted with the former Foreign Minister
and the president of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Egyptian 
Parliament his Excellency Mr. Mohamed Al- Orabi in August 2016. These
interviews provided valuable insight into Egypt's evolving foreign policy
and the strategic thinking of key decision-makers.
Hypothesis: 
For the development of this thesis, a number of assumptions have
been initiated. These suppositions will be applied throughout the course of 
the research, in such a way to be refuted or affirmed as follows:
1 Korany Bahgat and others, the Arab spring in Egypt: the revolution and after, 2012, center for Arab
unity studies, in Arabic, Al Rabie Al Araby fi masr: al thawra wa ma baadha).
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-Egypt is a pivotal middle power in the Middle East region that 
have always been on the leadership of the region, despite the setbacks that 
have faced the country during many phases of its history. These factors as 
the geopolitics, history, military and demographic power as well as its soft 
power are the assets of the Egyptian state that influenced the way the 
successive regimes have conducted the foreign policy, in order to serve the 
national interests of the country. As well and owing to its weight in the 
region, it could be easily noted that any changes or transformations that hit
Egypt, would affect all the neighboring states in the region.
-The previously mentioned determinants as well as the challenges facing
the Egyptian state especially in the last few years had imposed certain 
performance or conduct on any ruling regime to regardless of the ideology
or beliefs of the regime. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood group 
when they came to power in the country in 2012, for the first time in their
history, they tried to implement their own foreign policy according to their
dogma. Nevertheless, they could not do so and president Morsi found
himself obliged to carry out a foreign policy that serve to solve the
problems of the country at that period of time. 
-The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood ruling experience in Egypt, could 
represent a big challenge for the all the political Islam groups in the entire
Middle East region that are affiliated to the main group in Cairo. In other
words, what happened in Egypt will have a negative impact on the future
of the notion of political Islam not only in Egypt but also in the Middle 
East and Arab region. 
-The foreign policy is a mere reflection of the domestic policy and the 
internal situations. In this framework, it is worth to note that the January
revolution of 2011 was a direct consequence or outcome of the domestic
problems of Mubarak's regime, namely the debate about inheriting the 
presidency to his younger son Gamal, who stepped into the political scene
in the country as a part of the National Democratic Party (NDP). In 
addition to many other defies as the serious economic situation and the 
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high unemployment rates as well as the stagnation of the political life in 
the country. 
- Over the course of history it could be easily argued that the Egyptian 
foreign policy or relations will always revolve around core issues or 
circles, that are regarded as the backbone of the Egyptian external policies, 
particularly in this current period. For instance, the connections with the 
Nile basin countries to secure its share of water, and the Palestinian cause
which is considered as the main pillar for the Egyptian national security. 
-The restoration of the leadership role in the region will necessitate
embarking primarily on domestic reforms on all levels politically, socially
and economically to take the country out of its problems. This pathway
was initiated by the current regime under Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi who 
commenced a series of restructurings in the country, in order to achieve
this target. 
Structure of the Doctoral Thesis: 
Chapter 1: the thesis proposes to begin with an overall theoretical 
framework focusing on the main and constant factors which have a
determining effect on the shaping of the foreign policy in the Middle East 
taking into account geography, security, the ideological setting as well as 
the economic and social considerations.
Moreover, This chapter will involve the evaluation of the 
behavior of revolutionary states and the stages of revolutions as well as the 
Egyptian Post-Revolutionary Foreign Policy. In addition, this analysis
encompassed shedding the light on the role of Egypt in the region as a
pivotal middle power, through an in-depth examination and study for the 
nature of both pivotal as well as middle powers.
Chapter 2: this chapter involves an examination of the foreign 
policy of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took power in 1954, in the 
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23rdaftermath of the July , 1952 revolution that ended the monarchy in 
Egypt, and paved the way towards the establishment of the first republican 
system in the history of the country. In addition, this chapter will
encompass an assessment of the key incidences and policies of the former
president, as well as circles of foreign policy. This will include for
instance studying the Pan Arab Nationalism policy, the Non-Alignment 
Policy, as well as occurrences that represented major turning points in the 
history of the country and the Middle East region and maybe the world as 
the Suez crisis, the 1967 war and the war of attrition. What's more, this 
chapter will shed the light on the relations of Nasser's regime with the 
superpowers at that epoch the United States and the Soviet Union as well
as with the African continent.  
Chapter 3: This chapter involves an investigation of both the 
domestic and foreign policies of President Anwar Al-Sadat's, who came to 
power after Nasser's death in September 1970, in a very difficult moment 
of the history of Egypt, after the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula by
Israel during the 1967 war. The chapter will tackle the steps that have been 
taken, by the Sadat regime on the domestic level to consolidate his regime, 
as well as his foreign relations that he utilized to prepare for the 1973 
October war through which Egypt regained its occupied territories. The
chapter will deal also with the most important effect of the 
abovementioned war, that is the conclusion of the Camp David accords, 
which paved the way towards the bilateral peace agreement between Cairo 
and Tel- Aviv, and consequently a new episode in the history of Egypt. 
The chapter as well will discuss the consequences or impacts of the 
reconciliation with Israel on the Egyptian foreign policy with the isolation 
of the country from its Arab milieu for about a whole decade, and a
reorientation of the country's foreign policy from the east to west.
Chapter 4: this chapter will investigate the foreign policy under 
President Mubarak who took power in 1981 after the assassination of 
Sadat by the Islamist groups. In this framework, it will examine the steps 
that Mubarak took to return to the Arab world and regain its leadership 
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role in the region. in this regard the chapter will delve into major events as 
the Egyptian participation in the Gulf war 1991 and the active contribution 
to the settlement of the Arab- Palestinian conflict. As well, the chapter will
deal with circles of the Egyptian foreign policy which concentred on 
regaining balance in relations with all the powers of the world with special 
focus on the relations with the United States and the European Union, 
which flourished during his era.
Chapter 5: this chapter will explore the origins of January
revolution 2011, with a special reference to the domestic changes that took 
place during the last decade of Mubarak's rule that could be considered as 
the direct causes of the eruption of such uprising. Moreover, the chapter
will investigate the development of Social and political movements in 
Egypt since 1952 which played a pivotal role in the mobilization of the 
revolutionary forces in January revolution. Furthermore, it will investigate 
the foreign relations of Egypt during the transitional period after January
25th revolution, as well as international reactions towards the uprising and 
25ththe Foreign policy dimension in the January revolution. As well, it
will touch upon the challenges facing Egypt and the Middle East region 
before and after the Arab spring wave. 
Chapter 6: this chapter will study the origins of the Muslim
Brotherhood group and its history of establishment. Moreover, it will
discuss Egypt’s foreign relations since President Morsi’s election in June
2012, and the provisions for the presidential elections and the 
establishment of the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood group, that 
is the Freedom and Justice party (FJP). In addition, it will examine the 
relative impact of economic, international, and political pressures on the 
Egyptian government’s foreign policy and determine whether the Islamist 
orientation of this government has caused significant changes in the 
conduct of Egyptian foreign policy. It will highlight the shifts in Egyptian 
foreign policy. This section devotes particular attention to the Morsi 
government’s posture on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, relations with 
the GCC states and ties with the other regional power as Iran and Turkey, 
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as well as the relations with the super powers namely the United States and 
Russia. Finally, it will investigate the impacts of the fall of the Muslim
Brotherhood on their own prospects and the effect of the descent of the 
Muslin Brotherhood group on the future of the political Islam forces in the 
middle east region. 
Chapter 7: this chapter will concentrate on Egypt’s efforts to 
restore its vital role in the region, as a balancing act between its domestic
and international obligations during the ongoing period under the regime
30thof the current president Al-Sisi who took power in 2014 after the June
2013 popular revolution. It will explore the impact of domestic, 
international, political, and economic pressures on the execution of 
Egypt’s foreign policy initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 1:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
 
Introduction:
In this study, the Egyptian foreign policy after the Arab spring
will be extensively. In that sense and in this part there will be a focus on 
the foreign policy behavior of one of the most important pivotal middle 
powers in the Middle East region theoretically. This will be done through 
an extensive analysis of the nature of the pivotal states and middle powers 
themselves, which will be followed by a combination of both notions. 
Then, there will be an in-depth examination of the stages of the revolution 
and the post-revolutionary behavior of states, and in the case of Egypt. 
Stages of revolutions: 
Each and every revolution passes at least through three main 
stages following its success. The first period is usually an emotional one
that lasts around one or two years, during which rioters expect recognition 
and praise for what they have done; also they are extremely passionate and 
emotional. Additionally, if events do not go well and on form, they tend to 
criticize a lot. This period is considered the time when they can discover 
themselves and others, but cannot really weigh and evaluate incidents in 
the right way. Revolutionaries have a tendency to move from what could 
be known as the "ultra-nationalism" to the extreme overconfidence. 
Finally, the general public goes forth and back in between these two 
extremes.
The second period is the time when rationality takes over the 
extreme spirits and moods, and it is the minute when real concerns and 
problems such as, building up the country socially and economically as 
well as planning of foreign policy comes out. Thus, the economic and 
political development and keeping up the optimism of the first period turn 
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out to be the vital issues. Habitually they necessitate long-term planning, 
deep understanding and a strong and efficient decision-making with a
public support. 
While the third period is customarily the time to make real 
evaluations and considerations, both in negative and positive terms. 
During this period not only the earlier mistakes and experiences as well as 
successes are typically evaluated; but also the key ideological and 
sociopolitical penchants of the society and state are to a great extent settled 
on. Moreover, during this third period intellectual understanding, and 
global contribution as well as influencing the international politics as an 
effective actor take place. If the first couple of stages are successful, the 
last period consequently will bare its fruits in many aspects, but if not, the 
traces and shadows as well as the negative choices of the former periods 
are likely to come back again.
From sociological perspective, societies can only change after 
serious societal dynamics change, and as soon as these social dynamics 
have been altered or modified, the political and economic developments 
are only natural, not vice versa. Historically, two factors can induce
changes in the social dynamics, the first one is the movement of people 
while the second one is money. Therefore, in order to have an 
advantageous longstanding transformation in Egypt, a new generation of 
leaders should be prepared to deal with and focus on social dynamics, only
if a long-term change in the society is aspired. Additionally, Egypt should 
be exposed to the world, not only as a touristic destination, but also in a
more interactive way of engagement- especially for the youth- a matter
that would be a main defining feature in this long-term transformation 
process. 
Egyptian foreign policy has always faced a historical dilemma to 
create a consistent and coherent equilibrium among its multiple identities, 
namely the Arab, African and Islamic alongside with the Mediterranean, 
since the time of Mohamed Ali the founder of modern Egypt, this has 
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always represented intellectual as well as political challenges. During the 
early years of the 20th century, achieving the country's independence was 
the principal interest in Egypt, therefore the independence movement and 
anti-colonial discourse had been crucial elements in the Egyptian 
understanding of the world.  
After Nasser came to power next to 1952 revolution, this multiple identity
dilemma changed in favor of Pan-Arabism over other identities, even though there
was an African connection through both the Non-Alignment Movement and anti-
colonial discourse. Moreover, and during the course of Sadat's era, an immense shift 
took place when Cairo started to focus more on the western identity departing away
slowly from the Pan-Arabism and African elements, which has been the dominant 
and sole approach during Mubarak's presidency. 
Owning to both its location and history, Egypt never enjoyed the luxury of 
picking out one over others, as this matter has proved by experience to be tragic for
the country's national interests. For instance, the current arguments and discussions 
over sharing the Nile water with various African countries principally Ethiopia, 
might be considered as a result of a long term neglection of African dimension for
many years. 
An analysis of the post-revolutionary foreign policy behavior:
The foreign policy behavior of the post-revolutionary systems is generally
considered as an under -represented theme or topic in international relations studies. 
Whereas a number of scholars and analysts have closely scrutinized the 
international dimensions of revolutions(2). Only few of them have particularly
concentrated on the foreign policies of revolutionary states. For instance, a
revolutionary state or nation, according to David Armstrong, “is one whose
relations with other states are revolutionary because it stands for fundamental
2 Calvert Peter, Revolution and International Politics, second edition (London, UK: Pinter, 1984); David
Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1993.
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change in the principles on the basis of which states conduct their relations with 
each other(3).
Revolutions alter the prevailing or existing societal order, they
tend to change the "state-society dynamics", and every so often, they
generate or result in a system or regime with radical and uncompromising
new concepts of international relations. Undeniably, the well-established 
and steady actors or state, who tend to maintain the existing international 
order, are more likely to feel security threats arising from the revolutionary
states. From a realist point of view, Stephen Walt claims that the domestic
or internal transformations in a country would disrupt and upset the 
balance of power of the whole region and create a case of ambiguity and 
vagueness over the revolutionary nation's intents and competences, thus 
mounting the possibility of clash and misperception(4). In his assessment 
for the realist approach, Fred Halliday underlines the attempts of the 
revolutionary regimes to pass on their ideologies abroad and to mobilize
the populations of adjacent countries(5). 
Suggesting a theory of revolution and war, Walt affirms that 
revolutions can unexpectedly result in shift in the regional balance of 
power and change the threat perceptions of other states. Walt states that 
"Revolutions cause sudden shifts in the balance of power, alter the pattern 
of international alignments, cast doubt on existing agreements and 
diplomatic norms, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to 
improve their positions(6). "Originally, revolutions change the capabilities 
of a state, through diminishing its military strength as well as its economic
abilities. Hence, this momentary or transitory state of vulnerability
bestows an opportunity for other nations or states aspiring to improve and 
enrich their standings within their regions(7). 
3 David Armstrong, revolution and world order: the revolutionary state in international society, P.3, Clarendon
 
Press, Jun 10, 1993.
 
4 Walt M Stephen, Revolution and War, P. 1-21. Cornell University Press, 1996.
 
5 Halliday, Revolutions and World Politics. 

6 Walt, Revolution and War, P. 1.
 
7 Ibid, 21.
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Besides the above mentioned chances, states also may act on 
comprehended menaces or threats originating from the revolutionary
regimes. Given that revolutionary movements radically hunt for altering
the nature of the state, the new regimes have a tendency to take up 
objectives and predilections which are totally different from the ousted 
regime. Walt emphasizes that "estimating intentions is harder, and prior
commitments and understandings are called into question as soon as the 
new leaders take power(8)." While the new regimes are unfamiliar and 
unexperienced in conducting the international relations, other states or 
nations try to understand and envisage the intents of new regime.
Walt explains that "the revolutionary regime will rely on its 
ideology to predict how others will behave, while the other powers will
use the same ideology as a guide to the likely conduct of the regime."
Also, he underlines that ideology itself is not mainly accountable or 
responsible for Instigating conflicts and clashes. More accurately, it is the 
external perception of the revolutionary regime’s ideological objectives 
that could negatively affect the interstate relations and trigger 
confrontations. Therefore, and according to Walt perceptions are more
important than reality.
Thus, the possibility for conflicts and hostilities mounts when the 
view of a revolutionary state about its own competencies and welfares 
markedly fluctuates from other states’ perceptions. In the midst of the 
turmoil and improbability of the post-revolutionary situations, Walt
debates that the alteration in the threat perceptions might be considered as 
the key factor leading to confrontation and war.
In contrast and from his part, Fred Halliday underscores that the 
interior dynamics of revolution might be considered as the main reason of 
conflict. Discarding that shifting balance of power and threat assessments 
are the main stimuluses for wars or conflicts, he explained from his point
8 Ibid, 30.
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of view that revolutions are "international events in their causes and 
effects" a matter which means that they undeviatingly would result in 
agitation in the international world order(9).adding that transformation of 
the international order is a main purpose of the revolutionary movements.
Moreover, Halliday affirms that "revolutions have aspired to the 
internal transformation of societies, but equally they have sought to alter 
relations between states and nations(10)."Accordingly, the revolutionary
movements do not only target taking control of the state, but rather aim to 
replicate equivalent societal transformations and changes in other states, 
particularly in the neighboring region. Also, Fred Halliday argues that 
spreading the revolutionary process, institutes the most prevailing foreign 
policy objective of the revolutionary regimes:
"The challenge they pose to the international system is not so 
much that they propound a new form of diplomacy, or conduct 
international relations in a distinct manner, but that they make the altering 
of social and political relations in other states a major part of their foreign 
policy and regard themselves as having not just a right, but an obligation, 
to conduct their foreign policies on this basis(11)."Henceforth, 
revolutionary regimes first and foremost represent threats to other states 
namely ideological ones rather than military, economic, political, etc. For 
instance, in the case of Iran’s revolution, the Iranian leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini cried out for its exportation all the way through the Muslim
world, by "confront[ing] the world with [its] ideology(12)."
Consequently, the revolution galvanized and inspired the Shia 
communities thru the region, spurning demonstrations in the Arabian 
Peninsula and eventually had some bearing on Saddam Hussein’s decision 
9 Halliday, Fred, “‘The rise and fall of the Sixth Great Power,’” p. 213., Duke University Press, 1999.
 
10Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 3.
 
11 Halliday, “‘The rise and fall of Sixth Great Power,’” 214.
 
12 Khomeini: We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology,” MERIP Reports, 22.
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to invade Iran in 1980, a matter which initiated a devastating war that 
lasted for about eight years(13). 
Nevertheless, in the lack of any state-directed endeavors to spread 
the ideology of the revolution, these revolutionary processes will remain 
spreadable and transmissible. Efficacious revolutions against well­
established systems provide a pattern or a model for similar deeds and 
actions in other societies. Halliday discusses that the impacts and effects of 
revolutions "lies not in the deliberate actions of states, but in the force of 
example(14)."The revolutions are spreadable by nature and they are not in 
need for any regime-led tries or attempts of exportation to function as a
“catalyst” for agitating the established orders(15). For instance, the 
Bolshevik revolution revealed the capacity of the repressed proletariat and 
grassroots to cause the downfall of the monarchical order in Russia in the 
beginning of the last century, while the Iranian revolution showed off the 
mobilizing potential of the Muslim masses. Thus, These revolutionary
incidences can in that way stimulate or trigger other populations aspiring
for the similar social and political transformations.
Even though revolutionary nations cannot reduce the contagious 
effect emerging from within their borders, Halliday debates they can 
counterbalance this threat of revolutionary contagion via diplomatic 
efforts. In this context, he mentioned that, "revolutions tend not to begin 
by immediately confronting the international system, but rather tend at 
first to enjoy good relations with external forces(16)."(These revolutionary
regimes primarily seek a sort of adaptation and adjustment rather than 
disagreement with their neighboring states, in quest of subjugating their
rivals and consolidating the domestic control. So, nations in revolution 
would at the outset go through what could be described as a grace period, 
during which the external powers quietly witness the progress of the 
13The Shia revival: How conflicts within Islam will shape the future, Nasr, Vali, p. 138-139, W. W. Norton, Apr
17, 2007
14 Ibid, 218.
15 Halliday, fred “‘The Sixth Great Power,’” p. 218.
16 Halliday, fred, Revolution and World Politics, p. 135.
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revolutionary processes at the same time as the internal actors compete for
state control(17( . Thus, all the way through this period the foreign policy of 
revolutionary systems often presents or expose paradoxical objectives, 
namely maintaining a “dual commitment” to accommodation and 
promoting revolutionary ideology abroad. Therefore, Halliday insists that 
the revolutionary regimes aim to secure and firm up their domestic
political authority before challenging the international order.
On the other hand, while Halliday foresees that the conflict 
usually erupts in the last stages of revolutionary processes, Walt explains 
that the initial period of social upheaval in any state can be considered as 
the focus for clashes and conflicts. Walt allegation that foreign powers do 
not idly perceive a revolutionary nation's development denotes that wars 
and confrontations are most likely to occur immediately afterwards the 
revolutions, as this is the apt time when misperception is ordinary and 
common a matter which pave the way for the uncertainty to 
predominate(18). Contrariwise, the chances or probabilities of 
confrontation fades as the revolutionary transformation come close to an 
end and the new regime adapt and accommodate itself with the 
international order.
An assessment for Egypt’s Post-Revolutionary Foreign Policy: 
In compliance with the theoretical model of Fred Halliday, Egypt 
in the aftermath of the revolution has renounced any confrontations with 
the international order. Five years have already passed since the revolution 
deposed Mubarak's regime. Caught between the theories or modules of 
both Halliday and Walt either the inclination or desire to stimulate clash 
and revolutionary change abroad or the need for consolidating and 
preserving the revolutionary state domestically, the post-revolutionary
17 Ibid, 134
 
18 Walt, Revolution and War, p. 44.
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Egyptian regime the Muslim will seek to engrain itself internally before
pursuing any ideological objectives internationally(19).
Subsequently, according to Halliday’s model, the alleviation of 
domestic pressures would enable any post-revolutionary Egyptian regime
to challenge the international system. For instance, acting in a manner 
which more consistent with its ideology, the Islamist-led government 
while formulating foreign policy would have likely inclined in the 
direction of Hamas, adopted a more hostile attitude towards Israel, and 
increasingly defying U.S. interests.
On the other hand, Walt’s module would project the continuation 
of accommodationist trends in Egypt’s post-revolution foreign policy. As 
soon as the ambiguity surrounding the regime’s intents has receded, the 
likelihood of war eruption between Egypt and its neighbors will have
expectedly elapsed, and the Egyptian regime would become much more
adapted to the international system to which it belongs. Over the course of 
time, Walt argues that the ties between the revolutionary states and the rest 
of the world or international system will become increasingly normal, 
supposing that both sides are really capable of assessing and revising its 
policies in light of experience(20). In consequence, and as Egypt becomes 
familiar with the prevailing international order, the regime will gradually
search for integration and normalization with both its neighbors and key
regional states. If the regime feels domestically secure, ideology could 
affect—but not decisively reorient-Egypt’s alignment choices(21).Instead, 
Walt’s theory would predict, national security interests and threat 
perceptions will continue to dictate Egypt’s foreign policy objectives until 
greater domestic stability is achieved. 
19 Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, p. 156.
20 Walt, Revolution and War, p. 43.
 
21 Walt, Stephen. M, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 2013 , p.40.
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Diverging away from the expectancies and anticipations of both 
Walt and Halliday, Egypt’s revolution progressed without any military or 
ideological confrontations with external powers, -unlike other countries in 
region as Syria, Libya, and Yemen. the governing authority was delivered 
to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that managed to 
pursue normal diplomatic relations not only with Egypt’s neighbors but 
also with the international powers.
Even with the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding Egypt’s 
domestic turmoil, the sixteen months of SCAF interim rule remarkably did 
not involve any kind of interstate tensions or conflicts. Moreover, the 
following period of Mohamed Morsi’s presidency has witnessed the 
expansion of Egypt’s accommodationist behavior or attitude abroad. The
SCAF and Morsi government's trials to bind the country to its international 
commitments and intensifying diplomatic relations with regional actors, 
have succeeded to ameliorate the contagion effect of Egypt’s revolution, a
matter which is in contrary to Halliday’s expectation of revolutionary state
behavior.
The Brotherhood-led government has not pursued a dual policy
that entail both accommodationist and confrontational strategies. In its 
place, the Morsi's government has strongly renounced any intentions to 
spread and transfer either the revolution or its own ideological values and 
beliefs to other states or societies.
The Foreign Policy Behavior of Revolutionary States:
Even though significantly reshaping Egypt’s domestic politics, 
25ththe January , 2011, revolution has not dramatically re-oriented its 
foreign policy. Rather, it has deeply-rooted longstanding trends in its 
international relations namely receiving economic aid, strengthening
relations with the West, and preserving regional security. Regardless of its 
profound antagonism toward Israel and hateful views of the American 
foreign policy, the Muslim Brotherhood as the legitimate governing power 
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after the revolution had reduced the importance of its ideological 
objectives to the necessities of consolidating its domestic control over the 
country.
Furthermore, it could be argued that strains from the Egyptian 
bureaucracy as the Military and General Intelligence Service (GIS) as well
as the ministry of foreign affairs to some extent, has relatively triggered 
Morsi's government to maintain its standing relationships and to 
emphasize national security objectives in the near term(22). Whether
constrained by the absence of ideological objectives or the incapacity to 
pursue them, the Muslim brotherhood government has forged realistic and 
pragmatic foreign policy that concentrated on conserving Cairo's 
international commitments, obtaining financial assistance and political 
support, as well as maintaining and establishing alliances with a diverse
array of actors.
Whereas the changes on the Egyptian internal level are not likely
to induce such a substantial re-orientation in the country's foreign policy, 
tragic international events and circumstances could force the Egyptian 
regime to reevaluate its international alignments. Notwithstanding the 
Egyptian regime’s ideological orientation, the economic and national 
security considerations will probably remain the dominant and paramount
motives of Egyptian foreign policy for the time being.
Analysis of Egypt’s 2011 Revolution: 
Consumed by demands of regime change, the slogans and mottos 
of Egyptian protestors were barely fixated and concentrated on toppling
Mubarak and bringing to an end his regime. The Egyptian revolution 
lacked an international dimension, even with the broad popular opposition 
and aversion towards Israel as well as the suspicion of the policies of the 
22 A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy After The Revolution, Joshua Haber ,Helia Ighani ,May
2013, The Institute For Middle East Studies, the Elliott school of international affairs, the George Washington
university.
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west represented in both the United States and Europe. Instead, the 
Egyptian 2011 revolution sustained an inward focus, ensuring that 
economic and political issues would fundamentally shape the policies of 
Egypt’s post-revolution government.
A longing for dignity, justice, and economic opportunity, not a
aspiration to confront Israel or any other adversaries, stimulated and 
triggered the Egyptian masses in January 2011, likewise, the Egyptian 
revolution didn’t have any exportable ideological objectives a matter, 
which is totally contrasting –for instance- with the 1979 Islamic revolution 
in Iran that merged anti-imperialism with transnational Islamism(23). or 
even the 1952 revolution in Egypt of president Nasser, which combined 
both also the anti- imperialism but this time with the notions of 
nationalism and pan Arabism , etc.
Political analysts and scholars, were able to distinguish a crucial 
feature or characteristic between both revolutions, as for, the Iranian 
revolution it was not about economic concerns, but it was about American 
and Israeli interference in Iranian society. Therefore, this is quite
dissimilar and atypical from the Egyptian revolution, which was about 
achieving freedom and dignity as well as improving the economy not 
about Cairo's foreign relations by any means. This is why in the first few 
months no one burned neither the American nor the Israeli flags(24). 
Certainly, the Egyptian protesters were not mobilized by power-seeking
elites advocating or championing ambitious and elaborate ideologies, but 
they merely joined the leaderless demonstrations with the joint goal and 
target of toppling a 30 years old authoritarian regime. The lack of a
collective ideology or an external dimension for the 2011 revolution, made
its effects on the international system quiet minimal, rather, it created a
state of polarization and battles over other issues as the electoral and 
23 Halliday, Fred, Revolution and World Politics, 124-125. Duke University Press, 1999.
24 Op. Cit . p.8-16
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constitution-writing processes that governed the Egyptian political scene
for some time during the transitional period.
The 2011 Egyptian revolution aimed at introducing some internal 
transformation, by bringing the existing political order to an end on one
hand and endowing new actors to the political scene in the country on the 
other hand. Principally, the Islamic current represented in the Muslim
brotherhood group who were repressed for years under Mubarak and 
Nasser, come into view to assume as the new ruling authority, despite the 
fact that constituents of the old deposed regime who faced a state of 
exclusion and freezing out. Straightaway after the revolution, and 
instantaneously after taking power in Egypt, divisions broke out 
particularly between the ideology owned groups namely the Leftists and 
Islamists, as well as between the government and opposition.
However, this acutely polarized political climate did not manage
to create an ideologically-charged or confrontational foreign policy, as an 
alternative, the domestic instability underscored the importance and 
priority of alliance building and achieving economic development 
objectives. This behavior of the post- revolutionary Egypt is totally
opposite to the classical and typical behavior of revolutionary states in 
general. The Egyptian regime after the 2011 revolution has neither aspired 
to transfer and spread its revolution abroad nor sought conflicts with other
states, especially the neighboring ones. From its part, the Muslim
brotherhood government has revealed and showed its preference for
accomplishing cooperation, balance, and continuity. This behavior could 
be easily compared to the behavior of any actor under usual and traditional 
conditions rather than the behavior of a revolutionary state, as a result
Morsi government’s foreign policy orientation was largely windswept of 
any ideological content.
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Renouncing a "Revolutionary" Foreign Policy: 
Striving for projecting a non-threatening posture abroad and to re­
assure its neighbors that Egypt remains committed to maintaining peace in 
the region, the post-revolutionary regimes, including, the Muslim
brotherhood government has steadily exalted and praised the norms of 
state sovereignty and non-interference, whilst refuting an aspiration to 
spread the Egyptian revolution outside its borders. For instance, in his July
1st , 2012 inaugural speech, President Morsi clearly declared his 
government's commitment to international norms, he mentioned that “We
are not exporting the revolution. Egyptians do not export the revolution. 
We do not interfere in anyone’s affairs(25).”
Additionally, he reiterated this position during his September 2012 
discourse to the United Nations General Assembly, asserting Egypt’s 
aspiration to cooperate with the international community "in a spirit of 
equality and mutual respect, entailing non-intervention in the affairs of 
other states as well as the implementation of the international principles, 
agreements and conventions(26)." the same rhetoric that indicated Egypt’s 
nonthreatening intentions also appeared in the 2011 Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) electoral platform.
It was argued that despite the fact that the Islamist led 
government may consider and envision some ideological objectives, 
Egypt’s continual domestic challenges and pressures critically constrain 
the foreign policy choices of any government’s and advance the 
importance and significance of alignment decisions. This piece of work 
discusses that the Egyptian government pursues external alignments 
basically to consolidate and firm up its internal political authority. Also 
these alignments can help in the alleviation of the economic, political, and 
institutional challenges facing regime security. In this context and from his 
25 President Mohamed Morsi’s Speech at Cairo University,” Ikhwan Web.
 
26 Statement of H.E. Dr. Mohamed Morsi,” The Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations in New
 
York, September, 2012
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point of view the political scientist Curtis Ryan claims that, "Alignments 
are external solutions to both domestic and regional security
problems...made and utilized by a ruling political elite in order to 
maintain its own security and survival(27)."
Deviating away from the realist theory of international relations, 
which suggests that states and nations only form alignments and alliances 
just to maintain equilibrium against foreign powers and external threats, 
some scholars underscore the prevalence of domestic threats and 
challenges in forming and shaping foreign policy behavior of developing, 
weak and small states. Undeniably, systems and regimes presiding over 
the above mentioned entities, especially those facing fragile political and 
economic conditions are more likely to be toppled by internal coups or 
revolutions than by external invasions(28). 
The primacy of those internal challenges might be easily referred 
back to the nature of these regimes themselves, which stereotypically is in 
shortage of the adequate resources or governing legitimacy to tackle the 
domestic unrest. Confronting and encountering number of threats to 
regime survival, Steven David explains that Third World nations should 
direct their limited resources to deal with the most serious threats, whether
external or internal in nature. Accordingly, "the most powerful determinant
of Third World alignment behavior is the rational calculation of Third 
World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do what is 
(29)".necessary to keep them in power Creating or consolidating external 
alliances is useful in thwarting domestic threats to state security, again 
Curtis Ryan states that “An external alliance can generate resources 
(economic and military) to counter domestic threats by stabilizing the 
economy, providing economic payoffs to key domestic constituencies, or 
strengthening the power of the state security apparatus(30).”
27 Ryan R. Curtis, Inter-Arab alliances, regime security and Jordanian foreign policy, University Press of
Florida, 2009, p.12-14) 
28 Explaining Third World Alignment, David R. Steven, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1991), pp. 238
29 Ibid., 235
30 Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments,” p. 374
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To wrap up, the foreign policy behavior of revolutionary or post­
revolutionary states has received insufficient and little attention from the 
international relations scholars. Both Fred Halliday and Stephen Walt, 
whose works can be considered as the most substantive contributions to 
the already existing literature in this topic, label the foreign policies of 
revolutionary nations as aggressive and conflicting by nature. Though 
Walt conjoins the mysterious intents and unpredictability as well as the 
impulsiveness of revolutionary states with conflicts, Halliday debates that 
these nations induce confrontation either deliberately or unintentionally
through generating a contagious impact the neighboring countries. Yet and 
from its part Egyptian state has sought integration and accommodation 
with the avoidance of any confrontations with other power, in an attitude
or behavior that is dramatically different from both Walt and Halliday’s 
predictions and anticipations for the post-revolution systems.
This analysis has demonstrated that the Egyptian government is a
‘rational’ actor whose leaders plan and implement their decisions based on 
subjective evaluations of risks and threats as well as external perceptions. 
Even so, the decision-making process is not always thought through and is 
commonly predisposed to miscalculations and errors. For instance, and as 
for the post-revolutionary regime of the Muslim Brotherhood, who has 
never been in power before, the political naiveté and inexperience have
certainly influenced their foreign policy decision-making process. 
Moreover, relationships between institutions and jurisdictions were
unclear, a matter which augmented the potential for the miscommunication 
between Egypt’s various foreign policy actors(31).
Egypt: The Middle Pivotal Power:
The study will combine both the pivotal and middle powers, in 
addition to the foreign policy behavior and the different stages of 
31
A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy After The Revolution, The Institute 
For Middle East Studies, the Elliott school of international studies. The George 
Washington university,
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revolution in any nation. Hence, a brief history of the middle power 
approach will be presented. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that 
before the year 1945, middle power was a relational concept, in the logic 
that it has been defined with reference to other classes in the states system, 
especially the principal powers. 
Figure 1: EGYPT at a Glance
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Furthermore, there was little concern and considerateness of 
middle-sized states until the materialization of the League of Nations in 
1920 and later the United Nations in 1945. Until that time, such powers 
either did not really exist or were not cherished per se. What is more, and 
on the trail of the establishment of the League of nations, there had been 
strong demands, especially from some countries as, Canada, Australia and 
Brazil, to be formally recognized as middle-sized states. In addition to 
granting them an exceptional status in the existing structure of the 
international system(32)But unfortunately their efforts were not deemed to 
succeed and did not harvest the return they hoped for.
According to Waltz(33). the traditional typical and deep-rooted 
focus of international politics, has been of a big extent on the great powers, 
a matter which implies that the role of middle-sized actors has been 
omitted. In this regard, the light would here be shed generally on the 
influences or the impacts of middle-sized states in international politics 
with special emphasis on that of Egypt in the Middle East region.
In this framework, Cairo could be identified or describe as a
middle sized country, yet many elements for instance, population, size, 
history, military strength, and diplomatic experience, as well as, the 
strategic geographical position have always accorded it such a widespread 
and broad political influence in the whole Middle East region and Arab 
world. Cairo has been a crossroad for the regional, as well as the 
international trade and a cradle of the cultural renaissance for many
centuries; its intellectual and academic institutions are at the heart of the 
Middle East social and cultural development(34) 
What is more, the Egyptian military currently can be considered 
as the largest military powers among all the Arab nations. As well, it is the 
32 Holbraad, C., Middle Powers in International Relations, New York: St. Martins Press, 1984. p.42-56.
 
33 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979. P. 72.
 
34Kavi, O. T., Islamic movements in the middle east, Egypt as a Case Study, Perceptions: Journal of
 
International Affairs, Vol 6, No 4, December 2001- February 2002
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most densely inhabited country in the Middle East, with a population of 
more than 90 million people.
During the Cold War, the conception of middle-sized status was 
well suited to type of bipolar nature of the international system. Owing to 
the nature of the existing system, the bipolarity, middle-sized states played 
a limited role. Thus, they either had choose whether to join one of the 
blocs or choose to remain neutral and non-aligned. The possibility of 
middle-sized states playing a prominent role at international level 
remained limited. In the recent literature the middle power approach refers 
to states' sizes and rank which place them in an international division of 
labour, in which they have the opportunity of exerting political, economic
and moral influence on the international system(35). At the outset, Cox
debates that middle-sized states are to be found in the middle rank of 
material capabilities, both militarily and economically, and reveal that they
have these abilities and the technical expertise to function as middle 
powers on both global and regional levels(36).
According to the middle power approach, those states or actors 
are generally active in what some scholars have labelled as "low politics"
or in other words second order issues on the international agenda. 
Amongst the reasons are that great power have an implicit monopoly on 
the first order topics. Thus, the issues on the first agenda of global politics 
are not directly threatening middle powers, but they are more concerned 
with challenges and defies stemming from second order issues. However, 
this does not mean they have no effect on first order issues, but in fact, 
they do have relative influence on some matters as the agenda setting and 
policy coordination depending on their diplomatic skills.
35Schoeman, M, South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003 in J. Daniel, & A. Habib,
 
and R. Southall (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004, Cape Town:HSRC Publishers,
 
2003, p.350 .
 
36Cox, R. W., middlepowermanship, Japan and the future world Order, International Journal, 44,
 
Autumn 1989, p.826-827
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Their impact will be constrained by structural pressures though. 
Moreover, their influence might vary issue by issue, by institutional arena, 
and by the openness and receptivity to initiatives from other sources. 
There is a close affinity between the middle power approach and 
multilateralism. For all intents and purposes, middle power diplomacy
confers central role to multilateral institutions and they rely on 
multilateralism and networking to advance a vast range of common issues 
where they believe that they cannot act alone effectively, but might be able 
to have a systemic impact as part of a small group or through the 
international institutions. 
Consequently, in modern times, the roles of middle power have
been closely associated with the development of international 
organizations. Some scholars argue that middle powers are at the same 
time regional powers(37). in contrast, he stresses that middle powers have a
secondary role in alliances and no special place in the regional blocs, but 
in his analysis he was based on the Cold War experiences.
One of the most important elements in identifying middle-sized 
states in their international behavior or what is known as the middle power 
diplomacy(38). They have described middle power diplomacy as the 
inclination to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, for
instance, the tendency to embrace compromise or negotiation positions in 
international disputes, and the affinity to embrace notions of good global 
citizenship to direct their diplomacy. 
As stated by them, middle-sized states help out to maintain the 
international order by means of coalition-building, and serving as 
mediators or "go – between", as well as, through international conflict 
management and resolution activities, all of which require quality and 
37 Ibid, p.825.
38 Cooper, A. F., & R. A. Higgott and R. K. Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a 
Changing World Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993. P.19
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active diplomacy(39). It could be multilateral or based in the structures and 
processes of international organizations or regimes.
What is more, the Middle power diplomacy could be either 
dependent on the interaction of members of a group of especially
interested countries or conducted unilaterally by an individual country on 
its own motion. Over the long run, middle power diplomacy as(40) 
Henrikson emphasizes depends on institutions. Institutional membership 
within an organization can provide power, which may otherwise be
lacking. An organization might create an form of neutrality and legitimacy
for the actors too, while in the same time carrying an authority. All of the 
above-mentioned elements could assist in founding the credibility and 
acceptability that middle power diplomacy may need in order to be an 
effective player in the regional and global issues.
Another important dimension of the evolving diplomatic practices 
of middle powers in global politics especially with the process of 
globalization is the increasing importance of issue-specific, mission 
oriented diplomacy(41) As issue-specific diplomacy is becoming more up 
to date in the post-Cold-War era, middle powers keep up with the 
developments and use this for cutting across the ideological, regional and 
developmental barriers of the world problems. As Higgott explains(42), the 
mission-oriented diplomacy has principally three main dimensions. First of 
all, it plays the functional leadership and coalition building by an active
state bureaucracy through acting as a catalyst to facilitate managerial roles 
of states. While the second dimension is presented in its role in offering
space for the non -traditional actors in international affairs by focusing
more on the roles of Non-Governmental organizations, social movements 
39 Henrikson, A. K., middle powers as managers: international mediation within, across and outside institutions,
 
,p.56.
 
40 Ibid, p.61.
 
41 Higgott, R., issues, institutions and middle power diplomacy: actions and agendas in the post- cold war era,
 
p.37.
42 Ibid, p.38
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especially those who are interested in issues such as human rights, species 
protection, etc.
Lastly, it has ability to linkage issues, for instance, the 
relationship between gender and development or security; as well between 
trade and the environment which are considered as the most prominent 
questions coming to the top of the international agenda.
The image of middle power diplomacy in the aftermath of the 
Cold War is extremely different from the one of its historical roots. In this 
regard, it is worth to be noted that the focal point of middle power 
diplomacy in the past was predominantly centered on mediation activity. 
However, with the international agenda dominated by geo-political issues, 
the diplomatic efforts of middle powers were directed towards easing
global tensions as a general rule, and avoiding the possibility of another
world war particularly. On the other hand, After the Cold- War they have
embarked on a route that is not transformative but reformative in that they
try to gain some profits and advantages for themselves. Ever since that 
time the middle powers have had a greater chance or prospect to use their
enhanced space to widen their range of activity and maneuver. In fact, 
what has developed in the early 1990's in the world politics in the 
aftermath of the cold war, is not only a more segmented but more
multifaceted type of diplomatic behavior.
Pivotal State:
With the advent of the 1990s, that witnessed the closing stages of 
the Cold-War and the collapse of the USSR signaled the united states'
unipolar hegemony on world politics, the search for new paradigms for
understanding the new era has come to the forefront. Thus, a couple of 
theories have been put forward for the sake of comprehending both the 
politics of the new world order and the role of the United States in the new 
circumstances. The concept of pivotal state should be analyzed within this 
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context(43). The notion of pivotal state has been chiefly introduced as an 
analysis from above in the assessment of the American strategy towards 
the developing world. However, it was formed at the very beginning for
the US foreign policy decision-makers; academics and scholars from 
everywhere started to use the concept as an academic tool for examining
the politics of the developing countries.
Its founders claimed that the pivotal states are a small number of 
countries whose future fate is uncertain(44). Today's pivotal states can be
easily compared to yesterday's domino states. The domino theory argues 
that if one state was lost in its region during the Cold War, then, the whole
region could be lost or change its external allegiance. Yet, this was very
true and real during the period of Cold-War rivalry. In the present day, 
because of the characteristics and nature of the international system after 
the 1990s, the domino states no longer exist. The idea of pivotal states, 
however, could be perceived as an old concept in a new era. 
According to scholars as Chase, Hill and Kennedy, states have to 
possess essential features, namely vital geographical locations, large
populations, and physical size, as well as respectable economic potential in 
order to be defined as pivots. Henceforth, a state's territory must have
strategic significance; it could either be a borderline country or occupy a
strategic position regarding international trade and politics. Furthermore, 
the possession of a strategic strait could be sufficient and adequate to name 
a state pivotal. The large population and physical size are binary crucial 
requirements but they are not enough to describe a state's pivotness. 
In identifying a pivotal state, both economic potential and 
regional importance are also critical. In addition, a pivotal state could be
defined as a key country whose future may not only determine the success 
or failure of its region, but would also impinge on the international 
43 Ozkan, M., Geography of Strategic Thinking in the US in post- cold war era, Turkish Journal of Islamic Studies,
 
vol. 20, 2008, p.118-119).
 
44 Chase, R. & E. Hill and P. Kennedy, pivotal states and US strategy, Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, no.1, January­
February,1996. p.33).
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stability drastically. Pivotal state theorists do not emphasize the military
capabilities of such states. Instead, their main concern is the regional and 
economic importance of pivotal states. A pivotal state is extremely
influential regionally that its collapse would spell trans-boundary chaos, as 
migration, violence, pollution, disease, etc. While alternatively a pivotal 
state's economic progress and stability, would boost its region's economic
vitality and political soundness.
Chase, Hill, Kennedy's definition implies that pivotal states are
borderline states, in the sense that they could either progress or regress. 
They are exceptionally significant for their proximate regions, as they are
usually considered as strong states in their regions. What makes them even 
more important is the fact that there is always a high possibility of either 
tumbling themselves into mayhem or keep going with advancement. They
have the ability to affect their immediate regions in undertaking both of 
the abovementioned scenarios. To elucidate more, pivotal states' own 
development and democratization can affect the occurrences and incidents 
in their neighboring regions positively, as well their collapse could also 
have negative repercussions.
Chase, Hill and Kennedy also stress that pivotal states are
important because their fate could determine a wider region's fate implying
that these pivots are in a way role models. A pivotal state could be
distinguished as a country whose neighbors look to it for leadership, in 
many fields as the economic development and integration, as well as 
regional security. On the international level, pivotal states can play a key
role in the global negotiations on topics such as, environmental accords, 
human rights, and population problems.
Also, the pivotal states have to be encouraged to join global 
platforms and forums especially with the increased demand for the spread 
of democracy and human rights across our globe. In order to maintain the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and to boost the global 
economy more, pivotal states may play a significant role, and their
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exclusion from such platforms, would entail international stability to a big
failure.
To summarize on this point, a pivotal state is a key country that 
retains the potential to have a significant beneficial or harmful effect on its 
regions. Such states are not dreadfully poor or war-stricken countries; but 
on the contrary, they are large, populous states, often with a substantial 
growing middle class. They also have considerable infrastructural and 
educational resources. Furthermore, they exercise increasing integration 
into the global economy with their emerging market potentials. Likewise, 
with their capacity to play key roles on the regional level, pivotal states 
also have something to contribute to international community as well, such 
as in humanitarian matters.
Combining the Pivotal State and Middle Power concepts:
In the outset, it should be elucidated that the concept of the
pivotal middle power is a combination of the pivotal state and middle 
power approach. As explained previously, to be pivotal, a state have to be
physically impressive, with large population and economic power, as well
as strategic location. In addition, a pivotal state must have the ability to 
influence both the regional and international stability. Nonetheless, its 
collapse would result in transboundary turmoil, yet its prosperity and 
stability would shore up its region's economic and political vitality.
Then again, to be a middle power, in addition to size, population, 
and geo-strategic location, a state must have middle rank, economic and 
military capacities and emphasize multilateral diplomacy and quite a
relevant involvement in international organizations. Furthermore, a middle 
power is relatively active in second-order topics as, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian issues. Being a good international citizen and complying
with the general interest are also factors regarded as key behavioral 
patterns of middle powers. In the global affairs, middle powers act as 
catalysts, facilitators and managers.
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Pivotal state theorists do not emphasize the military capabilities 
of such states, while the middle power approach, in contrast, pays specific
attention to them, because middle powers could play a leading role in 
security issues both at regional and international levels. Pivotal states are
important for their regions` economic vitality and development. As 
previously mentioned, the theoretical basis of this study lies in 
combination of the concepts middle power and pivotal state to develop the 
pivotal middle power notion. The lack of military power in the case of 
pivotal states and the regional economic importance of middle powers are
one of the reasons why both ideas merged, while the other reason is that 
the pivotal states concept originated mostly to suggest a new framework 
for United States policy towards the developing world. This concept is, 
therefore, is considered as an analysis from above. While the middle 
power concept is on the contrary based on a state, centric approach 
designed to assess the role of the middle powers in the international 
system and to put forward an analysis from below.
In fact, pivotal middle power is more than merely a combination 
of two theories, as it has further implications. This new definition also 
does not only represent simply a power that is influential in its own region, 
but implies a state that could play critical role in international politics, 
where the issues are beyond the region. It is also must be noted that such 
states are not agents of global superpowers in their respective regions. 
Their interest might couple with that of these powers occasionally, but this 
does not mean, that they tend to be their agents.
By contrast, when the superpowers necessitate these pivotal 
middle powers more than normal times, they could deny the cooperation 
and act independently. This behavior might transform occasionally, and 
from one issue to another. If regional concerns are so strong and against 
the interventions of superpowers, such states could undermine even plans 
of the superpower.
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On the other hand, the pivotal middle power notion might also be
seen as an elaborated version of the Regional Security Complex Theory
(RSCT) developed by Buzan and Wæver in the year 2003(45).Their main 
argument is that as most threats tend to move more easily over short 
distances than over long ones, then security interdependence is normally
patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes. Their 
underlying argument for focusing on region is that the RSCT, by applying
to the international system offers a vision for emerging world order(46). 
They asserted that the regional level will always be operative, also they
have an opinion that the conditions of the post-Cold War world will
enhance the importance and significance of the regional level for security. 
While this argument is the basis of the pivotal middle power concept, it
fills the gap that Buzan and Wæver do not touch in real and practical 
sense. Whereas the security complexes are very analytical, and certainly
true in understanding today's global politics, yet the way that such 
complexes can contribute to global order in practical terms is not clear. 
Pivotal middle power aims to put this analysis into practice, by explaining
and understanding the behavior of the regional key state.
The pivotal middle power approach is of the similar opinion with 
the RSCT in analyzing regions and global politics in broader perspective. 
For them, the theories are generated in the global level and the regions 
fitted into them, creating a top-down approach most of the time. As Waltz
once stated, since Thucydides, the traditional focus of international politics 
has been on the great powers(47). A matter that meant that the role of 
middle-sized states has either been downplayed. Therefore and aware of 
such an approach(48), emphasize that RSCT is a bottom-up approach in 
attempting to capture the differences and specialties of regions and then 
assemble the global picture from these components. In that sense, both 
PMP and RSCT are the same on the basis that they are not top-down 
45 Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers, the Structure of International Security, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, P.39
46 Ibid, P.40
47 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979, P. 72
48 Op.Cit, P.85
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approaches. PMP argues that if the pivotal and middle power states came 
together from different regions and were able to act together, one would 
realize the increasing influence of regions and their superpowers, the 
PMP's in global politics. 
In the post-Cold War epoch, pivotal middle powers have been 
increasingly playing critical roles in their regional security, as well as 
global security through their contribution to peacekeeping and 
peacemaking process. While they are influential in their regions, their
contributions are limited on the global scale. Since the 9/11, it has been 
expected that the pivotal middle powers would play roles that are more
influential globally and regionally as soon as, they have opportunity to do 
so.
This study considers the pivotal middle power as a key state that 
is able, and willing to project power and influence developments beyond 
its borders-regionally and internationally and one to determine the fate of 
its region to a certain extent. Moreover, it will identify a pivotal middle 
power by its active involvement in security issues, such as peacekeeping
and its leading role with regard to regional economic development and 
integration.
The unique characteristic of pivotal middle powers is their ability
to play a role at regional and international levels. Furthermore, they are
regional powers, as they occupy the heartland of their regions. Thus, their
role however, cannot be limited to their regions. Another important feature
of pivotal middle powers is their ability to link between the issues of 
regional and international ones. They are aware of the fact that a regional 
issue could easily have repercussions at the international level and vice
versa.
In this study the usefulness of the pivotal Middle East power's 
comes from analyzing Egypt as a key country in defining policies in the 
region. With its economic potential, deep civilizational history, and 
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military power as well as its longstanding intellectual leadership, Egypt 
unquestionably has more influence in the Middle Eastern affairs than 
many others in the region. for that reason, it was very important to embark 
on this study that tackle the foreign policy of a country pivotal middle
power like Egypt throughout its modern history since the establishment of 
the first republic after the July 23rd, 1952 revolution.
Egypt experienced a dramatic identity transformation after the 
1967 war and this change led to advent of a new identity. According to 
Prizel(49). when changes occur within a state, as in Egypt, when one
government or a president in the case of Egypt, the national interests will
be redefined and/or reconstructed accordingly. This formation or 
reconstruction of its identity often reshapes a state's political and economic 
relations and development(50). 
A state's foreign policy role, as one of its social identities, refers 
to policy makers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and the functions, if 
any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international 
system(51). One of the basic objectives of any state is to define its role and 
have it accepted and acknowledged by other international actors. A state's 
role reflects its claim on the international system, a recognition by other
actors, and a conception of its national identity.
Therefore(52), Le Pestre argues that foreign policy change rests on 
a redefinition of a state's role. Egypt's role changed because of the 
domestic and international changes the country was facing after the many
25thmajor events namely 1967 war and the January revolt of the Arab 
30thspring and finally the June popular uprising that toppled the Islamic 
regime. This new role definition or articulation explains its foreign policy
49 Prizel, I., National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p:14
50 Cruz, C., Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember, Their Pasts and Make Their Futures, World
Politics, 52, 2000. p.277
51 Le Pestre. P.G., Defining Foreign Policy Roles After the Cold War, in Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Foreign Policies in Transition, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997. p:4).
52 Ibid, P. 5
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preferences, its self-image and the image the world had of it, its 
expectations, its definitions of specific situations and its available options.
As Karawan(53) also argues that any policy shift of Egyptian 
foreign policy has regional implications, showing its pivotal middle power 
status. Pivotal middle powers can play leading role not only in initiating a
policy regionally but also by their creative intellectual and entrepreneurial 
leadership(54). They could change the discourse on an issue. In other
words, domestic issues are so important for the behavior of the pivotal 
middle power that can define the scope of, or limit, its approach to any key
issue in its region. To conclude on this point, the domestic situation 
whether stabilized, less-problematic or conflicting, of pivotal middle 
powers can be as influential as their economic and military power in their
policies, projection and leadership role in their regions.
Determinates of the Egyptian foreign policy:
Settled on both sides of both the African and Asian continents,
packed in between the Mediterranean and Red seas, and watered by
River Nile that feeds ten countries, Egypt is a state predestined to have
a broad and widespread contact with the outside world. though the
nature of this relationship has receded and emanated throughout its
history, sometimes encouraging Egypt’s ambitious aspirations and at
other times demoting it to subject status, foreign policy is considered as
a dynamic important axiom of the success or failure of the Egyptian
state.
There are a number of constants that perpetually influence the 
pursuit of Egypt’s foreign policy, but these elements or features are the 
principles and considerations upon and within which Egypt should mold 
53 Karawan. I., Foreign policy restructuring: Egypt's disengagement from the Arab- Israeli conflict revisited,
 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol 18, No 3, October 2005. p:326
 
54 Higgott, R.A & Andrew F. Cooper Middle Power Leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns
 
Group, and the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, International Organization, Vol 44, No 4, Autumn 1990 P: 
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its interests rather than strict constraints on its ability to act. As a matter of 
fact, for the duration of the zenith of the Fatimid Caliphate, the rapid 
modernization of Mohammed Ali, or the Arab Nationalism and anti­
colonialism of the Nasser's epoch. Cairo has not only created a history of 
powerful and dynamic regional foreign policy, but it has always exhibited 
the will and capacity to be in the lead in both the regional and international 
arenas. Yet, there is a genuine truth about the Egyptian foreign policy that 
it has always been distinguished and defined by, two key factors, the 
geography and the history, and these factors have motivated comparatively
centrist policy trends during the course of the consecutive Egyptian 
governments, even those who were generally seen as radical or 
reactionary. 
In this framework, Geography is considered as the most important 
and crucial element in determining Egypt’s national security and threat 
perceptions. The country gets hold of the historical trading crossroads of 
three continents of the old world and depends on a single river whose
headwaters lie outside its borders for its nourishment. This interconnection 
and vulnerability has made Egypt exceptionally delicate, and receptive to 
the exploits of the external powers and shapes a pattern of stability, 
security, and balance in international relations.
This might give an explanation for some foreign policy actions 
throughout its history that hunted to protect its interests and power rather
than to exert its leadership on regional concerns. Even if the deeds of the 
most determined Egyptian governments have been grounded in notions of 
security and stability, they might have wandered away from the center. For 
instance, Nasser’s military interference in Yemen in 1962 and the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war, as well as Sadat’s bilateral peace treaty with Israel were
recurrently quoted as negatives. 
Regardless of these negatives, Egypt grasped foreign policy
successes under these two late presidents. The decolonization efforts and 
the daring move in kicking off the October 1973 war were high points of 
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former Egyptian leaderships. In those occasions, the foreign policy
obviously drafted or shifted away from the centrist trend as previously
mentioned, it has traditionally been the result of charismatic or ambitious 
leaders, aspiring to embed their individual vision on the county. 
In conjunction with the above mentioned geographic and
personal factors or variables, the historical influence has similarly
played a chief role in explaining this main stream trend in the country's
foreign policy. Due to the prolonged existence of the Egyptian state
thousands of years ago, the effect of history on the current policy is
particularly acute. Only few states in the region have remained away
from any contact with Egypt and most of them took long time to grow
defined standards of interaction.
Egypt’s predeterminations or presumptions, stemming from
past cultural, social, and political interactions or experiences, similarly
outline the present threat perceptions and interests in dealing with each
of its neighbors, specifically those either alongside the River Nile or at
the major trade corridors and such preconceptions will persist to
contour the country's foreign policy inclinations.
In the context of these historical determinants, it might be
argued that the most significant element in the development of Egypt's
foreign policy during the modern epoch was the impact of European
imperialism. Due to this colonial inheritance and the ensuing Cold War
rivalry to manipulate the post-colonial Middle East states, the Egyptian
foreign policy during the 1950s and 60s of the last century focused on
fight against the threat of foreign hegemony. In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that various American endeavors to impose anti-communist
security regimes, such as Baghdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine, fueled
this public fear and assisted in forming the Nasserite doctrine of Pan-
Arab and African solidarity in opposition to the Western interference. In
the meantime the establishment of Israel on the territory of Arab
Palestine in 1948 created a new and imminent threat aspect to Egyptian
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foreign policy, a matter that reinforced the notion of Egyptian-led pan-
Arabism, and dedicated Cairo's security calculations around the
confrontation with Tel- Aviv until the ratification of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty in 1979.
`The second significant legacy from the colonial stage was the
establishment of the Suez Canal in 1869 and its consequent
"nationalization" by Nasser in 1956 which led to the Suez Crisis and the
trilateral aggression on Egypt. The country's ownership of a direct
maritime passage between Europe and Asia helped both in the renewal of
Cairo's importance at the heart of international trade, especially afterward
the waning of overland commerce routes, and in boosting its
contemporary status as a campaigner for the Non-Aligned Movement.
However, on the long term, the nationalization of the canal as
well helped in sustaining the stability and security in the Arabian Gulf
region, a foreign policy interest that assumed special importance
particularly after the upsurge of Gulf oil economies to the international 
political eminence in the 1970s and 80s of the twentieth century. Nearly
20% of the world’s oil nowadays travels all through the Gulf and a
noteworthy part of that trade passes via the Red Sea. Into the bargain to
this trade through this important maritime passage, Gulf States grant
bilateral aid and direct investment to Egypt, as well remittances from the
Egyptian labor working mainly in these oil countries totaled around
$12.6 billion just before the 2011 revolution.
For that reason, if conflicts or instability menaces the Gulf
region, Egypt too can easily sense the effects. For instance, this occurred
for the duration of the first and second Gulf wars, where approximately
1.4 million out of the two million Egyptian workers in Iraq left the
country by 2003. This scenario has repeated itself in almost every crisis
where oil prices and Suez Canal incomes, as well as tourism was
adversely influenced by the insecurity in the region. Consequently,
stability in the Gulf area, throughout the Middle East region has
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progressively developed to be one of Egypt’s paramount foreign policy
priorities. This pattern has advocated itself in the strategic calculus of
every key foreign policy decision.
Egypt has a natural ability to lead the Middle East toward
foreign policy goals of stability, this stems not only from the country’s
geopolitical location, demographic weight, and military capability, but
also from its notable and historic role as the core of intellectual and
cultural innovation in the Arab world. In this context, it is worth pointing 
out that as early as the nineteenth century, Cairo has been the advance
guard of the contemporary Arab political thought. Trained in both
Islamic jurisprudence and European political philosophy, Egyptian
intellectuals and thinkers led the way towards some of the earliest
endeavors to link the Arab and Islamic principles with the notions and
ideals of European modernism.
Sent overseas to learn at the famous universities of Europe,
these intellects brought back the indispensable knowledge to implement
Mohammed Ali’s aspiring renovation plans. In addition, they brought
with them the concepts of individualism and democracy that would
provide the initial intellectual essences of the forthcoming anti­
colonialist and Pan-Arab as well as Islamist ideologies. Building on the
works of early reformers and intellectuals who introduced the concept of
national self-determination, Egypt became one of the strongest
generators of Arab political thought. In a few words, Egypt has provided
the origin for a good number of the major Arab political movements
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
That supremacy in both the intellectual and political innovation
has always been one of Egypt’s utmost assets in its Arab regional
environment. Throughout the 1950s and 60s Nasser was competent
enough to channel this power and lead the Middle East, as well as much
of Africa, in opposition to the remnants of colonialism. But when
Nasser’s rhetoric's terminated after Egypt’s disastrous defeat by Israel
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during the 1967 war, the paradigm of Arab leadership collapsed. From
his part, President Sadat attempted to revitalize and reinforce Egypt’s
status with his determined and bold vision of a reformed Egypt and a
Middle East at peace, however the unilateral character of the peace
accord with Israel and his heedless pace of economic reforming keep
apart both regional and domestic partners from him. While, Mubarak
prided himself on averring Egypt’s leadership role, but at the same time
he was risk-averse and unwilling to bear the responsibilities of
leadership.
Now however, as in the glory days of Pan-Arab Nationalism, the
Egyptian revolutions helped in the inspiration of a new generation of
Arabs to action. Egypt will once again has the chance to be in the lead in
the Arab region, especially in the fields of foreign policy and relations.
Egypt must lead the region rather than leave it behind, and guide its
neighbors without trying to dominate them, in order to restore its proper
regional and international role.
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CHAPTER 2
EGYPT’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NASSER 
Nasser: The First Republic:
The unmatched uprising that took place in Egypt in the year 2011 
came to such a critical end with the arrival of the Islamist group, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, in power and Mohamed Morsi to become the first 
democratically elected ruler of the country. This change is considered as a
turning point and defining moment in the history of Egypt, as the oldest
and deep-rooted Islamist group has came to power after three-decade old, 
regime of president Hosni Mubarak, for the first time in their history and 
the country's as well55. 
This change seemed as if the history is going over itself in the 
country. In the year 1952, military commander Gamal Abdel Nasser
launched what was known as "the Free Officers Movement" which 
revolted against the king Farouk I who reigned from 1936, to overthrow 
him and to establish the republican system for the first time in the 
country’s history that lasted for more than six decades till now. Moreover, 
it was the first time in more than 2000 years that the country is ruled by an 
Egyptian. Since Nasser the Egyptian foreign policy has predominantly
revolved around the certain issues, namely, achieving security and 
economic stability, as well as, enhancing its relations with influential 
states or powers in the world and the Arab and regional states. Owing to
these factors, various approaches and methods were adopted not only by
Nasser, but by the successive Egyptian governments to deal with these
55 Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp.690-691.
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concerns and interests according to the changing international 
circumstances(56). 
In this regard, President Nasser laid the principles and the future
perspectives of the Egyptian foreign policy after the 1952 revolution in his 
book "philosophy of the revolution" which was considered a noteworthy
document in the post - revolutionary era. This book did not only highlight 
the basis and plans of the domestic policy of this period, but it succeeded 
in defining the circles of interest for the Egyptian foreign policy through 
analyzing the geopolitics of Egypt. Thus, the book determined the circles 
of movement for the Egyptian foreign policy with the founding of the first 
republic consecutively as the following, first the Arab circle, then the 
Islamic circle and finally the Afro- Asian circle(57). 
This definition of these circles represented a great step for the
future of the foreign policy during that epoch. In this framework, the 
23rdEgyptian politics since the July revolution 1952 has witnessed a
fundamental transformation, especially after the defeat of the Egyptian 
forces in the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, which was one of the key motives 
for the revolt against the monarchy in the country(58). Nasser is considered 
the first Egyptian ruler who laid the foundation of an independent and 
valiant foreign policy. Prior to him, Egypt, due to British influence, could
not pursue sovereign and autonomous foreign relations. He gained 
confidence and trust for liberating his country from British occupation. 
The signature of "Al–Galaa" or Anglo-Egyptian evacuation 
agreement of 1954 which provided the withdrawal of the remaining British 
troops from Egypt and officially terminated the chapter of British 
dominance in the country, was a major step in the pathway of fixating the 
new Egyptian republican regime. It managed to disintegrate all the traces 
of the pre-revolution era, it paved the way towards the formulation of a
56 Derek Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1981 George Allen & Unwin, London: 1982, pp. 34-36.
57Philosophy of the revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Falsafet El Thawra, state information authority, 1955).
58 Mustafa Al-Feki, ‘Egypt Is Poised to Resume Role in Regional and World Affairs’, Al-Monitor, 6 October
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new completely independent foreign policy for Egypt under Nasser's 
regime(59). 
The previously mentioned evacuation treaty was a step that 
opened the door for Egypt to emerge as a vital and significant political 
actor in the Middle East region and Arab world. From his part, Nasser
since the beginning embraced an anti-West approach to face the western 
imperialist policies, since his country was deeply frustrated by the pro-
Israel policy of the West(60). Egypt has always deemed Israel as a
dangerous direct threat to its national security and the augmenting western 
support for Israel made the Egyptian leadership more uncomfortable. 
Consequently, and immediately after the 1952 revolution, Cairo 
concentrated on the solidification of its armed forces to counterbalance
Israel’s military capabilities(61) .
Pan Arab Nationalism:
In his attempt to expand the horizon of the Egyptian foreign policy
after he came to power in 1954, Nasser started to shift dramatically to the
Arab world, his first circle of interest. He promoted Arab unity in 
opposition to Israeli aggression and initiated a movement of Arab 
nationalism(62). In this regard, it is worth to mention that this Arab oriented 
trend in the Egyptian foreign policy was emphasized even in the first post­
revolutionary Egyptian constitution that was ratified in 1956, as it stated 
that Egypt is an Arab country and its official language is Arabic and it
mainly belongs to its Arab region or sphere. President Nasser believed 
that it was the natural geographical and historical extension of Egypt, that 
can't be ignored(63) .
59 Gamal Abdel Nasser, multiple angular vision, Royaa motadedat el zawaya, 2008, Ahmed Sharaf and others,
 
Arab book house, p: 449-460).

60 Hani Eman, ‘The Arab-American Relations: A historical perspective’, Arab News, 4 August 2002.
 
61 Said K. Aburish. 2004. Nasser: The Last Arab, New York: St. Martin’s Press; Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim
(Eds). 2001. (The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, NY: Cambridge University Press: p.170.)
 
62 Adeed Dawisha, Requiem for Arab Nationalism, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003, pp. 25-41.
 
63Searching for the status, the dilemma of the Egyptian external role, in Arabic al Bahth Aan Al Makana, Eshkaliet
 
Al Dor Almasry al Khareigy, October, 2014, Arab center for research and studies).
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Among the most important goals of the July 1952, revolution was 
the abolition of the colonialism from the whole Arab region and the 
extinction of the pro­ imperialism domestic forces. Thus, in this regard he
started to help the liberation movements across the entire region, from 
North Africa in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, until Iraq, Jordan and Syria in 
the Levant. Yet, the utmost significant measure was when he decided to 
directly intervene in Yemen. Nasser aspired at exporting Egypt’s revolution 
to other Arab countries and in this context Cairo sent its army to Yemen in 
the year 1962 to combat against pro-West government forces64. This 
intervention aimed to help Yemeni army officers to overthrow the deep­
rooted monarchy in the country and establish an Egyptian-style republic(65). 
The Pan Arabism and socialism notions were purely displayed in 
the support and solidarity that all the Arab governments and peoples 
showed during the Suez Crisis in the year 1956 -that will be discussed in 
the later- and its consequence of the trilateral aggression after Nasser
decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. This decision came as a direct 
response to the refusal of the High Dam finance from the part of the 
United States. Hence, the Arab states convened a summit in Beirut to 
express their consolidation with Nasser in his crisis. Moreover, the 
pipelines carrying the oil from the Gulf to the ports in the Mediterranean 
up to Europe were blown-up, a matter which caused a huge energy crisis 
in the European countries especially with the beginning of the winter(66). 
Then again the concepts of Pan Arab nationalism and socialism
were reflected when a very imperative step took place in 1958 with the 
founding of The United Arab Republic (UAR). It was a short-lived 
political union between both countries, which existed only for two years, 
when Damascus pulled out after the 1961 coup d'état that took place in 
64 Derek Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1981(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 64-65
 
65 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqalih. 1986. Abdel Nasser and Yemen: Chapters from the History of the Yemeni Revolution
 
(in Arabic), Fosol Men Tarekh Al Thawra al Yamania, Dar al-Hadatha.)
 
66 Arthur Mark wiesburd, Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II, Penn State Press, 1997, p.33).
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Syria(67). However, Egypt continued to be officially known as the "United 
Arab Republic" until 1971, and the Egyptian president ruled the union.
From his part president Nasser thought that this union could be a
first step towards a larger pan-Arab state, the UAR was created when a
group of political and military leaders in Syria, namely of the Arab 
Socialist Ba'ath Party proposed merging the two states. The sentiment of 
pan Arabism traditionally was very intense and deep in Syria; as well, 
Nasser was a popular hero-figure throughout the entire Arab world, 
especially in after the Suez crisis in 1956. Therefore, there was substantial 
popular support in Damascus for the creation of the union with Cairo(68). 
On the other hand, among his efforts to secure the concepts of the 
Pan Arabism and to demonstrate his country's influence and power all the 
way through the whole Arab world, Nasser set up a plan or a strategy to 
connect the entire region. Thus, he decided to launch a radio station under 
the name of voice of Arabs, in Arabic "Sawt Al Arab", which gorged on 
the Arab nationalism in its daily broadcasts, thrilling audience throughout  
the entire Arab speaking region from the Atlantic ocean to the Arab gulf 
and Levant. 
In 1954, it declared on air that "the Voice of the Arabs speaks for
the Arabs, struggles for them and expresses their unity". Also, the 
programming was characterized by an anti-colonial tone and a rejection of 
Western imperialism, so the voice of the Arabs was "in the service of the 
Arab nation and its struggle against Western imperialism in the Arab 
67 Elie Podah, The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic, The 
Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic, p.148-151.
68
James P. Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic, Lynne 
Rienner publishings, 2002, p.101-115
108 | P a g e 
   
 
 
    
 
    
  
    
 
  
  
   
 
    
 
   
 
   
   
 
    
    
 
   
                                                           
              
     
           
     
           
    
           
       
            
    
world(69). Consequently, the Voice of the Arabs performed as Nasser's 
main vehicle for the propagation of his Pan-Arabism ideas and beliefs(70). 
The African Circle:
As for the African dimension it is worth mentioning that 
regardless of the long-lasting relationship between Egypt and Africa
throughout the history, yet the 1952 revolution succeeded in re­
discovering the importance and vitality of the continent for Egypt, which 
is also considered together with the Arab region as its natural extension71. 
The July revolution stressed its commitment to the African continent, this 
principal remained very clear in the revolution's foreign policy on both the 
continental and international levels. This policy rested on very strong
pillars as the political cooperation, defending the continent's problems, as 
well as supporting the African revolutionists in their independence
battles(72). 
In order to play this role in the continent, president Nasser took 
into his account many determinates that helped Egypt to master this task 
among them, the importance of Egypt on the regional level for its 
geographical and political situation (geopolitics) together with all the other
sources of power(73). 
In that sense, it is worth to be noted that Egypt during Nasser's era
succeeded to play an effective role in Africa, through helping the 
liberation movements throughout the whole continent that has been under 
occupation, except for only three countries, Liberia, South Africa, and 
69 Adeed dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, Princeton University
Press, 2009, p.147-159).

70 
Cull, Nicholas J; Culbert, David H. & Welch, David, 2003, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical
 
Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present, ABC-CLIO, p.16)
 
71Hani Raslan, July policies, 50 years after revolution, Syasat Uolio Khamson Aam Ala Althawraal Ahram center
 
for strategic and political studies, 2002.

72 Shawki el Gammal and Abdallah Abdel Razek, Egypt modern history, Tarekh Masr Almoaser, Dar Al Thakafa
 
for publishing and distribution , 1997, p:112-113)
 
73 Hani Raslan, July policies, 50 years after revolution, Syasat Uolio Khamson Aam ala Althawra al Ahram center
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Ethiopia besides Egypt of course. Afterwards, a wave of national 
liberation started in Tunisia and morocco in 1956, then Ghana 1957, 
followed by Guinea in 1958, yet this wave has been followed by another
bigger and more extendable waves included Cameroon, Togo, and chad, as 
well as Congo, Zaire (democratic republic of Congo). This wave was 
succeeded by a second wave by the independence of Benin, Senegal, and 
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), as well as Niger, Gabon, cote d' Ivoire, Mali, 
Nigeria, Mauritania, Tanganyika (Tanzania) in 1961. The third wave came 
when Malawi, and Swaziland gained their freedom in 1968, till the number
of independent states in the seventies of the last century was more than 50 
countries(74) . 
Additionally, Egypt was keen to establish diplomatic relations
with African countries immediately after gaining their independence and 
in 1956, a department for African affairs to was established in the ministry
of foreign affairs. Moreover, on the military level Egypt was the first 
country that opened its doors to train the liberation movements in many
African countries as Angola and Mozambique, also the military school in 
Cairo received African personnel who formed the core of the national 
armies in a later stage. Furthermore, Nasser provided them with arms they
needed to the extent that he was willing to participate in some fighting
operations(75) 
Also, Cairo depended on the radio broadcasting to support the 
liberation movement as it established during the period between 1954 and 
1968 nearly 18 radio broadcasting stations in different languages including
the national languages to encourage the African societies to resist the 
colonization(76). 
74Egypt modern history, Tarekh Masr Almoaser, Shawki el Gammal and Abdallah Abdel 

Razek, Dar al Thakafa for publishing and distribution , 1997, p:117-118
 
75Mohamed Fayek, Abdel Nasser and the African revolution, Abdel Nasser Wa Al 

Thawra Alafrikya, Al Hayaa Alama Lksoor Althkafa, 2002, p:50-51.
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Furthermore, Nasser's regime realized that achieving
independence was not the ultimate goal for the African countries and the 
more important step was achieving the economic independence, and make
the utmost of its huge natural and human resources to reach a
comprehensive economic development(77).In this context, in March 1962 
was agreed to sign seven agreements to achieve unity and cooperation 
among the African countries including establishment of common African 
market launching the freedoms of work accommodation transfer between 
its citizens. Besides removing all customs formulating African financial 
institution alongside with the establishment of African bank in 1965 with 
the capital of 500  million $(78).
In addition, Nasser adopted this economic policy towards Africa
to accomplish two main goals, namely resisting the Israeli activity in the 
continent at that time as tel - Aviv succeeded in infiltrating through some 
African countries as Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Ethiopia. While the 
second goal was to open up economic opportunities for Cairo(79).In return, 
Egypt reacted to these to these steps of Israel so it started to give economic
aid to some African countries to be used in reconstruction and building
projects, though they were in small amounts of money, yet they played 
very important role in saving some countries from severe economic crises, 
this policy proved the Egypt was always supportive. Finally, all these
efforts were crowned by the founding of the "organization of African unity
in 1963 at that time which turned in 2002, to be the African union in Addis 
Ababa(80). 
77Mohamed Elgebaly, the common African market between politics and economy, Al Souq Al Afrikya Al 
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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM):
As mentioned before one of the foreign policy circles focused on 
the third world countries namely African, Asian and Latin American
nations, especially that the post 1952 era came together with the 
emergence of the notions and ideas of anti- colonialism and anti­
imperialism, and in the meantime this period witnessed the development
concepts of nationalism and socialism(81). 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was created to form an 
umbrella for the third world countries, who refused to be under the 
patronage of the world's superpowers at that time, namely the united states 
and Soviet union. Nasser along with India's Nehru and Indonesia's 
Sukarno as well as Yugoslavia's Tito, launched the movement during the 
Bandung conference that was held in 1955 with the participation of 29 
countries, where the Egyptian president declared that the positive
neutralism will be a main feature of his country's foreign policy(82) Thus, 
this conference represented a major pivot in the world's history during the 
20th century, as it witnessed the inauguration of the non-aligned 
movement, in which Nasser's played a very important role in its 
consolidation later on. This movement enabled Egypt to play a bigger and 
more effective role not only in the region but also on the Asian and 
African levels(83) . 
On the international levels, the superpowers reacted to the 
founding of the new movement. From its part, the U.S. started to put some 
pressure on Egypt to step back from the alliance. However, and despite all
these trials both countries reached the point of no return. Egypt was 
determined to stand for its position and, as a result, the Washington 
withdrew its promised economic aid to finance the establishment of the 
81Ahmed Sharaf and others, Gamal Abdel Nasser, multiple angular vision, Royaa Motadedat el Zawaya, 2008,
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high dam in Aswan. On the other hand, the Soviet Union seized this 
chance to further boost its impact and influence in Egypt and pledged to 
assist in the construction of the grand project of the dam(84) . 
Moreover, the non-aligned policy in the Egyptian foreign policy
has transformed from being just some stands or positions towards certain 
cases to be a trend or a basic principle in Cairo's foreign policy after 1952. 
In that context, it is worth mentioning that president Nasser declared in 
July 1954 that the next goal after gaining the full independence with the 
evacuation of the British troops from the country was staying away from 
the engagement in any alliances or camps(85). 
In this framework, the founding of the non-aligned movement during this 
period was correlated with some important developments that took place
on the international arena, during the course of the struggle between the 
eastern and western camps; these developments were directly related to the 
Middle East region. these occurrences involved the creation of military
pacts, namely the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) originally known 
as Baghdad Pact which was formed in 1955, by Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, 
turkey, and the United Kingdom(86).The formation of the pact was taken by
Egypt as a challenge to its leading role in the Middle East region, as well 
Nasser might have perceived this step as a devaluation or depreciation of 
its key status in the region from the part of both the united states and 
United Kingdom(87). 
Moreover, Nasser thought that these military and security pacts in 
the region represent a threat to the security of the Arab countries, so he
violently opposed them. What is more, it could be argued that the Egyptian 
president was concerned that this pact would bring back the British 
84
Asit K. Biswas & Cecilia Tortajada, ‘Development and Large Dams: A Global Perspective’, Water Resource
Development, Vol. 17, No.1, pp. 9-21.
85
Nabil Abdel Fattah, July policies, 50 years after revolution, Syasat Uolio Khamson Aam Ala Althawra, Al 
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influence back to the region. on the other hand, he believed that the 
Baghdad pact might intimidate and undermine the Egyptian role as a result
of the competition that would emerge with its traditional rival Iraq. 
Therefore, Nasser violently opposed the pact not only on the Arab level 
within the League of Arab States (LAS), but he also took the case to a
wider audience which is the members of the Non- Aligned movement 
during their reunion in Bandung. During the meeting he declared his clear 
refusal for the establishment of this kind of alliances in the middle east 
region, a matter which would serve only the interests of superpowers(88). 
Relations With The Soviet Union:
The ties with the Soviet Union has been transformed from 
negative to positive relation s in the beginning of the year 1954, and it is 
argued that the alterations in these relations can be attributed to the 
developments that took place during this period of time. For instance, the 
emergence of the non- aligned movement which will be discussed later, 
and the breakdown of the occidental arms manipulation in Egypt after the 
British withdrawal contributed a lot in the enhancement of these
connections. The Egyptian historian Mohamed Hassanein Heikal 
mentioned that the Egyptian- soviet relationship has witnessed many
fluctuations since the beginning of the 1952 revolution. Yet, it calmed 
down and stabilized finally after 1955(89). 
Historically, the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was 
officially inaugurated in august 1943. The Cooperation between Moscow
and Cairo was launched by the first economic agreement signed in 1948, 
according to which the Soviet Union exported grain, timber and other
goods in exchange for Egyptian cotton. Furthermore, during the 1950-60s 
of the last century, the Egyptian- Soviet partnership was at its uttermost. 
Thousands of Soviet experts were sent off to Egypt to help in modernizing
88 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, , UNC Press Books,
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the country's infrastructure. Those specialists contributed to the 
establishment of many factories as, the Iron and Steel factories in Helwan 
and Aluminum complex in Upper Egypt, as well they assisted in the 
founding of grand infrastructure projects among them the High Dam in 
Aswan and setting up the electricity networks between Alexandria and 
Aswan. Meanwhile, a number of Egyptian students in all fields were
having their education in Soviet universities and institutes(90). 
However, on the level of the military relations with Soviet Union, 
it is worth to be noted that those ties started in the year 1955, by a visit of a
military delegation to Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite country that was 
affiliated at that time to Communist or Eastern camp. This visit resulted in 
the conclusion of an agreement to provide all the Egyptian army's 
demands. Thus, the agreement included the purchase of 200 tanks, 150 
arterially pieces, 120 fighters, 50 bombers, 2 destroys, 2 submarines, and 
thousands of rifles and automatic weapons. This deal was a mixture
between Czech and soviet arms, and it provided Moscow with a great 
opportunity to prove that it is still capable of pursuing its influence in the 
middle east region, despite all the American and British relentless efforts 
to keep it out from the region(91). 
Thus, this step in particular was considered as a turning point in 
these strategic relations between the two countries as it paved the way
towards founding such strong ties between Moscow and Cairo until this 
very recent moment. Following this agreement Egypt succeeded to 
conclude two deals, one with Poland another satellite soviet country, to 
buy naval equipment and the other one was in 1956 to complete the very
first agreement that was signed in 1954(92). Yet, the peak of the relations
between Nasser's regime and the USSR, has been witnessed after the 1967 
90History of Russian- Egyptian relations, embassy of the Russian federation to the Arab republic of Egypt,
 
http://www.egypt.mid.ru/eng/hist/Index.html .
 
91Steven. A. Cook, the struggle for Egypt, from Nasser to Tahrir square, American university in Cairo, 2012, p.66
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defeat, when he asked Moscow to supply him with defense systems to be
installed throughout the Suez Canal to protect Egypt from the Israeli raids. 
Shortly before the launch of the war of attrition, Nasser decided 
to visit Moscow to ask them to establish an air defense system to be 
operated by Soviet pilots and an antiaircraft force to be protected by Soviet 
troops. In order to gain the Soviet Union support and assistance for his 
country, Nasser had to grant Moscow control over a number of Egyptian 
airfields as well as operational command over a large division of the 
Egyptian army. Moreover, The Soviet Union sent between 10,000 and 
15,000 Soviet troops and advisers to Cairo, and Soviet pilots flew combat 
missions.
Furthermore, a screen of Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs) was set 
up, and Soviet pilots joined Egyptian ones in patrolling Egyptian air 
space(93). In the Aftermath of the June 1967 War, Moscow bestowed aid to 
Cairo to substitute the smashed up military gear and to rebuild the armed 
forces. Nonetheless, by sending troops and advisers to Egypt and pilots to 
fly combat missions, the Soviet Union took a calculated risk of possible 
superpower confrontation over the Middle East. 
Relations with the United States:
Nasser's ties with the United States during the 1950's were
generally turbulent. In the beginning of that decade in the aftermath of July
1952 revolution, Washington helped out Egypt to conclude its evacuation 
treaty with the United Kingdom that ended the British presence in the
country, not only this but it offered military and economic help. Yet, soon 
after the relations between both states soured, when Cairo refused to get 
along with Washington plans to create a North Atlantic Treaty
93 bassam, Tibi Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security, Springer, Sep 28,
1998 p.104.
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Organization (NATO) like type of security and military pacts in the
Middle East(94). 
From its part, the United States aspired that Nasser would 
cooperate with it to contain the soviet influence in the Middle East, and to 
build the regional stability by accomplishing peace with Israel. However, 
Nasser rejected to join the Washington backed defence schemes, as the 
Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) and the Baghdad pact(95). 
Moreover, many other factors that came all together as, Nasser's 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China, opposition to the French 
occupation, and the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact as well as the Israeli
raid on the Gaza Strip in the beginning of the year 1955 in vengeance
for raids into Israel. All these events marked the end of Nasser's once good 
relations with Washington(96). 
Regardless of the Egyptian anti-West policies, Washington did 
not stop convincing the Egyptian leadership to join their camp. Thus, the 
Eisenhower administration offered Cairo an economic assistance
programme worth $ 56 million for the construction of the mega project of 
the High Dam in Aswan, in favour of reaching a peace settlement with 
Tel- Aviv. This project was the central component of Egypt’s never ­
ending quest for modernization. Constructing this dam was going to be the 
initial step toward bringing Egypt into the modern world and to save its 
suffering economy as well. Yet, that initiative failed to end the mistrust
between Egypt and the West(97). 
In this regard, is race in the Middle East set off by the Soviet 
Union vending Egypt arms and with France doing the same with Israel, 
which he saw as opening the region to Soviet influence. The American 
94Peter L. Hahn, Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, p.92­
93.
95 Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Clarendon Press, 1997, p.167.
 
96
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president Eisenhower launched a huge effort to create peace between 
Cairo and Tel -Aviv, through several rounds of secret diplomacy, where he
offered Nasser American assistance in exchange for a peace treaty with 
Israel(98).From his part, Nasser called for the return of Palestinian refugees 
and rejected direct talks with Israel(99). 
When the U.S. found that Nasser and Israeli Prime Minister Ben 
Gurion were ultimately unable and unwilling to reach a peace agreement, 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles plumped for
pressuring Nasser in a number of hidden means, particularly in promoting
relations with his traditional regional Arab rivals in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 
Libya. The U.S. gauged that Nasser, confronted by the possibility that the 
other Arab states were aligning with the West, would find himself with 
only one powerful ally, the Soviet Union(100). Consequently, the 
occurrences developed dramatically with the American administration 
withdrawing its offer to finance the dam establishment, a matter which led 
to the eruption of the Suez crisis(101). 
The Suez Crisis or The Tripartite Aggression:
The withdrawal of Washington's assistance offers built up 
domestic pressure on Nasser a matter which drove him to take the 
historical step of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on the 
26th of July 1956, and he closed the canal and Tiran straits in front of the 
Israeli shipping. he decided to use the income of the Canal to build the 
dam, yet the Nationalization of the Canal worsened the situation(102). 
It is believed that the Suez Crisis is considered as a major turning
point in the modern history not only for Egypt and the region but for the 
98Neff, Donald Warriors at Suez, Simon & Schuster: New York, 1981 pp. 130–131.
 
99Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960, University Press of Florida, 1993, 

p.165-166.
 
100 The U.S. and Egypt Since the Suez Crisis, Trudy Kuehner, July 2009,
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101 Kissinger, Henry , Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, p.529.
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whole world, as it pushed both the United Kingdom and France with Israel 
in the frontline to launch an attack on Egypt. The famous Egyptian writer 
and analyst Mohamed Hassanein Heikal mentioned that the main features 
of the political map of the world nowadays has been drawn during the 
Suez crisis in 1956, as it had serious implications on all involved 
parties(103). 
From the part of the United Kingdom, the nationalization decision 
represented a surprise for the British government, because of its negative
implications on the country's economic and military interests in the region. 
Therefore, Eden's government decided in favor of military intervention 
against Egypt to evade the downfall of British reputation in the 
region(104).On the other hand, The French government, supported by its 
public opinion were enormously annoyed by Nasser's step, and they
decided that he would not get his way, this attitude was heavily attached to 
Nasser's assistance to the Algerian liberation movements in their battle 
against the French occupation. In addition, the French government was 
worried from the growing influence that Nasser exerted on its North 
African colonies and protectorates(105).Therefore, the French Cabinet 
decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel, it
informed London of its decision, and invited the British government to 
combine their forces. Both Britain and France were eager that the Suez
Canal should remain open as an important conduit of oil, so they wanted to 
remove Nasser from power(106) 
As for Israel, it wanted to re-open the Straits of Tiran heading to 
the Gulf of Aqaba ahead of Israeli navigation, and set eyes on the chance
to fortify its southern border and to wear off what it perceived as a
threatening and intimidating country. This impression was predominantly
103
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the Suez story, the last battle in the Gargantuans' Era,,
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considered because of the attacks arising from the Egyptian-held Gaza
Strip at that period. What is more, Tel-Aviv was deeply troubled by
Egypt's procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry, as this huge
influx of such advanced armaments would contribute to the alteration of 
the already unstable balance of power in the Middle East region(107). 
Furthermore, Israel was enormously distressed by the Czech arms deal 
concluded by Cairo, as it assumed that it only had a limited space to hit the 
Egyptian army(108). 
The military attack intended for taking control of the Suez
Canal, Gaza Strip, and parts of Sinai, was a real tragedy from a political 
standpoint that led to affronted international and diplomatic reactions in 
the whole world not only in the Arab region. For instance, In Syria,  
the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline that transport the oil to reach tankers in the 
Mediterranean was blown up to cut Britain off from one of its main routes 
oil(109)of the . Moreover, Saudi Arabia imposed a full oil embargo on 
Britain and France(110).On the level of the American diplomacy, the 
Eisenhower administration assumed that if the United States complied 
with the attack on Egypt, the consequential repercussions in the Arab 
world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union. Thus, it urged Israel 
to withdraw from Gaza strip and Sinai, but Tel-Aviv refused a matter that 
pushed Washington to seek UN-backed efforts to impose economic
sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory(111).
30thOn of October, the Security Council held a meeting, at the 
request of the United States, when it submitted a draft resolution calling
upon Israel to withdraw immediately behind the established armistice
lines, but it was not taken on because of British and French rejections. In 
less than 24 hours, both Paris and London embarked on an air attack 
107 Chaim Herzog and Shlomo Gazit, The Arab-Israeli wars: War and peace in the Middle East from the 1948
 
War of Independence to the present, 3rd ed. 2008, pp. 113–117.
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against targets in Egypt, which was shortly pursued by a landing of their
troops at the northern end of the Canal Zone. Consequently, and due to 
the escalating situation and with lack of unanimity among the permanent 
members, the Security Council passed Resolution 119 that calls for the 
convention of the first emergency special session for the General 
Assembly , according to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, with the
purpose of attaining  proper counsels to end the warfare(112). 
In view of that, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
adopted Washington's proposal for Resolution 997, which demanded an 
immediate truce, and the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice
lines, and an arms embargo, as well as the reopening of the Suez Canal, 
which was still impassable. On the other hand, The Secretary-General was 
requested to report promptly on the conformity of those decisions to both 
the Security Council and General Assembly. Furthermore, the emergency
special session embraced a number of resolutions, which established the 
first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), in the history of the UN on 
7th of November by Resolution 1001(113).
The Soviet Union played an important role in the Suez crisis, 
especially when the soviet government was threatening military
intervention in this conflict on the Egyptian side, a matter that was 
extensively deemed at the time to have forced a ceasefire(114). As a result, 
the reputation and stature of Moscow rose highly not only in Egypt, but 
also in the Arab world and the Third World, and Nasser expressed his 
gratitude and appreciation for the soviet leaders and government for their
support to the Egyptian position(115). 
as for Egypt this crisis reveled the power of the Egyptians 
themselves in defending their land against this aggression of the three
112http://www.un.org /ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/3354&Lang=E
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powers, not only but at this specific moment the whole Arab world 
realized that the real power was the people's power. Moreover, Nasser
came into sight as an enhanced leader in the Arab world, as many Arabs 
regarded him as the vanquisher of European colonialism and Zionism. On 
the other hand, for the west this crisis revealed that the United Kingdom 
and France are no more the great powers or empires as their roles started 
to fade away, with the emergence of the United States as a new power in 
the Middle East region. As for the USSR, it went out from the 
international isolation, and started to appear as a main player in the Middle 
East region, which became the center of the international confrontations on 
all levels politically, economically and culturally(116). 
In the Aftermath the end of the Suez crisis, Egypt agreed to re-
open the Suez Canal in front of the international navigation and the United 
Kingdom reached a decision to pay the charges in sterling pounds. The
frozen funds had been emancipated and Israel had to take out its forces 
from the Sinai Peninsula after the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) deployed its militaries. The politics in the Middle East region 
dramatically transformed, especially with the power vacuum that emerged 
with the decline of the British and French influence in the region, a matter
that opened the door towards a new round of cold war, as it put both the 
United States and the Soviet Union in a direct confrontation. In this regard, 
the American president Eisenhower launched his famous doctrine known 
as "Eisenhower doctrine", which avows that any Middle Eastern country
could request American economic assistance or aid from U.S. military
forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another
(117)state . 
What's more, the American president pulled out 
the Soviet intimidation in his doctrine by approving the commitment of 
116Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the story of soviets with Egypt, "Kesset el soviet ma 
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U.S. forces to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of 
those countries, requesting such assistance against evident armed 
aggression from any state that is maneuvered by the communism. Thus, he
committed about $200 million for economic and military assistance in 
each of the years 1958 and 1959. It is argued that the Doctrine intended to 
arrange for an alternative to the independent Arab regimes versus Nasser's 
political control, through strengthening them whilst isolating the 
Communist impact by insulating the influence of the Egyptian president. 
Nevertheless, it failed on that front, for the reason that Nasser's power 
rapidly mounted by 1959 to the point where he could shape the leadership 
outcomes in neighboring Arab capitals, including Baghdad and Riyadh.
The 1967 Defeat
The June 1967 War or as known in the Egyptian narratives as the 
"setback", erupted between Egypt and its neighboring states Jordan, 
and Syria from one side against Israel, owing to the deteriorated relations
between Tel-Aviv and those countries since the first Arab- Israeli War in 
1948. During the phase, prior to this war the strains and dreads among all
parties exceptionally mounted as a result of minor clashes on between the 
Arabs and Israel on the borders. However, in April 1967 the and in 
reaction to Israeli attacks on Syria, the Egyptian forces according to the 
mutual defense treaty signed between the two countries in 1966, were
deployed along the Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula(118). 
What is more, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the emergency
forces stationed in Sinai since the Suez Crisis(119). In May 1967 
announced a blockade of Israel's access to the Red Sea considered by
Israel an act of war. He denied the Israeli vessel access to the Straits of 
Tiran despite knowing it might very likely provide Israel with the trigger it
118Awrych, George W. The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between
 
Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, Greenwood Press, 2000, p.5. 
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(120)needed to launch war .During the same month, Nasser received 
information from the Soviet Union about Israeli concentrations on the 
Syrian borders. 
Consequently, Tel-Aviv launched a series of preventive or 
preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian airfields, and at the same time, 
embarked on a ground offensive into both Sinai and Gaza Strip.  
Therefore, the army was taken by surprise, and almost the whole Egyptian 
air force was devastated. Israeli forces rushed westward in the depth of 
Sinai after Nasser's ordered to evacuate it(121).On the other hand, both 
Syria and Jordan began to attack Tel-Aviv, however the Israeli
counterattacks resulted in the confiscation of East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank from the Jordanians, as well as occupation of the Syrian Golan
Heights.
The political importance of the 1967 War was immense; Israel 
showed that it was able to initiate strategic attacks that could change the 
regional balance. Both Cairo and Damascus learned tactical lessons that 
enabled them later to undergo the 1973 war to reclaim their lost territory. 
Alternatively, the Egyptian defeat in the 1967 war or the setback, unveiled 
may major limitations in Nasser’s foreign policy. In this framework it is 
worth to mention that the military intervention in Yemen not only drained 
Egypt financially and trapped around 65,000 to 70,000 of its troops at the 
time of war with Israel but it also led to the loss of the Arab world’s 
support, especially Saudi Arabia(122). 
Moreover, and as a direct result of the withdrawal of the UNEF, 
a significant part of the Egyptian army had to be deployed at a fast pace in 
Sinai a matter that triggered off supply and management difficulties. In 
addition, Nasser disregarded the advice of his military officers as well as 
120 Ian. J. Bikerton, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History, Reaktion Books, 2009, p.111.
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the defence Minister who pushed him to go for first strike, and instead of 
that, he relied heavily on Soviet advice to refrain from launching a pre­
emptive strike against Israel. The United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) resolution number 242 known also as "Land for peace" that was 
adopted in November of the same year created a ceasefire, but in reality
Israel did not pull out from Sinai that has been occupied during the 1967 
war. This resolution is considered as one of the most widely affirmed 
resolutions on the Arab–Israeli conflict, which formed the basis for later 
negotiations between the involved states. It led to conclusion of Peace
Treaties between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, as well as 
the Oslo 1993 and 1995 accords with the Palestinians. 
From his part, Nasser admitted his responsibility for the 
military defeat in June 1967, and he decided to resign from his position as 
a president of the country in a radio broadcast, but he backpedalled under 
an immense popular pressure from the side of the Egyptian 
people(123).After the defeat and during the Arab summit that was held in 
Khartoum in September of the same year, Nasser restored his relations
with the oil Gulf States and they pledged financial support to Cairo, 
additionally, they agreed for the "Three No's", formula which rejects the 
any kind of negotiations, peace or even the recognition of Israel(124). 
On the other hand, Nasser believed that the military skirmishes
would force Israel and the international community to smooth the 
progress of a full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. This primarily took the 
form of restricted artillery combats and small-scale incursions into the 
depth of the occupied land of Sinai Peninsula that lasted for couple of 
years. However, by the year 1969 the Armed forces believed that it was 
geared up to undertake larger-scale operations. Hence, in March of the 
same year, Nasser announced the official launch of the famous War of 
123 David W. Del Testa, Government Leaders, Military Rulers and Political Activists, Routledge, 2014, p.132.
124 Edward R. Kantowicz, Coming Apart, Coming Together, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000 p.368
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Attrition, which was characterized by wide-ranging shelling along the 
Suez Canal, along with extensive aerial warfare and commando raids(125).
In face of these developments, the international community and 
both Cairo and Tel- Aviv endeavored to achieve a political solution for the 
ongoing dispute. In this framework, the United Nations formed a mission 
known as Jarring Mission that was supposed to ensure that the terms 
of UN Security Council Resolution 242 would be closely followed, 
nonetheless by the end of the year 1969, it was obvious that this mission 
had been a failure. Fearing the escalation of the tensions the American 
president at that time, Richard Nixon, decided to send his Secretary of 
State, William Rogers, to formulate the well known Rogers Plan which 
proposed the Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, in 
exchange for peace with the arab States(126). 
In August 1970, Cairo, Amman and Tel-Aviv agreed an armistice
under the terms proposed by the Rogers Plan. The blueprint enclosed 
limitations on missile deployment by both sides, prohibiting either side 
from altering the military current situation within zones extending
50 kilometers to the east and west of the cease-fire line(127). Yet, one
28thmonth later and on the of September 1970 president Nasser died with 
a heart attack and his vice Anwar Al- Sadat succeeded him to the rule of 
the country.
Some opinions argue that the geopolitical and geostrategic vision 
of Nasser for the Egyptian role has been theoretically true. Yet, this vision 
was not realistic as per his country's abilities and resources. In this context, 
it is worth mentioning that the 1967 defeat from Israel could be referred 
back to this confrontation between Nasser and the western camp, who 
perceived him as a threat for their interests in the region. Therefore, this 
defeat has been the result of many causes, namely, the domestic problems 
125 Aloni, Shlomo Israeli Mirage and Nesher Aces. Osprey. 2004, pp. 46–53.
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of Nasser's regime. In addition to the misperception, misjudgment and bad 
planning of many policies and reactions towards several situations, either 
internally or regionally, all these accumulated together with the 
confrontation of Nasser with the west.
Finally, Nasser's foreign policy should be judged within its real 
historical context, in that specific period of time. This era was 
characterized by the mounting aspiration of the Egyptian and Arab people 
to have a hero with the emergence of the national liberation movements 
with its leaders in the third world. for instance, Jawaharlal Nehruthe first 
prime minister of India, and Sukarno the first president of Indonesia, as 
well as Kwame Nkrumah the first prime minister and first president of 
Ghana. In addition to other figures as Patrice Émery Lumumba the 
Congolese independence leader who was the first democratically elected 
leader of the Congo as its prime minister and Ahmed Ben Bella the first 
president of Algeria. All these developments took place in the atmosphere
of the escalation of the cold war between the two world camps at that at 
epoch of history(128). 
128the Egyptian foreign policy between Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al- Sadat and Hosni 
Mubarak, Al Syiassa Al Kharigia Al Masreya Bein Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al- Sadat 
and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian council of foreign affairs, Awrak Publications , Vol: 
11, June 2011.
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CHAPTER 3
 
SADAT'S ERA: EGYPT FIRST:
 
The Corrective or Rectification Revolution:
When Anwar Al-Sadat succeeded Nasser, he lacked the latter’s 
popular legitimacy while his new regime found it progressively hard to 
keep hold of the welfare commitments of Nasserist socialism. Hence, to 
consolidate his system, Sadat brought about a “Corrective Revolution” of 
1971, during which he did radical changes on issues of foreign policy, 
economy, and even ideology. Thus, he expelled powerful Nasserist
figures with their ideological commitment to the Soviet Union from all the 
state institutions, including the both ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU)
and the army. Sadat's Corrective Revolution as well included the 
imprisonment of other political forces in Egypt, including liberals and 
Islamists(129) . 
Moreover, Sadat took a decision to expel all the soviet military
experts in July 1972, by asking them to leave Egypt at the earliest possible 
chance. This step from the part of Sadat was shocking and confusing to 
everybody even his advisors. At that time, Egypt was suffering critically
from economic glitches caused by the 1967 War and the relationship with 
the Soviet Union as well deteriorated owing to their undependability and 
rejection of the Egyptian regime demands for more military support. Yet, 
some opinions argued that this move could be referred back to his wish 
forgoing through the 1973 war alone and without reliance on any foreign 
powers, in order to achieve a pure Egyptian victory, that wouldn’t be
assigned to any other parties(130).
129Carl F. Petry The Cambridge History of Egypt, Volume 2, Cambridge University
Press, 1998, p.359.
130 Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, Springer, 1979, p.159-160.
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Policy of Economic and Political Reform:
Sadat launched a four-phased approach to introduce a multi-party
system in the country after years of stagnation in the political life during
his predecessor Nasser's rule. In this framework, he issued a
comprehensive political document under the name of “October Paper" in 
the year 1974, and he established political platforms in Arabic called 
"manaber”. In addition, he founded the Misr Party; and ultimately in 1978 
he formed the National Democratic Party (NDP). In the October Paper, 
Sadat reiterated his commitment to inaugurating a constitutional 
democratic government, preserving Egypt's socialist character, and 
rejecting the "concept of the single party" and hailed pleas for a multi­
party system(131) . 
It is argued that President Sadat's October Paper and political 
reform were motivated by need for self-preservation, not real democratic
idealism, as he perceived the Arab Socialist Union as a potential threat to 
his regime; so he divided the ASU into three ideological platforms, 
however in the year 1977 he took a decision to entirely ban all the union's 
activities. Furthermore, in July 1978, Sadat announced the formation of his 
own political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP)(132). 
Consequently, about 250 MPs of the People's Assembly decided 
to join up Sadat's new party. Some opinions claim that this step was 
certainly associated to the fact that the President's party would guarantee
for its affiliates an explicit way in to the state's resources. The main point, 
however, is that since most of the NDP's members were originally
members of the disbanded ASU, its foundation could be based on 
presidential instigation more than of pressures from the public. the 
transformation from "socialist" to "democratic" ideology entailed not only
the aspiration to continue under direct presidential patronage, but also that 
131Arafat, Alaa Al-Din (2009). The Mubarak Leadership and Future of Democracy in
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the emergence of the ruling NDP was no not reflective of citizenry
interests than the ASU was under Nasser's party system(133). 
The endorsement of the parties’ law in the year 1977 exhibited 
Egypt’s political regime officially turned into the era of party multi
pluralism. However, the law enactment did not mean the total abolition of 
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU); rather it had given the Union more
capacity to allow party formation. The law stipulated party principles 
should not run counter to the Islamic Shari’ah doctrines and conserve the 
national unity, social peace, the socialist and democratic system as well as 
socialist gains. It also affirmed that the party should not be formed on 
ethnic, racial, geographical or discriminatory bases due to sex, origin, 
religion or creed(134). Following the signing the peace accord with Israel in 
1979, the law further postulated that both the party founders and members 
should not be opponent to the peace treaty. Following the signing the 
peace accord with Israel in 1979, the law further stipulated that the party
founders and members should not be opponent to the peace accord.
On the other hand, The October Paper announced Egypt's new 
economic policy as combining Arab capital, together with the Western 
technology, and the state's lavish resources in an endeavor to transform the 
country's economy. This in mint condition economic policy became was 
known as the Economic Opening, in Arabic Al-inftah. This policy ended 
the control of Egypt's economy by the public sector and encouraged both 
domestic and foreign investment in the private sector. Sadat believed the 
his country's economy, with its large public sector, had changed into a
"Soviet - style system" of "inefficiency with 
(135)overpowering bureaucracy . 
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Some opinions contends that the economic openness policy was 
not only ideologically but also politically induced by Sadat's wish or 
aspiration to align his regime with the capitalist West, and the rich and 
powerful sects of Egyptian society, he wanted to single out himself from 
his predecessor Nasser while at the same time securing his position in 
(136)power .Yet, this economic liberalization policy will be discussed later 
in other parts.
Foreign Policy Reorientation from East to West:
In the Aftermath the death of Nasser in September 1970, as 
mentioned above his vice Anwar al-Sadat assumed power and started to 
open his own new chapter in the Egyptian foreign policy. He realized very
early that the restoration of Egypt's political importance, especially after 
the defeat in the 1967 war, could not be attained without enough support 
from the west in general particularly the United States. Moreover, another
factor has contributed to the shift in the new president approach in relation 
to Cairo's external movement, which is the appeasement between Moscow
and Washington. In this regard, it is worth to mention that during the 
1970s, the united states made a dramatic policy alteration and started on a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Underneath that new policy, both 
world powers signed two disarmament treaties, Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)(137). 
The reconciliation between the superpowers had a noteworthy
influence on Middle East politics and compelled Egypt to re-evaluate its 
relations with the Soviet Union. Sadat grasped that the military
dependence on Moscow would not come about anymore. Thus, to portray
a favourable image for the West, he introduced the previously discussed 
"Revolution of Rectification", which These measures were generally
welcomed by the West(138). Meanwhile, Sadat accused the Soviet Union of 
136 Goldschmidt Jr., Historical Dictionary of Egypt, Scarecrow Press, 2013, p.201-202.
 
137 Mark R. Amstutz, International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics (Madison: 

Brown & Benchmark,1995), p.128.
 
138 Derek Hopwood, Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1981, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982,pp 105-106.
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not supplying his country with up-to-date weapons. However, he was a
second-sighted and insightful politician and political leader that he did not 
rush to completely splitting up ties with Moscow. Thus, he concluded in 
1972 a "friendship agreement" with the USSR to enhance the cooperation 
between the two countries, a step which Nasser himself did not manage to 
take(139).
With the conclusion of the Egyptian- Israeli peace accord in 1979 
under the American patronage, Cairo managed to restore its relations with
Washington that had been damaged after the 1967 Arab-Israel war. In this 
way, Sadat prevailed in realizing two important foreign policy goals, 
namely, the restoration of its links with the most important superpower 
and the termination of the security threat from the part of Israel. Though it
led to a completely new era of American and Egyptian relations both 
politically and economically, yet it resulted in the isolation of Cairo in its 
Arab region. 
Retaining security at the border with Israel had become a massive 
load on the Egyptian economy, as the military re-building expenditures 
surged to about 25 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
country. Ensuring security was crucial for Egypt’s deteriorating economy,
a matter which could not be accomplished without the financial and 
economic aid of Washington, as Sadat accepted as true that the U.S. was 
the only state capable of putting pressure effectively on Israel(140). Sadat
has always been convinced that the United States was the only
international power capable of resolving the ongoing conflict politically. 
In that context, it is worth mentioning that Sadat repeatedly reiterated a
statement that the Washington holds 99 per cent of the cards in the Middle 
East(141). 
139 http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/sadat-and-nasser/ .
140 Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘Egypt: Background and US Relations’, CRS Report for the Congress, 12 August 2008,
p.5.
 
141Middle East annual review, 1978, p: 202, Michael Field.
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Accordingly, the restoration of the relations with Washington 
assisted Cairo to enhance its economy as under the peace treaty with 
Israel, Egypt received about $ 7.3 billion in US aid in 1979. Moreover, Under
the Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979, the US provided
both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, 
respectively. A yearly two billion dollars’ aid was supplied for subsidizing
Egypt’s defence budget and modernizing the country’s infrastructure. 
Henceforth, after 1979 Egypt became the second-largest recipient of US
aid, a matter that moved Egypt out of the Soviet sphere and entered it into 
the US one(142).
142William B. Quandt, The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, Brookings
Institution Press, 2010, p.65.
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Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 
1969, 1970, and 1971. P.L. 480 II Grant for 1993 includes $2.1 million in Section 416 food donations. 
TQ = Transition Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year
* = less than $100,000 
IMET = International Military Education and Training
UNRWA = United Nations Relief and Works Agency
Surplus = Surplus Property
Tech. Asst. = Technical Assistance 
Narc. = International Narcotics Control
DA = Development Assistance
ESF = Economic Support Funds 
PL 480 I = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan 
PL 480 II  = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title II Grant
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As for the relations with the Soviet Union, they witnessed a
gradual deterioration throughout the presidency of Sadat, especially with 
improved relationship with the United States after the 1973 October war. 
This decline in the linkage with Moscow took place, despite its 
participation in negotiations that led to the conclusion of disengagement
agreements between Egypt and Syria from one side, and Israel from the 
other side. Also, the Soviet Union co-chaired with the United States the 
Geneva conference that was held in December 1973 that was established 
(143)to seek an end to the Arab- Israeli conflict . 
Yet, the USSR continued to have some doubts about its role in 
this process and the new arrangements that was taking place in the region 
at that time with the sponsorship of the American administration via the 
"shuttle diplomacy", of its foreign minister Henry Kiesinger. He started the 
first round in January 1974, with Israel’s proposals for disengagement with 
the Egyptians(144).
As a result, we can recognize that all the above mentioned 
accumulations pushed President Sadat to criticize the Soviet Union 
publically and to cancel the previously signed "Friendship Agreement" in 
1976, as well as the recall of the Egyptian ambassador to Moscow, that 
step that thrusted the soviets to do the same with its ambassador to Cairo.
To conclude, the end of the seventies has been a witness over a
major shift in the Egyptian foreign policy than that of the fifties as Sadat 
focused on achieving the national interest of his country as a priority on 
top of its regional priorities. In addition, the relations with the Soviet 
Union was totally replaced by a strategic long lasting linkage with the 
United States and the west(145). 
143Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, P R. Kumaraswamy, Rowman &
 
Littlefield, second edition, 2015, p:192.
 
144https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/shuttle-diplomacy.
 
145Aboul Gheit, Ahmed, eyewitness on peace and war, in Arabic Shahed Ala Alharb Wa 

Alsalam, 2013, Nahdet Masr for Publishing, p.185.
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October 1973 War and Camp David Agreements:
In October 1973, Sadat took his critical and historical decision to 
launch a surprise attack on Israel in cooperation with Syria to free both 
occupied Sinai and Golan heights. The Egyptian president made his mind 
up with the war decision few months before it broke out, after the 
Washington suggested that possibility of Israel's returning the Sinai 
Peninsula to Egyptian control with the withdrawal from all of occupied 
territories except for some strategic points. However, Sadat was already
determined to go to war. Moreover, he stated that Cairo was prepared to 
"sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory(146). 
By the end of the year 1972, Egypt commenced intense efforts to 
re- build its armed forces. It received from the Soviet Union under the 
friendship agreement signed between the two countries, military
equipment included MiG-21 jet fighters, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA­
7 antiaircraft missiles, in addition to T-55 and T-62 tanks, RPG­
7 antitank weapons, as well as AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile. 
Moreover, the military generals, who had been deemed responsible for the 
1967 defeat, were substituted with proficient ones(147) . 
Once more, Sadat in an interview published in Newsweek on 
9thApril , 1973, menaced to launch war against Israel(148). Likewise, 
several times during 1973, Arab forces conducted large-scale military
exercises a matter that put the Israeli army on the highest level of alert. 
However, the Israeli leadership believed that if an attack took place, 
the Israeli Air Force (IAF) could easily find it off. On the other hand, one
year before the outbreak of the war Sadat during a meeting with the 
146Klaus Mommsen, 60 YEARS ISRAEL NAVY: BoD – Books on Demand, 2011 p.173­
174.
 
147Anthony Tucker-Jones, Soviet Cold War Weaponry: Aircraft, Warships and Missiles, 

Pen and Sword, 2015, p.133-135.

148 Klaus Mommsen, 60 YEARS ISRAEL NAVY: BoD–Books on Demand, 2011, p.175.
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Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, declared his intention to go to war 
with Israel even without proper Soviet support(149). 
Preparations and arrangements for the October war had begun in 
actually in the year 1971 and was conducted in absolute secrecy, even the 
high- rank commanding officers were not communicated about the war 
plans until less than a week prior to the attack, as well the soldiers were
not informed until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack Israel in 
unison with Syria was called operation Badr Amaliyat Badr or plan Badr 
Khitat Badr in Arabic.
6thOn the of October the Egyptian troops attacked the Israeli
fortifications on the East Bank of Suez Canal and destroyed Bar-Lev line, 
while in the same time the Syrian army attacked the Golan Heights. On 
22ndOctober the United Nations (UN) brokered a ceasefire that was 
quickly collapsed, with each side accusing the other for the infringement. 
24thBy October , the Tel-Aviv had improved its positions and completed 
its clinch on Egypt's Third Army and the Suez city; a matter that led to 
tensions between the superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union 
Therefore, a second ceasefire was imposed cooperatively on October 25th 
to end the war(150) . 
Disengagement talks between both Egypt and Israel took place on 
October 28th, 1973, known as "Kilometre 101". United Nations 
checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli ones, non-military supplies 
were allowed to pass, and war prisoners were to be exchanged. Hence, the 
Geneva Conference of December 1973, was proposed where all the parties 
involved in the war namely, Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Jordan were invited 
to a common effort by the Soviet Union and the United States to finally
usher peace between the Arabs and Tel-Aviv. This conference was 
recognized by UN Security Council Resolution 344 and was based on the 
149George Walter Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between
 
Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, Greenwood Publishing Group,
 
2000, p.133.
 
150P.R. Kumaraswamy, Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, Routledge, 2013, p.61-62.
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Resolution 338, calling for a "just and durable peace". However, the 
meeting was compelled to defer on January1974, because of the absence
of Syria(151) . 
After the failure of the first conference, secretary of state Henry
Kissinger started to conduct the famous shuttle diplomacy, meeting with 
Israel and the Arab states directly. Consequently, the initial tangible
outcome of this effort was the primary military disengagement agreement, 
18thsigned by Israel and Egypt on January , 1974. Under this Sinai 
Separation of Forces Agreement, commonly known as "Sinai I", Israel 
agreed to back off its forces from the West of Suez Canal, which it had 
occupied from the time when the hostilities had been terminated. What is 
more, Israeli forces also pulled back on the length of the whole front to 
create security zones for Egypt, UN and Israel. Thus, Israel gave up its 
advances reaching beyond the Suez Canal, but it still held nearly all of 
Sinai. It became the foremost of many such Land for Peace agreements 
where Israel surrender territory in exchange for treaties. The peace talks at 
the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for 
direct public negotiations since the 1948 war(152). 
On the other hand, the Arab states played a very important role in 
this war, in this regard it is worth to mention that they added up to 100,000 
troops to Egypt and Syria's frontline. For instance, Iraq in addition to its 
forces in already based in Syria sent a squadron to Egypt. The squadron 
quickly gained a reputation amongst Egyptian field commanders for its 
skill in air support, particularly in Anti-Armor strikes(153). Likewise, 
Algeria sent a squadron each of MiG-21s and Su-7s to Egypt, which 
arrived at the front between October 9 and October 11. It also sent an 
armored brigade of 150 tanks; as well, Algerian fighter jets participated in 
attacks together with Egyptians and Iraqis. In addition, deposited around
151P.R. Kumaraswamy, The A to Z of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Scarecrow Press, 2009, 
p.93.
 
152Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, Springer, 2016, p.112.

153 The Crossing of the Suez, Lieutenant General Saad el Shazly, 2003, The Crossing of the Suez, American
 
Mideast Research, p.277-278.
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$200 million with the Soviet Union to finance arms purchases for both 
Cairo and Damascus(154).
From its part Libya had forces stationed in Egypt before the 
outbreak of the war, that include one armored brigade and two squadrons 
of Mirage V fighters, of which one squadron was to be piloted by the 
Egyptian Air Force and the other by Libyan pilots(155). On the other hand, 
Saudi Arabia sent 3,000 soldiers to Syria, bolstered by a squadron 
of Panhard AML-90 armored cars. Kuwait dispatched 3,000 soldiers to 
Syria and Egypt. Morocco sent one infantry brigade to Egypt and one
armored regiment to Syria. While, Tunisia sent 1,000–2,000 soldiers to 
Egypt, where they were based in the Nile Delta and some of them were
positioned to defend the city of Port Said. Lebanon sent radar units to 
Syria for air defense; however, it did not actually take part in the war(156). 
In response to U.S. support of Israel and in order to put more
pressure on Washington to amend its pro-Israeli policy, the Arab 
members of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on 
17thOctober . A couple of days later, the American President Nixon 
authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in 
appropriations for Israel. As a reaction, Riyadh announced an oil embargo 
against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended 
against other western countries, causing the 1973 oil crisis(157). 
The October 6th, 1973 war disrupted the status quo in the Middle 
East, and acted as a direct originator of the 1978 Camp David Accords, 
which resulted in the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty, the first ever between 
(158) 6thIsrael and an Arab state . The victory in the October war healed the 
154Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016,
 
p.302-303
 
155 Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, U of Nebraska Press, 2004, p.361.
 
156 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/536573.
 
157Franco Praussello, Sustainable Development and Adjustment in the Mediterranean
 
Countries, Following the EU Enlargement, Franco Angeli, 2006, p.137.
 
158 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, Brookings Institution Press, 2015 – p.339.
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psychological trauma of the Arab and Egyptian defeat in the 1967 War, 
allowing them to negotiate with the Israelis on a later stage as equals. The
Egyptian president Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the 
Sinai from Israel, grew frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In 
this regard he expressed his will to open to a more constructive dialog to 
achieve a comprehensive peace between the Arabs not only the Egyptians  
with Tel- Aviv.
On November 9th, 1977, Sadat surprised the world when he
announced before the Egyptian parliament that he was willing to visit 
Israel and address the Knesset. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government 
cordially invited him to make a speech at the Knesset. Thus, in November
20th, Sadat took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the 
(159)first Arab leader to do so . This step opened the door towards the peace
process between the two countries. The United States President Jimmy
Carter invited both the Egyptian president Sadat and the Israeli prime
Menachem Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace
between Cairo and Tel-Aviv. 
The negotiations took place from September 5–17, 1978(160). In 
due course, the discussions succeeded, and the two states signed the Israel-
Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979, by which Tel-Aviv withdrew its troops in 
Sinai, in a swap for normal relations and a long-term peace with Egypt.
Additionally, these issues also encompassed, the freedom of passage for
the Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, and recognition of the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, as international waterways(161) 
The normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt and full 
diplomatic relations went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors for the 
first time in history were exchanged between Cairo and Tel-Aviv in 
159 Itamar Rabinovich, Jehuda Reinharz Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, 
and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, UPNE, 2008, p.363.
160 http://www.mfa.gov.eg/Lists/Treaties%20DB/Attachments/646/Framework_en.pdf.
161 http://www.mfa.gov.eg/Lists/Treaties%20DB/Attachmen s/ 645/ Peace%20Treaty_en.pdf.
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(162)February of the same year . The boycott laws with Israel adopted by
the league of Arab states (LAS) were annulled by the Egyptian parliament 
in the same month, and some trade began to develop. Furthermore, in 
March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began 
supplying Israel with crude oil. Then again, both Sadat and Begin went 
halves the Nobel Peace Prize in the year 1978 for their efforts in creating
peace amid the two countries(163) . 
The Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, who 
participated in the negotiations team in Camp David, wrote that "president 
Sadat dreamed of a truly new Middle East, one in which free peoples, each 
living in their own sovereign states, freely cooperated with their neighbors 
for the common good: Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan. 
This is the only viable map of the Middle East. Let us rededicate ourselves 
to this vision, thereby ensuring a better future for the next generation, and 
perhaps enjoying some of it ourselves if we work hard enough"(164).These
words of Sadat reflects his insistence to conclude the agreement which will
have to pave the way towards the creation of stability in the regions, under 
any cost or circumstances.
The Impact Of The Peace Agreement On The Egyptian –Arab Relations:
The Sadat's vision to towards its foreign policy especially in 
relation to the Arab region, totally differed from Nasser's vision, while the 
latter estimated that Egypt's foreign policy is mainly and directly
committed to its Arab domain. Yet, President Sadat on the contrary, 
realized that the Egyptian foreign policy should focus on achieving his 
country's interests. Though, both the domestic and external policies of 
Sadat differed totally from that of his predecessor Nasser. Yet, they both 
began their presidencies with sovereignty problems as some parts of the 
Egyptian land was still under occupation. Thus, as Nasser worked hard to 
162Bernard Reich, A Brief History of Israel, Infobase Publishing, 2008, p.129.

163Laszlo Solymar, Anatomy of Assassinations, Author House, 2013,p.235.

164 Anwar Sadat And His Vision, Ahmed Maher El-Sayed, Sadat And His Legacy Egypt And The World, 1977­
1997, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, 1997, P:10.
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end the British occupation, President Sadat main cause was putting an end 
to the Israeli occupation of Sinai, and restoring the Egyptian land back(165). 
The Arab world was shocked and furious at Egypt's peace with 
Israel, and was considered as a stab in the back. Sadat became extremely
ostracized and he was branded as traitor. Because of the signing of the 
Egyptian unilateral agreement with Israel, the summit of the Arab league
that was held in the Iraqi capital Baghdad in November 1978, took a
31stdecision to freeze the relations with Egypt. On March , 1979, only five
days after the ratification of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the Arab 
leaders again convened in Baghdad in the absence of Egypt. during this 
conference, the Arab countries decided to suspend its membership in the 
league of Arab states (LAS), and to move the headquarters of the Arab 
league from Cairo to Tunis, alleging that this agreement significantly
affected the rights of the Palestinian people. Moreover, the Arab 
governments punished Egypt for taking this step by imposing economic
sanctions on the country(166). 
Furthermore, the Arab leaders also tried to incite the member 
states of the former Organization of African Unity (AOU), the current 
African Union (AU), as well as the leaders of the Non- Aligned movement 
(NAM), to take the similar position towards Egypt and to isolate Cairo 
from their membership. However, these trials went through a big failure
and the majority of the members in these organizations supported Egypt's 
foreign policy moves(167) . 
In brief, the two consecutive decisions of war and peace were
among the most valiant and strategic resolutions in the history of Egypt. In 
165The Egyptian foreign policy between Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al- Sadat and Hosni 

Mubarak, al Syiassa al Kharigia Al Masreya Bein Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al- Sadat 

and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian council of foreign affairs, Awrak Publications,Vol:11,
 
June 2011.
 
166Tucker, Spencer C.; Roberts, Priscilla (2008-05-12). The Encyclopedia of the Arab-

Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History [4 volumes]: A Political, Social,
 
and Military History. ABC-CLIO.
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addition, President Sadat realized that turning to the west specially the 
United States would be the only exit to all his country's problems, 
regardless of all the negative impacts of this rapprochement on the 
Egyptian leadership role in the region(168) . 
President Anwar Sadat, was assassinated two years after the 
signing of the bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, during
the annual victory parade held in Cairo to commemorate the historical 
victory for Egypt in 1981. In this framework, it is worth to mention that a 
command or "fatwa" authorizing the assassination of the president had 
been issued by the ex-leader of the Egyptian terrorist group, "Al Gamaa Al 
Islamyia", Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman. (he at this time is serving a life
plus 65 years imprisonment in the United States, after being convicted 
with crimes of plotting to bomb many vital installations as FBI
headquarters, the United Nations building)(169).
The planning for assassinating the president started right after the 
signing of the peace agreement between Cairo and Tel- Aviv, and the 
sharing of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 by both the Egyptian President 
and Israeli Prime Minister at that time Menachem Begin. At the time, the 
Egyptian terrorist groups took advantage of these accords as card to gain a
backup for their cause(170).
Egypt's Islamists who were formerly considerate to the endeavors 
of the late president Sadat's to assimilate them into Egyptian society, 
deemed after the signing of the peace accords with Israel, to be deceived 
and called for the overthrow of the Egyptian president publicly. Moreover, 
they urged for the substitution of the state system of governance with a
new system grounded on Islamic theocracy(171). 
168 Aboul Gheit, Ahmed, eyewitness on peace and war, in Arabic Shahed Ala Alharb Wa Alsalam, 2013, Nahdet 

Masr for Publishing, p.422.
 
169 http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/101/omar-abdel-rahman.
 
170 https://modernegypt.info/timeline/?random=483.76251850277185.
 
171Monte Palmer, Princess Palmer, At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists, and
 
America's War on Terrorism, Rowman & Littlefield.. 2007, p. 87.
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CHAPTER 4:
 
MUBARAK: SEARCHING FOR BALANCE:
 
Egypt return to the Arab world:
The former president Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, was appointed 
as a vice for the late leader Sadat in 1975, took over the rule of Egypt in 
the constitutional way through in the aftermath of the assassination of the 
latter in 1981 by the Muslim Brotherhood. This matter could be an 
indicator for the political stability that Egypt has been witnessing during
this period. Yet, this epoch was characterized by some kind of domestic
agitation especially after the shooting of President Sadat. Mubarak's era
was inaugurated with some internal problems, mainly the state of volatility
that challenged the social and national fabric of the country, especially
after the re-emergence of the extremist groups who have been dormant 
during Nasser's rule and the rise of some secretin problems. In addition to 
the coldness in relation between the ruling regime and the political figures 
of both left and right wings as well as the negative impacts of the 
economic policies of his predecessor Sadat(172). 
Thus, the main target for President Mubarak was to restore the 
stability to Egypt on both the internal and external levels. In this domain, 
he endeavored to regain his country's relations with the Arab world, a
matter that represented a great challenge for Mubarak in his early days as a 
president, as he tried hard to reach a compromise between the relations
with the Arabs from one side, and his commitment with Israel from the 
other side. Thus, he attempted to balance between these two obligations, 
so he always stressed on his keenness to maintain the peace agreement 
172Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, continuity and change in The Egyptian foreign policy of president Mubarak, al Syiassa
al Dawleyia, vol.69, July 1982, p.105-132, in Arabic Alestmrarya Wa Altaghyeer Fi Al Siyassa Alkharegia Al
Masryia Lel Raeis Mubarak.
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with Tel- Aviv and his readiness in the same time to get back the ties with 
the Arab Nations(173). 
For instance, the condemnation of the Israeli acts in the 
Palestinian occupied territories, as well as the Israeli invasion to Lebanon 
in 1982, represent a clear example of this balance practiced by Mubarak's 
administration at that time. In addition, the Egyptian regime censured 
Sabra and Shatila massacres that took place in September 1982 in a
neighborhood and Palestinian refugee camp in southern Beirut. and 
withdrew the Egyptian ambassador to Tel-Aviv and put the complete 
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as a condition for his return. Moreover, 
Egypt insisted on the importance of executing its demands, despite the 
American administration pressure on Mubarak, especially that Washington 
tried to link between the Egyptian- United States relations from one side, 
and the Israeli- Egyptian relations from the other side(174). 
Obviously, during this period Mubarak struggled to reveal his 
good intentions towards all his neighbors, thus he helped in taking out the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon and ending the 
Beirut siege, and decided to freeze a number of the normalization 
agreements signed between Cairo and Tel-Aviv. These steps were
followed by improvement in the relations with the neighbors(175). Another 
important factor contributed to the restoration of the Egyptian relations
with the Arab countries and the termination of its isolation in its Arab 
sphere, which is the eruption of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran in 
1980. In this context, it is worth to mention that regardless of the cut in 
the links between Iraq and Egypt at that moment, the latter helped the 
former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in his war was against Tehran, as 
Mubarak regime supplied Baghdad with arms and military equipment. As 
173Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford, Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition
and Support for US Foreign Policy, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007, p.163.
174Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, Oxford University Press 2001, pp.382­
383.
 
175 Egypt, Routledge Revival: MERI Report, Middle East Research Institute, Routledge, 2015, p.44-46.
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well Cairo helped the Iraqi regime to conclude an arms deal from United 
Kingdom in spring of 1982(176) 
Finally, and with this gradual rapprochement the reconciliation 
between Egypt and its Arab neighbors took place during the Arab summit
that took place Amman in the year 1987. During this reunion a decision
was taken by the heads of member states to resume the diplomatic 
relations between Cairo and the Arab countries, and its readmission to the 
league of Arab states (LAS) in 1989 and the return of the headquarters 
back to Cairo one year later(177).
In the aftermath of the reconciliation Mubarak regime has 
always stressed the region's need to create a more comprehensive 
framework, that is not limited only to the traditional security aspects but 
includes political coordination and economic cooperation, a matter which 
was crystallized in the creation of a forum under the name of the Arab 
cooperation council in June 1989. This council included along with Egypt, 
three countries namely Iraq, Yemen and Jordan, who agreed to enhance
and coordinate the political and economic relations among them(178).
What's more, the signing of the Damascus declaration by the gulf 
countries, Syria and Egypt in 1991, represented an important step towards 
the further integration between Egypt and the Arab states(179). 
Concerning the relations with Syria, it is worth mentioning that it
has witnessed a real good cooperation between the both Mubarak regime
and Hafez Al –Assad regime on all levels, politically, economically, and 
diplomatically. However, by the death of the former Syrian president and 
the father of the current president Bashar, the relations started to fade out 
176Farhang Rajaee, Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, University Press of Florida,
 
1997, p.17.

177 http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/monitored-igos/interregional-organisations/568­
league-of-arab-states
 
178 Jonathan Sutherland, Diane Canwell, Key Concepts in International Business, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.8.
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with the gradual rapprochement of the Syrian regime with both Iran and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon(180). 
The Iraqi-Iranian Gulf war 1980-88:
On the side of the ties between Cairo and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), Mubarak when he came to power announced that security
of the Arabian Gulf is indivisible part of Egypt's security is ready to 
provide assistance to any Arab country is facing a threat. In addition, he
called the Arab oil states to work to develop a common Arab security
strategy with and that his country is ready to implement the joint Arab 
defense treaty with the Gulf countries if required to do so. As well, the
first gulf war between Baghdad and Tehran played a major role in the 
rapprochement between Cairo and oil gulf countries, especially with the 
broadening of the Iranian attacks on the southern borders of Iraq until it
reached Kuwait and the Saudi arabia and extended across the whole gulf 
region. At that point the gulf states realized that Egypt could be their only
protector and defender(181) 
Egypt also showed a great plea to restore relations of economic
and financial cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 
this regard, it is worth mentioning that despite the official boycott of 
Egypt, the amount of the investments of the Gulf Cooperation Council
states in Egypt exceeded 2.1 billion Egyptian pounds in 1987(182).
Moreover, by end of 1986, the relations between Egypt and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) was resumed in the field of military
cooperation(183). 
180
My testimony, the Egyptian foreign policy 2004-011, Aboulgheit, Ahmed, 2013, Dar
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On the side of the ties with the Saudi Arabia, it is worth to 
highlight that Mubarak during his rule has always tried to maintain an 
active relationship with this major power in the Gulf region by stressing
the importance of Egypt as a strategic depth for Riyadh, regardless of its 
strong connections with the United States. For instance, and the despite the 
boycott between Cairo and Saudi Arabia, yet Mubarak assisted the Saudi 
government to get Airborne Warning and Control System surveillance
planes (AWACS), during the administration of president Ronald Reagan 
in 1987, this deal was considered at that time as the largest foreign arms 
sale in the US history(184). Moreover, He assured the successive Saudi 
regimes that his country would guarantee not only its own security, but 
also the safety of the whole Gulf region against any Iranian intervention in 
their internal affairs(185). 
The ties with the Soviet Union:
On the other hand, President Mubarak was really careful to re­
correct the path of its relations with the Soviet Union through inviting the 
soviet experts to participate in the repair of the High Dam engines and the 
industrial advisors to work again in the iron and steel factories in the 
neighborhood of Helwan near Cairo. In addition to the continuation of the 
economic projects already launched between the two countries(186).
Moreover, in the year 1983 the Egyptian and soviet governments signed 
scientific and cultural cooperation agreement, and the trade as well as the 
economic relations were resumed between the two countries(187). 
One year later in 1984, Cairo and Moscow decided to exchange
ambassadors, three years after the expulsion of the Russian ambassador 
from Egypt in 1981. Furthermore, by the year 1986 Egypt had become the 
184 Nicholas Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of
America's Competing Interests in the Middle East, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p.204.
185 My testimony, the Egyptian foreign policy 2004-011, Aboulgheit, Ahmed, 2013, Dar Nahdet Masr for
publishing, in Arabic, Shehadaty Al Siyassa Al Kharegia Al Masrya 2004-2011, p:341-342.
186 http://www.nytimes.com/ 1981/11/09/world/mubarak-pledges-to-improve-living-for-allegyptians.html.
187William B. Quandt, The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, Brookings
Institution Press, 2010, p. 89)
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largest trading partner in the Arab world. The trade between the two 
countries has approached $ 850 million, making the Soviet Union Egypt's 
second largest trading partner after the United States(188). in the year 1987 
the relations between Egypt and the soviet union witnessed more positive
developments, as Moscow agreed to reschedule the Egyptian debt for the 
soviet government which was approximately estimated by about $ 3 
billion to be paid in 25 years with a grace period of 10 years(189). 
However, in 1988 the soviet government approved carrying over 
the Egyptian military debt that was calculated approximately with $ 1.5 
billion for about 19 years and six years as a grace period, this debt was 
agreed to be exchanged by Egyptian products to be exported to 
Moscow(190).Finally and in the year 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union Mubarak regime disclosed that the federal republic of Russia is the 
heir of the disintegrated union, and the relationship between the newly
formed state and Cairo began to develop dramatically through the 
exchange of visits.
The ties with the United States and The second Gulf war 1991:
The reconciliation with Moscow was not on the expense of its 
excellent relations with the united states that passed by many difficult 
situations, as a result of some differences of visions and opinions 
regarding some issues. The developments of Arab- Israeli conflict, and the 
Egyptian debts and its negative impacts on the economy, as well as the 
refusal of Egyptian administration to permit the Americans to use of the 
military base in Ras Banas area overlooking the red sea, and to grant them 
some more military facilities. All these factors created some tension in the 
relations between Cairo and Washington during the 1980's. Despite this 
188 Eur, The Middle East and North Africa 2003, Psychology Press, 2002, p.291.
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Mubarak's administration was careful to regain the lost equilibrium or 
balance in the ties between the two countries(191).
In this regard it is worth to mention that Mubarak aspired at 
changing the Egyptian foreign policy towards the united states, as he
believed that his predecessor’s foreign policy towards Washington has 
negatively impacted Egypt status and tarnished its image in the Arab 
world. For this reason, Mubarak wanted his country to enjoy some sort of 
independence in its relations with the united states to improve this image. 
During the first decade of Mubarak's rule the connections between the two 
states witnessed some ebb and flow. For instance, the first tangible unease
between Cairo and Washington took place during the Israeli invasion to 
Lebanon in 1982 when Mubarak asked the American administration to put 
some pressure on Tel-Aviv to withdraw for the Lebanese territories and to 
revise its policy towards the middle east to reach a peaceful solution for
the ongoing Arab Israeli conflict(192). 
Yet the most important crisis that occurred between the both 
capitals in the year 1985 when the American air forces barred an Egyptian 
plane and obliged it to land in Italy under allegations that the Palestinian 
abductors of the Italian cruiser Achille Lauro were on board of this flight. 
This incident upset the Egyptian regime who labeled it as an unfriendly
(193)action from the part of the united states . Moreover, the relations
between Cairo and Washington on the background of the latter attack on 
Libya to destroy some political leadership and military targets in the 
Libyan capital Tripoli and city of Benghazi, under the claims that they
were related to the Libyan regime of Gaddafi who was accused of 
executing terrorist attacks against the American interests(194). 
191
The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers: economic, political and strategic perspectives, 
By Rasul BuxRais, p:89-90.
192H. Thomas Davis, 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion, DIANE Publishing,
1995, p.97
193 Itamar Rabinovich, Haim Shaked, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984-1985, The Moshe Dayan Center,
1987, p.34.
194William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy,
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.149.
153 | P a g e 
   
 
 
  
   
   
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
     
 
   
     
     
  
    
  
    
                                                           
 
       
        
   
Regardless of the tensions between the two sides, the Egyptian 
president Mubarak paid five visits to the United States from the period 
between the years 1981-1985. Furthermore, the economic relations
between Cairo and Washington witnessed a number of dramatic
progresses, especially in relation to the increase of the amount of financial 
assistance granted to the Egyptian government for the military and social 
aspects. This advancement reflects the concern of both the American 
administration and congress with the pivotal role of Egypt in the Middle 
East region and the importance of improving its capacities and capabilities 
to keep up with this responsibility. 
In this context, it is worth to note that the evolution in the 
financial aid started in the year 1979 after the conclusion of the of the 
bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, when the American 
administration agreed to grant Cairo a loan worth $ 1.5 billion for five
years. Yet part of it was considered as a bestowal in the years 1982, 1983 
and 1984. In addition, starting the year 1985 the American military
assistance to Egypt had transformed to annual grants of an average of $ 1.3 
billion. Thus, Cairo during the 1980's received a total of $ 30 billion(195) 
With the beginning of the 1990's two important developments that 
have taken place and contributed to giving a push to the Egyptian relations
with the united states, the first one was Mubarak's administration position 
from the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in August 1990, a matter that revealed 
the real leverage of Egypt's role in the region. In this domain, it is worth 
to highlight the that both the Egyptian and Arab response to the aggression 
could be underscored in the emergency meeting that has been held by the 
league of Arab states (LAS), without the approval of any resolutions, 
waiting for results of King Hussein's of Jordan peace initiative. At the 
same time, The Iraqi President Saddam called the King earlier in the same 
day, suggesting a mini-summit to solve the crisis. Thus, King Hussein 
195Mohamed Kadry Said, the Middle East security in the Egyptian-American dialogue, al 
Siyassa Al Dawelyia, Vol.134, November 1998, p.134, in Arabic Amn Al Shark Al-
Awsat Fi Al Hewar Al Masry Al Americy.
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went to Cairo to obtain President Mubarak's approval for this proposal, 
and both of them contacted President George Bush (the father) asking for
only 48 hours to end the situation(196) . 
Meanwhile, the former American President did not waste time 
especially after he had been warned by the British Prime Minister at that 
time Margaret Thatcher not to be hesitant. Therefore, he offered the late
Saudi King Fahd the help of United States, if Iraqi troops did not stop at 
the borders of kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, and on a further
development, President Bush cautioned King Fahd once again from the 
massing of Iraqi troops along his country's borders, and sent the Secretary
of Defense, at that time Dick Cheney, to Riyadh. This step was followed 
by the deployment of American troops on the Saudi lands, in an operation 
that turned out to be known as "Operation Desert Shield". Moreover, the 
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 661 that imposed economic
sanctions on Iraq(197).
On the other hand, another emergency meeting of the Arab 
League, 14 Arab states pursued Mubarak's path in denouncing the Iraqi 
invasion and urged for an instant withdrawal from Kuwait. The seven 
votes against that resolution were from Iraq, Djibouti, Libya, Jordan, 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yemen and Sudan. However, 
and as a reaction to the arrival of the American troops in Saudi Arabia and 
to the U.N. economic sanctions, a new significant development took place
when Iraq declared a union of Iraq and Kuwait. 
Therefore, another Arab summit conference was held, during
which President Mubarak forced a vote on a resolution, urging the Iraqi 
withdrawal from all the occupied territories and rejecting at the same time 
the annexation of Kuwait. Also it called for the restoration of the Kuwaiti 
Prince and supported the U.N. economic sanctions, demanding the 
196Jerry M. Long, Saddam's War of Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of
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formation of an Arab "expeditionary force" to help Saudi Arabia. The vote 
on the resolution put the Arab states at odds, as they were separated into 
three camps, one supporting Iraq, another supporting Kuwait, and the third 
was neutral. The twelve votes in favor of the resolution were those of 
Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Djibouti, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. While, the three
votes against were those of Iraq, Libya, and the PLO. Yet, the remaining
six states were neither for nor against. Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen uttered 
their abstention; at the time both Sudan and Mauritania expressed their
reservations; and the only country was absent from the summit was 
Tunisia(198) .
The Egyptian participation in the international coalition to 
liberate Iraq, with about 35, 0000 troops gave a push to the American –
Egyptian relations to the extent that Washington dropped around $ 
billion of the Egyptian military debt and this relation continued in the 
same line with the consecutive administration of the democratic president 
Bill Clinton. Not only but also the Arab countries together with 
Washington cancelled about $ 20 billion of the Egyptian debt, as well the 
United States managed to persuade the Paris club – which is an informal 
group of creditors countries- to let off $ 10 billion or half of what Cairo 
owned to a group of European countries, united states, japan and Canada.  
This step enabled Egypt to borrow more money a matter that eased the 
pressure on the country's budget and helped to pave the way for the 
economic growth(199). 
On the other hand, the second important development that helped 
in strengthening the American–Egyptian relations was the balanced way
that the American president at that time George Bush and his foreign 
minister James Baker dealt with the peace process in the Middle East that 
started with the Madrid peace conference in 1991. From its part, Egypt 
198www.gulfwar1991.com/Gulf%20War%20Complete/Chapter%206,%20The%201990%20Crisis%20Leading
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believed that an international peace conference could be the only
convenient way to discuss the complicated issues of the Arab- Israeli
conflict. Egypt has always been convinced that there is an organic 
relationship between achieving progresses either on the bilateral or 
multilateral tracks from one side, and between the achievement of progress 
upon issues as water, refugees, arms control and economic cooperation 
that necessitate stable and cooperative environment in the whole
region(200). 
In this frame work it is worth to note that in the year 1989, U.S. 
Secretary of State James Baker mentioned that Israel should forsake its 
expansionist policies; this remark was taken by many circles as a signal 
that the pro-Israel Reagan years were over. In the Aftermath of the Gulf 
War in 1991, President George Bush (the father), highlighted that the 
achievement of a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict that is based on the 
land -for-peace principle and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights was one
of the main priorities of his administration's foreign policy(201). 
Accordingly, and as a first step President Bush declared his 
intention to reconvene the international peace conference in Madrid, as the 
American administration at that time believed that there was a chance to 
use the political momentum engendered by the U.S. and its allies success 
in the Gulf War to invigorate the Arab-Israeli peace process. This initiative
concentrated on organizing a multi-party international conference that 
would later break into separate bilateral and multilateral negotiating
paths. Consequently, Baker made eight visits to the Middle East region to 
get patronage and backing for the upcoming conference. A framework of 
goals and intentions was devised and Washington together with Moscow, 
200Itamar Rabinovich, Jehuda Reinharz, Israel in the Middle East: Documents and
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spread out an invitation letter to Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians(202). 
On the economic level, the Egyptian – American relations during
Mubarak's era also endorsed several developments with the agreement to 
upgrade the partnership treaty to create a Free Trade Area (FTA), the 
matter that would have allowed the Egyptian exports to access the 
American market without any customs and tariffs. However, during this 
period Cairo signed the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreement in the 
year 2005, with the United States and Israel. This agreement allow the 
products that contain at least 11,7% of its components of Egyptian origin 
to the American market without any customs or tariffs. The results have
been positive. Israeli exports to Egypt rose over 30% from $ 29 million in 
2004 to $ 93.2 million and exceeded $ 125 million in 2006. As of the year 
2008 about ten QIZs have been set up in Egypt(203). 
202http://www.mideastweb.org/ madridconference.htm.
203 http://www.qizegypt.gov.eg/.
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Figure 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt
 
($ in millions)
 
Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Counterterrorism Efforts:
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks of 2001, the 
Egyptian-American relations have become a bit tense, this could be
attributed to Cairo's unwillingness to send troops to both Afghanistan and 
Iraq in peace stabilization missions, as the Egyptian regime at that moment 
preferred to participate in the in those efforts only through training and 
technical assistance. Egypt supported the U.S. efforts in its war against
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international terrorism after 9/11, however it rejected to send troops to 
Kabul during the war and after it(204). 
From its part, Cairo totally disagreed with the U.S. military
intervention of March 2003 in Iraq, in the operation known as "operation 
Iraqi freedom". It continued to oppose Washington occupation of the 
country even after the termination of the military operation and further
refused to comply with George W. Bush administration's War requests to 
send troops to the country even under the auspices of the United Nations 
(UN). 
Moreover, the issue of chipping in the post-war construction 
efforts in Iraq has been controversial not only in Cairo but also in the 
entire Arab world. Form one side the antagonists believed that the military
intervention in Iraq and toppling a deep- rooted regime even under the 
allegations of acquiring weapons of mass destruction was illegitimate, and 
it was necessary to wait until Iraq form its legal representative government 
to tackle it. Alternatively, backers of participation argued that the 
responsibility to protect Iraqi people and to help them in time of crisis 
should predominate and direct the Egyptian administration's movement 
in the country, regardless of the disagreement of the Iraqis themselves(205). 
However, and in the framework of the cooperation between Cairo 
and Washington in the counter terrorism efforts. It is worth to mention 
that the American officials have always labeled the collaboration with 
Egyptian security and military apparatuses, as having shared useful 
intelligence and providing each other with beneficial counterterrorism
assistance. Washington have appreciated the mutual aid from the Egyptian 
204U S Congress, Congressional Record, V. 151, PT. 17, October 7 to 26, 2005,
Government Printing Office, 2010, p.364.
https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1164525344/egypt-and-the-war-on-iraq-implications-for­
domestic.
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side with the successive American administration in the 1980s, 1990s, but 
particularly in the last decade since the 9/11 attacks(206). 
Moreover, when the relations between the United States and 
30thEgypt worsened after the June revolution of 2013 that toppled Muslim
Brotherhood regime in the country. The American administration decided 
to introduce some cuts in the military aid granted to Egypt, yet it continued 
to finance all the activities related to the counter-terrorism, border security 
and security operations in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, which is 
(207)considered very important for maintaining Israel's security . 
Military cooperation between Cairo and Washington:
In the aftermath of the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt 
and Israel, the U.S. during the period between 1979 and 2003 has provided 
Cairo with about $19 billion as military aid, a matter which made Egypt 
the second largest non-NATO recipient for the U.S. military assistance
after Tel-Aviv. In 1989, both Egypt and Israel became a major non-NATO
ally of the United States. In addition, Egypt received about $30 billion in 
economic aid within the same episode. In the year 2009, Washington 
granted a military assistance of $1.3 billion as well as an economic
assistance of $250 million(208).
It could be argued that the military cooperation between the U.S. 
and Egypt is probably the strongest aspect of their strategic partnership 
between the two states. In this framework, it is worth to mention that the 
American executives have always emphasized the vitality of the Egyptian 
role in the Middle East, as it is considered a key pivotal country in the 
region. Egypt had always been labelled by the different administrations as 
206Musa Tuzuner, Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing, IOS 
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the most prominent player in the Arab world and a key U.S. ally in the 
Middle East region(209). 
On the other hand, the military cooperation between the two 
countries involves a very important aspect which execution of a series of a
joint training exercises led by United States and Egyptian forces in Egypt
known as operation bright star. These military exercises which are carried 
out every two years, are considered one of the most high-ranking and 
prominent in the world, they began in the year 1981, after the conclusion 
of the Camp David Accords. This military operation was mainly intended 
to reinforce the ties between the Egyptian Armed Forces and the United 
States Central Command and to enhance the ability of Washington to 
support its allies in the Middle East during the periods of war. In the 
aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait through the Operation Desert Storm, 
these military exercises got bigger and have counted in about 11 countries 
with approximately 70,000 personnel, among these countries are
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Greece, besides 
the Netherlands, in addition to Jordan, Kuwait, as well as the United Arab 
Emirates(210).
The military exercise begins with coalition inter-operability
training to explain to the participating countries, how to operate with each 
other during the time of war, then continues with a Command Post 
Exercise that is planned to help standardize command and control 
procedures, followed by a large-scale Field Training Exercise to rehearse
all the above mentioned together(211). For the Egyptian armed forces, the 
goal of the exercise is to exchange experiences and mutual understanding
between the various military schools, and advanced armament systems. In 
addition, the training provides a great opportunity to strengthen the bonds 
of cooperation and friendship between the participating countries(212). As 
209Craig N. Murphy, Global Institutions, Marginalization and Development, Routledge,
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for the United States, Bright Star focus is the largest and most important 
exercises conducted by the Central Command, which is responsible for
forces in the Middle East and Central Asia, to improve the fighting skills 
in the desert. They train the troops everything from how to keep their
equipment in the dessert to how to communicate with each other and with 
the coalition forces.
The operation 	 Bright Star for the year 2012 was suspended 
25thbecause of the january Revolution of 2011, The Egyptian Government 
and the United States mutually agreed in August 2011 to postpone the 
2012 exercise in light of ongoing transition events. The decision was 
reached as part of the routine bilateral conversations between the two 
countries(213). Furthermore, the Bright Star 2014 that should have taken 
place in September 2013, was annulled from the part of the American 
administration of president Barack Obama. This step was taken as a
response for the Egyptian government evacuation of the two encampments 
by backers of ousted president Mohamed Morsi in Cairo, after six weeks 
of unauthorized sit-in(214). 
However, during the last years of Mubarak's rule and with 
President Barak Obama coming into power in the United States with his 
new administration, he showed some positive vibes, to restore back the 
strength of the relations, despite the continuing existing differences over 
many issues. In that sense, it is worth mentioning that the American 
president Obama chose the Cairo University, the oldest Arab university in 
the modern history, to deliver his first speech to the Arab and Islamic 
worlds, during which he expressed his new concept of democratization in 
the region(215).
213http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/08/110817_bright_star.shtml.
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The Arab- Israeli Conflict:
A new era of the relations with Tel- Aviv has started in Egypt 
with the arrival of President Mubarak to power in the country. He
inaugurated his term with what is known as cold peace, despite the 
improvement in ties between both sides after the full Israeli withdrawal 
from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982, because of two factors. The first 
one was the Israeli invasion for Lebanon, while the second was the 
establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, which was 
strongly condemned from Cairo, and put the relations between the two 
countries in a state of permanent tension. Also the refusal of Tel - Aviv to 
pull out its forces from Taba(216). 
At that period, the Egyptian government as mentioned before
suspended all its official connections with Israel and refused a proposal 
from Tel- Aviv to hold a bilateral meeting to solve the Taba issue and it
imposed many conditions for the return of the Egyptian ambassador to 
Israel and resume the normalization process between the two sides. 
Among these conditions were the complete withdrawal from the Lebanese
territories and clarifying the officials who were responsible for executing
the Sabra and Shatila massacres, in addition to putting forward a clear 
solution for the Palestinian cause that conserve the rights of the 
Palestinians. The Arab – Israeli conflict has always been on top of the 
Egyptian foreign policy priorities and the public opinion in Cairo has been 
active at that period as it expressed its disagreement with the recurrent 
Israeli violence against the Palestinian people and the air raiding of the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981(217). 
The tension between the two countries lasted until the year 1985 
that witnessed visits from mutual official visits, in addition to convening
three negotiating rounds about Taba with the participation of American 
216Ephraim Dowek, Israeli-Egyptian Relations 1980-2000, Psychology Press, 2001, 
p.270.
 
217Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt Islam And Democracy: Critical Essays, American
 
University in Cairo Press, 2002, p.212).
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experts yet it failed to reach any solution. Yet this improvement did not 
last for too long with the occurrence of two important incidences, namely
the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Cairo that was followed by
another shooting for a group of Israeli tourists(218). In the year 1986, the 
relations endorsed little room of advancement with an American mediation 
when the Egyptian president Mubarak agreed to hold a meeting with the 
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. In the course of this reunion it was 
approved to forward the case of Taba for the international arbitration and 
to convene an international conference to settle the middle east conflict, a
matter which was considered as a precedence in the history of this 
struggle(219) . 
Despite the intense exchange of visits between Cairo and Tel-
Aviv during this period on the foreign ministers levels, yet no tangible
progress had been achieved on the Arab- Palestinian conflict except for the 
withdrawal from Taba, but without any success on the other tracks. In the 
meantime, some voices inside Israel started to reject the idea of convening
an international peace conference particularly after Yitzhak Shamir came 
as a prime minister in Israel(220). The eruption of the first Palestinian 
intifada in December 1987 again had a negative impact on the peace
process in the middle east, while Egypt persisted on its stance concerning
the peace conference(221). 
Since the Madrid peace conference that was held in the year 1991 
the Egyptian foreign policy depended on using its regional weight and 
acted as a meditator to push the peace process in the Middle East, and to 
work with both the Palestinians and Israelis to conclude a fair agreement 
between them. Throughout these efforts, Egypt took advantage of its 
218 Abdelmoneim said, back to the line, Egypt and the Arab world, 1978-1988, al Mostkbal al Araby
 
Publishings, Vol. 22, p.117, in Arabic Alawda Lel Saf, Masr Wa Alalam Alaraby, 1978-1988.
 
219Taylor & Francis Group, The Middle East and North Africa 2004, Psychology Press,
 
2003, p.534.
 
220 Hassan A. Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 1988-2002, Routledge, 2004, p.50 .
 
221Zachary Lockman, Joel Beinin, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli 

Occupation, South End Press, 1989, p.5-22.
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swinging relations with Tel-Aviv and tried to revive the peace talks with 
the different Israeli governments that showed some flexibility, as the 
governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres. While
during the presence of other governments as the governments of Ariel 
Sharon and Netanyahu the peace process suffered from big recession, a
matter that was reflected on the Egyptian–Israeli relations and deepened 
the concept of cold peace between the two sides, which ended up with the 
withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador to  Tel-Aviv once again(222).
Following the September 1993 Oslo accords, during which Israel 
and the Palestinian liberation organization (PLO), recognized each other
through what was known as the declaration of principles, Egypt played a
supporting role by encouraging both parties to uphold their commitments. 
In fact, Mubarak regime took this role seriously, it hosted many summits 
and meetings in Sharm el Sheikh throughout the 1990's and 2000's(223). 
In the year 2008, Egypt mediated a cessation of hostilities 
between Israel and Hamas. The agreement demanded Hamas to halt its 
rocket attacks on the Israeli cities and to put into effect a quiet period 
throughout Gaza strip. In return, Hamas presumed that the blockade on 
the strip to come to an end, and to recommence the trade, and truck 
consignments to 2005 levels, which was estimated between 500 and 600 
trucks daily(224). During the 2008-2009 Gaza War, Egypt condemned the 
Israeli attacks. Thus, during the united nations security council (UNSC) 
meeting Cairo affirmed that the crippling blockade enforced by Tel- Aviv
is considered from the Egyptian point of view as a flagrant violation of 
Israel's responsibilities under international law, international humanitarian 
law and its obligations as an occupying authority. Moreover, it opened 
the Rafah Border Crossing to allow the injured into Egyptian hospitals. 
222Dr. Gehad Ouda, challenges of Egyptian foreign policy making in the 21st century, Al-
Marekh publishing 2004, p.222-261, in Arabic Tahdyat Senaeat Al Siyassa Al Kharegya 
Al Masrya Fi Al Karn Al Wahed Wa Eleshreen.
223Mohammed El-Nawawy, The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Process in the Reporting of
Western Journalists, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p.25.
224 http://www.un.org/ press/en/2009/090115_Gaza.doc.htm
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(225)(Elizabeth Wilmshurst ,In addition, following the 2010 Israeli military
raid on the Gaza freedom Flotilla, Mubarak censured the excessive and 
unjustified use of force from the part of Tel-Aviv, and the Egyptian 
Foreign Ministry summoned the Israeli ambassador in Cairo to express its 
denunciation. As well, he ordered the opening of the Egyptian border to 
Gaza to permit the humanitarian and medical aid inside the Gaza Strip(226). 
On the other hand, Egypt during Mubarak era played a crucial 
role in the mediation of the reconciliation process between the Palestinian 
factions Fatah and Hamas to resolve the hostility amid both since their
conflict that took place in the period between 2006—2007 which resulted 
in Hamas' capture of Gaza Strip. In this regard it is worth mentioning
that the first reconciliation agreement known as The Palestinian Cairo 
Declaration was signed 2005 by a broad spectrum of Palestinian factions, 
including Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, etc. It sought after shoring up 
of the status of the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people through the participation of all factions to it according
to democratic principles(227). This step was followed by a number of
rounds of negotiations that were held in different Arab capitals for the last 
10 years. Yet, and in spite of the conclusion of a number of agreements, 
those reconciliation endeavors until this very recent moment have not been 
successful, as Hamas is still having full control on the Gaza Strip, 
regardless of the formation of a unity government in June 2014(228). 
In brief the Arab – Israeli conflict has always been one of the key
priorities in the Egyptian foreign policy during Mubarak's era, as it 
dominated a huge part of the Egyptian foreign activity throughout those 
years. In this framework, it I s worth to note that the Egyptian foreign 
policy in relation to the Palestinian cause is based on coherent principles 
that involves the importance of the withdrawal of Israel from all the 
225 International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, OUP Oxford, 2012, p.282.
 
226Ernest Tucker The Middle East in Modern World History, Routledge, 2016 p.355.
 
227 https://web.archive.org/ web/20070704163620/http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=2&id=849.
 
228 http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-27660218.
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occupied territories, and achieving just and comprehensive peace in the 
region. In addition to resolving of all the suspended issues. 
Relations with Africa:
Concerning the relations with the Africa, the Mubarak era was 
characterized by a relative neglection to the black continent compared to 
Nasser's era for example. However, during the first years of Mubarak's 
rule, these relations witnessed cooperation in one of the most critical 
issues for Egypt that is the water issue. Therefore, it tried to gather all the 
Nile basin countries in an informal assembly called the "UNDUGO
assembly" to organize the various fields of cooperation among all parties 
to maximize the benefits for all countries. In more details, the group which 
means brotherhood in Swahili language, was a purely Egyptian idea and 
includes most of the Nile Basin countries in East and Central Africa
region, and its creation has been announced during the first ministerial 
conference of the Nile Basin countries, held in Khartoum in November
1983(229). 
The assembly aimed at augmenting consultation and coordination 
of positions between the member countries towards regional issues, 
besides enhancing the cooperation between the assembly members in the 
field of development. Moreover, the assembly aspired to exchange of 
experiences in all fields in order to support regional cooperation, as well as 
supporting the economic integration between the different member states. 
Nevertheless, this gathering encountered many obstacles that prevented the 
achievement of its objectives and the most important of these obstacles 
were the lack of sufficient funding to finance its projects, and the constant 
competition between Ethiopia and Sudan to host the permanent follow-up 
(230)committee . 
229P. P. Howell, J. A. Allan, The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource: A Historical and Technical Review of Water
Management and of Economical and Legal Issues, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.360.
230 http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=145#.V0 4cPl97IU.
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In addition, Cairo participated with the organization of African 
unity (AOU) in tangible efforts to sole the regional conflict as in Chad, 
Mauritania, and Senegal, as it believed in the importance of resolving
these disputes to give a chance for those countries to achieve real 
development for themselves and their societies. Therefore, these efforts 
were gelled with the establishment of a mechanism to prevent, manage and 
resolve the African conflicts that came out during the African summit in 
1993. Moreover, Egypt is considered as one of the largest contributors in 
the African union, as well as the peacekeeping operations in the 
continent(231). 
Despite the Egyptian activities and interests in Africa, yet the 
foreign policy of Mubarak towards Africa needed more concentration and 
focus on the neglected aspects. For instance, the Egyptian participation in 
the African summits and conferences on the presidential level, that has 
been so limited or nearly disappeared, since the failed attempt to 
assassinate president Mubarak in June 1995, in Addis Ababa while he was 
attending the summit of the Organization of African Unity (AOU)(232).
On the other hand, Egypt established the African cooperation 
fund which is affiliated to the ministry of foreign affairs in 1980 to be
responsible for providing funds for the development projects in the 
different African countries. Furthermore, it aims at sharing the Egyptian 
experience in several fields as, agriculture, irrigation, medicine and 
education which are considered as vital fields needed by the African 
countries. However, the budget of this fund has always faced a problem of 
insufficiency and limitation despite the trials to increase this budget from 
one side and to encourage the Egyptian business community to explore
their chances in Africa(233).
231Deych, Tatiana, Zhukov, Alexander Africa's Growing Role in World Politics, 
MeaBooks Inc, 2016, p.19.
232 https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/02/04/document-friday-mubarak-al-bashir-al-zawahiriand-bin-laden­
the-1995-assassination-atempt-in-addis-ababa/.
233http://www.siyassa.org.eg/NewsContent/6/52/3081/%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%A9%D8% 
A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8 
4%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B 
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The Mubarak regime tried to face the weak trade levels with the 
African states which didn't manage to exceed 1% of its total foreign 
commercial relations with the whole world. thus, he was encouraged to 
face this fact and enhance the trade and not to stop at the already signed 29 
bilateral trade agreements with the continent. Accordingly, Mubarak 
decided to join the agreement of the Common Market For East And South 
Africa (COMESA) in 1998, a market which embraces 21 countries with 
more than 300 million population at that time, aiming at substituting the 
reduction of the Egyptian exports to Europe and to get the row materials 
with lower prices(234). 
Also, the Egyptian diplomacy tried hard to find a proper 
mechanism to enhance the European – African relations, a matter which 
has been crystallized successfully by convening the first Euro- African 
summit in Cairo in the year 2000. From his part the former Egyptian 
foreign minister Ahmed Abou Elgheit mentioned that, all the critics to 
Egypt about the regression of its role in Africa are not really true, because
Cairo nowadays is present in Africa, but in a different way than that of the 
fifties and sixties, when it used to help the African liberation movements. 
Yet, at the moment it plays an important role in the development of the 
black continent through pumping investments and sending experts in all
fields(235) . 
Relations with Europe and the Mediterranean:
As mentioned before the foreign policy during Mubarak's period 
aspired at regaining or restoring the balance in its external relations as well
as expanding the margin of movement for the Egyptian administration in 
the course of this time. Mubarak regime through reinforcing its ties with 
Europe and the Mediterranean did not aim at substituting its connections 
4/%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5­
%D9%84%D9%80%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9% 
84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9%20.aspx.
 
234 OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews, Egypt 2007, OECD Publishing, 2007, p.19.
 
235 My testimony, the Egyptian foreign policy 2004-011, Aboulgheit, Ahmed, 2013, Dar Nahdet Masr for
 
publishing, in Arabic, Shehadaty Al Siyassa al Kharegia al masrya 2004-2011, p:307-328.
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with a superpower as the United States, but he believed that the relations
with a player like Europe would give Cairo more influence. Moreover, he
perceived Europe as an international power that is capable of exerting
pressure on Israel to push the peace process forward. As well, Mubarak 
understood that enhancing the bonds with Europe would assist the country
to overcome its problems of foreign debts, through either rescheduling or 
cancelling them. 
In that context, Cairo started taking several steps throughout this 
path, as inviting Spain and Italy in 1990, to convene an international 
conference on security and cooperation between the Mediterranean 
countries. Thus, in December 1990 a high official meeting was held with 
the participation of official from many Mediterranean countries among
them was Spain. On the other hand, and as part of Barcelona process 
Egypt started in 1995 negotiations with the European union that lasted 
more than four years which ended by the signing of the association 
agreement to develop cooperation relations between them in certain fields 
in 2001(236).
The Euro- Egyptian relations developed on two main levels, the 
bilateral level, as Europe is considered as the main or the trade partner for
Egypt, as it represents 40% of its trade and is considered as the first trade
partner for Cairo. Also, the EU is considered as the main source of tourism
for Egypt and it is the second main investor and the second biggest aid 
donor. Therefore, all these aspects drove Egypt to develop its relations
with the EU since 1977, by signing the first cooperation agreement that 
has developed gradually to reach this agreement in the year 2002.
While the second level is the multi- lateral Mediterranean level 
which started with the Barcelona conference in 1995 with the participation 
of 27 countries on both the Mediterranean which ended by the announcing
the "Barcelona declaration" to enhance the cooperation in three main 
236 Gamal M. Selim, The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The Limits of Externally-
Induced Change, Springer, 2015, p.80
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fields(237). These arenas include Political and Security issues, Economic
and financial and social and cultural cooperation. The Barcelona process 
throughout all these years has faced a lot of problems with the deadlock of 
the peace process in the Middle East, the matter that affected its 
achievement of any success.
Thus, and in a trial to face this failure the former French president 
Nicolas Sarkozy, proposed to revive the Barcelona process by launching in 
2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), which was formed by 40 
countries by Co- Chairmanship of both the former Egyptian president 
Mubarak and Sarkozy. The idea of the union is to focus on the 
implementation of development related projects in different fields as 
education, health and energy for the southern Mediterranean countries(238).
The European Union (EU) is considered as Egypt’s biggest 
trading partner at this time accounting for 42% of Egyptian exports and 
37% of imports according to the estimations of the year 2004. This was the 
year that witnessed the entry into force of the association agreement 
between the two sides, however the trade balance until now is still in favor 
for the EU(239). 
Egypt’s main exports to the EU are energy, textiles and clothing, 
agricultural products, and chemicals. Major imports from the EU are the 
power generating machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, and food 
and agricultural products. Trade relations with the EU are good although 
there are several outstanding trade and sanitary issues. These range from 
market access issues and difficulties for businesses facing a highly
regulated and complex system to restrictions in the export of agricultural 
237https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/barcelona_declaration.pdf.
 
238
the Egyptian foreign policy between Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al- Sadat and Hosni 

Mubarak, al Syiassa al Kharigia al Masreyabein Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al- Sadat 

and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian council of foreign affairs, Awrak Publication , vol.: 11
 
, June 2011.
 
239 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/june/tradoc_117680.pdf.
 
172 | P a g e 
   
 
   
  
 
  
    
  
   
    
   
  
   
  
    
   
    
   
  
    
  
    
   
     
 
     
  
     
  
 
                                                           
 
            
     
  
goods as the potatoes and fishery products since they do not conform with 
EU quality standards(240).
On the level of the Egyptian relations with the Mediterranean, 
Egypt has always represented a link between two civilizations, yet many
factors have played roles in hindering the enhancement of these relations, 
and many Egyptian thinkers have always highlighted the emphasis of 
Mediterranean identity over the other identities. It is worth to note that 
one of the most important preoccupations for the Egyptian foreign policy
during the last two decades of Mubarak's regime was the increasing gap 
between the north and the south. This concern mounted owing to its
negative impact not only on the relations between them, but, also on the 
stability of the whole international system. Accordingly, Egypt has always 
insisted on rifting this gap through an effective dialogue, a matter that 
drove Egypt with a group of countries of the southern hemisphere to 
establish a forum, under that name of G 15. This group aims at starting an 
effective south – south cooperation at first step, then to open up a useful 
dialogue with the developed countries of the north cooperation as a later 
(241)stage . The G 15 is considered as one of the most important informal 
cooperative models between countries of the South, which forms a nucleus 
for regional cooperation, through implementing of projects among its 
members initially, then among the rest of the third world countries as a
next step. Therefore, they are working in an integrative framework to serve
the Third World issues in the areas of economic and social development. 
The idea of the establishment of the group dates back to the call made by
President Alan Garcia, the former president of Peru to hold a consultative 
9thand cooperative conference between countries of the South, during the 
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that was held in Belgrade in 
September 1989(242).
240http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/egypt/)
 
241 
G 15 and south–south cooperation, promise and performance, Kripa Sridharan, third world quarterly, vol :19
 
, No: 3, pp: 357 -373, 1998)
 
242 http://g15.org/member-countries-2/ historical-background/.
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The group was formed at the beginning by 15 of the Non-Aligned 
countries, namely: Egypt, Senegal, Algeria, Zimbabwe and Nigeria as 
representatives the African continent, besides India, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, on behalf of the continent of Asia, in addition to Peru, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela for Latin America, and 
Yugoslavia on the continent of Europe. Then Chile joined in 1991 instead 
7thof Yugoslavia, and in the summit of the Group that was held in Kuala 
Lumpur in 1997 Kenya joined, followed by Sri Lanka, which applied for
8thmembership to the group at the summit in Cairo in May 1998. The G 
15 adopts several goals, mainly enhancing Coordination between the 
member countries in the economic and financial fields, strengthening the 
South- South dialogue to reach a comprehensive cooperation among
developing countries, and nourishing the of dialogue between North and 
South in order to establish equal relations between them.
Additionally, the group endeavors at working to solve the 
worsening debt problem in the Third World, and trying to develop a
common format for these countries to negotiating with the major
industrialized countries. Moreover, the group aims to exchanging of views 
on the international economic situation and its implications, as well as 
examining the position of developing countries of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, and the subsequent 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and their impact 
on economic and trade situation of these countries(243) . 
Mubarak regime ruled Egypt for three decades until the January
2011 revolution erupted as a direct result for many reasons- that will be
discussed in details in the next chapter-, yet amongst the causes of the 
2011 uprising were the ban on political and civil rights, and corruption. In 
addition to the augmenting unemployment, as well as inflation and low­
income rates. Mubarak took the least interest in the socio-economic
welfare of the people, which turned the Egyptians against him. Apart from 
243http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=439#.V09Gb_l97IV.
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domestic causes, Egypt’s pro-West and idle policies towards the 
Palestinian issue were the sources of frustration and disappointment 
among the people against Mubarak. Furthermore, the Tunisian bloodless 
revolution also inspired the Egyptian people to take to the streets and stand 
up against the government. However, this will be discussed later in details 
in the next chapter(244).
Stages of Development of the Egyptian Regional Role from 1952- 2011:
The determinants of the Egyptian national security could be
divided into two main levels: the first one, is the external level which is 
directly linked or attached to Egypt's regional role in relation to three
prime issues, mainly the Arab - Israeli conflict, the Nile water, and 
maintaining the balance in the Middle East region. While the second level 
is the internal one, which mainly involves the protection of national unity, 
23rdand the fight against terrorism. As the revolution of July , 1952 is 
regarded as a reference point in the history of contemporary Egypt, with 
the founding of the first republic in 1954, the regional role of Egypt could 
be parted into four general stages between the rise, decline, renewal and 
retreat as follows:
The Rise Stage:
This stage started off since the July 1952 until June 1967, it
commenced with the July Revolution that inaugurated the Republican 
regime in Egypt as mentioned in advance, and it was considered as one of 
the repercussions of the war on Palestine in 1948. As a result, in the 
following years, the hostility to Israel was the ruling feature of Nasser's 
regime in dealing with the Arab - Israeli conflict. All through this era
Egypt has sought to form a unified Arab position with Cairo in its center, a
matter which resulted in the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 
1958.
244http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/feb/17/what-caused-egyptian­
revolution.
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On the other hand, in order to reach an evacuation treaty with 
Britain in 1954, Egypt has recognized the right of self-determination for
Sudan. The matter which resulted in the declaration of independence of 
Sudan in 1956, a step that was followed by, the signing of the Nile waters 
agreement in 1959 between Cairo and Khartoum, which is a legal 
framework that command full control utilization of the Nile waters(245).
The Recession or Decline Stage:
This period has extended according to some opinions from June
1967 until August 1990, where the setback in June 1967 led to the decline
of the Nasserist tide. Then, Egypt entered into a step where it had to 
rebuild its military capacity, which was followed by reforming of the 
political foundation, by President Anwar Sadat who took the power in 
1970. Only one year after he sent away his political adversaries, namely, 
the leaders of the Nasser regime, a measure that was identified as the 
movement of re-correction in May 15, 1971.
The October 1973 triumph has lifted up the shares of the Sadat 
regime in the Arab world. it restored back to Egypt's its long-established 
role in preserving the balance of power in the region, a status or situation 
which was soon altered to the opposite with the visit of president Sadat to 
Jerusalem in 1977, a step that ended up with the signing of the Egyptian -
Israeli peace treaty in 1979.
The peace with Israel led to the suspension of Egypt's 
membership in the Arab League, and the relocation of its General 
secretariat headquarters to Tunisia. These developments were coincided 
with the emergence of an Egyptian political orientation of "Egypt comes 
first", which omitted an essential geo-strategic element, which is that the 
245
K. Mekonnen, The Defects and Effects of Past Treaties and Agreements on the Nile River Waters: Whose
Faults Were they? (1999). http://www.ethiopians.com/abay/engin.html.)
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Egyptian national security boundaries area way beyond its geographical 
boundaries.
On the other hand, a project of integration has emerged between 
Egypt and Sudan in the era of President Gaafar Nimeiri. Thus, one of its 
important stations was the signing of a joint defense agreement between 
the two countries on May 15th, 1976. (A History of the Sudan: From the 
Coming of Islam to the Present Day, P. M. Holt, M. W. Daly,p:146, 
Routledge). Also, this phase witnessed the deterioration of Egypt's 
relations with the regime of Mengistu Halammeraam in Ethiopia, who was 
ousted in May 28th, 1991.
The Renovation or Renewal Stage:
This phase lasted from August 1990 until September 2000, where
the former president, Hosni Mubarak, has called for the convention of an 
emergency Arab summit in Cairo to discuss the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in August 1990. This summit resulted in the consensus of the Arab States 
around the Egyptian vision of the need for the withdrawal of Saddam 
Hussein's forces from Kuwait and freeing it even by force, if the Iraqi 
regime refused to pull out its troops.
Later on this step led to the participation of most of the Arab 
countries in a broad US-led international coalition to liberate the occupied 
country, which granted more legitimacy to this alliance. In return the 
Egyptian debts were reduced, and Cairo embarked in cooperation with 
Bretton Woods institutions to start an economic reform program in the 
nineties of the past century, and then it entered in 1995 in discussions with 
the European Community to reach a partnership agreement between the 
two sides.
This phase was accompanied with a new role which is different 
from what it looked like in the pre-reverse phase. This new task was 
revealed or displayed in the increased Egyptian interest in the Gulf 
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security, together with intensified activity of the Egyptian diplomacy in the 
peace process in the Middle East, a role that was welcomed by many
countries in the region such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon as 
well as other Arab Gulf states.
The same period witnessed the launch of Egypt's ferocious 
combat against terrorism, which one of its rounds was the assassination 
trial of the former president Mubarak in Addis Ababa, during his 
participation in the African summit in June 1995. A matter which resulted 
in tension in Egypt's relations with the Salvation Front regime in Sudan, 
and stagnation in the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations, as well as, the
presidential absenteeism from the participation in all the following African 
summits, since then and until Mubarak's ouster. This was accompanied by
a relative withdrawal of Egypt's away from its African surrounding; in 
conjunction with its full involvement in the peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East conflict.
The Regression or Retreat Phase:
This phase began in September 2000 until the ouster of Mubarak, 
in February 2011, where this phase has seen the collapse of the Camp 
David II negotiations, in July 2000 between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis. This took place in association with the visit of the head of the 
Israeli Likud Party at that point of time, Ariel Sharon, to Al-Aqsa mosque
in September of the same year, a matter which resulted in the outburst of 
the second Palestinian uprising, known as "Al-Aqsa uprising".
As a result of this eruption of cycle of violence between Israelis 
and Palestinians, and the waning of opportunities and prospects of 
peaceful settlement between the two sides, the regional role exerted by
Egypt during the nineties of the past century in the circle of the Arab-
Israeli conflict has retreated to a great extent.
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This was reflected on the balance of power in the region, which 
was displayed by the extended role of other regional powers, as Iran based 
on its emerging nuclear capabilities, in which it sponsored the resistance
movements, and it was directed to what was called the "axis of objection 
and resistance", in which Iran, Syria, Libya and Yemen as well as 
Hezbollah and Hamas formed an anti-Western and anti-
Israeli alliance(246). 
in the face of the "axis of moderation" led by Egypt and other
(247)Arab states . From its part, Turkey has sought to leave behind the 
traditional pivotal role between the Arab and Western worlds, to play a
central role, where the most prominent feature of it was taking on a
balanced policy towards the Arab - Israeli conflict.
On the Arab level, some peripheral countries, such as Qatar tried 
to play a bigger role even more than its geo-strategic capabilities. While, 
the late Libyan president Gaddafi took advantage of the occupation of 
Cairo in the peaceful settlement issue, to set sights on Africa, and sought 
to exercise, such a conceited responsibility or role in which he spent much 
of the wealth of the Libyan people.
In spite of the Egyptian–Sudanese rapprochement on the 
background of international choking of the Bashir regime to reach a
comprehensive peace agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement. Yet, this did not really put a stop to the widening of the divide
among the Nile basin countries, culminating with four of these countries 
14thsigning in May , 2010 the "Entebbe Framework Convention for the 
redistribution of the Nile basin countries water quotas".
246
Sullivan, Marisa (April 2014), Hezbollah in Syria (PDF), Institute for the Study of
War) ( Drums Of War: Israel And The "AXIS OF RESISTANCE" (PDF), International 
Crisis Group, 2 August 2010).
247 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/09/27/The-Arab-axis-of-moderation-needs­
help.html.
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Chapter 5
 
The Arab spring
 
Regional and Domestic Changes Affecting Egypt Before The Arab Spring:
25thThe of January revolution, brought to light the fact that Egypt
after this historical event, will never be the same as before, as it has 
affected all its policies on the internal and external levels. Though, some 
points of views have passed judgment on the regression of Egypt's 
regional role during Mubarak's era, which had an effect on the whole Arab 
system and led to the emergence of other regional powers, namely Turkey, 
Iran, and even Arab countries as Qatar. Yet, the defenders of the ousted 
president Mubarak's foreign policy claimed that the transformations in the 
Middle East region, impinged on this policy, as the logic that ruled the 
region during the 1950's and 1960's has passed through many big changes 
and was totally different from the one during the 70's and after.
Also, they argued that Egypt before 1967 was totally different 
from Egypt after this critical and important year, which witnessed a heavy
military defeat from Israel which led to the occupation of Sinai Peninsula. 
Prior to1967 Cairo had a prominent and leading position, yet some 
developments that took place on two main levels.
The number one level is the regional level, as mentioned earlier, 
with the rise of rivals, as well as the alteration in the nature and status of 
the Arab states itself with the upsurge of oil resources and its revenues. 
This opened the door in front of some of some them, as Qatar to try to play
a bigger role in the Arab world and compete with Egypt. 
While the second level, involves the changes that took place on 
the domestic level, namely the dramatic growth of population and its
socio- economic influences, a matter which affected the foreign policy
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making in Egypt both regionally and internationally(248). The 25th of 
January revolution started off as peaceful demonstrations in Cairo's and 
the Egyptian governorates main squares where thousands of youth 
gathered through the social media means namely, Facebook and twitter. 
However, the Egyptian security apparatus and the regime didn’t have any
strategies to deal worth these protests, despite its fast pace especially after 
the fall of Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia just two weeks before.
Mubarak regime at that very specific point of time was facing
many problems and dilemmas, mainly the social and political stagnation in 
a way that became unsatisfactory for the ambitions of the vast majority of 
the Egyptian people with all its sects especially the youth, which 
constitutes around 60% of the Egyptian society.
The revolution exposed the fragility of the Mubarak regime, 
which forced him to step down and submit the power to the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). These changes took place after the 
rapid development of the events and the mounting of the slogans 
demanding the regime to step down and calling for the liberty, dignity and 
improving the economic conditions as well as realizing the social equality
and democracy. 
Contemporary Challenges Facing the Egyptian National Security since 2011:
International relations scholars and researchers have always 
underscored that the foreign policy of any nation is no more than an 
extension of its domestic politics, a matter which entails that it should 
work for the orientation and general policies of the country internally. 
Nonetheless, this relation has deepened along with the increased effect of 
the globalization and the exchange of information and knowledge, in such 
a way that made it tremendously difficult to make a real distinction 
between the internal policies and foreign policies of a state.
248 The revolution and Egypt's regional and international role, Althawra Wadormasraleklimywaaldawli, in Arabic,
Al Sayed Amin Shalabi, March 14th ,2011, Almasry Elyoum
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Not only this, but it became extremely arduous to make this 
separation between the domestic, regional and international effects on the 
strategic surroundings of a country. This played an important role in the 
advent of new varieties of diplomacy that reflects the spirit and nature of 
the current era and its challenges as well as the ruling systems and its goals 
like the public diplomacy as an example. 
As for the Middle East region itis worth mentioning that the 
whole region has been passing throughout a period of deep changes since
long time, which threat not only the national interest of some countries but 
their existences as well, a matter which inflict a number of exceptional 
challenges on the national security of Egypt as:
1- The incessant wave of terrorism that face the region, which has been 
launched by the terrorist allegedly Islamist organizations as Al- Qaeda
in the past and currently, the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). These
organizations aim at founding an Islamic kalifate that goes against the 
components of the traditional national country, as known in the modern 
history, ever since the Westphalia agreement. This adversely influenced
both the geopolitical and the political map of the region, as 
acknowledged since the termination of world war I and the fall down of 
the ottoman empire. This matter imposes a real challenge to Egypt, 
especially with the presence of those jihadists groups in Sinai peninsula  
as well as on its western and southern borders in the same time, in 
addition to the existence of dormant cells that belong to those groups in 
the Egyptian depth not only on the borders. And above all, the 
continuation of smuggling of arms and drugs into Egypt.
2- The alteration of the relation between the state and the people, on 
account of the wave of Arab spring revolutions that hit the region in 
2011, and the increased number of the well-educated youth with his new 
ideas, principles and ambitions.
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3- The increased and intensified effect of the public opinion in formulating
the policies of the country, not only the internal ones but also the 
external, a matter which led -as mentioned before- to the polarization 
state. This emerged from the lack of recognition of the extent of 
transformation and change in the perceptions and beliefs of the society, 
particularly among the youth.
4- The relative diminution of the strategic significance of the gulf area in 
the American foreign policy as a result of the modifications and 
transformations in the internal energy map, with the lessened weight and 
dependence on the oil and natural gas, a matter that transformed the 
American policies towards the whole region.
5- The alteration in the relationship between Egypt and its neighbors of the
Nile basin countries, on the background of the tension that broke out 
after the refusal of Cairo to sign the "framework agreement of the Nile 
basin countries", that allowed Ethiopia to construct the "renaissance
dam". This step would negatively affect the Egyptian share of water in 
particular during the period of its filling, and might endanger the water
security of the country, and put it under the control of Addis Ababa in 
the future, a situation that is unprecedented and hazardous for Egypt.
6- The worsening economic situation as a consequence of the instability
that Egypt faced over the last five years since the January revolution. In 
that sense, it is worth to be mentioned that the economic indicators had 
depreciated to its lowest levels and the reserve of the foreign currency
lessened considerably. 
7- The deterioration of the Egypt's relations with other states in the region 
as Turkey and Qatar, on the background of the difference in the points 
of views and policies, regarding the dealing with the various political 
Islam groups and currents in the whole region, in addition to, the Qatari 
and Turkish relationships with the banned Muslim brotherhood.
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8- The tension in the ties between Egypt and the United States in relation to 
the American policies in the Middle East region, which endeavor to 
instigate the so called "greater Middle East project". This project aims at 
altering and transforming the Arab identity via dissolving the Arab 
world in a bigger and larger entity that is more diverse ethnically
religiously, and breaking down the Arab countries on these bases. 
While, the other reason for the tension between Washington and Cairo is 
30th a result of the backing of the Egyptian army to the protestors on the 
of June revolution, which was meant for re-correcting the January's 
revolution pathway and bringing the Muslim brotherhood regime to an 
end.
The change of the security concept itself by means of the digital 
revolution in all domains and the development of new soft threats for the 
national security of the nations and states a matter which puts more burden 
on the Egyptian diplomacy.
The Transformation Process of the Middle East Region in the Wake of The Arab Spring:
Before discussing the Egyptian revolution of January 2011, an 
overview and analysis of the Middle East region since the Arab spring
should be demonstrated in this next part. From the time when the Arab 
uprisings started, the political order in the Middle East region has been 
denoted by substantial alterations and variations within every single state
at the national level in the most vital region in the global geostrategic 
configuration.
The uniqueness and remarkability of the Arab region has come to 
an end, inasmuch as the structures and balances of emerging powers in the 
late 1970s, transforming since the end of the Cold War, have been  
changed(249) 
(ÜLGEN, S., et al., Emerging Order in the Middle East. Washington, D.C, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2012.)
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With the end of Gulf War, the security menaces and strains 
became more intense among the Middle East countries, a matter that 
resulted in direct or indirect clashes intimidating their social and political 
as well as economic security. The danger of the interstate hostility has 
been manifested in different, new and more serious approaches in the 
context of the Arab Spring, at a sub-state level, but with extremely
eminent implications on the regional stability and the international 
security. In brief, the Middle East is undergoing a process of development 
of a new security order and regional re-configuration.
The Arab uprisings have unbridled or unchecked the internal 
dynamics of protest in the region as well as the political change in most of 
its states. The Middle East region is at a crossroads, facing a number of 
security defies both from neighboring countries such as Israel, Turkey and 
Iran.
The Arab Spring burst out in the course of a deep structural 
transformation in the Middle East region(250)The 2011 awakening aspired 
at terminating the deep-rooted authoritarian paradigm, founded by Arab 
regimes for decades, to establish new systems based on social equality and 
justice. In next to no time, these first impressions mismatched and 
contravened with the geopolitical genuineness of the Arab regional system 
as enshrined throughout history(251). 
The key pleas of the Arab revolts concentrated on achieving
freedom, good governance and social justice, with the foreign policy being
kept on the back - burner. The upheavals have led to a major alteration in 
the status of the Arab populations, as they turned to be more effective and 
active actors in the political scene in those countries, where in earlier times 
they were considered as the missing equation in power relations. This shift 
of power to the people is exhibited in the fact that they are here and now 
250 RÓZSA, E., Geo-Strategic Consequences of the Arab Spring. Barcelona, European Institute of the
Mediterranean, 2013.
251 SALLOUKH, B., “The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East”. Roma, The International
Spectator. Italian Journal of International Affairs, 2013.
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aware of their ability to mobilize, demonstrate and fairly vote, a matter
that would lead to a real transformation and bring improvement in the 
power and capacity of Arab societies(252). 
The transitions in the Arab countries have their political, 
socioeconomic and geostrategic implications, the matter that represents a
challenge for these states. In addition, this defy would either unveil a
number of alternative versions of a new regional order, promote the 
continuation of the division of individual states(253).
The configuration of power has shifted in the Middle East over 
the past years since the Arab awakening in 2011, through the subsequent 
tendencies, firstly, the emergence of people's power and domestic
discontent with the former ruling regimes as in the case of Tunisia and 
Egypt. secondly, the proliferation of civil wars like the situation in both 
Libya and Syria, and finally the increased competition among Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Consequently, the sum of these trends will
restructure the geostrategic vision for the region in the years ahead. 
As for the paradigm of the power of people, it is worth to mention 
that the political scene in the Arab spring was mobilized and dominated by
the middle class forces who were hunting for the founding of a new just
and free socio-political system within their societies. In both Egypt and 
Tunisia people succeeded in carrying out a peaceful struggle for their
dignity, a matter that created a new model of change that involved the 
mobilization of the different sectors of the society through mass protests in 
the streets, preceded by the youth using the social media as an innovative 
tool of political activism. 
In addition to the impulsive and unprompted nature of the 
protests, one of the most striking features of the Arab Spring is the lack of 
252 ÜLGEN, S., op. cit, p 3.
 
253 SALEM, P., The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for
 
International Peace, D.C, 2008.
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dominant political or organizational force. The new distribution of power 
that emerged from this included the legalization of Islamist movements 
which were until then repressed and marginalized(254). Yet the most
important remains the fact that the Arab Spring ascertained that the Arab 
people are as well capable of making the first move towards the change
and democratic transformation255. 
In the case of both Cairo and Tunis, it is worth to mention that the 
atmosphere of hope and euphoria of the Arab uprisings has declined to a
certain extent by time. The Tunisian transition has been much quieter 
compared to the Egyptian, especially in relation to the challenge of 
reaching a national consensus about the drafting of the constitution and the 
rule of the Al-Nahda Party.
Yet, the emergence of a Salafist movement represented a
fundamental challenge to Tunisian civil society. After months of clashes, 
apprehension, doubt and ideological polarization as well as political 
assassinations, the main actors of public and political life have managed 
to agree on a formula of coexistence, arrayed in a constitution that has 
been described as "the most liberal in the Arab world."
Accordingly, it was confirmed that the Arab states which possess 
competent institutions and a substantial middle class, have the potential for
a safer political transition without violence. The aspect of aggression and 
bloodshed was not an element in the revolutionary imagination of the 
people in both countries. The masses just wanted to face the 
authoritarianism and repression by demanding “bread, freedom, social 
justice and dignity”. 
The other paradigm that faced the Arab spring was the 
proliferation of civil war in a number of countries as Libya, Syria and 
254 RÓZSA, E., op. cit, p. 6
255 (RÓZSA, E., op. cit, p. 11
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Yemen. For instance, the civil war in Libya fired up when the people rose
non-peacefully against the Gaddafi regime who ruled the country for more
than forty years without attaining any development or progress in the 
country. The eruption of the civil war in Libya reflects the fragility of the 
middle class, in addition to the lack of any civil society or state
institutions.
After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, military bases fell into the 
hands of rebel fighters and Libyan mercenaries during a civil war that 
swiftly created a geopolitical tension zone. In addition, weapons were
smuggled to the radical groups as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and 
they were able to extend their control in the Sahel zone. Thus, a state of 
instability and tensions has been created among different international 
actors such as, Mauritania, Morocco, Mali, Mauritania, and Libya as well
as Niger, until the West African region. As a direct result, both Sinai 
Peninsula and Gaza strip were the earliest recipients of all kinds of light 
and heavy weapons.
The civil war scene in Libya embraced two main threats on the 
region. At the outset, the emergence of radical Islamist groups and on top 
of them Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh), a matter which 
created instability and shifted the power away from the state institutions, 
dividing them among the different Islamist groups and the state. While, the 
other threat is the spread of arms trafficking in the whole region through 
the borders of the neighboring countries.
Moreover, the weak structure of the Libyan state after the civil 
war and the failure to rebuild its institutions, especially the security sector, 
produced a vacuum, which became manifested in the continuous clashes 
and fighting among the various factions in the country. Therefore, the 
transformation process in Libya has founded a weak state with fragile
socio-political forces, a matter that opened the door towards more
geopolitical chaos in the region.
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On the other hand, the Syrian uprising began as peaceful 
demonstrations calling for the accomplishment of tangible political 
reforms and social justice, yet it ended up with a sectarian civil war. It is 
argued that the massive use of force by the government led to the 
radicalization and militarization of the opposition. The civil war in Syria
has led to a vicious circle of violence and conflict, based on the sectarian 
polarization among the multiple factions and religious groups in the Syrian 
society. 
The convolution or the complexity of the Syrian dispute stems 
from the sectarian violence in the context of a broader proxy war between 
the world powers along with other regional powers in a repetition of the 
same scenario that took place in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Regardless of 
the international efforts to resolve the ongoing conflict since 2011, which 
left behind thousands of deaths, and millions of refugees, as well as the 
destruction of its infrastructure and historical patrimony, Syria remains the 
main victim of this confrontation. 
As for the increased geostrategic competition between some 
regional powers in the middle east, namely, Saudi Arabia and Iran has 
triggered struggles throughout the whole region in a number of countries 
as Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain, as well as Syria, thus switching the region 
into one geopolitical Great Game(256).This rivalry is manifested in several 
aspects, for instance the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran stems 
from a sectarian identity conflict arising during the early periods of Islam, 
and maybe before that as the roots of the conflict date back to a contention 
between Arabs and Persians(257) .
The sectarian issue is considered the cornerstone in this rivalry
between Riyadh and Tehran, with tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. 
Seeing that the Islamic belief of Saudi Arabia is the Sunnism, which does 
256 MABON, S., “The Middle Eastern Great Game”. Zürich, ISN-ETH, International Relations and Security
 
Network, 2013, p. 2.
 
257 MABON, S. op, cit. p 4.

190 | P a g e 
   
 
  
   
  
  
   
   
  
  
    
 
   
    
   
  
    
 
    
  
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
   
                                                           
             
not accept Shia Muslim, as true believers. Religion is considered one of 
the most sensitive concerns for both states that grant the ruling regimes 
there, the political and religious legitimacy in both Riyadh and Tehran.
This legitimacy is indispensable for the consolidation of power 
domestically and internationally, as both Saudi Arabia and Iran face strong
internal challenges from their people. Given the importance for the two 
countries in relation to the religious factor, Islam is interpreted into terms 
of a competition for the leadership of the Islamic nation, which lends 
legitimacy to a conflict.
The other determining factor in this rivalry is the geopolitical 
dimension of the conflict that is crystallized in the Iranian and Saudi 
regional security strategies. As for Tehran, its regime is in favor of 
creating a centralized security approach in the Gulf, in contrast to Riyadh 
who looks to external actors, especially the United States, to guarantee its 
national and regional security. This crossover of national interest, pushes 
the entire region into a power game(258). 
The decomposition of the Saddam's regime in Iraq as a regional 
power after the US invasion in 2003, was received by both Riyadh and 
Tehran as an occasion or a chance to extend their hegemony over the Gulf 
region. Up to that time, Saddam Hussein represented the equilibrium point
in the regional powers game, yet his downfall resulted in a vacuum of 
power that has triggered these certain actions and policies in the regional 
dynamics for the successive decades. 
Hence, both Saudi Arabia and Iran tried to fill this gap by
functioning beyond their own borders. In the post-Saddam era, Tehran has 
granted financial and military support through the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard and Shiite factions in Iraq. On the other hand, the performance of 
Riyadh in Iraq is more difficult to distinguish, often financing and 
supporting Iraqi Sunni groups. Moreover, Iran is suffering the loss of its 
258 BRADLEY, J., “Iran’s Ethnic Tinderbox”. Washington D. C, the Washington Quarterly. Vol. 30, 2007.
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impact in the Levant region because of the Arab Spring for the reason of 
its support for the Syrian regime(259).
Then again, the mounting role of non-state actors, namely, 
Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, represent a worrying defy to Saudi Arabia. 
While Iran provided support for Hezbollah, when it came into view in the 
1980s, Saudi Arabia is unwilling to offer help to the group, with its Shiite 
convictions and faiths as well as its close ties to Iran. Tensions between 
Hezbollah and the Council of the Gulf Cooperation have been escalating
especially in the aftermath of the Syrian civil war, owing to the 
participation of Hezbollah in the conflict on the side of the Syrian army.
Saudi Arabia's attitude towards the Arab risings in 2011 was 
determined by its own purposes, namely, cutting off the country from the 
"winds of change", and maintaining the existence of the neighboring
monarchical regimes in the gulf and in the same time undermining Iranian 
regime power and influence in the region. In this context, Riyadh used its 
military and financial power, along with its political influence to keep in 
check the impacts of the protests in the Arabian Peninsula, specifically in 
Bahrain and Yemen. Correspondingly, the Saudi regime extended its 
financial assistance to reinforce other monarchies in the Middle East 
region as Morocco and Jordan against popular reformist mobilization(260).
The Arab spring have similarly changed the role of both Qatar
and Turkey in the region. hence, the two countries started to leave behind 
their old pragmatic positions and proclaimed a new regional role after the 
Arab Spring. For instance, Doha made use of its relations with the Muslim
Brotherhood and the political and financial cooperation with Islamist 
parties that took power in some states to bolster its geopolitical position. 
Accordingly, the Qatari owned Al Jazeera channel has played a
momentous role in the intensification of the protests all over the Arab 
region. 
259 RÓZSA, E., op. cit, p. 18.
260 SALLOUKH, B., op. cit.
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Similarly, Turkey has emerged in this period as a power that 
generates the equilibrium between Arab countries, standing between 
Sunnis and Shiites. Ankara's power was clearly growing in the region 
before the Arab spring due to the foreign policy of 'zero problems'(261).
This initiative was based on the expansion of Turkish influence in the 
region, playing a constructive role in regional conflicts(262).
Yet, the Turkish role in this region has altered or transformed 
after the Arab spring. Its stance regarding the Syrian crisis specifically has 
mutated throughout three main stages, first as an ally of the regime, then 
mediator and last of all in disapproval with Bashar al- Assad regime to the 
extent of supporting the opposition factions. 
Finally, Israel remains the most important source of geostrategic 
threat to Arab region security. Tel-Aviv is the near neighbor who 
possesses nuclear weapons, thus creating serious military imbalance with 
the Arab countries. The lack of the real will to resolve the Palestinian issue
from the part of Israel creates a state of instability in the region. the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is relatively suffering the loss of some prominence in 
the geopolitics of the region confronted by all the other disputes and 
concerns arising from the Arab Spring, which create greater apprehensions 
among the Arab countries who became more concentrated on the domestic
and national policies rather   than on this conflict.
To conclude, the Middle East before the Arab uprisings seemed 
like a dissimilar security system, and these features or criteria were
inherited from the epochs of colonialism and Cold War. However, the 
Arab uprisings came to bring together and unify the internal dynamics of 
protest and the political transformation in most of the countries of the 
region, a matter that impinged on the political order in the Middle East.
261 DAVUTOĞLU, A., "Turkey’s zero-problems foreign policy." Washington, D.C Foreign Policy, 2010.
262 BALOGH, I., “The Middle Eastern Balance of Power in 2012 And Its Implications for the Future” en
ONDREJCSÁK, R., et al. Panorama of Global Security Environment. Bratislava. CENAA, 2012.)
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In this regard, it is worth mentioning that there are two basic 
geostrategic consequences and repercussions, which would contribute to 
the re-shaping the future of the balance of power in the Middle East 
region. initially, the emergence of people as the key catalyst for those 
states' internal dynamics. The popular revolts in the Arab world were a 
result of the combination of economic, political and social deficits in some 
countries. Whereas there are similar circumstances in quite a lot of Arab 
countries, the responses of the regimes were dissimilar, thus creating
different models of conflict. 
Consequently, the outcomes of the protests fluctuated from one
state to another, thus countries as Egypt and Tunisia have undergone
smooth democratic transition from the bottom up. While in other cases, as 
in Morocco, Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council, gradual reforms 
were initiated from the top down. However, the worst scenario was 
crackdown of the government against the protesters or even a
disintegration of the state in the form of civil war as in the case of Libya
and Syria.
The second outcome would be represented in the augmentation 
and escalation of geopolitical disputes crystallized in underlying conflicts. 
Accordingly, their connotations will have great impact on the relations and 
power structure in the Middle East. In this regard, it is vital to be
acquainted with the rivalry and the power struggle among Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Turkey, which will shape the region in the coming years. 
The main features of this competition, is the misuse of 
sectarianism to achieve geopolitical objectives, by both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, which may trigger a regional recoil effect. Moreover, the resilient 
rifts within the Sunni world, arising specifically between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar.
As for the Turkish power, this nation who has always been 
regarded as a model of political and economic success by many countries 
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in the Middle East. Yet, this victory did not really manage to create the 
aspired "neo-Ottoman order" in the region. Quite the reverse, Ankara has 
lost some of its soft power after the Arab spring owing to its political and 
diplomatic stances regarding certain issues. 
Concerning Iran, it possibly has reached the limits of an 
expanding influence, and its ability to contribute constructively to the 
security of the region could be easily restrained. The Iranian nuclear 
program has added relevance to the consecutive regimes, a matter that 
raised concerns among its Arab neighbors in the Gulf. Yet, the Arab 
Spring has indirectly led to the waning of Tehran's role in the region 
because of its part in the Syrian civil war.
The old geopolitical epicenters of the region, Egypt, Syria and 
Iraq are experiencing complicated transitions, for instance, Cairo is 
passing through very difficult economic and political circumstances, while 
Damascus is suffering from an extended civil war, in addition to Baghdad 
who is experiencing ethnic and sectarian division since the fall of Saddam 
regime. This has encouraged the conservative monarchies of the Gulf, led 
by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to attempt to fill the geopolitical vacuum in the
Arab and Middle East region. 
As a final point, on a systemic level, the Arab awakening has 
managed to create a new socio-political and economic reality in the region, 
transforming the balance of power, not because some states have become 
stronger, but rather because other states have become weaker and more
fragile.
The 2011 Revolution: Roots and Consequences:
25th,The January 2011 was not just a revolution to overthrow the 
existing autocratic regime that ruled Egypt for 30 years, but to change the 
whole political structure that governed the country for several decades. In 
this context, the grounds of this revolution could be attributed to many
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factors, the most important among them would be the structural ones, and 
on top of it the total stagnation of political life in the country. From his 
part the famous Egyptian writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal described the 
political scene in Egypt during 30 years of Mubarak’s rule in one of his 
articles as “a process of erosion for all the land valid for cultivation”(263). 
It is argued that this wearing away strategy pursued by Mubarak 
regime was not a new one but it was only a continuation of the strategies 
that have been followed by the two former regimes of Nasser and Sadat 
but with different tactics and tools. Thus, he tried to create or to build a
fake democracy through permitting a limited margin for his opponents to 
express their criticisms for the regime up to a certain extent that wouldn’t 
affect its stability. Consequently, this breathing space succeeded to 
guarantee survival of Mubarak’s regime for a longer time on top of power 
in Egypt. 
For instance, some opposition and independent newspapers and 
TV talk shows were allowed to criticize the president and the government 
and highlight some issues as, the governmental corruption and 
bureaucracy, inheriting the presidency to Gamal Mubarak the younger son 
of Mubarak. thus, in the upcoming part the direct internal causes of the 
January, 2011 revolution will be discussed in details:
Inheritance of power:
The preparation of Gamal Mubarak to be his father's successor as 
the next president of Egypt became increasingly evident at around the year 
2000(264). With neither a vice-president, nor heir noticeable in the scene, 
Mubarak's younger son Gamal started off enjoying substantial attention in 
Egyptian state-run media(265).
263 Shorouk newspaper, political history of Moussa and AlBaradei, March 24, 2011.
 
264 Aziz, Muhammad Abdul and Hussein, Youssef (2002) "The President, the Son, and the Military: Succession
 
in Egypt" Arab Studies Journal 9/10: pp. 73–88),

265 Brownlee, Jason (2008) "The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak" Arab Studies Journal pp. 36–56.
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In February 2000 he was appointed to the General Secretariat of 
the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Bashar al-Assad's rise to 
power in Syria in June 2000 just hours after Hafez al-Assad's death, 
inspired an intense debate in the Egyptian press in relation to the 
predictions for a similar scenario to take place in Cairo(266). Both President 
Mubarak and his son refuted the probability of any inheritance of power in 
Egypt, and this claim was made in 2006, when Gamal Mubarak affirmed 
time after time that he had no aspiration to come next to his father. He
confirmed that he would rather preserve his title in the then-ruling NDP as 
deputy secretary general, a position he held, along with heading the party's 
policy committee the most important organ of the NDP(267).)
In 2004, several political groups of the left and the right, declared 
their sharp opposition to the inheritance of power and they called for
political change and a fair, multi-candidate election. In addition, Mubarak 
in 2005sent off for some constitutional amendments to open the door for a
multi-candidate presidential elections before September 2005 by asking
the parliament to revise Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution. This 
change in the constitution was perceived by analysts and senior judicial 
figures as a maneuver to allow the president's son to inherit the power in 
Egypt. By these amendments Gamal Mubarak would be one of the 
candidates in a presidential elections and would be supported by the ruling
party and the government-controlled media. Thus, the inheritance of 
presidency would be undertaken through a democratic process. However 
all above mentioned remain as opinions and assumptions made by political 
activists and analysts.
Moreover, and to continue the scenery, Mubarak's regime
permitted some small opposition parties that neither had history, ideology
nor real presence among the people in the street that was called the 
“cartoonic parties”, as well as, other political forces to participate in the 
political life in Egypt. In this manner, Mubarak seceded to create a
266 Sobelman, Daniel (2001) "Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?" Middle East Quarterly8 (2): pp. 31–40)
267http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/egypt/?id=16096
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political scene characterized by a fake or nominal multi-plurality. 
Nevertheless, in reality the politics in Egypt was run according to what we
can call an implicit agreement between the regime and these parties and 
powers as long as they will not cross their red line.
Furthermore, the Mubarak regime allowed the banned group of 
the Muslim brotherhood since 1954 to take part in the public life. For 
instance, they were permitted to participate in workers’ unions and 
syndicate elections during mid and late 1990’s until their success to 
participate in the parliamentary elections in 2005 in which the Muslim
brotherhood members took part as independent candidates. 
This strategy has been so beneficial for Mubarak regime in many
ways for three decades, as it added some kind of legitimacy for this 
system, which helped him to appear as a democratic country in front of the 
world. Hence, this legitimacy helped this regime to promote itself for the 
western powers as the one and only valid choice or option to rule the 
country to prevent or limit the penetrating power of the Isalmists or what 
was known as the “Muslim brotherhood scarecrow”.
The socio-economic factors:
Also, the harsh economic situation in Egypt has immensely
contributed in speeding up the way towards the revolution, as this 
economy faced big structural problems. Those glitches spread vastly
during the first decade of this century, despite the positive steps taken by
the government to adjust the economic situation. For instance, Mubarak's 
government tried to improve the investment environment and to enhance
the information technology services for businessmen(268)., as well as 
expanding more infrastructure projects(269).. However, the major dilemma
remained was the failure of the government to convert or transform its 
268 Ministry of investment, Egypt investment monitor 2009, June 2009
 
269 world economic forum, the global competitiveness report 2008-2009) (Norman Loayza and Rei Odawara,
 
infrastructure and economic growth , the world bank group, policy research working paper 5177)
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minor achievements into real and concrete results that could be reflected 
on the daily living of the Egyptians.
In this context, Many economic and development experts 
assumed that the main reason behind the failure of the economic policies 
of the Egyptian government since the beginning of the nineties of the last 
century was its inability to implement real broad development in the 
country which goes further than the indicators of macro economy to 
include comprehensive humanitarian development(270). These failures were
demonstrated by ranking Egypt as country 101 out of 169 country in the 
human development report issued by united nations development program 
UNDP in 2010(271) and the 14th country among the 22  Arab states(272). 
19thLikewise the European revolutions that took place during the 
century to remove the traditional European monarchies and the East 
European countries revolutions that burst in 1989, as a direct result of 
depression and suffering of the peoples in those countries under the 
corrupt political regimes. The Arab spring that flared in many countries 
namely Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen in 2011, also aimed at 
the ousting of regimes that ruled them through many decades. 
Accordingly, the success of the revolution in countries like Egypt
and Tunisia goes back to many reasons, on top of them, the presence of 
unfair longstanding regimes, a matter that facilitated the mobilization of 
people against them. Also, the presence of elite political classes which 
were not ready to defend or even support the system, a matter which led to 
the loss of the support and source of power for the existing regimes, as 
well as the gathering of huge numbers of demonstrators from all the 
sectors of the society in the streets and squares.
270 Heba Saleh, Egypt: you can’t feed the people economic indicators, financial times, 12 October 2010.
271 http://hrdstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/EGY.html)
 
272 United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report 2009 , United Nations 2009.
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In addition to this, the presence of the international organizations 
has been considered as a main contributor to the success of the revolution 
as they could represent an obstacle nowadays in the face of any regime to 
use force against its people and might put pressure on those regimes to 
step down and rotate power peacefully(273). As for the Egyptian revolution, 
it succeeded to prove that despite the violence of the security forces during
the first days of the marches. Yet, they failed to face the unprecedented 
masses that grouped in the streets, in other words, “the power of people"
succeeded to defeat the "people in power"(274) 
25thThe of January revolution in Egypt was not a revolution to 
overthrow the Egyptian president Mubarak or his autocratic regime but it
was mainly a revolution against ideas, principals, and philosophy of 
governance that has been adopted by the consecutive regimes. In 
conclusion, it was an uprising in the face of the notion of the powerful 
centralized state, which dominated the lives of the Egyptians in all ways 
for decades.
The development of Social and political movements in Egypt since 1952:
Between 1952 and 2011, Egypt was ruled by three presidents 
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. From his part, Nasser pacified labour unrest 
and introduced many social programs that did well to the population. 
subsequently Sadat started to turn the spotlight on the 'social contract' with 
Egyptian society, and when Mubarak came to power in 1981, the 
following three decades especially the last ten years of his rule witnessed 
the imposition of a neoliberal order, complete with crony-capitalists, as 
well as relatively corrupted bureaucracies and suppressive police
apparatus. Thirty years of greater than before poverty, polarized wealth 
and power, and labor instability become more intense, all these features or 
factors laid the groundwork for the 2011 popular uprising.
273 Goldstone: “understanding the revolutions of 2011: weakness and resilience in the Middle East autocracies”.
Foreign affairs, vol. 90, No.3 (may/June 2011), pp.8-16
 
274 Wael Ghoneim, Elthawra Elmasryia 2.0 in Arabic, the Egyptian revolution 2.0, shorouk press 2012)
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As Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952 he was engaged in a
power struggle for a short-lived period, before assuming whole command 
in 1954, at that point the independent political organizations were banned 
and he marshaled a populist-corporatist pact between labour and the state, 
in which the state controls the bulk of the economic, political, and social 
domains. This approach left only insignificant and minor space for society
to develop itself and for the interest groups to float up, compete, and act 
independently and unconventionally(275). Labour groups were put in 
order into a restricted number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories. 
Moreover, in the year 1957, the Egyptian government founded the General 
Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (GFETU), dominating nearly all the 
labour unions under the government's authority or command, with the 
exclusion of the radical leaders and at the same time drafting in the 
moderates. Since this stage, these trade unions have served as an arm rest 
or support of the state rather than as representatives of workers. Hence, 
labour activism and actions fundamentally receded throughout the 1950s 
and 60s. 
Regardless of the repression of these independent political 
organizations, communists and militant labour groups, Nasser became 
incredibly popular either domestically or regionally across the Arab world. 
Additionally, he established a single state party and an enormous security
apparatus. However, his deeds in relation to the Arab nationalism and 
Arab socialism, which were considered as the "twin pillars of his 
revolution" hunted for the freeing of Egypt, as well as, the Arab world 
from imperialism, and to embark on a social revolution internally as a part 
of the informal social contract. Accordingly, The Egyptian people agreed 
to take restrictions or limitations on their political freedom in return for the 
promise of higher living standards and a stronger nation(276). A huge
275 Rabab El-Mahdi, "Labour protests in Egypt: causes and meanings," Review of African Political 

Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 390.
 
276 Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law and
 
Culture (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010), pages 198-199.
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network of social services was launched, which offered education, 
healthcare, and employment, as well as subsidized food and transportation. 
These social programs helped to create a modern middle class in Egypt. 
The commitment and adherence of this middle class to Nasser's regime
was secured by the government guaranteeing state employment to all
university graduates(277).
Also, large amounts of money were spent on the development and 
modernization of the country's military, which was perceived as its 
protector from the external enemies and threats(278). In addition, Nasser
implemented major agricultural reforms, from the period between 1952 
and 1961, he managed to reallocate about one seventh of the Egyptian 
cultivable land from large landowners, passed on to the landless and near 
landless peasants. This led to an improvement of rural incomes and 
agricultural production, as well as the undermining of the influence of the 
large landowning class of Egyptians(279). 
By the conquer of Egypt in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and its 
suffering from a mortifying defeat, which was followed by Nasser’s death 
in 1970, a matter which led to the emergence of a new president Anwar 
Sadat, who was also emerging from the military, who ruled the country
from 1970 until 1981. Taking on a policy of "de-nasserisation," Sadat 
wanted to undo many of Nasser's policies, to earn the friendship and 
acceptance of the West. Amongst these policies were to return the 
sequestered land to the significant landowners within Egypt, also he
implemented an open door market oriented program called "infitah" in 
Arabic. This scheme assisted in the creation of suitable conditions for a
real estate and credit boom, a matter which led to the transformation of the
country to become increasingly dependent upon foreign financing(280).
277 Rabab El-Mahdi, op. cit., page 390.
 
278 Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law and
 
Culture (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010), page199.).
 
279 
Ray Bush, "Coalitions for Dispossession and Networks of Resistance? Land, Politics and Agrarian Reform in
 
Egypt," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 38, No. 3, December 2011), page 395.
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The "opening" or infitah offered an alternate vision of economic
progress and development to that of Arab socialism; launching a process 
of liberalization and an influx of Western investments, to assimilate Egypt 
into the Western capitalist system. Also, Sadat's policies managed to 
gradually eliminate Nasser's social plans and the relinquishment of his 
anti-imperialism. Hence, Egypt hastily became more trade dependent, 
having to import basic foods, and foreign financing was restricted to non­
productive sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, the country increasingly exported its labour to the oil
rich Gulf States, which facilitated the trim down of the problems of 
unemployment domestically, a matter which mounted the country's 
dependence upon transfers from its foreign labour sending their earnings 
back home. For instance, in the year 1974, labour transmittals, oil exports, 
tourism, and foreign aid as well as the Suez Canal revenues accounted for
nearly a third of Egypt's foreign income, a number that blew up to 75% in 
1980. On the other hand, a different and new money-making elite 
developed with widespread ties to the state, despite the fact that economic
unfairness and inequity between the rich and the rest of society speeded 
(281)up .However, such policies witnessed adequate resistance, in the form 
of strikes and "popular unrest" that took place all through the mid-1970s, 
beside a major transport worker strike in 1976 and huge food riots in 1977, 
stemming from academics, state bureaucrats and workers. From his part, 
Sadat reacted to the labour unrest and staple protests by sending in the 
military to overwhelm the demonstrations. Also, head ministered the 
formation of a link between the landowning class and the business class as 
well as the conservative religious elite, to the extent that he even sought to 
build ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Sadat restructured 
the connections with the United States, and even established an alliance
and peace treaty with Israel, negotiated by the Carter administration in 
Washington as the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords. This step which 
281 
Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law
and Culture (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010), page 200.
203 | P a g e 
   
 
    
   
  
   
   
   
    
 
    
   
    
   
 
    
   
    
    
  
  
  
 
 
 
    
                                                           
           
        
             
       
           
         
               
           
negatively affected the president's popular support, until he was ultimately
assassinated by an Islamist group in 1981(282).
In 1981, Hosni Mubarak took control of Egypt, as well emerging
from within the military, he embarked on deepening the economic reforms 
initiated by his predecessor Sadat. During Mubarak's era, the military and 
economic elites became much more closely amalgamated, and with the 
imposition of the "Emergency Law" in the wake of Sadat's shooting.  
Mubarak wielded more strict power, with the suspension of the 
constitution and adding more restrictions on civil liberties. Moreover, a
new parallel legal system was formed, relying upon military courts, to be
used for the trial of terrorists(283).
During the 1980s and 1990s Mubarak masterminded a massively
long-drawn-out entrenchment of neoliberal economic and social reforms in 
Egypt. Additionally, he pursued a fierce battle against the extremist 
Islamists, who were attaining political gains within sectors of the society
by exploiting the poverty and popular anger towards the government, 
brought on as a result of the economic reforms(284). Likewise, Mubarak 
started to execute further reforms to the agricultural sector along the 
neoliberal lines during the 1980s. In this framework, he began 
implementing agriculture sector liberalization policies in 1986, in 
cooperation with the USAID and the World Bank. Washington 
underscored the importance of market-oriented improvements and fostered 
export-led growth, as USAID invested nearly $1.26 billion on the 
agricultural reforms. These modifications and transformations continued 
over the 1990s, and resulted in widespread dispossession of small farmers 
and a further alliance between economic and military-political elites(285). 
282 
Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law
and Culture (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010), page 200-201)
283 Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law and
Culture (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010), page 201-202)
284 
Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law
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The major neoliberal reforms in Egypt under Mubarak reached 
the utmost with the signing of an Economic Restructuring and Adjustment 
Program with the IMF in the year 1991, which called for the liberalization 
of trade and prices, privatization, and labour 'flexibility, as well as the 
(286)removal of several social safety net measures . The new economic elite 
that surfaced in Egypt as a consequence of the IMF's programs of the 
1990's were intimately knotted to the ruling party, the National 
Democratic Party (NDP), and Mubarak's son, Gamal, who headed the 
party's policies committee(287). Prominent businessmen became more
influential in policy-making circles, as well the number of businessmen 
who were elected to Egypt's parliament multiplied from 8 in 1995 to 150 
by 2005. Moreover, the Public spending on social services was noticeably
cutback, and the state-owned industries were privatized and employees 
were discharged(288) 
The labour protests in the 1990s was as twice as the ones that 
took place during the 1980s. With the 1991 IMF program, Cairo was 
ingrained in a neoliberal order, which would accelerate over the next two 
decades. Fifteen years after the IMF program's beginning - by the year 
2006 - Egyptian workers had been subjected to constant sufferings and 
difficulties a matter that increased their resistance to these hardships(289).
The privatization program led to the unprecedented manipulation 
of the Egyptian economy into the hands of relatively few economic elites. 
Out of 314 state-run companies, 209 were went public by 2005, resulting
in a substantial transposition of the public sector workers. The number of 
workers working for the public sector companies was cut in half between 
the years 1994 and 2001. The IMF paid tribute to the privatization 
286 Angela Joya, "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic
politics," Review of African Political Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 370
287Dunne, Michele (January 2006). "Evaluating Egyptian Reform". Carnegie Papers: Middle East Series (66).
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program of 2006 for having outshined prospects. Thus, wealth and power 
were clustered in the hands the country's elite, and a few large
multinationals controlled the main areas of the economy(290). 
More neoliberal restructurings and modifications were further
implemented under Ahmed Nazif the Egyptian Prime Minister during the 
period from 2005 till 2011, as he thought that the businessmen should take
a more direct role in managing the state. In that sense, six ministers were
appointed to run the ministries of trade and industry, housing, 
transportation, health, and agriculture as well as social welfare. Taxes were
curtailed for corporations and businesses, Corruption and the ill use of 
public funds were extensively spreading as the privatization programs 
according to some opinions effectively subsidized the private sector at the 
expense of the nation as a whole291.
The prices of food, and fuel as well as transportation soared.  
Thus, in 2006, Egypt witnessed a new wave of labour unrest as a result of 
the accumulation of such factors292. Independent and self-regulating forms 
of worker organization re-emerged and in 2006 alone, there were about   
220 major strikes, involving tens of thousands of workers in the largest 
strike wave that Egypt had witnessed in decades293 
In 2006, a three-day strike of workers at a weaving and spinning
factory in Delta city of El-Mahalla was considered as a turning point in the 
history of the Egyptian workers' movement, demonstrating a full work­
stoppage and longer duration in comparison to the previous strike 
actions294. 
290 Henry Veltmeyer, "Unrest and Change: Dispatches from the Frontline of a Class War in
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291 
Angela Joya, "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic
 
politics," Review of African Political Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 370-371)
 
292 Rabab El-Mahdi, "Labour protests in Egypt: causes and meanings," Review of African Political 

Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 395).
 
293 
Henry Veltmeyer, "Unrest and Change: Dispatches from the Frontline of a Class War in Egypt, 

"Globalizations (Vol. 8, No. 5, October 2011), page 612)
 
294 
Rabab El-Mahdi, "Labour protests in Egypt: causes and meanings," Review of African Political
 
Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 397-399
 
206 | P a g e 
   
 
   
    
    
 
     
   
   
  
  
  
    
  
   
  
  
  
   
 
  
  
  
 
   
   
                                                           
 
          
       
          
         
         
       
The abovementioned strike was the largest and most politically
significant industrial strike since in 1947, involving approximately 24,000 
workers with over 10,000 of them occupying the factory for three
uninterrupted days, yet on the fourth day of the strike the Egyptian 
government granted a concession by offering a 45-day bonus. This step 
facilitated the start out another wave of worker protests and strikes across 
the country over the next years. 
In this context, it is worth to be mentioned that between 2006 and 
2009, an estimated 1.7 million workers participated in protest actions, 
including private and public industrial workers, postal workers, and 
educational administrators, workers in transportation along with the tax
collection, as well as healthcare workers. The last few years before the 
January revolution witnessed labour unrest that has been denoted as "the 
largest social movement in over half a century" that took place within 
Egypt295.
Then again, between the years 2006 and 2008, Egypt recorded 
annual growth rates of 7% -while much of the world was experiencing
negative growth. Nevertheless, between 2008 and 2009, poverty in the 
country grown from 20% to 23.4%, while around40% of Egyptians lived 
on less than $2 per day, and youth made up about90% of the unemployed. 
Accordingly, while the neoliberal reforms of the previous three decades 
generated high growth rates, but they also led to the worsening of the 
living standards for the mainstream of the population and the amplified the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a the minority296. Between the 
years 1998 and 2010, there were around 2 to 4 million workers who took 
part in between 3,400 and 4,000 strikes and other labour actions297. There
295 
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Research (Vol. 79, No. 2, Summer 2012), page 326.)
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were 266 strikes and labour actions in 2006, 614 in 2007, and they reached 
roughly 1,900 in 2009298 
As the industrial actions rocketed, the calls for higher wages and 
more democratic union representation developed into demands for the end 
of the Mubarak regime and the neoliberal reign of Prime Minister Nazif. 
The protestors explained that they were challenging the Mubarak regime
and they are not ruled by the World Bank. The protestors carried signs 
calling for the toppling of the government and they wanted a change in the 
structure and hierarchy of the union system in the country. They added that 
the way unions in Egypt are organized is completely wrong, to look like
the workers' representatives have been elected, when really they were
chosen by the government299.
The second Palestinian Intifada which is known as "Al-Aqsa" in 
the year 2000, helped in the initiation of new social movements in Egypt. 
Thus, in 2002 a conference was held in Cairo in an attempt to organize the 
different social groups around two key common stances, namely anti­
neoliberalism and anti-war. this led in the year 2004 to the formation of 
the "Enough" in Arabic "Kefaya" and the Egyptian Movement for
25thChange, who played a major role in the instigation of the January
revolution in 2011300. 
All these factors were supported by a notable demographic 
change within the country, where by 2011, around 52% of Egypt's 
population was of youth under the age of 25, and it was this group which 
disproportionately lacked employment, with approximately 95% of post­
secondary educated youth being unemployed or working in fields 
unrelated to their education with very low salaries. Hence, it was this 
298 
Ibrahim Awad, "Breaking Out of Authoritarianism: 18 Months of Political Transition in Egypt,"
Constellations (Vol. 20, No. 2, 2013), page 278.
299 
Joel Beinin, "Egyptian Workers and January 25th: A Social Movement in Historical Context," Social
Research (Vol. 79, No. 2, Summer 2012), page 331
300 
Angela Joya, "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic
politics," Review of African Political Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 368-369)
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youth sector which became increasingly mobilized around the non­
ideological movements such as, "Kefaya", arranging a series of anti-
Mubarak protests in the years 2004 and 2005, pressing for democracy and 
accountability. The younger members of this group afterwards established 
the April 6 Movement, which is an organization that emerged to support 
the 2008 strike of the textile workers in El-Mahalla city301.
A number of other social groups and protests organizations 
appeared since the year 2004 onwards, among them, Students for Change, 
University Professors for Change, Youth for Change, Workers for Change
and Artists for Change, as well as the People's Campaign for Change. In 
the year 2005, as Kefaya well thought-out a massive anti-Mubarak 
demonstration, a group of Egyptian intellectuals was formed as the 
"National Assembly for Democratic Transition". Lawyers, journalists and 
other professions progressively took part in protests302.
Moreover, The Internet-based social media platforms, namely, 
Facebook and Twitter rapidly became very popular among young
Egyptians. For instance, approximately one in nine people throughout the 
country have Internet access, and 9% of those who have access used 
Facebook, making it the most visited website in the country, following
Google and Yahoo. The Facebook page for the April 6 movement was 
reported in 2009 as the page witnessing the most dynamic debates among
the youth in Egypt, whom most of them had never been involved with 
politics before joining the group. The Facebook page granted a spot for
these young Egyptians to gather virtually and communicate freely about 
their concerns303 .
In 2010, the labour turmoil persisted all over the country, as the 
demonstrators realized that the Mubarak regime represents the marriage
301 Scott Hibbard and Azza Salama Layton, "The origins and future of Egypt's revolt," Journal of Islamic Law
and Culture (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010), pages 206-207.
302 Angela Joya, "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic 
politics," Review of African Political Economy (Vol. 38, No. 129, September 2011), page 369).
303 Samantha M. Shapiro, "Revolution, Facebook-Style," The New York Times, 22 January
2009:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25bloggers-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
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between authority and money, thus this knot needs to be broken up, calling
in the same time for the resignation of Ahmad Nazif's government, as it
operates only for businessmen and ignores social justice304. 
Egypt was obviously on the verge of an uprising, all that was 
required was a 'spark' - which came in the form of the Tunisian uprising in 
December of 2010 and January of 2011. With the overthrow of the 
Tunisian president Ben Ali, Egyptians were motivated to mobilize in 
opposition to Mubarak305.
The Foreign policy dimension in the January 25th revolution:
Despite that the revolution, as mentioned before, erupted because
of domestic social and economic demands, it carried on latent implications 
for foreign policy. The intense anti-Mubarak protests frequently featured 
slogans and catchphrases that sarcastically demanded Mubarak for
example to strive for refuge in Israel306. This immense popular rage
reflects the strong belief among the marchers that the regime did not serve
national interests of his country but rather those of Tel –Aviv and 
Washington. Afterwards the fall down of Mubarak regime, several 
opposition groups started on fierce marches outside the embassies of the 
United States and Israel in Cairo307. 
The Egyptians wanted a further assertive foreign policy that 
would comprise the defense of Palestinians people rights308. as well as, the 
Egyptian expatriates working in the Gulf states. That is why; heavy
304 25thJoel Beinin, "Egyptian Workers and January : A Social Movement in Historical Context,"Social
Research (Vol. 79, No. 2, Summer 2012), page 339.
305Egypt Under Empire, Part 3: From Nasser to Mubarak, Andrew gavin marshall, the Hampton institute, july,24th, 
2013 
306 Alhayat, ‘Slogans of the Egyptian Revolution,’ September 26, 2014:http://alhayat.com/Articles/ 4769345/ in
Arabic shearat al thawra almasrya besarahtha wa khafiyah.
307 Egyptians attack Israel embassy, ambassador evacuated,’ Reuters, September 10, 2011;) ‘(The storming of
Cairo’s Israeli embassy: an eyewitness account,’ Ahramonline, September 10
2011:http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/20856/Egypt/The-storming-of-CairosIsraeli-embassy-an­
eyewitne.aspx.
308 Khaled Elgindy, Heba Saleh “Egypt, Israel, Palestine,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, American
University in Cairo: http://www.aucegypt.edu/ GAPP/ CairoReview/ Pages/ article Details. aspx?aid =221#),
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demonstrations also took place at the embassy of the Saudi Arabia in 
Cairo, on the background of the detention of an Egyptian lawyer in Riyadh
airport for the possession of banned pills(309).
These marches demanded the his release and all the Egyptian 
detainees in the Saudi prisons, a matter which led to the closure of the 
Saudi embassy in Cairo310 
On their side, both Riyadh and Tel-Aviv endeavored during the 
January revolution to rally international backing for the former president 
Mubarak. For the one and only time, Israel permitted Egyptian battalions 
to be deployed in the demilitarized Sinai311. Whereas, the late Saudi King
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud condemned Egyptian demonstrations as 
the work of “infiltrators” out to destabilize Egypt312. The latter was 
worried that the removal of Mubarak from power would encourage other
Arab countries to arise against their ruling regimes. Thus, by supporting
Mubarak, Riyadh wanted to maintain its friendly alliance with both Cairo 
and Washington to restrain and curb the rising Iranian influence in the 
region.
From its part, the United States called for an “orderly
transition” under the supervision of General Omar Soliman, Mubarak’s 
longtime intelligence chief (whom Mubarak appointed as vice president 
during the uprising) and Field Marshal Mohammad Hussein Tantawi the 
minister of defense at that time313. 
310 ‘Saudi Arabia closes Cairo embassy,’ Financial Times, April 29, 2012).

311 Israel allows Egypt troops in Sinai for first time since 1979 peace treaty,” Haaretz, January 31, 2011: 

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-allows-egypt-troops-in-sinaifor-first-time-since-1979­
peace-treaty-1.340405
312 Caryle Murphy. February 14, 2011, ‘Fall of Mubarak deprives Saudi Arabia of closest local ally,’ The 
National: http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/fall-of-mubarak-deprivessaudi-arabia-of-closest­
local-ally)
313 Clinton Calls for ‘Orderly Transition’ in Egypt,’ New York Times, January 30, 2011: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/world/middleeast/31diplo.html?_r=0)
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International Reactions towards the January 2011 Revolution:
As a result of these marches that erupted in Cairo the international 
reactions started immediately after, these positions could be described by
confusion which indicates that many countries in the world needed more
time to recognize the changes that took place in Egypt especially that they
didn’t expect these quick changes.
If we tried to analyze the American and European reactions to the 
Egyptian revolution, we can assure that all officials for both sides thought 
that the situation in Egypt would not escalate to take the same path as the 
situation in Tunisia. Not only this but they thought from the very
beginning of the Arab spring that the Tunisian effect will not reach Egypt 
at all.
In that context, we can highlight the statement that had been 
issued by the state department that mentioned that the Tunisian snow ball
will not extend to other countries in the region, these declarations came 
from the Washington only three days before the beginning of the Egyptian 
revolution. Hence, the United States had such a conservative position 
arguing that it was an internal Egyptian affair and this matter shouldn't be
interfered in from any external part, as it only matters the army and the 
people.
However, the extension of the demonstrations throughout the 
country convinced the United States that the Mubarak regime in Egypt has 
come to an end, a matter that urged President Barak Obama to congratulate 
the Egyptians immediately after the stepping down of the Egyptian 
president on February 11th.
This reaction from the part of Washington comes in adverse to the 
usual orientation of the American foreign policy towards its traditional 
alliances in the region, namely, the Gulf countries that put pressure on 
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Obama's administration to support Mubarak and preserve his rule, as they
had their own fears that Arab Spring wave might strike their regimes.
In this context, we can realize that the American administration 
used some statements that reflects the change in its situation on daily basis
28thgradually. For example, on the of January 2011 it expressed its wishes 
that the violence in Egypt will come to an end. While few days later and 
30th on the Obama's administration expressed its hope to transfer the 
power peacefully.
1stOn the of February a strong declaration was issued urging for
the transfer of power peacefully as soon as possible a matter which reflects 
the forsaking of Mubarak by Obama's democratic administration only
within three or four days.
On the other hand and despite corrective steps that the former 
president Mubarak took to contain the mounting situation as the 
appointment of the late General Omar Soliman the head of the Egyptian 
intelligence service at that time as his vice president, a step which was 
considered as a unique step since Mubarak took over in 1981.
Besides, the formation of a new government headed by lieutenant 
general Ahmed Shafik, in addition to launching promises of constitutional 
reform. In addition to announcing that the president will not run for the 
next presidential elections that should have been held in September 2011, 
neither he nor his younger son Gamal who was appointed on 3rd of 
February 2000, as the General Secretariat of the ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP).
Yet, all those changes didn’t make real contribution to the realize
any improvement of the situation on the real ground, as it didn’t change
the demands of the Egyptian people neither the Stance of the united states 
from the events in Cairo. In that sense, Washington retreated its demands 
for the peaceful transfer of power within a time framework.
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Moreover, the secretary of state at that time Hilary Clinton 
supported the idea of the including the Muslim brotherhood in the dialogue
that was established between the government and the revolutionary forces 
and the opposition to overcome the crisis.
On the other hand, the European Union tried to keep a balanced 
situation since the beginning of the crisis. In this regard, it is worth 
3rdmentioning that the EU issued a joint statement on the of February
signed by United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy in which 
that expressed their deep concern towards the protests taking place in 
Egypt and the deterioration of the situation there.
Also, they condemned the violence and called for the need for a
quick and organized transfer of power to a government that represent the 
Egyptian people with all its broad spectrum, a government that would be
able to help the country to face its challenges. This statement has been 
considered as a confession that the changes taking place in Egypt became 
a reality. 
As for the individual European stances, they varied between 
among the European countries, and some of them could be traced here. For 
29thinstance, the Swedish foreign minister on the of January, only three
days after the eruption of the marches described them by "Tsunami of 
democracy". He confirmed that the sole exit for the crisis would be the 
implementation of the demands of the protestors, which is, achieving
sustainable economic reform organizing new presidential elections.
From their part the British Prime Minister David Cameron, the 
German counselor Angela Merkel, and the Greek Prime Minister Georgios 
Andrea Papandreou expressed their concern and worries towards the 
events in Egypt and demanded the cessation of violence. Additionally, 
they called for the respect of liberties and right to demonstrate, asserting in 
the same time the importance of attaining democratic transition.
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To conclude, the European Union tried to keep a balanced 
position, as the EU high representative for security and external affairs at 
22ndthat time Catherine Ashton put in plain words on the of February that 
all the EU statements about Egypt have been very clear.
The stance of the United States and the European Union, as well
as, many other countries in the world has been affected by the "street 
authority". In other words, the will of the Egyptians to change really
played the most important role in directing the attitudes of the international 
powers that used to support Mubarak regime to face the threat of " Radical 
Islam".
As for the stand of Israel, it could be realized that Tel-Aviv was 
one of the most concerned countries with the changes taking place in 
Egypt and the fall of the former president Mubarak with its consequences 
on the status - quo in the middle east. The Israeli government had some 
fears that the upcoming regime in Cairo would not commit itself to the 
Camp David peace agreement, as they considered Mubarak as a strategic 
treasure from the Israeli national security interest.
Not only, Tel- Aviv also had fears that the new changes in Cairo 
might affect its economic gains resulting from its relations with Egypt, 
namely, supplying Israel with about 40% of its needs of natural gas 
especially that about 50% of the Israeli production of electricity depends 
on this gas. Likewise, most of the Israeli factories depend on the natural 
gas to work a matter that might affect the future of the Israeli economy
plans, as an important partner for Europe and United States.
Accordingly, after the outbreak of the events in Egypt, the Israeli
government delivered a series of reactions, not necessarily in the form of 
statements, but also through convening a number of reunions and meetings 
28thto evaluate the situation. So, on the of January the Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked all the spokespersons and officials in 
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his governments not to comment on the situation in Egypt to any source of 
media.
Nonetheless, many of Israeli minsters ignored this stand and 
started to give their opinions about the Egyptian revolution even in an 
29thunofficial way. Subsequently, and on the following day the of 
January, it was reported threat the Israeli government has commenced 
secret talks with the united states and many European countries, 
expressing its concern about their reactions in relation to what was 
happening in Egypt and asked them to reduce their criticism to the 
Egyptian president Mubarak.
Moreover, on the same day Netanyahu convened a reunion with 
his defense minister Ehud Barak and his foreign minister Avigdor 
Lieberman, as well as the head of the Israeli intelligence agency (Mossad) 
and Israel Security Agency (Shabak) to discuss the strategic effect of the
Egyptian revolution on Israel.
Also, the same day witnessed a meeting between the minister of 
interior and the Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces Gabi 
Ashkenazi at that time, as well as some high military officials during
which a decision was made to the army not to comment on the 
development in Egypt.
30thMoreover, on the of January the Prime Minister Netanyahu 
specialized the weekly reunion of his government to discuss the situation 
2ndin Egypt. While, on the of February and after Mubarak's declaration 
that he is not going to run for the upcoming presidential elections, he
warned that the turmoil and demonstrations in Egypt will lead to instability
in the region for many years. 
2ndAs well, on the the Israeli interior minister mentioned that 
Mubarak era has come to an end, and it's a reality that can't be neglected or 
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ignored, highlighting that this reality would have long term impacts on his 
country314.
As for the reactions of the Arab countries, it could be easily
traced here, as for the Saudi Arabia, it is worth underscoring that the 
Riyadh stand from the January 2011 perceived some turbulences and 
fluctuations. Accordingly, and only one day after the outbreak of the 
demonstrations in Egypt, the former director of the Saudi general 
intelligence Prince Turki Al Faisal, criticized Mubarak regime. He stressed 
that its future will depend on its ability to understand the real reasons 
behind the unprecedented scenery in the country, adding that the whole
world is waiting to see how the Egyptian leaders will deal with the 
situation.
However, when the Saudi regime realized that Mubarak's regime
was really endangered, the late Saudi king "Abdullah" declared his bias to 
Mubarak regime mentioning that some agents go into hiding between the 
demonstrators and they are being used to create a strife among the 
Egyptians. Moreover, and in their trials to save Mubarak regime as they
feared from the transfer of the Arab spring to their monarchies.
The Saudi king elucidated to Obama's administration that his 
country was willing to help Egypt with financial aid to save Mubarak 
regime from falling as a substitute of the American aid to Cairo. 
Therefore, this step is considered as a reaction to the American 
administration's situation which started to push the former president to step 
down.
However, all these trails failed and when the Egyptian regime
fell, the Saudi Arabia tried to deal to deal with the situation in an 
intelligent manner, when it welcomed the peaceful transfer of power to the 
314 the 25th of January Egyptian revolution, middle east center for strategic studies, Amman , Jordan, April 2011,
various editors, thawretkhamsa we eshreinyanair al masrya, in Arabic)
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SCAF and offered financial aid to the new Egyptian transitional 
government to face the problems of the Egyptian economy.
The Foreign Relations of Egypt during the Transitional Period after January 25th
Revolution:
The Egyptian foreign policy beheld an immense commotion since
25ththe outbreak of the of January revolution. This was demonstrated in 
the variation from the deterioration of relations during Mubarak's era, and 
the alliances that have been strengthened during the period of Supreme 
council of Armed Forces (SCAF), till the ties and partnerships that have
been established with new countries during the one year Muslim
brotherhood rule.
All these developments and changes drove the Egyptian 
leadership to revise its foreign policy orientations and relations with all the 
countries whether on the Arab, African or even the international level. 
Some opinions argue that the revolution didn’t only aim at toppling
Mubarak's regime, but, it also aimed at correcting its mistakes and the 
paths of policies that it used to take especially with the African continent.
In brief, the Egyptian revolutions aimed at restructuring the 
Egyptian foreign relations as well as its aspiration to achieve domestic
successes that would fulfill the ambitions of the Egyptian people as 
improving the economic and living conditions, as well as accomplishing
liberty, democracy and social equality.
In this context, it could be argued that the majority of the 
25thEgyptians started to feel just before the of January 2011, especially
the new generations that their country was passing through a period of 
stagnation and that doors are really closed in front of the youth for the 
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participation in the political life. Thus, the change at that moment in the 
Arab world not only in Egypt was a must315.
25thFinally, we can say that the January revolution has returned 
to Egypt its skipjack spirit, and it started to regain or restore Cairo's 
original circles of interest where it belongs. It remained to be the 
revolution which opened the door towards laying down the principles and 
foundations of a genuine democratic transition, a matter which will
formulate the foreign policy to be perfectly expressive of the collective
conscience of Egypt, represented by the popular will.
315 The Egyptian foreign relations in the balance of January's revolution, successes and failures, January 2015, al 
badeel, in Arabic, al elakat al kharegia al masrya fi meyzanthawretyanayer, nagahatwaekhfakat).
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CHAPTER 6
EGYPT UNDER THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
REGIME
 
Origins of The Muslim brotherhood:
The Muslim Brotherhood group A group of modernist essence, 
secular means beside the Islamic appearance and banner. It is a global 
transnational Sunni Islamist organization which was established in Egypt 
by the Islamic scholar Hassan Al-Banna in march 1928, with another six
workers of the Suez Canal Company, as a Pan-Islamic, political, religious, 
and social movement316. Moreover, the Company assisted al- Banna to 
construct a mosque in Ismailia city that would attend as the Brotherhood's 
headquarters, the Society of Muslim Brothers.
From his part Al-Banna, he believed that contemporary Islam had 
mislaid its social dominance, because the majority of the Muslim
community had been altered and negatively affected by Western 
influences. Thus, he considered that Shariaa law grounded on the both 
Qur'an (the holy book of the Muslims) and the Sunnah which is the 
verbally transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and sayings, of prophet 
Mohamed317. should be applied to all components of life, including the 
organization of the government and the handling of day to day teething
troubles318. 
Moreover, the Muslim brotherhood provide the social services for
the society through the establishment of its own social institutions, such as 
hospitals, pharmacies, schools. In that sense The Brotherhood expanded so 
quickly going from 800 members in the year 1936, to reach 200,000 by the 
316 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405).

317 (http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e332)
 
318Husaini, Ishak Musa (1956). The Moslem Brethren. Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative. pp. 62–63
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year 1938 and over 2 million by 1948. As its influence in the society both 
socially and politically grew, it opposed British rule in Egypt starting in
1936319. But was banned after being accused of violent killings, including
the shooting of a Egyptian Prime Minister at that time by a young
Brotherhood member320.
The structure of the Muslim brotherhood itself differs totally in 
nature and the philosophy from any other social or educational institutions 
in the Islamic history, as Al-Azhar which is largest Sunni institution in the 
Islamic world. Therefore, the Islamic history never witnessed any
organization similar to that of the Muslim brotherhood in relation to the 
centralization, hierarchy or even the extreme discipline of its own 
members to the extent of losing his own identity and independence within 
the identity of the whole organization.
As a result, the Muslim brotherhood as an organization was 
established on institutional and philosophical basis that belongs to the 
western modernization more that its emanation from the Islamic traditions. 
For that reason. the Muslim brotherhood in its final version of organization 
and hierarchy came more like the communist parties, not only in the latter
attributes, but also in the other aspects, as the decision making process 
and the administrative stringency. Thus, and in such way or manner its
own members that would transform those members to be more like
obedient machines that cannot think or decide. 
The Muslim brotherhood since its establishment in 1928 has been 
facing a major contradiction and challenge. as it tried, on one hand, to
appear as a modernist organization, that reflects a balanced and modern 
image of Islam, in such a way that became much more similar to the 
secular western thoughts and philosophy, while on the other hand it sought 
to preserve and maintain its Islamic identity and values. Consequently, this 
319 Mitchell, Richard Paul, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 68–69),
320Lia, Brynjar. The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928– 
1942. Ithica Press, 2006. p. 53
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double nature of the organization led to a state of unrest and disarray in
policies, strategies and decisions of the Muslim brotherhood that was 
obvious during their one of rule. 
In that context, their hostility and support for the west at the very
same moment was so obvious and clear, they tried to use the west to 
strengthen their legitimacy after they took the power in Egypt, moreover, 
3rdthey relied on them to restore their rule back after it was lost on the of 
July 2013. To wrap up, there is a huge contradiction and difference
between the national states and the Islamic kalifate in relation to their
30thnatures, aims and goals. in addition, after the of June revolution the 
Muslim brotherhood will not be able to return back to its dual nature321. 
Provisions for Undergoing the Presidential Elections in 2012:
In the wake of the January 25, 2011 revolution, Egypt’s general 
public opinion started to exert bigger influence and play a more important 
role in foreign policy making, and they sought for change. Egyptians 
24thanticipated after electing President Mohamed Morsi on June , 2012, a
broad break from the policies of ousted president Hosni 
Mubarak. However, from the early weeks of his reign, it became clear 
that developing "a categorically different foreign policy" was not high on 
the new regime’s agenda.
“We can see how the dream of the Islamic Caliphate is being 
realized, Allah willing, by Dr. Mohamed Morsi and his brothers, his 
supporters, and his political party. We can see how the great dream, 
shared by us all - that of the United States of the Arabs"
This was the statement utilized to commence Mohamed Morsi’s 
presidential campaign322 . The Muslim Brotherhood’s intent to superintend 
321 Dr. Nasr Mohamed Aref, The end of the modernist Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, , in Arabic, nehyet 
al islamaweya al hadatheia llekhwan al muslimen, al siyassa al dawleyia, vol: 194, October 2013)
322 Egyptian Cleric Safwat Hegazi Launches MB Candidate Mohamed Morsi's Campaign: Morsi Will Restore the
"United States of the Arabs" with Jerusalem as Its Capital”, Memri, 1 May 2012
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an Islamist government was unquestionably evident from the very
beginning. Though, in the next two months the former president Morsi 
with the efforts and help of the Muslim Brotherhood strove to run a
different electoral campaign, representing himself as the only advocate of 
equality values and democratic principles. And finally as the surprise 
winner Mohamed Morsi was declared as the new Egyptian president, on 
the 24thof June 2012.
The Establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party:
Erstwhile to the year 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
theoretically excluded from participating in any parliamentary elections as 
a political Islamist party323. Still, the group had been struggling to get a
foothold in political arena in Egypt for eras. Underneath the regime of 
former President Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood was, mostly, 
allowed to take part in the political scene but devoid of any official legal 
(324)status . 
Consequently, the group started to pitch candidates, to run as 
independents, since the 1984 parliamentary elections. Yet, The Muslim
Brotherhood had succeeded to secure its greatest electoral triumph in the 
year 2005 when their candidates won 88 out of the 454 seats in the 
Egyptian parliamentary house, "The People’s Assembly". Though, the 
group’s 150 candidates officially competed in these elections as 
independents, their connection with the Muslim Brotherhood was clearly
advocated325. 
The Muslim Brotherhood had thought about starting on a political 
party in 1996(326), and then another time in 2007327. However, no concrete 
323 Kienie, E., “A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt”, publisher I. B. Tauris (2001),
page 57
324 
325 Otterman, S., “Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary Election”, Council on Foreign Relations,
1December 2005
326 http://egypt.electionnaire.com/parties/?id=18
327 Michael, M., “Egypt's Brotherhood party details platform akin to that of Iran”, The Boston Globe, 11 October
2007
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measures were taken till June 2011 when the Freedom and Justice Party
(FJP) - in Arabic  Al Hurreyah wa’ Al Adala-was officially founded(328).
Despite the fact that the registration of political parties with a
religious identity was still restricted, yet the Muslim Brotherhood was 
capable of registering their party through showing it as a "civil party" . the 
FJP was one amongst numerous new parties which managed to flow into 
the political life in Egypt after the 25 January 2011 revolution329. 
The Freedom and Justice party was frequently labelled as the 
political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood group 330. Likewise, this near 
relationship was conceded by the Muslim Brotherhood itself, through a 
number of joint statements that was released on the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
(331)official website .The common submissions of both the Muslim
Brotherhood and its political wing the FJP in front of the Human Rights 
Council on the 3rdof November 2014 disclosed that the Muslim
Brotherhood established a civil political party under the name of the 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) with the intention of take part in the 
political democratic procedures on track in the post-revolutionary
Egypt(332).
In spite of this definite link between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
FJP, the group has made many endeavors to picture the party as a separate 
and individualistic entity. In that sense, enormous efforts have been 
concentrating on keeping the FJP away form and not submissive to the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance office. So, these measures were
commenced to curtail apprehensions from both the international 
328 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/104/24939/Elections-/Political-Parties/Freedom-and-Justice­
Party.aspx)
329 
Shukrallah, Salma., and el-Abbasy, Nourhan., “January Revolution generates a new Egyptian political map”,
Ahram Online, 4 March 2011
330 Engaging with the Freedom and Justice Party: Protecting American National Security Interests in Post-Arab
Spring Egypt”, Harvard University Institute of Politics, September 2012
331 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29837.
332 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ article.php?id=31884
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community in relation to the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood group 
and the newly established political party, as well as, the Egyptian voters. 
Though, on the real ground the FJP and Muslim Brotherhood did 
not act out as distinct entities, and, the Guidance office obviously had 
some sort of authority over the progress and improvement of the party. In 
this context, it is worth mentioning that the members of the Muslim
Brotherhood were directed to cast their votes for the FJP candidates and 
they were also prohibited from becoming members in any other party other
than freedom and justice party(333).
Furthermore, those members who did not act in accordance with 
these instructions were dismissed from the Muslim Brotherhood. This 
involved young members of the group who were excluded next to the 
establishment of their own party under the name of the Egyptian Current 
Party in Arabic Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masri,.
Additionally, The Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council had an
explicit contribution to the selection process of FJP’s headship so it
appointed Mohamed Morsi as FJP’s president, and both Essam El-Erian as 
well as Saad El-Katatni, as vice-president and secretary-general 
respectively334. They also were members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Guidance Council, which is the group top leadership and administrative
body. Principally, the main out stream and grand parameters of foreign 
policy continued without a change, despite appearances. Actually, the 
differences that really emerged were mainly in the implementation of this 
policy, which became less efficient as a result of dualism and confusion in 
decision-making. Foreign policy decisions under Morsi were made at two 
levels: first by state bodies, including the ministry of foreign affairs and 
national intelligence, and then by the Muslim Brotherhood's foreign policy
333 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/104/24939/Elections-/Political-Parties/Freedom-and-Justice­
Party.aspx).
334 El-Hennaway, N., “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood selects hawkish leaders”, Egypt Independent, 30 April 
2011
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advisors335. The Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm—the Justice
and Freedom Party—became a part of the institutions playing a role in this 
process. Consequently, the position of foreign policy adviser for the 
president became much more influential than ever. In that sense, Essam Al 
Hadad a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was 
nominated as President Morsi’s political advisor played such a critical role
in the process of foreign policy making.
Egyptian Foreign Policy under Muslim Brotherhood
Since the inception of the Morsi presidency in June 2012, the new 
government has not even tried to alter mostly Egypt’s foreign policy
priorities. Despite its Islamist orientation, the foreign policy positions of 
the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), its political arm, did not differ 
significantly from all the former regime’s perception of Egyptian national 
interests. While officially independent of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
party has been overwhelmingly influenced by the Brotherhood guidance
office ideas and opinions, it received its advices and recommendations on 
both domestic and international issues. Consequently, the FJP’s foreign 
policy programs and positions were mostly in harmony with Brotherhood
philosophy and beliefs336.
The FJP’s 2012 electoral campaign underscored Egypt’s 
aspiration of playing a pivotal role on many levels. It affirmed that Egypt 
can such be a momentous power, in its region based on its historic and 
cultural inheritance, referring to a Nasserist approach of foreign policy. In 
that sense, they tried to mingle nationalism with Islamism, the freedom 
and justice presented their electoral program to the Egyptian people.
335 Morsi's foreign policy failures, ahram online, Sunday 21 Jul 2013
336A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy After the Revolution, Joshua Haber, Helia Ighani, May
2013, The Institute for Middle East Studies, the Elliott school of international affairs, the George Washington
university.
227 | P a g e 
   
 
 
    
  
  
 
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
 
    
 
  
   
   
 
     
   
   
    
  
    
      
                                                           
        
        
 
 
This renaissance project, or "al-nahda", in Arabic, concentrates 
on regaining Egypt’s leading role in the region tosecure the welfares of 
Egyptians on both levels domestically and externally. Additionally, ousted 
President Morsi during his electoral campaign asked for the support of the 
Egyptians, and the fruitful cooperation of both society and the country’s 
institutions to successfully accomplish the target(337). 
The objectives set up by the so called "renaissance project", 
which presented the core of the electoral campaign of the Muslim
Brotherhood candidate, laid down the foundation for reshaping Egypt’s 
post-revolution foreign policy,-according to their point of view­ this new 
foreign policy strived towards principal targets, namely, attaining
independence from foreign powers, achieving a regional leadership role.
Hence, the first goal was in favor of distancing from foreign 
powers, but in the same time with respecting and maintaining existing
accords and treaties concluded with the international community. The
mutual thread underlying these elements was an endeavor to foster the 
economic growth and development by attracting new investments to the 
country in order to minimize Egypt’s dependence on foreign aid.
In addition, the Morsi's electoral program sketched out a foreign 
policy vision that focus on fostering the Egyptian relations with five main 
circles, in a manner that can assist pursuing its objectives. Thus, Egypt will
have to strength its ties with its neighboring countries in the region, U.S, 
Europe and Asia as well as the rest of the world. These circles has always 
been considered as the main circles of movement for the Egyptian foreign 
policy since the declaration of the first republic. Hence, this foreign policy
vision stresses the need for improving the economic relations with other
337
A Delicate Balancing Act: Egyptian Foreign Policy After The Revolution, Joshua Haber, Helia Ighani ,May
2013, The Institute For Middle East Studies, the Elliott school of international affairs, the George Washington
university.
228 | P a g e 
   
 
  
 
   
   
   
  
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
    
     
  
   
   
 
   
 
                                                           
        
countries in the forms of strengthening trade relationships, tourism 
exchanges, and development projects338.
The FJP defines its second objective through the exertion of 
Egypt’s leadership role in groups with which it already has relations. On 
the regional level, the FJP identifies three “affiliation circles” in which 
Egypt could reassert a leadership role, namely the Arab, African, and 
Islamic circles. This stems from a widely held belief—shared by the 
Muslim Brotherhood—that Mubarak largely neglected foreign policy and 
subordinated Egyptian interests to those of Israel and the West over the 
last thirty years. Contending that Mubarak maintained power through 
illegal means and neglected his duty to foster growth in the Arab and 
Islamic circles, the FJP platform asserts:
"The humiliating decline in Egypt’s status and its role regionally 
and internationally went so far that Egypt was supplying the Zionist 
occupiers of Palestine and Jerusalem with gas and oil, at the cheapest 
below-market prices, while Egyptians were in bad need of the same. We
blockaded and antagonized freedom-fighters in Palestine. We failed in 
managing the Southern Sudan issue and the Convention on the Nile Basin. 
Our national security was in danger, even in the depths of Arab and 
African realms".
In particular, the FJP emphasized the pivot to Africa as a
complete departure from the former regime’s foreign policy. The Muslim
Brotherhood emphasized that Mubarak had completely neglected his 
continental neighbors following a 1995 assassination attempt while 
traveling to the Organization of African Unity summit in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 
The third objective of opposing foreign intervention and 
occupation is reflected in the FJP’s 2012 presidential election platform of 
Mohamed Morsi. On the international level, the FJP proclaimed Egypt’s 
338 Foreign Policy in Morsi’s Election Platform,” Freedom & Justice Party
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opposition to all forms of foreign meddling and the need for public
consensus on all foreign policy decisions. Even before coming to power, 
the FJP sought to redefine the U.S.-Egyptian relationship in a “bilateral 
dimension.” It asserted that the United States “should not impose on Egypt 
any specific agenda in its foreign policy as it seeks to open up to all
countries…and preserve Egypt’s right to evaluate its relationship with all
parties based on Egyptian interests.” This encapsulates a sentiment that is 
not unique to the FJP, but is rather a common belief among the Egyptian 
public.
Moreover, he committed several major political missteps that led 
to his ouster only one year as follows:
First, the gradual prioritizing of domestic issues over foreign 
policy in Egypt began as early as some fifteen years ago—that is, about 
two-thirds through Mubarak’s three decade presidency—as his aging
began to take its toll on the functioning of his foreign policy. The only
exception to this demotion was issues and developments related to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Not surprisingly, even during the past three
tumultuous years, it was repeatedly asserted that one of the revolution’s 
main objectives was to restore Egypt’s regional role. Finally, while it may
well be too early to evaluate Sisi’s foreign policy, one change can already
be seen: a far higher degree of congruence between Egypt’s foreign and 
domestic policies.2 Thus, even as Sisi has given Egypt’s internal 
development top priority, he has been working to create a favorable 
external environment for this agenda by putting emphasis on maintaining
Egypt’s peace with Israel and by strengthening his country’s ties with the 
Gulf Arab states(339). 
Mohamed Morsi was the first civilian freely elected president in 
Egypt’s history. Yet, he wasn’t able to seize the opportunity to use the 
leverage and autonomy always given to the presidency to enhance the 
339 Post-Revolution Egyptian Foreign Policy Abdel Monem Said Aly, middle east brief,
No 86, November 2014, crown center for middle east studies, brandies university
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country’s regional or international position. In other words, the major
problem with the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule was that it they were not able 
to grasp the significance of the moment in which moved from them being
in opposition to being in power after eighty-five years(340).
In that sense, we can trace three factors that contributed to 
constraining ofhis foreign policy which led to the limitation of Egypt’s 
role, furthermore weakening its position in the region and in the world as a
whole. The first factor was the primacy of domestic politics over foreign 
policy which resulted from a number of problems that has been facing the 
country namely, a complicated political and constitutional dilemma, a
turbulent security situation, and a growing economic crisis, besides the
Islamist president Morsi was at the same time facing a significant decline
in domestic support. Accordingly, even with his extensive travel to many
foreign capitals since he came to office, he had very limited room for
playing a productive role in foreign affairs341 .
The second constraint on Morsi’s foreign policy resulted from his 
affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood group who pressed him to deal
with a wide range of Salafist organizations and jihadist groups internally. 
Hence, not only did he release from prison a large number of members of 
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiya and al-Jihad, but also during the 2012 October
War celebrations he praised the assassins of President Sadat, mainly
Tarekal-Zumor and Assem Abdel Maged when he summoned them in a
rally at Cairo Stadium in which they and other Salafists attacked the Shia 
and in which he severed diplomatic relations with Syria. 
Moreover, when Ansar Beit Al-Maqqdes group kidnapped 
Egyptian soldiers in Sinai, Morsi announced that he would work to save
the lives of both the hostages and the kidnappers, and the pace of pardons 
increased dramatically after he took officeas he released nine decrees 
340 The end of the Muslimbrotherhood rule in Egypt, Amr Mahmoud El- Shobaki, August, 1st, 2013
341 Post-Revolution Egyptian Foreign Policy Abdel Monem Said Aly, Middle East brief, No 86, November
2014, crown center for Middle East studies, Brandies University
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with pardons starting soon after he was inaugurated, freeing nearly 2,000 
people amomg them the brother of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri, 
343 344 345Mohammed342, , , . 
In conclusion he wasn't able to reconcile the pragmatism needed 
for the effective conduct of foreign policy with the ideology of political 
Islam.
From the time when the January 2011 revolution took place, the 
Egyptian state has faced many challenges and problems whose effects and 
consequences became more complicated by the ascendance of the Muslim
Brotherhood and its Islamic allies to power, along with President Morsi’s 
blind obedience to the instructions and decisions made by the 
Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau. Indeed, he was prioritizing the 
organizational interests of the Muslim Brotherhood over those of the state, 
the matter which sparked clashes with the state security apparatus and the 
state bureaucracy responsible for implementing foreign policy.
Among these challenges that faced Egypt since the January
revolution, was firstly, the emergence of regional environment consisting
of failed states as Since 2011, Egypt’s geo-strategic environment has 
worsened as the country has become surrounded by some dysfunctional 
states, such as Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, the 
matter that noticeably augmented Egypt’s vulnerability and exposure to 
the massive smuggling processes of advanced weapons and arms into its 
territory from almost all its borders. 
As for Sudan it downgraded its partnership with Egypt regarding
important Nile related issues, while at the same time attempting to exploit 
it by demanding the reopening of the sovereignty issue over Shalatin and 
Halaib triangle which lies in Egypt’s southeastern corner which Sudan 
342 Hamza Hendawi, “Egypt: Morsi’s Links to Jihadists Probed,” Associated Press, December 3, 2013.
 
343 Tom Perry, “Egypt’s Mursi Frees Islamists Jailed by Mubarak,” Reuters, July 31, 2012.
 
344 Doaa El-Bey, “The Reconciliation We Need?”, Al-Ahram Weekly, October 11–17, 2012.
 
345 Jason Howerton, “Paying Off Political Debt,” The Blaze, July 31, 2012 .
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always claimed that it is part of its territories. Yet, Morsi made one of 
worst moves for the Egyptian foreign policy in April 2013 when, during a
visit to Sudan, he crossed redline concerning the Egyptian national 
security and interest, when rumors spread about willingness to give up the
Halaib and Shalatin to the Sudanese.
Consequently, as an immediate reaction concerning these rumors, 
the presidency denied in some official declarations the proposed deal 
between President Morsi and his Sudanese counterpart Omar Bashir that 
would give the Halaib and Shalateen triangle to Sudan, alongside, 
Presidential advisor on foreign affairs at that time EssamEl -Haddad 
mentioned that “The Egyptian position on Halaib and Shalateen has not 
changed. Moreover, The chief of staff of the Egyptian army at that time 
and the current minister of defense Sedki Sobhi, made a visit to Khartoum 
to clarify the Egyptian state situation, that was not negotiating the give up 
of any piece of its land, this was an incident that to the military that the 
Brotherhood was directly working against Egypt's national security
interests(346). 
Concerning Libya, compensating for its own vulnerabilities, it
managed to pressure Egypt to surrender Libyan political refugees and 
restricted the employment of Egyptian workers in Libya.
On the part of Palestine, Egypt’s alliance with Hamas 
complicated Egypt’s situation, the Brotherhood's close cooperation with 
them, especially on illegal smuggling tunnels into Gaza whether by
smuggling weapons and arms through these tunnels or by providing direct 
access to a variety of terrorist groups, would have had negative long-term 
consequences for both Egyptian national security and relations with Israel. 
346 
Presidency denies debate on status of Halaib, Daily News Egypt, Ethar Shalaby, April 7, 2013.
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Hamas Organization Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood Regime:
Hamas Islamic resistant group as widely known and as stated in 
its establishment statue issued in 1988, represents a part of the 
international brotherhood system or organization. However, it has been 
present in Palestine since the Forties of the last century, when some 
brotherhood in Egypt went there to support the Palestinian case. And with 
the founding of Israel and its control over about half the area of the 
territories that has been allocated by the United Nations Resolution 181 
(also known as the Partition Resolution) which was adopted on November
29th , 1947 to split Britain’s former Palestinian mandate into Jewish and 
end(347)Arab states in May 1948 as the British mandate was slated to . 
Then with the occupation of the rest of the Palestinian territories in 1967, 
the brotherhood there started to concentrate on the importance of its 
indulgence in the society from the bottom aiming at building and 
controlling it as a priority before thinking about resisting the occupation 
and freeing the land.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that the literature of the 
Muslim brotherhood documenting this period of time suggested that it has 
been weak enough to resist the occupation to liberate Palestine, because of 
this it didn’t participate with the other Palestinian resistance groups which 
heavily flourished at that point of time to struggle against the Israeli
occupation. Even more it tried to benefit from disclaiming having any
relation with these resistance groups to build and reinforce its institutions, 
a matter which the Israeli occupation forces used to hit the Palestinian 
resistance factions, namely the Palestinian liberation organization (PLO). 
Moreover, Israel bolstered the hostility state from the part of the 
Muslim brotherhood in Palestine towards the armed Palestinian resistance
factions, and described it by the "secular factions". Throughout the whole
period since the establishment of Israel and the occupation west bank and 
347 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel
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Gaza strip in 1967, and until the explosion of the First Palestinian Uprising
(in Arabic intifada) in December 1987, not even a single member of the 
brotherhood in Palestine participated in any resistance activities against the 
Israeli occupation.
The Muslim brotherhood group in Palestine at that moment 
retreated that it was still very fragile and its participation in any kind of 
these resistance activities, would give Israel reasonable ground to get rid 
of the group and its projects in Palestine. As previously mentioned this 
situation continued until the eruption of the 1987 uprising, in which all the 
sects of the Palestinian society participated, yet and only at this point the 
group really started to face extreme internal pressures and criticisms from 
its youth members who claimed that the Muslim brotherhood image in 
Palestine was becoming very negative because of its inaction.
Consequently, the Muslim brotherhood in Palestine faced vast 
divisions among its members which resulted from the longing of its youth 
to take part in the resistance against Israel with the PLO factions. Thus, it
took a decision to creäte an armed wing to execute some resistance
operations, only two weeks after the commencement of the first intifada, 
and called it the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). What is more, the 
newly established Hamas started to launch declarations claiming that it
was the interior of the first intifada and the one who is supporting it. 
At that point it was obvious that the emergence of Hamas, 
represented a enormous burden for the Palestinian people, as it refused to 
merge with the joint Palestinian leadership for the uprising, and it started 
to work separately without any coordination with them. The matter which 
led to the exhaustion of the Palestinian citizens as it called for organizing
strikes in days different from those days determined by the joint 
leadership, not only but it demanded the Palestinians to boycott the strikes 
of the leadership, a matter that weakened the momentum of the resistance.
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Then and there, with the developments that took place on the 
ground and the initiation of the peace process between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis by the convention of Madrid Peace Conference that was held 
from the 30th of October to the 1st of November 1991, and hosted 
by Spain with the co-sponsorship by both United States and the former
Soviet Union, this conference was just a beginning that was followed by
the signing of the Oslo peace agreements in September 1993, the Islamic 
organization Hamas refused the decided to refuse their outcomes, stressing
that Palestine is a Muslim territory that can't be relinquished under any 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, Hamas started to execute several explosions against
Israel to smash up the above mentioned agreements that have been reached 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis and to stop their implementation. 
Besides, it refused to run for the parliamentary elections that was held in 
1996, under the allegations that they were the outcome of the rejected Oslo 
agreements. Yet, Hamas movement decided to run for the next 
parliamentary elections that was organized in 2006, where it won with a
big majority and took control over the Gaza strip and completely
separated it from the west bank.
At that point, the head of the political office of the Movement 
announced in July 2008 the willingness of the Islamic resistance
movement to accept the two states solution that it previously turned down
and carried out for the sake of that many suicide bombings. The matter
that led to the Israeli re-occupation to the parts of the territories that it had 
already withdrawn from it. When Hamas was criticized for this 
contradiction, it explained that it was a temporary stance related to their
inability to "destroy Israel" at that point of time, adding that when the 
moment have possession of enough power it would certainly begin its 
battle and struggle against Israel. 
Moreover, Hamas managed to separate Gaza strip and dealt with 
it as the launching point for the establishment of the wider Muslim
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brotherhood project or dream to extend the group all over the world. Thus, 
it started setting up tunnels across the borders with Egypt to get all its 
basic needs of oil and food, etc. from there. Likewise, Hamas has been 
involved in the assassinations of many Egyptian soldiers in Sinai by its 
members who managed to infiltrate there via those tunnels, also there are
many enormous doubts about the role that Hamas has played during the 
25th of January revolution especially in relation to the breaking in of a
number of prisons in Egypt to smuggle many of the Muslim brotherhood
members who were imprisoned from the part of Mubarak's regime just few 
days before the revolution amongst them the former president Morsi.
Also, those doubts about Hamas expanded to include their role in 
the burning of a number of "security state department" centers throughout 
the country, which is the main security Egyptian institution or organ 
responsible for the follow up of their activities, to destroy the archives of 
the most important security apparatus in the country. It was also engaged 
in providing the Brotherhood group in Cairo with the some of its elements 
to support Morsi's regime after taking power in Egypt.
Hamas and the Egyptian national security:
The role of the Muslim brotherhood in the arrangement for the 
25th of January 2011 revolution, some of its leaders declared through some 
of its leaders that they would not participate in the demonstrations against
Mubarak regime. However, the role of the group was revealed later either 
with their participation via the armed members in the raiding of the 
different jails as mentioned before as well as taking part in the 
assassinations and killing of the protestors in a number of squares in 
Egypt. 
Likewise, during the rule of president Morsi, Hamas movement 
activities in Egypt intensified immensely, for example the leaders of the 
movement started to meet Morsi in the presidential palace and convening
reunions in the guidance bureau away from the related official institutions 
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and organs of the Egyptian state, as the national security council didn’t 
play any role in the arrangement of those meetings and visits, also it didn't 
have any clue about the identity of the leaders and members of the 
movements who attended those reunions. 
What is more, the security apparatuses in Egypt reported the 
attendance of some formerly noted Hamas leaders on their watch lists for
those previously mentioned reunions, because of their dangers on the 
Egyptian national security, a matter which augmented the risk of the 
execution of more terrorist operations against Egypt. In brief, Hamas 
delegations came to Egypt in the middle of an extremely turbulent and 
nerve-wracking situation between the former president Morsi and his 
brotherhood group from one side, as they tried during the one year rule to 
control the country, a matter which was faced by vast opposition from the 
Egyptian society with all its sects who called for the departure of the 
president and the organization of early elections.
In the middle of the unstable scene in Egypt, some members of 
the Muslim brotherhood and their affiliates of the other political Islam
groups began to threat the Egyptians if demonstrations came out against
Morsi. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the vice president of the 
freedom and justice party (FJP) declared that Muslim brotherhood would 
summon what is known by the "Egypt free army" to launch a war against
the Egyptians in the case of the ouster of Morsi. 
During the preparations and arrangements that was taking place at 
that point of time by the Egyptians especially by the youth to organize the 
30thdemonstrations of the second revolution of the of June, a delegation of 
the military wing of Hamas movement paid a visit to Cairo which the 
security apparatuses knew almost nothing about it. However, some 
opinions argued that this visit aimed at discussing the role of the 
movement's members in facing Morsi's opposition.
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For instance, using Hamas members to confront with the 
Egyptians who would go out to demonstrate against Morsi to organize
early presidential elections, a matter which has been underscored by some 
opinions as the natural extension of the role of that the movement played 
25thduring the of January revolution, especially in relation with the break 
in of the Egyptian prisons to free the Muslim brotherhood members, 
amongst them was the former president Morsi.
30thYet, with the eruption of the of June revolution some 
information about the preparations taken by the Hamas movement for
conflicting with the protestors, a matter which led to the generation of 
hatred and anger feelings among the Egyptian people against not only
Hamas movement but also against the people in Gaza strip and the all the 
Palestinians. Those adverse feelings that had aroused from the part of the 
Egyptian public opinion towards the Palestinians as a reaction of Hamas 
deeds, negatively   affected the cause of Palestine.
30thFinally, it could be argued that the of June revolution had a
lot of impacts in relation to the several aspects interrelated to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, these after-effects cannot be limited to the events of that 
30thtook place during the of June only, but it could be also linked to prior 
episodes namely, the 25th of January revolution on one hand, as well as, 
the aftermaths of the Arab spring on the other hand. Along these lines, the 
most important outcomes of these impacts is could be represented in the 
uncovering of the falsity discourse of the political Islam with all its 
factions348 . 
These challenges were complicated by major changes in the 
scenery of the rest of the Mashriq area, a matter that affected and 
minimized Egypt’s capacity to play its significant traditional regional role. 
In brief, Egypt’s importance in the region fall down to a level far below 
that in the later years of the former president Mubarak, who has been 
348 The lost chance, Israel and hamas calucluations in the post brotherhood era, Dr. Emad Gad, in Arabic, al forsa
aldeaa, hesabat israeel wa hamas fi marhlaet ma baed al ehkhwan, al siyassa al dawleyia, Vol:194, October 2013)
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already criticized for the diminishment of Egypt’s long –established 
position as a major regional power. 
As for the second challenge, it would be represented in the 
waning of the Egypt-Gulf alliance which was formed back in the year  
1973 during the Arab-Israeli war, this alliance could be considered as one
of the most important pillars of Egypt’s foreign policy over the past four
decades, this alliance was negatively affected to reach its lowest point
during Morsi's presidency. Moreover, Egypt has always been extremely
important for the Gulf countries security, because of its military strength 
as the Egyptian army is ranked among the most powerful 20 armies in the 
world349 
However, the gulf powers started to be suspicious of the Islamist 
regime that emerged in the country under president Morsi, on the 
background of Egyptian–Iranian rapprochement which naturally did 
corresponding harm to its relations with the Gulf countries and Arab 
monarchies, with the exception of Qatar.
Relations with Iran: 
This warmness in relations began with an August 2012 visit by
Morsi to Tehran to participate in summit of the Nonaligned Movement, in 
which he transferred the leadership of the 120-nation bloc to Tehran(350).
This was the first time for an Egyptian president to visit Iran in decades 
after the severing the Diplomatic ties between Iran and Egypt in 1980 after 
the former signed a peace treaty with Israel and gave asylum and a state
funeral to Iran's exiled Shah Reza Pahlavi during the era of President 
Anwar Sadat after which Tehran named a street in Tehran after his 
assassin Khaled Islambouli, this visit was reciprocated by one for the 
349 The world's 20 strongest militaries, business insider, Jeremy Bender, Oct. 3, 2015
350 http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/morsi-arrives-in-tehran-in-first-visit-by-egyptian-leader-to-iran­
in-decades-1.461644,
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former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's to Cairo in February
2013(351) 
In March 2013 one month after the Ahmadinejad's visit, the first 
commercial flight in three decades traveled between Cairo and Tehran, a
step that backfired, as it was faced by strong criticism from the political 
establishment, leading to the its suspension. However, on May 31, Morsi 
called for the flights to be recommenced, with nearly 132 Iranian tourists
arriving in Aswan as part of a bilateral tourist agreement, but this time, 
oppositions from the security apparatus were joined by street protests by
Salafists in front of the residence of the Iranian charge d'affaires in 
Cairo(352).
For instance, ties between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates 
suffered a major blowback highlighted by the detention of ten Egyptian 
Brotherhood members accused of committing terrorist activities and 
training local Islamists on how to overthrow Arab governments353.
Moreover, the Saudi-Egyptian relationship deteriorated as well, with the 
Saudi ambassador being summoned more than once. Even the Jordanian 
king Abdallah II described former Islamist president Morsi as having "no 
depth" of understanding concerning the complexity of the problems in the 
region.
Besides, many other factors contributed to prioritizing these
relations in the Egyptian foreign policy, on top of these factors is the 
presence more than three million Egyptian expatriates in the Gulf region, 
and the passage of Gulf oil through the Suez Canal and the Summed 
pipeline and Arab Gulf investments in Egypt. Without a doubt, this strong
Gulf –Egypt relations has permitted the latter to overcome the negative
and furious Arab reaction to its signing of the 1979 peace treaty with 
Israel, the matter which enabled Egypt and the Gulf states in a later stage
351 Iran President Ahmadinejad begins historic Egypt visit .bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 5 February 2013
 
352 Egypt's Evolving Foreign Policy, Adel el Adawy, the Washington institute for near east policy, October 17,
 
2013
 
353 Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood cell detained in UAE, Reuters,Tue Jan 1, 2013)
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to unite behind a single strategy for liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi 
invasion in 1991, through the formation of a coalition, also these strong
relations has always succeeded to hold off against the hegemonic
tendencies of Iran in the Gulf and beyond as well as its nuclear threat.
Ties with Syria: 
the ousted President Morsi as mentioned before made one of his 
worst moves and greatest mistakes in his foreign policy, when he
announced his the expulsion of the Syrian ambassador to Egypt and 
closing the embassy. Moreover, he decided to sever the diplomatic ties 
with Damascus and denunciating Bashar Al Assad regime354.
In addition, Morsi called for military intervention on behalf of the 
opposition355. Moreover, he pledged to provide financial aid and moral 
support to the Syrian rebels356.
In conclusion, the relations with the Arab countries started to 
deteriorate in the aftermath of the January 2011 revolution, because of fear 
of the Gulf regimes from the exportation of the Arab spring revolutions 
from both Egypt and Tunisia to them, the matter that would represent 
direct and immense threat on these monarchies357. Yet, these relations
witnessed a real severe relapse after the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to 
power in June 2012, because of President Morsi’s excessive obedience to 
the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, his alliance with radical groups, as 
well as his dealing with the case of former president Hosni Mubarak, who 
was seen by the Gulf states as a reliable ally, all these reasons created a
sort of apprehension and mistrust that weakened the alliance with Egypt 
these regimes. 
354 Morsi role at Syria rally seen as tipping point for Egypt army”, The Irish Times, 4 July 2013
355 International Crisis Group, “Marching in Circles: Egypt’s Dangerous Second Transition”, Policy Briefing –
Middle East/North Africa Briefing No. 35, 7 August 2013
356 Mohsen, M., “Egypt to aid Syrian rebels”, Daily News Egypt, 15 June 2013
357 Islamist-led foreign policies: what implications?, pp.157-166 Europe in the reshaped Middle East, Kristina
Kausch, FRIDE, 2012).
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As for the relations with the west, it also went through a decline
during Morsi's presidency, on the contrary of what it used to be before, 
especially since the beginning of the 1970s, when President Anwar Sadat 
started to shift Egypt’s major international alliance from the Soviet Union 
and the socialist bloc to the U.S. and its Western allies, from this moment 
on the relations on all levels either military, security, and economic
relations became closer till the end of Mubarak era. 
However, After a short period of enthusiasm vis-à-vis the Arab 
Spring, these countries began to doubt Egypt’s capacity to function as a
stabilizing factor in the region and their confidence further deteriorated 
after the Muslim Brotherhood came to power. For example as few months 
After Morsi's presidency President Barak Obama, expressed his point of 
view about Egypt's status and how it has been demoted from that of a
“strategic ally” to “neither an ally nor an enemy358.”
Though, the U.S. and the EU thought in the very beginning that 
the Muslim Brotherhood were capable to move Egypt towards a real
democratization. Yet, still was big concern about their ability to do so, and 
which contributed to a certain extent in complicating the relations between 
Egypt and the west especially the United States. For instance, Morsi's 
promise during his first public speech on the eve of his inauguration in 
June 2012, to work to free Omar Abdel-Rahman, the spiritual leader of 
those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing359 
The United States government issued a firm criticism to his 
declaration, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded to 
President Mohamed Morsi’s call for extraditing Omar, who is serving life
imprisonment in the US, by stating that the legal procedures of his trial 
358 David Jocktson, “Obama: Egypt Not an ‘Ally’ nor ‘Enemy,’ USA Today, September
13, 2012.
359 Egypt’s new president vows to free blind sheikh tied to 1993 WTC bombing”, Daily
Mail Online, 29 June 2012.
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were correct in her interview with CNN. She added that the evidence
against Abdel Rahman, was clear and convincing.
Morsi's spokesperson then tried to rectify the president’s 
statements, pointing that they were based on sympathy for his family, from 
a humanitarian perspective and not a legal one, adding that Egypt respects 
laws and criminal rulings issued in other countries with stable judicial 
systems360.. Moreover, New York’s mayor stated that he would face any
attempt to demoralize the sentence of life imprisonment he had received. 
Another Obama administration official also mentioned that there was 
“zero chance this would happen361.
In conjunction with all these events, a coveted visit of President 
Morsi to the Washington has never been materialized during his year in 
office, the Muslim Brotherhood wanted the president to conduct an official 
or a state visit to united states, and the presidency spokesperson declared 
that President Barak Obama during a phone call between him and 
president Morsi's, invited the latter to visit Washington.
Yet, unfortunately the white house issued a statement denying
the Egyptian spokesperson declarations about what came in this phone
call362. This incidence reflects the weakening of the relations between 
them and the lower priority granted to them by Washington. In the 
aftermath of issuing the November 22, 2012 decree by President Mohamed 
Morsi's that grants him broad powers. The State Department released on 
November, 23rd, a statement mentioning the following:
"this step raise concerns for many Egyptians and for the 
international community. One of the aspirations of the revolution was to 
ensure that power would not be overly concentrated in the hands of any
360 Clinton says trial proceedings for 'Blind Sheikh' were correct, July, 02, 2012, Egypt independent
361 Kirkpatrick, D., “Egypt’s New Leader takes Oath, Promising to Work for Release of Jailed Terrorist”, New
York Times, 29 June 2012.
362 a statement by the white house concerning the phone call between Morsi and Obama ignoring his invitation
to visit Washington, Almasry elyoum, Feb, 27, 2013
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one person or institution. The current constitutional vacuum in Egypt can 
only be resolved by the adoption of a constitution that includes checks and 
balances, and respects fundamental freedoms, individual rights, and the 
rule of law consistent with Egypt's international commitments. 
We call for calm and encourage all parties to work together and 
call for all Egyptians to resolve their differences over these important 
issues peacefully and through democratic dialogue363". 
Relations with Europe:
On the European level, in his early months of office Ousted 
president Morsi visited many key European capitals for Egypt, namely, 
Berlin, Rome and Brussels, as well as receiving a number of European 
Union envoys, which is considered as the second economic partner for the 
country. Morsi attempted through these steps to induce some sort of 
confidence in political situation of his country, in order to encourage
economic support
Egypt has always perceived as one of the most important and 
main pillars needed for maintaining the union's political stability. Yet,  
this perception or view has been amplified especially with fear of the re­
spread of violence and terrorism in Europe by the religious extremist 
groups namely, ISIS or Al-Qaeeda; as Egypt has always been one of the 
most active countries in combating the threats of terrorism. 
Moreover, its distinctive geographical location and significant 
role in the Middle East have always played an important role in bringing
Egypt closer to European states. Their relations further strengthened and 
developed as mentioned earlier in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership (EMP) which was initiated in 1995 and then the EU-Egypt 
363The United States' Reaction to Egypt's November 22 Decisions, Press Statement, U.S 
Department of State, November 23, 2012
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Association Agreement signed in 2001, which came into force in 
2004(364),(365).)
Yet, the Europeans governments chose not to rush in tightening
the relations with the new Egyptian Islamist regime. However, they
preferred to implement a wait-and-see policy, but generally speaking we
can assume that the European stance has been more often positive than 
negative. At the same moment, Morsi started to encounter unexpected 
domestic troubles and unrest, which resulted from the confrontations over 
many issues such as the constitution, government performance and 
composition, as well as confrontations with many state entities as the 
judiciary and press, etc.
The European capitals that had been impressed by Morsi early in 
his presidency as to their own perception-could bring the country to a real 
democratization began to grow wary because of the rapid deterioration in 
his popularity after all the prior mentioned events. For instance, many
European diplomats in Cairo mentioned they had not expected such a big
turnout.
Moreover, these diplomats commented that from the time when 
the struggle and tension over the constitutional declaration started. it was 
obvious that Morsi was not reaching out to the political opposition and he
was not thoughtful and keen enough about keeping the pledges and 
promises he repeated more than once to several European officials 
including the Former High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  Catherine Ashton366.
The declining relations with Europe were due to Morsi’s regime
inability to live up to basic democratic expectations, a fact that was met 
with much friction in European parliaments.
364 http://eeas.europa.eu/egypt/index_en.htm
365 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
366 Morsi's foreign policy failures, 21 July 2013, Dina Ezzat, Ahram online.
246 | P a g e 
   
 
   
    
  
    
 
   
 
  
    
    
    
     
    
  
    
 
   
      
  
 
    
     
    
  
  
   
    
    
                                                           
  
  
The decline in Egypt’s standing on the multilateral level 
especially the Arab, African, and Islamic circles failure to the Muslim
brotherhood regime, as Egypt's foreign policy succeeded over the last 
decades since Nasser's era in guaranteeing the country an important status 
within the Third world through its organizations, as the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the Islamic Conference, and the African Union, the matter that 
enabled it to mobilize support for Egyptian and Arab causes in the 
different international forums. 
Yet, aftermath the January 2011 revolution and the Muslim
Brotherhood’s consequent arrival to power, Egypt’s image as a civic and 
moderate state gradually started to be changed and replaced by another, 
which is the unstable and religiously oriented state, this image was a result
of its new perception as a fresh safe haven for radical and even terrorist
group. Hence, this perception was not appealing for many countries 
especially which is has been suffering from the threats of political Islam. 
In conclusion, Egypt’s status was about to be converted from a country to 
be respected to one that should be feared.
In that sense, former President Morsi attempted during his one
year presidency to join the BRICS bloc which includes, developing newly
industrialized emerging economic powers namely, Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa, which was founded in 2001with the aim of 
working away from what they deem as Western-dominated international 
(367)economic system . Therefore, during his visits to these countries, he
expressed clearly his aspiration to accept Egypt as a part of this promising
entity, during his visit to New Delhi in March 2013(368).
Yet, his efforts failed miserably, not only because of Egypt’s 
weak economic performance, but also owing to the nature of the country’s 
new political regime. The dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood over 
Egyptian politics did not endear it to countries, especially Russia being the 
367 http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/information-about-brics.
368 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/egypts-morsi-aims-join-brics
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best example—that felt threatened by different varieties of Islamic 
fundamentalism.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that in the year 2003, 
Russia declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and 
banned all its activities, this step came after a series of investigations, 
carried out by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), since
November 2000 the had led to the listing of about 2000 “structures” linked 
to the Muslim Brotherhood in some 49 out of 89 Russian regions, as well
as in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
These inquiries claimed that these brotherhood structures were
related to charitable entities sponsored by organizations in some Arab 
countries as Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, and Palestine. Moreover, The FSB
claimed it had blown the whistle on a network of militant Islamic cells run 
by extremists seeking to agitate trouble in both Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States369. 
The Ethiopian challenge to Egypt’s water rights in the Nile 
Traditionally, Egypt’s national security concept has located the sources of 
threats it faced in the north, from where the Greeks, the Romans, the 
French, and the British had invaded; the northeast, from where the 
Crusaders, the Mongols, the Turks, and the Israelis attacked; and the south, 
where the sources of the Nile-Egypt’s water lifeline—are located: the 
Ethiopian heights and the central African Nile Basin states370.
The threats brewing in this last area were largely neglected by
Egyptian policy planners over the past few decades, allowing the Nile 
Basin states to build a coalition that threatened to undermine Egyptian 
interests through a new accord that would replace previous agreements 
signed with Egypt in 1902, 1929, and 1959. Although Egypt’s 
369 The Muslim Brotherhood in Russia, J. Millard Burr, Dec, 9th 2014, American center for democracy.
370 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, “Egyptian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, July 1978.)
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disagreements with the Nile Basin states did not begin with the January
2011 revolution and Morsi’s later advent to power, these developments 
further complicated Egypt’s relations with these countries. Thus, Ethiopia 
felt it could move ahead with construction of the Nahdha Dam on the Blue 
Nile, potentially diminishing the amount of water available to Egypt and 
its ability to generate electricity from the Aswan Dam. Ethiopia’s move in 
turn encouraged other Nile Basin states to explore the possibilities of other
projects on the Nile without seeking Egypt’s consent. Egypt’s nightmare
of water deprivation thus came closer
The fragility of Egypt’s new alliances To compensate for the 
aforementioned weakening of Egypt’s international and regional standing, 
President Morsi attempted to build a new coalition composed of Egypt, 
Qatar, and Turkey. But Turkey’s entanglement in Syria and the protests in 
Istanbul’s Taksim Square in June 2013 have made Ankara too vulnerable 
and fragile to be a solid regional and international partner. Such a coalition 
would have been fragile in any case, given Qatar’s small size and Turkey’s 
diversified and often conflicting interests in Europe, Central Asia, and the 
Middle East.
Endangering the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty Although President 
Morsi made every effort to keep the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty intact, 
and his government helped to end the 2012 Israel-Hamas military conflict, 
many Israelis worried about the long-term implications of the relationship 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and its subsidiary in Gaza. Israel’s 
uneasiness was compounded by the continued functioning of the Gaza-
Sinai tunnels and the movement of thousands of Egyptian and 
international Islamist terrorists across the border into the Sinai. The more
frequent attacks on Egyptian security personnel in the Sinai Peninsula 
further increased apprehension about a crisis in the making in Egyptian-
Israeli relations.
Loss of the trust of the international community the cumulative
effect of the aforementioned trajectories, coupled with the deterioration of 
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domestic politics in Egypt, made the international community doubtful of 
Egypt’s ability to meet its international obligations. The most glaring
expression of this lack of confidence was Egypt’s failure to sign an 
agreement with the IMF to grant it a $4.8 billion loan. The mistrust of 
Egypt’s ability to manage the challenges it faced has led to a sharp decline
in tourism and foreign investments.
The Fall of Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and its strategic effects.
The June 2013 Egyptian Revolution which is also referred to by
several domestic and international media sources as the "Second  
30thRevolution", took place on the of June, a date that marked the first 
anniversary of the former president Mohamed Morsi inauguration, as the
number one civilian fairly and democratically elected president of Egypt. 
On that day, mass protests with millions of Egyptian people, started across 
the whole country, where demonstrators took the main squares and streets, 
calling for the instant stand down of the president and demanded for the 
organization of early presidential elections, along with the kick off a 
replenished constituent process.
The rallies were a direct response to "Rebel" or as known in 
Arabic as "Tamarod" which is a grassroots movement, that managed to 
instigate a petition in April 2013, demanding for the Muslim brotherhood
government to resign and succeeded to gather more than 22 million 
signatures only in 2 months. The number of protesters was estimated to be
14 million, according to military sources that claimed to have counted the 
numbers through helicopters that scanned the demonstrations' perimeters 
across the country, and is has been described as "the largest gathering
during the course of  the Egyptian history"
Tamarod movement succeeded to coordinate a door-to-door,
street-level, campaign to mass signatures from Egyptians throughout the
whole country, it was supported by several opposition parties as well as 
independent social movement. Thus, the movement unceasingly earnt 
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strong admiration and popularity among Egyptian people which was 
reflected in their readiness to register their names and identity card 
numbers in addition to their signatures on the petition form in public(371).
Meanwhile, Tamarod was also strengthening its political activity, 
through bringing together all the anti-Brotherhood parties and most
6thpolitical factions namely the April youth movement and the national 
salvation front, as well as enough or as known in Arabic "kefaya
movement"  in its doings.  
30thRebel movement started on the of June front to manage both 
the next demonstrations and the transitional period which will follow 
Morsi's overthrow, hence, they suggested a roadmap for the management 
of the latter, during which the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
would take over the power to be the interim president, also all executive
powers would be delivered to a newly chosen prime minister. 
Furthermore, the suspension of the 2012 constitution and forming
a committee of experts to draft a new constitution to be put to a
referendum were also amongst the demands of the protests and they were
also a part of the newly set roadmap(372). The leaders of the tamarod 
movement stated the following:
"We announce the 30 June Front as an initiative from Tamarod to 
represent Egyptians who refuse Muslim Brotherhood rule and to share
with the great Egyptian people their political vision in order to avoid the 
mistakes of the past period and to continue on the path of January 25 
Revolution"
Nevertheless, as a counter reaction towards Tamarod movement 
from the Muslim Brotherhood group and their supporters of other
Islamicfactionsanother movement called "Tagarod" (which is Arabic 
371http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/05/reactions-vary-to-tamarods-30-june-plans/
372 http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75034.aspx
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translation for "impartiality") which was initiated by “Al-Gama'a al-
Islamiya” prominent figure Assem Abdel Maged, who urged President
Morsi's supporters to sign a petition to keep the "legitimately elected 
president in his post"(373).
Yet, this campaign, was a big failure in terms of its impact 
compared to Tamarod which was able to penetrate and mobilize the silent 
majority or the critical mass of Egyptian people who usually avoided 
participation in any political events but prominently joined anti-Morsi 
demonstrations this time(374).
The second Egyptian revolution with the huge numbers of 
protestors revealed that Morsi’s opponents were not only a small bunch as 
was claimed by the Muslim brotherhood leaders. on the contrary, it was a
clear reflection for the anger of the Egyptians of Morsi’s regime only one
year after being in office as a result of accumulative errors on both internal 
and external levels. Domestically, he did nothing to rescue the economy
from forthcoming collapse, 
Although only in office for a year, Morsi’s presidency oversaw 
the worst economic crisis in Egypt since the 1930s(375). with almost half of 
Egyptians living close to or below the poverty line376. In that sense it is 
worth mentioning that the Egyptian pound and foreign exchange reserves 
have both fallen, inflation was rising and unemployment among those 
youth under 24 rose up to more than 40%,(377) energy problems augmented 
with electricity cuts that have become annoyingly frequent and queues for
petrol have prolonged in the street(378) .
All these factors led to the tarnish of the Egypt's image and 
reputation abroad. Thus, in the sake of overcoming the country's economic
373 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16279
374http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/10/gaza-tamarod-protests-oust-hamas.html
375 Kingsley, P., “Egypt ‘suffering worst economic crisis since 1930s’, The Guardian, 16 May 2013
376 Egypt’s Poverty rate rises to 26% in 2012/13: CAPMAS”, Ahram Online, 28 November 2013.
377 Halime, F., “Egypt’s Long-Term Economic Recovery Plan Stalls”, The New York Times, 2 May 2013
378 Egypt’s tragedy, the economist, July6th, 2013
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problems, former president Morsi had to implement tough reforms and 
secure a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)379. 
Yet, despite an initial agreement with the IMF, Morsi yielded to the 
pressure of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and suspended the loan 
and the agreed reforms in an attempt to appease the public opinion and to 
expand his popular support(380) .
Moreover, Morsi's refusal to work with opposition parties 
complicated the situation preventing as well the development of an 
effective economic policy, as stated by the visiting IMF delegations, he
ought to build extensive popular and political support in order to achieve
success for his reforms. Instead, he isolated himself from dealing not only
with the opposition381, but also large employers and trade unions, and 
preferred   cooperating solely with his Muslim Brotherhood allies382. 
Two main dilemmas contributed to the fall of Muslim
Brotherhood rule, the first is related to the way Morsi and his group dealt
with the state and its institutions, and the second is society’s perception of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. As for the way in which the Muslim
Brotherhood dealt with these institutions it played a major role in their
downfall, the state’s institutions were seriously threatened after the 
January 25th revolution, the matter which distracted their functioning. 
In that sense, it is worth mentioning that after former President 
Mubarak’s ouster, those institutions were in deep need of a real political 
leadership capable of remodeling them rather than avenging or 
demolishing them. Yet, the Muslim brotherhood failed to offer any
political or institutional alternatives capable of reforming its way of 
functioning. On the contrary, The Muslim Brotherhood, which remained 
379 Black I., “Mohamed Morsi: the Egyptian opposition charge sheet”, The Guardian, 3 July 2013
 
380 Halime, F., “Egyptian Economy Caught in a Political Bind”, The New York Times, 19 December 2012.

381 Charbel, J., “In opposition to Morsy, Mahalla declares autonomy”, Egypt Independent, 12 December 2012
 
382 Farid, D., “Egypt’s economy over three years of turmoil”, Daily News Egypt, 20 September 2014.
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a secret and banned group for a long period of time tried to take revenge
on it after rising to power.
Successful transition experiences showed that any new power or 
radical group that comes from outside the traditional political system of 
the state, must adopt some sort of a calming policy toward this system, 
which has shaped the outlines of the country for many consecutive years. 
However, The Muslim Brotherhood during its year in power ignored the 
reality that it was a group with has origins outside of Egyptian state
institutions, unlike all other rulers from Abdel Nasser to Mubarak. Hence, 
instead of pursuing a real reform process, the Muslim Brotherhood
proceeded in the opposite direction, choosing to intimidate the existing
state institutions.
The Brotherhood intentionally rebuffed and coldshouldered those 
with any experience in fields of law and policy making, consequently they
failed to manage the political life or even reach an inclusive constitution. 
Nevertheless, they chose to take an antagonistic attitude toward the all­
important state apparatuses namely, police, judiciary, and army as well as 
Foreign Service alongside with the press. Morsi insisted to undermine
these main powers, which are considered as the main pillars that reflects 
the power of government in mature democracies.
For instance, they opted to go into struggles and clashes with the 
judicial authority, well-known historically for its conducts and traditions. 
It did so not with the aim of restructuring them but rather to try to control 
these institutions. This approach was demonstrated clearly when ousted
president Morsi issued a decree that exempts all of Morsi's decisions from 
legal challenge, these new edicts give the president near-absolute power
and immunity from appeals in courts for any decisions or laws he declares 
until a new constitution and parliament is in place, as well as offering the 
same protection to the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly, which 
was drawing up the country's 2012 constitution. This move triggered 
Egypt's most senior judges who condemned the ousted President for
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granting himself sweeping new powers which they described as an 
"unprecedented assault" on the independence of the judiciary. However, 
Morsi's assistants indicated that the presidential decree aimed at speeding
up the delayed democratic transition that has been hampered by several 
legal impediments383.
On the level of the other bureaucracies as the army, police and 
Foreign Service, it should be noted, the Egyptian state has historically
refused narrow-minded ideological stances. For instance, the Egyptian 
army has no ideological affiliation unlike other armies in the Middle East 
region, as is the case of Turkey. Instead, the army reflects Egyptian society
in its conservatism and religiousness as well as in its civility. Similarly, the 
Egyptian bureaucracy has never had an ideological affiliation, even during
President Gamal Abdel Nasser era, when the rhetoric of socialism was 
predominant. Even if the Muslim Brotherhood did not try to impose
"sharia law" on the state and society or change anything significant in civil 
law, yet the perception of the Brotherhood as a closed ideological group 
continued, the matter that triggered and annoyed both the state and the 
society.
The religious establishment of the organization, which served to 
keep the Brotherhood’s consistency throughout many year while it was in 
the political opposition, closed and confined it from the rest of society. 
The belief of the Muslim Brotherhood members that their association with 
the group is considered as a sort “jihad in the name of God” and that 
preserving the organization is a goal in itself, all these factors assisted in 
retaining the group intact during its presence in opposition. Yet, upon its 
arrival to power, all the latter factors became a point of weakness as they
kept the Brothers in a closed group, isolated from the rest of the society. 
This state has augmented the people’s antipathy towards the organization, 
383 Egypt's top judges condemn Mohamed Morsi power grab, Hannah Godfrey & Peter Beaumont, The 
Guardian, November, 24th, 2012.
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which many people perceived as prioritizing the interests of its members 
before the interests of society. 
Additionally, there are some opinions suggesting that the closed 
nature of the Muslim Brotherhood led it to govern the country via the same 
secretive or clandestine measures that it used before during its time in 
opposition. Officials in various ministries and government sectors 
complained that state institutions were led by small circles of Muslim
Brotherhood members and allies. They did their meetings in such a private 
manner during which representatives from the ministries discussed with 
advisers from the Muslim Brotherhood matters of governance, while the 
other employees at the ministries did not know about the discussions and 
outcome of these meetings. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood transferred the 
practice of holding secret meetings to the heart of government 
institutions384.
Not only this, they started a campaign or a process of 
empowerment in the Egyptian bureaucracy, (or “Ikhwanisation”) in 
Arabic, through granting jobs to their members or affiliates. For instance, 
in only seven months they employed more than 13,000 personal in 
different ministries and governmental institutions in all fields. Not only
this, but this process extended also to reach the higher level,in that sense, 
in the government of Hesham Kandil the Prime Minister during Morsi's 
era, eight Muslim Brotherhood members were appointed as ministers.
Alongside many ministers' advisors and deputy minister were
part of the group or affiliates, this is beside the appointment of 
spokespersons, director of minister's cabinet in certain ministries namely
education, health, industry and foreign trade as well as Deans of Faculties 
and Heads of Universities(385).
384 The end of the Muslim brotherhood rule in Egypt, Amr Mahmoud El- Shobaki, August, 1st, 2013
385 Conquering Egypt, documents of Muslim Brotherhood empowerment, Fatteh Masr Wathaek Al Tamkeen Al 
Ehkwani, in Arabic, Hamdi Rezk, p.p 147-150, Dar Nahdet Masr Publishing
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In a nutshell, the Muslim Brotherhood persisted to follow their
old traditional approach as a secret group when it arrived to power and 
refused to legalize its status in accordance with state laws. This expanded 
the opinion that it was, with no overestimation or exaggeration, a
clandestine group that ruled Egypt from behind a curtain, with vicious 
plans to damage the country and remain on the top of power in the 
country.
In assessing the Brotherhood’s Attitude, we can highlight that the 
Brotherhood wasted a genuine chance to accomplish democratic transition 
in Egypt, in that sense their failure in ruling Egypt would be considered as 
exceptional in the history of political movements, because usually
opposition groups or movements learn extensively when they come to 
power in a country. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood went in the 
opposite direction from the path it should have taken. Accordingly, it
brought the whole country to the edge the matter that made many people 
support the idea of carrying out the unprecedented popular uprising of 
June 30th.
It is important to consider what has happened to Egypt since the 
ousting of Morsi in the context of the perception many people had of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The popular rejection of the group, which many
Egyptians viewed as an outsider to the society, was unprecedented. This 
failure should push the Muslim Brotherhood to consider a surgical 
reevaluation of its thinking, a task it has neglected to undertake since its 
establishment in 1928. If the Brotherhood refuses to evolve and learn from 
its mistakes, it will squander any future opportunities it may have to be an 
influential component of the Egyptian political spectrum.
On the level of foreign policy, there was a real misconduct of on 
all fronts, it became clear that adopting and shaping of a new and different 
foreign policy was not a priority for the new regime. In that sense, we can 
claim that the major parameters of foreign policy during the Muslim
brotherhood remained the same without any change. the only difference
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that appeared was primarily in the execution of the foreign policy, it
became less efficient due to the confusion and duality in the decision­
making were made at two levels first by state bodies, including the foreign 
ministry and national intelligence, and then by the Muslim Brotherhood's 
foreign policy advisors386. 
Furthermore, the Muslim brotherhood group underestimated the 
strong linkage between Egypt’s foreign and domestic policies, as after the 
2011 revolution, the public opinion played an unprecedented role in 
influencing the formation of foreign policy and decision making process. It 
is worth to be mentioned that Egypt’s domestic stability prior to 2011 had 
always been built on the grounds of a moderate, consistent and pragmatic 
foreign policy shored up by strong alliances with the both United States 
and the Arab Gulf monarchies.
Hence, since the election of Mohamed Morsi’s as the president of 
Egypt in June 2012, an anti-American sentiment augmented within a
large sector of the Egyptian society, to the extent that Anne Patterson, US 
Ambassador to Cairo at that time, was singled out during the marches as 
the one to hold responsible for allegedly plotting to bring Morsi to power 
and for knotting political bargains and deals with high-ranking
Brotherhood officials and leaders(387).
From her part the former US ambassador Paterson censured the 
30th of June protest march against the Muslim brotherhood president, and 
emphasized that the White House supported and backed him because he
was the first democratically and fairly elected president in the history of 
the country. In that sense she declared "Some say that street action will
produce better results than elections. To be honest, my government and I
are deeply skeptical,(388)"
386 Morsi's foreign policy failures, 21 July 2013, Dina Ezzat, ahram online.
387 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/19/they-hate-us-they-really-hate-us/
388https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/01/egypts-protesters­
find-a-new-villain-the-u-s-ambassador/.
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Moreover, some of the foremost activists entitled her as "the evil
lady" who is generating divisions among Egyptians, highlighting that 
Washington and the Brotherhood have bonded to confound and 
overwhelm them. There was a strong and sound faith among the majority
of the Egyptian people that the American government was sturdily
intervening in the country's domestic affairs(389).
The Arab spring represented the most important challenge as well
as the greatest opportunity for political Islam, which started in Egypt 
during first quarter of the 20th century by Hassan el Banna who 
established the Muslim Brotherhood group in 1928 which afterwards 
expanded to the whole Arab world. The backbone of the political Islam 
policy and its raison d’ etre has been always based on claiming the 
oppression and injustice they are facing through all these decades.
However, the fall of the authoritarian regimes in some Arab 
countries proved the opposite. in fact, it unveiled many realities about the 
weakness and lack of planning of these groups as they never had a real 
project to develop Egypt for the benefit of the Egyptians and they were not
ready to rule the country which means that the greatest loss and defeat for
the political Islam came from the Islamists themselves. The Egyptian 
experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in power has been dreadful. The
Morsi presidency took the country along to the edge of collapse and civil 
war, winning unfavorable comparisons with the previous regimes, 
especially Mubarak's regime(390) . 
In conclusion, June 30th revolution might be considered as the 
main reason behind the regression of the phenomenon of political Islam
389http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/03/knives-come-out-for-u-s-ambassador-to-egypt­
anne-patterson/
 
390 The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power 2012-2013, Report, 9 Bedford Row, 3 June
 
2015.
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will face during the coming decade at least not only in Egypt but in the 
Arab world(391).
Ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood and International Reactions: 
As for the international reactions about President Mohamed 
Morsi being deposed from the position after only one year by the popular
30threvolution of the of June, they varied from being too harsh as the 
reaction of the African union and some other countries as will discuss 
later, to the full support as the situation of Russia. Also these reactions 
were characterized by the confusion, un clarity and uncertainty, as some of 
the regional and international powers as well as the international 
organizations at the moment described what happened in Egypt as a
"military coup" a description that will impose some kind of certain 
reaction from the part of these powers and organizations that might 
contradict and oppose their economic and political interests with Egypt in 
a way that might affect negatively the future path of the relations with this 
strategic country.
In summary, the Responses which varied both internationally
and regionally towards the future roadmap that was announced by
3rdDefense Minister at that time Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on July , 2013, 
between supporters and opponents. Reluctance by some countries was 
noticed on the characterization of what happened on June 30, whether it is
"a new popular uprising" or "softcoup" against a democratically elected­
president. However, and after a while most of the world's countries were
convinced that what happened in Egypt was an uprising and a second 
wave of the January 25 popular revolution against a new authoritarian 
regime. 
Many high officials in prominent international organizations 
preferred to appear as professional and neutral as possible to avoid 
391 Mohamed abdallah younis Mawget enhedar wave of declination the reflections of morsi’s overthrow on the
Muslim brotherhood organizations in the region, the regional center for strategic studies, Cairo, July 2013.
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damaging the relations with Egypt. For example the secretary general of 
the United Nations Ban Ki Moon in a series of declarations about the 
situation in Egypt in July and August 2013, expressed his worries about 
the removal of a democratically elected president by the military, but in 
the meantime he heightened the legitimacy of the demands of the Egyptian 
people, urging in the same time the accelerating the process of returning
back to civilian rule and maintaining the democracy and human rights. His 
spokesperson in a declaration attributed to the secretary general July 2013 
few days after the escalation of events in Cairo the UN reiterates its calls 
to return of stability and peaceful dialogue among different stakeholders in
the country and rejection of violence. Moreover, He also urged the 
Egyptian authorities to end arbitrary arrests and called for Morsi and other
detained MB leaders to be released or have their cases reviewed 
immediately(392),(393),(394).
In august after the breakup of the sit in of the Muslim
brotherhood and their followers in Al Nahda and Rabaa Al adawia, the 
secretary general Ban Ke Moon condemned the use of force from the part 
of the Egyptian security forces against the protesters. As well, He urged all
the Egyptian stakeholders to intensify their efforts in order to reach quick
national reconciliation.
As for the African union reaction which was considered as the 
harshest international reaction ever against the removal of President Morsi, 
5th as it decided in its resolution issued on July 2013 to suspend the 
participation of Egypt in the activities of the union. This decision was 
taken under the allegation that what has happened in Egypt was a
unconstitutional military coup against democratically elected authority(395).
392 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45352#.VnrVCnYrLIU
393 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45366#.VnrX83YrLIV
394http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45543#.VnrZpXYrLIV
395 http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-peace-and-security-council-of-the-african-union-au­
at-its-384th-meeting-on-the-situation-in-the-arab-republic-of-egypt
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This reaction from the part of the regional organization was taken 
under the lomé declaration adopted in July 2000 on the unconstitutional 
change of governments in the member states. this declaration stipulates 
that the membership of any country facing unconstitutional change of 
regime either through military coup or rebel movement should be
suspended with a grace period of six month would be given to the coup 
power to restore the constitutional authority. thus, in case of failure in this 
step then sanctions will be imposed on the country, this case has been seen 
before when the union decided to suspended the membership of Central 
Africa, Mali and Madagascar(396). 
From its part the Egyptian government immediately reacted to the 
African union's situation, through issuing a declaration made by its 
Foreign Minister at that time Mohamed Kamel Amr expressing Egypt's 
deep regret to the issuance of such unfair and precipitated resolution which 
misunderstands the truth about the popular revolution that took place in the 
country. as well he aspired at correcting the democratic course in the 
country. Moreover, he stated that the Foreign Ministry began to take
urgent steps and make extensive contacts with many African countries, in 
particular members of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, to express Egypt's dissatisfaction with the resolution, which 
ignored the ambitions and aspirations of the Egyptian people, and counted 
on weak legal and inaccurate grounds irrelevant to Egyptian situation".
"Also, he added that the Lomé Declaration, issued in 2000, based 
on the Peace and Security Council resolution, does not address cases of 
changing regimes and governments through legitimate popular revolutions 
against governments who deviated from the democratic and constitutional 
path, yet limited to handling cases of military coups, armed rebellion 
movements and other cases irrelevant to the revolution correcting course
on June 30.
396 http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-decl-2-xxxvi-e.pdf
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On the other hand, the Foreign Minister expressed hope that the 
African Peace and Security Council would reconsider, at the earliest 
convenience, its resolution on suspending Egypt's participation in the 
activities of the African Union. He revealed the intention of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to send envoys to a number of African countries in the 
coming days to clarify the ongoing developments in Egypt and how vast is 
the popular support for the process of transferring power to the Civil 
interim President of Egypt, and the road map, which would ensure
correcting and continuing the constitutional path as fast as possible, toward 
holding the parliamentary and presidential elections(397)".
On the other hand, the Secretary General of NatoAnder's Fogh 
Rasmussen in his statement issued on August 14th, 2013,declared that he
was deeply concerned about the situation in Egypt, and the continuing
reports of "bloodshed anddeploring the loss of life", adding that Egypt is 
an important partner for NATO through the Mediterranean Dialogue. He
called on all sides to exercise restraint and refrain from violence and to 
work to restore the political process(398).
On the European level, ranging attitudes were noticed either from 
the part of the European powers either individually or separately and 
between the common European stance towards the removal of the former
president Morsi at that time. However, these reactions were totally altered 
after a while with the appointment of the head of the constitutional court 
Adly Mansour as an interim president according to the Egyptian 
constitution in the 4th of July 2013 for one year ended in  8th June 2014. 
In that sense, the position of the European Union was expressed 
by many statements that was issued throughout the whole course of events 
in Egypt. For instance, the former European Union's High Representative 
397 http://www.mfa.gov.eg/english/ministry/news/pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e­
ee26ce851de8&newsID=6b606fcd-15a7-4992-ba79-4d3122608df0
398 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID­
F3858040E11804F6/natolive/press_releases.htm?query=&keywordquery=*&date_from=&date_to=&sort=date: 
D:R:d1&start=370
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For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy Catherine Ashton, in different 
statements urged all sides to return to the democratic process. This 
included the holding of free and fair presidential and parliamentary
elections and the approval of a constitution, to be done in a fully inclusive
manner, so as to permit the country to resume and complete its democratic
transition." Additionally, she expressed her hope that the new 
administration will be fully inclusive and reiterated the importance of 
ensuring full respect for fundamental rights, freedoms and the rule of law."
On the side of the individual European states reactions, it can be
identified through highlighting the positions of the main European powers 
namely, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, and France. For instance, the 
German Foreign Minister at that time mentioned that "the country must
return to constitutional order as quickly as possible and called on all those 
responsible in Egypt, to act calmly, to meet each other halfway and to seek 
ways out of this serious crisis of state together.(399)" 
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister declared in a statement 
about the events that were taking place in Egypt that "It is not for this 
country to support any single group or party, "What we should support is 
proper democratic processes and proper government by consent". While
his Foreign Secretary also mentioned that his government doesn’t support 
military intervention as a way to resolve disputes in a democratic system 
and it's of course a dangerous precedent to do that, if one president can be
deposed by the military, then of course another one can be in the future
that's a dangerous thing." These declarations took place immediately after 
30ththe removal of president Morsi from power after the of June
revolution(399) .
From its part the French government, expressed its hopes for the 
organization of the elections that the new Egyptian leadership have
promised, so that the Egyptian people can freely choose their leaders and 
399 Setback for Democracy, Spiegel online international, July 4th , 2013.
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their future." Nevertheless, this statement from French Foreign Minister
Laurent Fabius did not directly address president Morsi's toppling(399) .
The Spanish Government has conveyed to the Egyptian 
ambassador in Madrid their concern about the ongoing situation in Egypt, 
and asked for the "containment" of the demonstrators400. Moreover, The
Prime Minister expressed his hope that the situation in Egypt would be
fixed in the earliest possible chance, adding that he would like that the 
problems in Egypt and across North Africa in areas closer to Spain could 
be resolved"401. 
In reality, the European union the first trade partner for Egypt was 
not expected to have a different attitude, this could be attributed to various 
reasons, including, the division in the positions in the individual European 
countries concerning the developments of the events in Egypt. 
Additionally, the insignificant amount of the European aid granted for
Cairo as well as the humble military cooperation and activity between the 
two sides, don’t represent a strong pressing factor that can influence the 
new Egyptian authorities. 
Moreover, the deterioration of the situation in Egypt and the 
danger of its gradual sliding into deep political and sectarian divisions
under the rule of the Muslim brotherhood wasn’t a hidden fact for most of 
the European capitals402. Furthermore, there is a growing stream of the 
governments in Europe which realized that the rule of the Muslim
brotherhood in countries of Arab spring is a failure and they won't be able 
to continue in the power either in the post-revolutionary countries and 
Turkey, a matter which might encourage the extremists in the Islamic and 
400 Europa se plantea endurecer sus relaciones con El Cairo, Europe proposes to harden its relations with Cairo,
Luis doncel. El pais internacional, 16 august 2013.
401 Rajoy sobre Egipto: “Espero que las cosas se arreglen a la mayor celeridad posible”, Rajoy on Egypt: "I hope
things as quickly as possible get fixed ", el pais internacional, 4 July 2013
402 Egypt and the EuropeanUnionhold the stick from the middle, masr wa al ithad al oroby , emsak alasa men
almontasaf, Dr. Mostafa al labad, assafir newspaper, august 23rd, 2013.
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Arab communities in the European countries to commit terrorist attacks all
around Europe.
This came in contradiction and disappointing to the assumptions 
of the majority of the European capitals who thought that enforcing and 
strengthening the Islamic rule in the Arab spring countries and Ankara to 
the extent that would allow them to have such a big influence on the above
mentioned communities avoid their expected violence, as the Europeans 
believed that the Muslim brotherhood a capable of limiting the extremism 
more than any other democratic or national governments403.
On the other hand, Russia through the Chairman of the foreign 
affairs committee in the Russian senate, argued that what happened in 
Egypt is a correction of the path of the Arab Spring and not the its end, 
adding that this step has been supported by opposition parties and youth 
groups, and mass demonstrations in major cities across the country. From 
his part the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, mentioned that Egypt 
should seek a peaceful transition of power through a fair elections, 
emphasizing Moscow's concern about the risk of further unrest after the 
overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, though in the same time 
supporting efforts aimed at ending any manifestations of violence and 
confrontation, and promoting the stability of the country.
Moreover, he emphasized, that the stability in the Middle East 
and the Islamic region and the world depends to a large extent on the 
development of the situation in Egypt, highlighting that Moscow is 
interested in maintaining security and stability in Egypt and the entire
region.
The Russian foreign minister underscored that Egyptians must
decide their own fate on the basis of internal comprehensive dialogue. 
403 The international pressure to internationalize the Egyptian crisis, in Arabic, al doghot aldawleya letadweel
alazma almasria, al-Hayat newspaper, Gamil Matar, august 19th , 2013)
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Also, he stressed the importance of maintaining the cooperation with 
Egypt, pointing out that this cooperation does not depend on the existence
of this or that government404. While Russian President Vladimir Putin 
expressed his fears that Egypt could have slid towards a civil war similar 
to what took place in Syria. 
The official "mysterious balanced" position of Moscow as argued 
or described by many opinions can be partially attributed to the 
recommendations that has been submitted by some orientalists to the 
Russian parliament "kremlin" during Morsi's rule. These recommendations 
underscored the importance of the adoption of a more pragmatic policy by
Russia to keep up with the changes in some countries in the Middle East 
region, they also presented the Muslim Brotherhood as a "moderate group"
that should be dealt with to secure that Russian interests in the region.
In this context, also some Russian thinkers and analysts argued 
that the Islamic forces that came to power in some Egypt do not represent
a real threat, adding that the opposition against the Muslim brotherhood
remains very limited, so that it's not capable on loosening the brotherhood
authority, and president Morsi and his group remain the most powerful and 
influential. Undoubtedly, these recommendations which reflects the 
division among the Russian elites, led Moscow to adopt a more pragmatic 
and balanced position towards the course of events in Egypt405.
On the other hand, the neutrality of the official Russian attitude
can be referred back to the mistakes that Moscow had committed during
the Arab spring towards Libya, Tunisia thus Russia tends to be more
cautious while dealing with the course of events in Egypt but for Moscow
the toppling of the Muslim brotherhood represent a triumph for the 
404 International reactions to 30th of June, almawakef al dawlia men 30 uonio, Arab center for research 

and studies, 17th, July 2013)
 
405 Moscow and the isolation of Morsi, the balance and mystery. Moscow Wa Azl Morsi, in Arabic,

Altawazon Wa Alghomood, Dr.Hany Shady, Assafir newspaper, august 12th ,2013
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Russian administration that has been fighting the Islamic movements in 
northern Caucasus.
In general, the Russia will remain linked or concerned with 
maintaining two important strategic interests in Egypt, namely, sustaining
the wheat contracts, as Egypt is considered as the first importer of wheat 
from Moscow, and conserving the security of the Russian people and 
tourists in Egypt, which is considered as a primary and cheaptouristic 
destination for the Russians406. 
Israel has responded cautiously to the events in Egypt, in this 
context, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed his 
hopes that new transitional government headed by interim president Adly
Mansour, could resume the frozen contacts between the two countries. 
Moreover, parliamentary sources in Knesset close to Netanyahu have
made some press declarations mentioned that Isolating Morsi strengthens 
the feeling that both countries may have passed the bad period, and there
may be an opportunity now to revive the relations with upcoming ruling
system in  Egypt in the near future407.
From its part, the position of China towards the events in Egypt 
was pragmatic to a certain extent. Thus, in that context the Chinese
ministry of foreign affairs issued a statement announcing it full support to 
Egyptian people's choice, and called for pursuing the dialogue between all
the parties of the society. Also, it expressed its hope that all concerned 
parties in Egypt will avoid the resort to violence, and that they can resolve 
their differences through dialogue and consultation in order to achieve
reconciliation and social stability408. 
406 Russian silence towards Egypt, no condemnation no praise , Samt Russy Tegah Masr, in Arabic la Edana la 
eshada, Rita Mita , Assafir Newapaper, july 5th , 2013
407La Unión Europea pide que Egipto vuelva a la democracia “cuanto antes”, the 
European union calls Egypt to return back to democracy as soon as possible, El Pais 
internacional, July 4th , 2012).
408http://www.alalam.ir/news/1491328, in Arabic, international and Arab reactions to the 
ouster of Morsi, July 4th 2013
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Moreover, the statement underscored the importance of the 
historical and developing bilateral relations between the two countries that 
is based on friendship and cooperation, pointing out at the same time that 
these relations will not be altered and will continue regardless of any
changes that have taken place on the domestic level in Egypt. Some 
opinions argue that this position in not strange for the Chinese foreign 
policy that is usually characterized by pragmatism which was totally
highlighted in its declaration about the continuity of the relations under 
(409)any cost .
On the level of the Arab countries, most or nearly all of them with 
the exception of Qatar and Tunisia, supported the removal of the Muslim
brotherhood president, in that sense this support can be determined or
traced through analyzing their reactions to the 30th of June that led to the 
deposition of Morsi. Hence, it is possible to underscore these positions;
through statements, congratulatory telegrams, and aids sent by many
countries to Egypt, following the move by the defense minister at that time 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in order to preserve the nation. Most Gulf States 
supported the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, especially Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, as well as the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and Syria.
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia had realized that Cairo before the 
30th of June and during the one year rule of the Muslim brotherhood has 
come into a very critical revolutionary status, which involved many
parties, namely, a political class that is affiliated to the Mubarak regime
and some youth revolutionists who doesn’t have neither a history in the 
political field nor an organized political and ideological leadership, besides 
the presence of the Muslim brotherhood group in power in the country, 
with their relatively vast popularity -at that point of time-, this 
409 Foreign attitudes towards the isolation ofMorsi, a trial to understand, in Arabic ,almawakef alkhargeia heyal
azel morsi, mohawla lelfahm, almasry elyoum, july 11th, 2013)
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organization that had no previous experience in the governance while on 
the contrary having an long standing practice in opposition.
Thus, and in light of all these pressing circumstances, Riyadh 
thought that the intervention of the military institution in Egypt to save the 
country from a faral destination and chaotic scene similar to that of many
other neighboring countries in the middle east region was a must at that 
point of time. It realized that the stability of Egypt, especially, after the fall
of both Syria and Iraq means the stability of the whole region and it
became a priority not only for Cairo but for Saudi Arabia too.
This was reflected in the Saudi position from the events that took 
30thplace in Egypt on the of June 2013, and led to the ousting of former
president Morsi, in which the Saudi monarch, late King Abdallah has sent 
congratulatory letter immediately to the counselor Adly Mansour, the head 
of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, who was appointed as 
interim president of the State. He praised in his letter, the leadership of the 
Egyptian armed forces for taking such a step that brought Egypt of a dark 
tunnel that nobody knows its dimensions and repercussions. Moreover, 
Saudi Arabia has decided to provide an aid package to Egypt of five
billion dollars, including two billion dollars cash deposit to be put in the 
Central Bank, and another two billion dollars of oil products and gas, and 
one billion dollars in cash. This stance aimed at sending a clear message to 
the new interim Egyptian regime that it is backed and supported by key
powers in the region. 
Goals of the Saudi support to Egypt:
It could be argued that the Saudi position from the June30th 
revolution was based on three main factors, the first and the most
important among them was preserving the stability of Egypt which 
represents a paramount strategic interest for Riyadh in this current 
moment, as Saudi Arabia lies in the core of the ongoing events in the 
middle east for more than three years, because of its geographical location 
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which lies between Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain, which all suffer from either 
wars or internal tensions and problems.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia represents one of the most
important sides of what is known as "the Arab regional order" which was 
founded by four main countries in the Middle East region mainly Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria. This order had been imperiled by the fall of 
Baghdad and Saddam Hussein regime by the American invasion in 2003 
and its consequences which ended by the spread of terrorism and chaos in 
the country by "Iraq and Syria Islamic state"(ISIS or Daesh). 
Furthermore, the Iranian influence has extensively increased in 
the Arab region as an upshot of the Iraq invasion, this was followed by the 
eruption of the revolution in Syria which turned to be a devastating civil 
war for more than five years now. Therefore, the only two countries left in 
the Arab regional orderwere Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in that context the 
latter has suffered a lot form what happened for the other sides of the order 
and it realized that it will not be able to afford the loss of a pivotal country
in the region.
Saudi Arabia encountered that the Egypt's slipping into a civil 
war or chaos as the other neighboring countries that might extend over a
long period of time, the matter that not only would take Cairo completely
out of any regional balances and calculations, but also might turn it to be a
yard for any regional or international interferences as in the case of both 
Syria and Iraq. From the point of view of Riyadh this will leave Egypt 
exposed to any types of threats and risks, a situation which might lead to 
vast regional chaos and thus the Saudi regime would be the responsible 
alone for confronting the threats in the region and its consequences. 
Moreover, some opinions argue that the Saudi regime has rushed 
to support the second Egyptian revolution to cut the road in front of the 
any attempts of appeasement between the Muslim brotherhood and the 
Irana matter that would really worry the kingdom. While the second factor 
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is related to the link between the Saudi regime and the Egyptian military
on one hand and its relation with the Muslim brotherhood on the other
hand. As for the relations with the latter it passed through many phases 
since the establishment of the organization in 1928, though it has always 
been described by being suspicious, anticipating and turbulent.
As per the ties between Riyadh and the military institution in 
Cairo, it is a long standing one that has been extending for more than 42 
years during the rule of both former presidents Mubarak and Sadat, 
throughout this period of time these relations were described by being
stable and solid. Moreover, the Saudi regime believed that the Egyptian 
military will remain the largest, strongest as well as the most organized 
institution in Egypt. Thus, and for these motives Saudi Arabia chose to 
side with the Egyptian military against the Muslim brotherhood group.
It is worth noting here that this choice made by Riyadh wasn’t 
really surprising as it was built on a deep political calculations that aimed 
at supporting the stability of Egypt at this moment, and the military was 
the only institution capable of implementing this. Yet, this choice didn’t 
take supporting the Muslim brotherhood out of the Saudi equation, but it
remained as a less urgent option as Egypt's stability continued as the first 
priority.
As per the third option, it was the Obama's administration 
position from the events that took place in Egypt which was characterized 
by reluctance and weakness a matter that really worried the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia about the future of the region. Additionally, what augmented 
the Saudi concerns was the forging ahead of the current American 
administration towards the "Asian Pivot" or turning to the pacific ocean 
and strengthening its relations with those countries and giving them, by
giving them the priority in its new strategy over the Middle East region.
In this context, it is worth highlighting that the Saudi regime
started communicating with the European powers to find a solution for the 
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critical situation in Egypt, while it didn’t establish the same connections 
with Washington, as Riyadh didn’t expect much from the American 
administration, especially after its negative experience with it in dealing
with the Syrian crisis. Some opinions argue that for Saudi Arabia Obama's 
administration seems to be hesitant and indecisive, a matter which Riyadh 
couldn’t tolerate as the situation was volatile and progressing so fast. 
The Western Point Of View Towards Riyadh's Supporting Position To Egypt:
It was expected that the west especially the United States would
show some resentment from the Saudi support to the toppling of the first 
democratically elected Egyptian president, as what happened in Cairo 
couldn’t be clearly defined by the west at that moment, whether it was a
coup or a popular revolution to remove the brotherhood regime. Some 
American media sources namely the New York Times noticed that the 
bizarre American position from the developments in Cairo as president 
Obama and its administration didn’t show any immediate response and 
remained silent. They also didn’t hide their wonder towards the differences 
between Washington and Riyadh over the situation in Egypt.
On the other hand, it was debated from the western media point of 
view that the main motive behind the Saudi stance from the Egyptian 
revolutions was the dual fear from the success of democracy in Egypt, on 
one hand and from the Muslim brotherhood that took the power in Cairo 
on the other hand. In another words, the concept of democracy itself is the 
real threat to the Saudi regime and the arrival of an Islamist president from 
the brotherhood doubled the intensity of these threats, as the vision of 
Islam form the point of view of the Saudi regime differs than the view of 
the Muslim brotherhood.
To summarize, there was no clear and solid situation from the 
part of the united states towards the developments in Egypt, despite the 
presence of an American law that prevents granting aid except for
medicine and food aid to countries or states that witness military coup over 
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democratically elected governments, yet the American administration and 
the congress preferred not to raise up this issue. 
To wrap up, there was a kind of division in the positon of 
congress in relation to the situation in Egypt. While, in the meantime the 
American administration suffered from a clear uncertainty and wavering as 
they were not so content with the step that the Egyptian army has taken, 
but in same time they couldn’t or didn’t want to express its wrath by an 
explicit political situation, and it was only limited to a number of vague
declarations by the white house spokesperson .
In this milieu, it is worth underscoring that Obama himself just
after the victory of president Morsi in the presidential elections, announced 
that "Egypt for the United States is neither an ally nor an enemy". it was 
argued that this ambiguous announcement from the part of an American 
president about a country as big and important as Egypt, a matter which 
reflects the disinclination of the American administration's policies 
towards the Middle East after the Arab spring410. 
From its part, The United Arab Emirates was so quick, in that 
sense Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the Emirates, sent 
a congratulatory telegram to the Chancellor Adly Mansour. They
mentioned that his country have followed with appreciation and 
satisfaction the national consensus witnessed in Egypt, which had a
prominent impact in Egypt out of the crisis faced by the peaceful 
reservation institutions and embody the civilization of ancient Egypt, and 
strengthen the Arab and international role,"". As the United Arab Emirates 
submitted a package of financial aid and oil are estimated at one billion 
dollars, and a loan of $ 2 billion deposit to the Central Bank .
410Aftermath the Muslim brotherhood, rebuilding the Egyptian relations with the gulf, Dr.
Khaled Aldakhil, ma baad alekhwan, eadet benaa llelelakat almasryia alkhaleygeya in
Arabic, Alsiyassa al dawleya, vol: 194, October 2013)
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Moreover, The Foreign Ministry of the United Arab Emirates 
issued a statement praising the greatness of the army of Egypt, who proved 
again that it represents the fence, protector and the strong shield that 
ensures that the country remains a state of institutions and law, which 
embraces all the components of the Egyptian society. It added that UAE 
followed with satisfaction the latest developments in Egypt, and stressed 
that the government of UAE is confident that the great people of Egypt is 
able to overcome the difficult moments passing by them.
As for Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah prince of State
of Kuwait praised the Egyptian Armed Forces on the positive and 
historical role they played in maintaining stability of the country. Also, 
Kuwait offered assistance estimated at 6 billion dollars, either a deposit at 
the central bank or oil aid.
From the part of the kingdom of Morocco, it stressed in a
communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 
the need to preserve the national unity of Egypt and its people's security, 
stability and tranquility. The communiqué underscored that the Kingdom 
of Morocco, followed with concern and attention the recent events in 
Egypt and stressed the need to preserve the national unity of the country
and to achieve the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people in the light 
of the principles of freedom and democracy. 
As for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it expressed its support 
for what happened in Egypt, through its foreign minister who confirmed 
his country's respect for the will of the Egyptian people, and that his 
country is has a deep respect for the Egyptian armed forces. King
Abdullah II congratulated the interim president Adly Mansour, the king
stressed his absolute keenness to continue to work to enhance the bilateral 
ties in various fields in the common interest of both peoples.
While the Syrian president Bashar al- Assad underscored that the 
events that Egypt witnessed is considered as a defeat for political Islam. 
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Also he emphasized that the groups that make use of the religion for the 
benefit of its own policy or for the benefit of a certain class without the 
other will fall anywhere in the world. Moreover, in a statement attributed 
to Syrian Arab Republic presidency it was highlighted that the army made
a great achievement which represented a radical turning point in favor of 
democracy. 
Furthermore, according to a statement that was broadcasted on 
Syrian television Damascus expressed its deep appreciation of the 
national popular movement in Egypt, which yielded a major breakthrough, 
asserting that what happened was a radical turning point involves a strong
will to maintain democracy and diversity in the Egyptian society.
The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, met the steps done by
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi the defense minister at that time with 
satisfaction. In that context, he was so quick to send a congratulatory
telegram to the Chancellor Adly Mansour after being sworn in as head of a
transitional Egypt, has applauded the role of the Egyptian army and the 
people of Egypt in the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood President 
Mohamed Morsi, who had close ties withHamas group which controls the 
Gaza Strip411.(
From his part the new prince of state of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin 
Hamad Al Thani, sent a congratulatory telegram to the counselor Adly
Mansour. Additionally, the Qatari foreign minister mentioned in his 
declarations that his country will continue to respect the will of Egypt and 
its people across the spectrum despite the tension between the two 
countries that not only continued but augmented in a later stage because of 
Doha's relationswith the Muslimbrotherhood, as it has been a major
financier of Islamic groups in the Arab world, and has provided billions of 
dollars in aid to Egypt since the revolution of January 25, 2011 that ended 
Mubarak's rule.
411 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23175379)
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As for Iraq, the Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Congratulated, the 
Egyptian interim President Adly Mansour, and issued an official 
statement, expressing the will of his government to stand with the 
Egyptian people and its readiness to develop relations between the two 
countries to a higher level. He added that his country is supporting the 
wise choices of the Egyptian people. In the same time, he affirmed that 
their confidence in the ability of Egypt and its people to overcome the 
difficult phase and restoring its role on the regional and international levels 
is not shaken. He expressed his certainty that the new transitional 
government in Egypt will move forward to achieve the demands of the 
Egyptian people and their aspirations.
It should be pointed out here that those countries that have been 
mentioned above rushed to provide billions of dollars in aid, whether loans 
or deposits or oil aid. They have had promised after the revolution of 
25thJanuary , 2011 to provide financial assistance, as promised Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia to provide aid of an estimated amount of $ 3.75 billion,
but they only offered Cairo $1.75. While the UAE has promised to 
provide $ 3 billion in aid in 2011, but suspended this amount until Egypt 
could reach an agreement with the IMF, as well as the bad relations with 
the former regime of Muslim brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi.
Although there were many Gulf states and neighboring countries 
in favor of the decision of the overthrow of Morsi, there was also a number
of Arab countries that opposed this step; this could be attributed to the 
good relations that has been established between these countries upon the 
arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to the rule of Egypt, especially with 
regimes that is known with its Islamic orientation. These regimes 
succeeded to come into power with the tide of political Islam after the 
Arab spring, and built close ties with the Muslim brotherhood regime in 
Cairo. Hence, they described what happened in Egypt as a military coup; 
and called for the rejection of the move that -in their opinion- would 
hinder the process of democratic development.
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Tunisia was considered as one of the most countries opposing
countries to what happened in Egypt, and called it a military coup; as by
that time it was governed by the Islamic Renaissance Movement, which 
represents a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia. Hence, the 
Tunisian President Monsef Al-Marzouki, mentioned that immediately after 
the ouster of Morsi that the military intervention is totally unacceptable, 
called for securing Morsi’s physical protection.
In the same context, the Islamic Renaissance, which was leading
the government in Tunisia, expressed its rejection to what it described by
the "flagrant military coup", and stressed that the legitimacy in Egypt is 
the only one that is represented by the democratically elected President 
Mohammed Morsi and no one else. Also, it denounced together with its 
partner in the rule “Congress Party for the Republic" what it called a
military coup in Egypt.
From its part, the Congress for the Republic party condemned this 
step, and considered that what was done by the Egyptian military
leadership is a setback in the path of the Egyptian revolution, and 
considered it as a trial to re- install the old system. It added that what 
happened in Egypt is dangerous for path of democracy in the Arab world 
and it is against the will of the masses and ballot boxes.
At this point it will be worth analyzing the reactions or positions 
of both Iran and Turkey, who are considered as two big regional powers, 
each with its goals and its calculations at both the regional and 
international levels. Hence, the two of them use its regional role as an 
entry point for a playing a global role far beyond the borders of the region.
There is a kind of unspoken and hidden rivalry between the two 
countries on the role and prestige in the Middle East, especially in light of 
the major changes taking place in the region and the world, which are
visible and notable in the regional strategy for each of them, in which 
Egypt after Mubarak formed important part of it. Thus, the competition 
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between the two countries could be witnessed in different ways and 
degrees towards Egypt, which is passing through difficult and complicated 
period, that has limited its ability to restore regional and international role
which declined significantly under Mubarak, a matter which made it more
vulnerable to external interference in its internal affairs412 . 
The Reaction of The Turkish regime:
From its part, Turkey refused the step that was taken by the 
Egyptian army, that dislodged the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi 
from power, stressing that this action do not reflect the will of the people  
and called on Cairo to return to democracy.
In this context, the official statements for each of the Turkish 
President, Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister at that time Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, and also the Foreign Minister at that very moment Ahmet 
Davutoglu, about the events of June 30 and spun around several points; 
namely, emphasizing that the ouster of Morsi who came to power through 
the ballot box by a military coup is considered an setback for democracy
and is unacceptable and against the will of the Egyptians.
In doing so, the Turkish system, adopted the position of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and some of the forces and Islamic parties 
sympathetic with them, which means ignoring the fact that huge popular
crowds that came out on June 30, demanding the departure of the 
President. They underscored that the Change of the president of Egypt did 
not come as a result of popular will and was not in line with the change of 
law and democracy, because in all democratic countries elections are the 
only way to get into power and it is unacceptable for a government, which
412 Dr.Hassanein Tawfik Ibrahim, Divergent bets, a reading in the Iranian and Turkish positions towards the 30th 
of June, al rahnat al motabinah ,keraa fi al mowkefen al torki wa al irani tegah 30 uonio, Al syiassa al dawleya,
the internatonal politics, al ahram center for political and strategic studies, October 2013,
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has come to power through the ballot box, to be toppled through illicit
means and, even more, a military coup.
Turkish officials also called for a return to democracy, which 
means the return of President Morsi, a matter which reflects the 
indifference of the Turkish authorities towards the new road map of 
Egypt's future that have been announced immediately after the toppling of 
Morsi. Furthermore,the Turkish officials did not stop at the point of 
describing what happened in Egypt as a military coup, but also the current 
president and the ex-Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, claimed that 
Israel was behind the army to isolate President Morsi, and they coordinate 
with the new authorities in Egypt.
This declaration involved a serious affront to the Egyptian people 
and the national army, and it was rejected by both Egypt and Israel, while 
the interesting observation to be considered is that Washington has 
criticized him publicly, describing it as hostile, wrong and baseless, a
matter which prompted the Turkish prime minister and foreign minister to 
reject the conduct of public criticism of their country by the ally as 
Washington.
There are several factors, as well as internal and external 
calculations that might give an explanation to the sharp position taken by
30ththe Turkish authorities towards the events of June and its 
consequences. The leaders of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development 
Party, are obsessed with military coups experience in their country. 
Therefore, they have fears from the idea of returning of the Turkish 
military to exercise a political role as what happened in the past.
These fears augmented in light of the recurrence of similar mass 
popular demonstrations in Taksim Square in the heart of Istanbul that 
could be easily supported by the Turkish army as what happened in Egypt. 
In other words, the Justice and Development Party government does not 
want the current of political change, through the popular movements to
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move to their country and to be backed by the army. It is worth mentioning
here that the Justice and Development Party government had been 
conducted in previous periods some constitutional and legal amendments, 
aimed at preventing the Turkish army to return to the political arena again 
under any constitutional and legal justifications.
Moreover, The Brotherhood experience failure in the rule of 
Egypt will cast a negative shadow over the prospects for the success of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in any other Arab country, which is considered as a
negative yield for the Turkish model promoted by the Justice and 
Development Party leaders. Thus, the party's experience in government is 
fostered as a model of Islamic rule that must be followed in some Arab 
countries, especially that it embodies the compatibility between Islam and 
democracy, and efficiency in the management of state affairs, as well as 
economic and social achievements of concrete.
In addition to the foregoing, the exclusion of President Morsi 
from power in Egypt has thwarted the ambitions of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party leaders in Turkey play a leading role in the Middle 
East over many groundworks, most notably, the strong Islamist parties that 
took the reins of power in Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia. Hence, 
the Brotherhood's failure to rule Egypt, and the exclusion of Morsi from 
power, represented a strategic loss for Turkey.
While, the Turkish position has been marked by sharp clarity and 
continuity, as already mentioned, the position of Tehran could be marked 
30thby a state of fluctuation and reluctance, since the eruption of the of 
June revolution, as the Iranian government was keen enough not to raise 
any disagreements with the new power in Egypt. Also, it is noted that the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry was more involved in the expression of the 
official political stance of Iran towards the developments in Egypt, through 
the statements of the foreign minister, and the official spokesman of the 
ministry.
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Tehran expressed its concern about the escalation of violence in 
Egypt, and stressed the need to listen to the voice of the people, and to 
respond to their legitimate demands in order to maintain Egypt's security
and stability. it also expressed its confidence in the national Egyptian 
army, and demanded that the Egyptians for vigilance and caution from the 
plans and foreign plots.
Following the overthrow of President Morsi, Tehran criticized 
this step, mentioning that it is not good for the democracy and that the 
intervention of the military in politics to change the governments is an 
unacceptable work. Also, it asked the supporters of President Morsi to 
continue their efforts in order to return him to power.In addition, the 
Islamic republic of Iran issued a statement by the foreign ministry stated 
that the resistant nation of Egypt will protect its independence and 
greatness from foreign and enemy opportunism during the difficult 
conditions that follow. It added that Tehran emphasizes the need to fulfil
the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people and expressed its hope that 
developments will provide an atmosphere to meet their needs.
There are several factors ruled the Iranian position towards the 
events of June 30 and its aftermath, among them: the arrival of reformist 
candidate, Hassan Rowhani, to power in Iran, as it is well known for the 
Iranian reformists that they show some degree of flexibility and openness, 
as well as an amount of pragmatism, besides their avoidance for taking
entrenched positions, compared to the conservatives. Additionally, 
Tehran's bets on the ability of Morsi's regime to normalize relations 
between the two countries, and coordination on regional issues, were not 
in place.
In this context, some opinions argued that Tehran has bet that 
President Morsi, who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood will pave the 
way for strengthening relations between the two countries, and it will take
a harder line towards Israel stance, that could aggregate to a cancellation 
with a peace treaty, and the formation of a strong front with Iran in this 
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regard. However, the Morsi regime policies and practices confirmed that 
Iran's bet was not really accurate, since Morsi's policy toward Israel didn't 
differ from his predecessor's policy.
And even more, it adopted a position that is totally in contrary to 
the Iranian attitude toward the Syrian regime, where he called forneed for
the departure of the Syrian president Bashar Al- Assad, not only but the 
matter extended to severing the Egyptian relations with Damascus.Also, 
hehighlighted publicly his readiness to provide support and assistance to 
the Syrian opposition, as mentioned in details previously, and 
consequently the Egyptian position became consistent with Washington's 
position in this regard. 
The last factor in the analysis of the Iranian authorities position 
from the ouster of Morsi, and its keenness to avoid taking strong positions 
towards the new authorities in Egypt was in part motivated by a desire to 
keep the door open to prospects of the resumption of relations between the 
two countries, especially in light of the major challenges facing Iran, and 
the state of relative isolation experienced at the international level, not to 
mention the developments and complications associated with the Syrian 
crisis. 
In this context, the volatility that has characterized the Iranian 
30thposition of events June of June and its consequences that ended with 
the ouster of Morsi could be understood, compared to the Turkish position, 
where Tehran was keen on a truce with Cairo.
In summary, it is likely that the change of the regime in Egypt, 
and its consequences will lead to the recession of the Turkish role in the 
region in the short and medium term at least, as the Islamist parties 
opportunities to take the reins of power in other Arab countries became 
very difficult, especially after the failure of the parent group in Egypt. 
Also, the clear bias of Ankara to support the Islamist groups and parties, 
on the expense of other political currents in many Arab countries, will lead 
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to the decline of its role as an acceptable mediator able to contribute to the 
resolution of conflicts in the Middle East region, and achieve national 
reconciliation. In addition, the loss of Turkey, to an important Arab state in 
the weight of Egypt will cast a negative impact on its regional strategy, 
especially in light of changing alliances in the region.
As for Iran, the more likely it will be negatively impacted also by
the change of the regime in Egypt, due to the changing map of alliances in 
the region. In return for the position of Turkey, and to some extent Iran, 
towards the developments in Egypt, the emergence of the role of other
countries as Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf cooperation Council
countries (except Qatar) and Jordan to support the new power in Egypt, 
has been very noticeable. Thus, their support was far beyond words, at all
levels, either economically and financially as in the case of the United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait who pledged big amounts of aid 
as mentioned before. In this context, some opinions argue that it is 
unlikely that the Arab moderation axis might be revived in one form or 
another.
However, If the Egyptian - Turkish relations will remain captive
for some time to Turkey's aggressive position towards the events of June
30th , and the process of isolating President Morsi, the Egyptian - Iranian 
relations will be affected, to one degree or another, especially with its 
relation with important regional files linked to the issue of security of the 
Gulf, and Iran's interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf countries. 
Thus, these relations will be definitely be affected in light of the 
qualitative leap witnessed by these countries relations with Egypt, after the 
removal of Morsi from power. All of this and the other indicates that the 
future of Egyptian - Iranian relations will depend in significant part on the 
limits of change in Iranian foreign policy towards Egypt after Morsi, as 
well as to a number of Arab issues and the central files.
To sum up, the internal situation in Egypt will keep the main 
determinant of foreign relations, including relations with both Turkey and 
284 | P a g e 
   
 
    
 
  
  
   
  
  
     
   
  
 
   
 
     
   
  
   
     
 
 
   
       
  
    
   
   
   
   
 
Iran. Thus, Restoring security and security in Egypt, and move steadily on 
the path of democracy, development and social justice, will strengthen its 
ability to restore regional and international role, and build regional and 
international relations on the basis of equality, safeguard national 
independence and to achieve national interests. 
On the side of the United States, and as mentioned before that the 
30thunprecedented demonstrations of the June , and the size of the broad 
popular rejection expressed by the masses against the Muslim Brotherhood
and their President Mohamed Morsi, represented a surprise to many
Western analysts, specifically the Americans, and the decision-making
circles.
Some opinions argue that the western especially the American 
research centers have always considered that political Islamis the 
representative of the mood of the main stream of the peoples in the Arab 
region; a matter which prompted the US administration to adopt a strategy
to support "moderate" political Islam groups, -from the western point of 
view-after the revolutions of the Arab Spring; as that these groups are the 
key to political stability and stand for the orientation of the masses in those 
countries, as well as its capability to mobilize the crowds and its effect on 
the public opinion.
Therefore, the US administration had a great shock when the 
popular rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, who was 
elected only one year before, a matter which represented a big surprise 
that confused the American position, especially with their belief that the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the political Islam in general are the only
factions capable of gathering the huge crowds as explained before.
30thThus, the U.S. reactions towards the June events were
variable, both in their acceptance of the reality of the demonstrations or in 
dealing with it. On one hand, the official U.S. institutions, namely, the 
White House, Congress, and Pentagon, expressed its reservation in the first 
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moments after Sisi's statement in which he gave president Morsi a
deadline 48 hours to react to the streets demands, and these institutions 
Referred to earlier expressed their deep concern about the process of 
democratic transition. 
However, few days later, and after Sisi's second statement in 
which he declared disruption of the constitution and assumed Adly
Mansour the head of the constitutional court as interim president of the 
country. Thus, and in that context, president Obama issued a statement on 
the situation in Egypt, highlighting that the United States since the 
25threvolution of January , 2011 has been supporting the basic principles in 
Egypt, only the principles, neither persons nor parties, also he expressed 
concern over the army's decision to isolate Morsi and suspending the 
Constitution, and demanded the Egyptian military to speed up the 
restoration of authority back to a democratically elected civilian 
government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent 
process, and to avoid any arbitrary arrests of President Morsi and his 
supporters.
At the same time, Obama announced that he ordered a review of 
US aid to Egypt in light of US laws in the light of new conditions. Thus, 
he uttered that according to the developments that Egypt witnesses, he
directed all the relevant departments and agencies to review the 
implications under US law for assistance to the Government of Egypt. 
Also, he went furthermore when he decided to cancel the biannual bright 
star military exercises which was supposed to be held in September of the 
same year. Additionally, he stressed that the voices of all those who have
protested peacefully must be heard, including those who welcomed 
developments and those who have supported President Morsi413.
October 2013, Obama suspends delivery of F16 fighter jets, 
M1A1 tank kits, Harpoon missiles and Apache helicopters. Their delivery, 
413https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/08/15/will-canceling-u-s-egypt-military­
exercises-do-anything-probably-not/, Max fisher)
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the US said, was contingent on “credible progress toward an inclusive, 
democratically elected civilian government through free and fair 
elections.” The US said it would continue to “provide parts for US-origin 
military equipment as well as military training and education.”
Though, the Congress position was different from the White
House position, and the Foreign Affairs Committee in Congress issued a
statement on the situation in Egypt, on behalf of both the committee's 
Republican chairman and one of its Democrat member's in the committee, 
which means that the statement expresses the point of view of both parties.  
The statement considered that the Muslim Brotherhood failed to 
understand what real democracy is, and demanded the army and 
transitional government demonstrate their intention to perform a true
democratic transition in the country. In the same time, it stresses the 
importance of the involvement of a wide range of people in the process of 
writing the new constitution, also the statement called all political factions 
in Egypt to renounce violence.
However, the statement did not consider what happened in Egypt 
as a coup, and considered it as a democratic development in the positive
direction. Moreover, the statement did not mention something about 
stopping or reviewing the aid, and this is considered as the first sign of a
change in the American attitude toward the isolation of President Morsi.
During the following days, the US administration's position began 
to inch gradually, and appeared to accept the new situation in Egypt. In a 
statement issued by the White House about a meeting between U.S.
President and members of the National Security Council, Washington
stressed that it rejects all the allegations about its backing to any party or 
person in the crisis in Egypt.
In addition, it underscored that it just stand with the Egyptian 
people and their objectives, which they have been trying to achieve since
25ththe January revolution. It called on the political forces to sit down and 
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negotiate and start a political process and away from violence. This was 
the same position confirmed by the State Department spokesperson, who
announced that the assessment of the situation in Egypt whether it is a
coup or not, and the impact of this step on the assistance given to Cairo 
will take time out from the U.S. administration.
On the other hand, the Deputy U.S. Secretary of State arrived in 
Egypt in the first visit by a US official, since Morsi's insulation. During
this visit, he stressed that he is not carrying American solutions, and did 
not come to advise anyone, or to impose an American model of democracy
on Egypt. He ruled out that Egypt would follow Syria on the path towards 
civil war, demanding at the same time the release of detained political 
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood's group so that a real dialogue about 
the future would be started as soon as possible.
The visit and the statements of Burns represented a turning point
in the dealing of the parties of the political process with the United States. 
They represented a shock for the Muslim Brotherhood and the supporters 
of the isolated President, as they have been counting heavily on the US 
administration position; as the United States is considered the only
international player that the group has been betting on until the last breath.
In the aftermath of all these movements a statement, was issued
by secretary of state John Kerry, that managed to put an end to the 
controversy surrounding the characterization of what happened on June
30th, and considering it as a coup or not. Kerry emphasized that it is 
difficult to describe what happened as a coup; as the Egyptian army spared 
the country a civil war.
In summary, some opinions argue that president Obama tried to 
hold the stick from the middle, in a trial to preserve or maintain the 
numerous and intersecting American interests both in Egypt and the 
Middle East region. However, and regardless of these efforts the 
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democratic American administration was heavily criticized by all parties 
of not being able to manage or deal with crisis in Egypt.
The American president has been so keen not to characterize or 
describe what happened in Egypt as a "military coup", to avoid being
embarrassed before his administration so as not to be obliged in 
accordance with US laws to cut aid. Moreover, the cancellation of the 
Egyptian –American military exercises was a symbolic move, because the 
internal conditions in Egypt was not correctly prepared that's why it was 
almost going to be called off under any circumstances. However, his 
critics stressed that what Obama did doesn’t exceed an expression of 
position that doesn’t live up to be level of policy414. 
The real dilemma that faced Obama's administration was the loss
of its influence that enables the United States to affect either positively or 
negatively the course of events and developments in the Egyptian crisis. 
This could be attributed to its welcoming position to the Muslim
Brotherhood president, since he came to power, a matter that created a
state of coldness in the relations not only with Egypt but also with the Gulf 
countries namely, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Because of this Obama 
appeared with the image of the person lacking to the power of influence, to 
the extent that some opinions argued that this is the first time in more 30 
years American hegemony in the region seems to be fading out415. 
A Precise Examination Of The Muslim Brotherhood Policy During One Year:
The Egyptian government during the one year has pursued 
external alignments mainly as a way to deal with domestic threats since it
was functioning in an unstable domestic environment. Instead of 
advocating an international order which is based on the Arab and Islamic 
414 Waiting for Decisiveness, interactions inside the US with the change of power in Egypt, regionalcenter for
 
strategic studies, fi entzar al hasm, tafolat aldakhel alamericy maa taghieer al solta fi masr ,karen abo elkheir,
 
august 27th, 2013)
 
415 Jeffery Kemp, Obama and Egypt, the reality and hard choices, alittihad newspaper, in Arabic Obama wa masr,
 
alwakee wa alkhyarat al saaba, August, 23rd ,2013)
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unity and solidarity, in the same way as the Brotherhood’s ideology
asserts, former president Morsi has developed warmer relations with a
various array of actors-involving Turkey, Iran, and Sudan, as well as 
Hamas organization-while maintaining its key relations with Washington 
and preserving diplomatic channels with Tel- Aviv. 
The Muslim Brotherhood government’s policies and actions 
towards both Israel and Hamas, specifically, contradict the group's deeply­
held ideological persuasions. In spite of the Brotherhood’s pledge to 
support the Palestinian resistance against Israel, yet, Morsi's government 
mediated a ceasefire between both Israel and Hamas in November 2012, 
and refrained from the complete opening of the Rafah border crossing
between Egypt and Gaza, also it coordinated counterterrorism activities 
with Israeli military forces in the Sinai.
Although Morsi's government envisaged ideological ideas and 
objectives, yet Egypt’s continuing domestic defies critically constrained 
foreign policy of his government’s choices and promoted the value of 
alignment decisions. In reality, some opinions contend that the Egyptian 
government during the brotherhood era took up external alliances chiefly
to secure and strengthen its internal political power. In the midst of the 
political, institutional and economic confronts to regime security, these
alignments could have helped to alleviate burdens facing the regime. 
Final Analysis of the one year of Muslim Brotherhood rule:
To recapitulate, it is worth highlighting that in general the 
foreign policy conduct of revolutionary or post-revolutionary states has 
grasped inadequate and not enough attentiveness from most of the 
international relations scholars. Hence, some of them as Fred Halliday and 
Stephen Walt, whose writings managed to provide the most respectable
and significant contributions to the existing literature, and it also helped to 
spot the foreign policies of revolutionary states as intrinsically aggressive
and belligerent.
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At the moment that Halliday debates that they induce
confrontation either inadvertently or intentionally to generate a contagion 
impacts in neighboring countries, Walt tries to conjoin the impulsiveness 
and the mysterious intentions of revolutionary nations with conflict and
war 416. Diverging dramatically from the anticipations of both scholars 
Walt and Halliday’s, the post-revolutionary Egypt has striven for
integration whilst tirelessly precluding clashes with another powers.
As of June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood government has 
directed the Egyptian foreign policy objectives towards furthering the 
country's national interests ,but, in same time without alienating donors, 
partners, allies, as well as the internal political circles. Thus, the foreign 
policy initiatives of the former president Morsi's mirrored the rivaling
welfares of various constituencies rather than the ideological benefits and 
interests of the Muslim Brotherhood group.
The Morsi government’s forthright declaration of its 
commitment towards the international treaties and pledges, as well as its 
obvious abandonment of any ideological or revolutionary aspirations and 
dreams, all these steps aimed predominantly to calm Egypt’s partners and 
promote deeper relations particularly with the Gulf monarchies. Moreover, 
President Morsi’s proposal about Syria's quartet striven for enhancing the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ perception of Egypt’s new 
Islamic government from one side, and to gain the domestic political 
support on the other side. 
Similarly, his decision to curb Cairo's relations with Tehran 
aimed to alleviate the fears of both the GCC states and Egypt’s Salafists. 
In that context, it is worth mentioning that the quartet for Syria, was a
proposal that has been suggested by Egyptian former president Morsi, 
aiming at gathering all the major supporters of the Syrian rebellion namely
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well as Egypt itself and Iran, which is 
416http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39026/1/Halliday's%20revenge%0(LSERO).pdf).
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considered as the biggest regional ally of Syrian President Bashar Al­
Assad417.
Ultimately, the Muslim brotherhood government’s position 
towards Israel and Hamas reflects the victory of pragmatism perspective in 
Egypt’s post-revolutionary foreign policy. Instead of supporting the 
Palestinian resistance and breaking the relations with Tel- Aviv, the 
Egyptian government has maintained Camp David agreement, and 
facilitated a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Generally, the Morsi 
government has constantly given precedence to building alignments, and 
implementing national security objectives at the expense of its ideological 
considerations.
Constrains Of The One-Year Rule Of The Muslim Brotherhood Regime In Egypt: 
- Role of the Diminutive Time frame and lack of experience:
The Egyptian government has been treated in this research as a
"rational" actor whose leaders are capable of planning policies and 
implementing decisions based on objective assessments of pressures, 
jeopardies, as well as other external insights. However, the decision­
making process is not thought through at all times and is often liable to 
fault and mistake. Given that the Muslim Brotherhood has never been in 
power throughout their long history since the group founding in 1928, it
could be easily noticed that the inexperience and political naivetéhave ­
without any doubts-negatively impacted the foreign policy decision­
making process under the Islamic regime. 
Moreover, the relationships between the different institutions 
during the one year rule of the Muslim brotherhood suffered from a kind 
of uncertainty and reluctance, also the jurisdictions were every so often 
417http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-hosts-summit-of-new-quartet-on-syria-hoping­
to-persuade-iran-to-change-stance/)
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indeterminate and imprecise a matter which augmented the potential for
miscommunication between Egypt’s several foreign policy actors.
Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the one year of former
president Morsi in power witnessed an immense lack of coordination and 
synchronization among the different institutions in the country, as well as 
overlapping realms of authority of the Presidency, Ministry of Foreign 
affairs, and intelligence apparatuses, a matter which initiated a status of 
confusion that have sent sort of mixed messages to external powers.
Likewise, since Mohamed Morsi’s inauguration as Egypt’s first 
democratically-elected president, the political system of the country
remained in a status of agitation and unstable transition, some of the 
Egyptian institutions were in a delicate and vulnerable state, by the effect 
of consecutive revolutions and then by the process of empowerment in the 
Egyptian bureaucracy, (or “Ikhwanisation”) in Arabic, that took place
through bestowing posts to Muslim brotherhood members or affiliates. 
Besides, the looming threat of the deterioration of the economic situation, 
especially with the re-emergence of the street demonstrations and marches 
that have laid exorbitant pressure on the new regime at that time. 
Confronted with all these pressuring defies, the Morsi government failed
either to make a dramatic re-orientation of the Egyptian foreign policy or 
to embark on ideologically driven initiatives.
The Effect of the fall over of The Muslin Brotherhood On The Political Islam Forces:
The fall of the Muslim brotherhood regime in Egypt represented 
a painful hit not only to the future of the political Islam movements but 
also to the main ideology of these forces, which depend on the use of 
religious discourse as a base for its political activity. Not to mention the 
several mistakes and errors that the Muslim brotherhood committed during
its one year of rule in Egypt, it could be easily noted that there is a
dominant general impression that have widely spread among many
sectors of the Egyptian society, that the political materialization of the 
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Muslim brotherhood as well as all the political Islam forces are is so weak 
and lacking the ability to take the full control of the power in any country.
Moreover, the other political Islam forces namely the Salafists 
with their political party known as "the light" or in Arabic" Al Nour"
tried to separate or isolate itself from the Muslim brotherhood and appear 
with a different image, yet its ability to overcome the brotherhood model 
and to present a new alterative example for the political Islam totally
failed, as it on the contrary of the brotherhood organization, it adopted a
more conservative and traditional doctrine, regardless of its trials to be
seen as  pragmatic as possible.
Furthermore, these political Islam forces, such as the Salafists, are
still insisting on mixing up their religious role with the political one, a 
matter which predicts that their destiny would definitely be the same as the 
fate of the Muslim, brotherhood. Likewise, most of these forces have lost
their leverage in the in a country like Egypt, as they suffering from an 
extremely difficult social and political situation not only because of the 
loss of power but also as a result of the image that has portrayed in the 
minds about their political capabilities and efficiency. 
Hence, it is expected that the political Islam forces would suffer a
lot from the removal of the Muslim brotherhood from power in Egypt, yet 
the major challenge facing these forces would remain the possibility of 
pulling out itself away from the Muslim brotherhood in the minds of 
25thEgyptian people. After the break out of the of January revolution all
the political Islam forces almost got united together and they had been 
looked at as the main supporter for the Muslim brotherhood, this blending
is considered as an unprecedented one, because it has never been preceded 
by any type of ideological reviews or revisions. 
The arrival of Morsi to power represented a turning point in the 
long journey of the Islamists, who, and for the first time in their history, 
took the leadership in a regional power as Egypt, they became the decision 
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makers and the rulers after decades of oppression and secret work.  
Moreover, some opinions believed that after taking the rule in Egypt the 
Muslim brotherhood would make extra efforts to moderate the discourse
of the conservative Islamic powers namely the Salafists and the ex­
jihadists, yet and surprisingly the opposite has happened as the Muslim
brotherhood was trapped in the by the ideological and religious 
blackmailing of all the other conservative forces.
All this happened during the peak of the political and religious 
polarization that was taking place in the society at that point of time, while 
the Muslim brotherhood failed to evade this state of polarization and it got 
closer to these conservative forces. In that sense some scholars argue that 
the changes or the transformations of the religious discourse of the Muslim
25thbrotherhood group already started long time before the of January
2011 revolution418 
During the one year of the Muslim brotherhood in power 
president Morsi sought to appease with the different Islamic forces or 
powers either because of the similarity in the orientations and ideology or 
because of his need for their help and support. This policy aimed at 
achieving some equilibrium with the other opposing forces in the society.  
However, this policy led to nothing but increasing and widening the gap 
with the other secular and civil forces which turned to be a complete 
hatred till the ouster of Morsi.
This strong relationship that was established between the Muslim
brotherhood regime and the more conservative or radical Islamist powers
could be easily spotted in their cooperation and coordination to pass the 
2012 constitution, through a deal between the regime and those forces to 
adopt that it at any price, on the expense of achieving political and social 
consensus about it. Yet, the link between the two sides reached its peak 
418 Hossam tamam, the Salafism of the Muslim brotherhood the erosion of the brotherhood ideas and the rising of
the Salafism inside the muslim brotherhood group, in Arabic, tasalof al ikhwan, taakol al otrohah al ikwanya wa
seoud al salafya fi gamaeet al ikhwan al moslmeen, marased 1, bibliotheca Alexandria 2010).
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with the full backing of the constitutional decree that Morsi issued in 
November 2012 , this step was followed by the launch of an alliance
between them that continued till the removal of Morsi from power, a
matter which negatively affected the traditional discourse of the Muslim
brotherhood and their image as a moderate Islamic movement.
The future of the Muslim brotherhood and the political Islam:
There is no doubt that the Muslim brotherhood after the failure if 
their experience in Egypt is passing through one of the most difficult 
exams in its long path, since the fifties of the past century when the group 
was totally banned and hundreds of its members and leaders were arrested 
in 1954, which resulted in their complete exclusion from the political 
scene in Egypt for more than two decades, a period well known in the 
literature of the group as the "crisis" period. Yet, the predicament this time  
seems to be more aggressive, not only because of their removal from 
power just after one year but because of the growing hostility that face
them from all the state institutions and the majority of the Egyptian 
society, not to mention the unprecedented negative media reports and 
comments about the brotherhood since the last decade.
30thImmediately after the of June some opinions argued that the 
Muslim brotherhood would not vanish even after its loss of power in the 
Egypt, claiming that it is a big and old organization with deep roots in the 
Egyptian society and couldn’t be easily defeated or dismantled by the 
security repression, this argument was based upon the previous
experiences with the Muslim brotherhood group as any ideological group 
who has always been able to overcome its problems through its internal 
consolidation to face the severe exclusion and repression. Yet, this didn’t 
not really happen this time because of the violence that was committed by
the brotherhood members a matter which pushed the Egyptian government 
to ban the group once again in 2013 and dismantle its institutions and 
organizations until this moment of writing these lines. 
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However, two scenarios were put forward by some scholars 
concerning the future of the Muslim brotherhood group, it was argued that 
this future depends on two main factors which are, the readiness of the 
Egyptian state to deal with them in such a realistic way, not through the 
security tools, while the other factor is related to the ability of the Muslim
brotherhood to accept the conditional inclusiveness in the political process 
again. As for the first factor, it would be divided into two main currents, 
one called for the importance of the exclusion of the Muslim brotherhood
from the society.
While, the other direction or current called for the conditional 
inclusiveness of the group in society, arguing that it is unrealistic and 
inevitable to exclude the an deeply rooted organization as the Muslim
brotherhood from the political process in Egypt, yet their blending in the 
society would have been done under two main circumstances, Firstly, 
dismantling the group or transforming it to be a civil organization that 
plays a social role throughout the country and completely away from 
politics. Secondly, the freedom and justice party (FJP), quit or abandon its 
religious ideology and to accept the rules of the political scene in Egypt.
As for the readiness of the Muslim brotherhood to deal 
realistically with the new political scene in Egypt after their loss of power, 
and its acceptance for the unconditional inclusiveness, this means firstly, 
they would confess the strategic mistakes they committed, either because
of their lack of experience or the miscalculations , secondly the Muslim
brotherhood ought to revise its political and ideological discourse. This 
discourse over the one year of the ruling of the Muslim brotherhood has 
represented a real problem for the group especially that it had a tendency
towards cultural and religious conservation, a policy which has been 
adopted by group to gain the support of thre Salafists and to augment its 
popularity among its followers. Moreover, the future of the group as 
argued would have been changed with the emergence of new leadership or 
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reformist movement after this last crisis, to counter the dominating role of 
the conservative movement in the group in the decision making process419.
30thTo summarize, the of June revolution represented a
historical defining moment in the history of the Muslim brotherhood as it
was revealing for the glitches in the intellectual and institutional structure
of the group, either it make a comprehensive review for its ideas and 
discourse through its highbrow members who were not involved in 
violence to establish a new organization or a group on the debris of the old 
one or it would end up out of history like other ideological and religious 
groups throughout the history.
419 Turning point, the fall of the Muslim brotherhood and the future of politicalIslam, Dr. Khalil al enani, in
Arabic, noktett tahawol: seqout hokm Al ekhwan wa mostaqbal al islam al siyasy, Al siyassa al dawleyia, vol. 
194, October 2014,)
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CHAPTER 7
THE THIRD REPUBLIC UNDER PRESIDENT 
AL-SISI:
 
Re-Orientation of the Egyptian Foreign Policy:
With the arrival of the current president Abdel- Fattah Al Sisi, to 
the power in Egypt, the international opinion was keen and curious to be
more acquainted with his policies either domestically or externally. 
Aiming at determining the Egyptian orientation in this critical period that 
face not only Egypt, but also the whole Middle East region, specifically
with the changes taking place in it and the threats that endanger it. 
Subsequently, all these influences are really important to tackle
specially that President Sisi, inherited a heavy responsibility of his 
predecessor Morsi politically and economically420. 
The determinates controlling or directing the Egyptian foreign 
policy in the post 30th of June era, included some important principles that 
represents a development for the foreign policy after the 25th of January
revolution a matter which represents a complete turnover of his 
predecessor Morsi and maybe of Mubarak himself. The first principal 
depends on giving up presenting any kind of even minimal concessions to 
any external forces or powers in relation to the Egyptian domestic policy
that became an uncrossable line that nobody can interfere in for any
reason. Even if such intervention was conditioned with providing aid or 
returning back some military parts that has been sent for maintenance in 
one of the big powers.
420 Foreign policy during sisi, regional center for strategic studies, Ambassador Azmi Khalifa, march 2015, in
Arabic, al syiassa al kharegia fi ahd al sisi
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While, the second principal focuses on achieving more balance in 
the Egyptian foreign policy which means that Cairo's strategic relations
with Washington doesn’t mean neglecting the relations with the other
world powers as, Russia and China. However, the third determinant  
highlights that tackling the terrorism should be characterized by
inclusiveness which stress the importance of confronting this phenomenon  
in all its forms and working on cutting all its supply and financing sources, 
as well as defying all the terrorist organizations not only some of them, 
either  domestically and on the borders.
In addition to the refusal of the participation of groups and 
factions that might be seen by certain people as representatives of 
moderate political Islam in the rule of many countries. On the other hand, 
the fourth and fifth factors concentrate on dealing with national security
threats and paying more attention to revitalizing the Arab national security
to support Egypt in its confrontation with the terrorism in Sahel And 
Sahara area (Coast and Desert). Furthermore, the declarations of President 
Al–Sisi reflect implicitly a very important orientation indicating that the 
national security of individual Arab countries will only be achieved in the 
framework of the regional Arab national security. 
This concept is considered a relatively new one in the field of 
security studies, which emphasis that the perception of the national
security of the states has been shifted from the national level to a much 
higher level, which is the regional level especially. in the context of the re­
arrangement of security priorities to include, humanitarian security, 
national security and regional security which are considered the three
levels of a state responsibility in a direct manner, before moving on to the 
international security level which is considered the responsibility of the 
united nations.
The study of the foreign policy will not be completed without
making a comprehensive evaluation for policy's pillars as realizing the 
sources of threats, policies and orientation for especially that Egypt is 
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passing through after the June 30th revolution. Thus, it is expected that 
these pillars will include core or radical modifications, in relation to the 
orientation and policies.
On the level of realizing these different sources of threats, it is 
worth mentioning that there is a noticeable perception or a realization of 
the national security threats. Yet, on the level of the policies implemented, 
it could be realized from the external visits of President Sisi since he came 
to power, it should noticed that these visits, go along with the new 
orientations. For instance, due to the dangerous and critical situation in 
Libya, President Sisi visited both Italy and Algeria to coordinate the 
efforts to combat the threats of the Islamic terrorist organizations in 
Africa. Once more, He visited France and Algeria to send a clear message
about Egypt's foreign policy orientation after the revolution, in addition to 
his regular visits to the United Nations in New York during its annual 
General Assembly session to lay emphasis on this orientation in fighting
terrorism421. 
Priorities of the Egyptian Regime Post June 30th Revolution:
On assuming office in June 2014, after the end of the interim 
government president Al-Sisi thought about resetting and reshaping the 
country’s foreign policy. In doing this important step he embarked on 
taking many steps both domestically and externally to reinforce Egypt’s 
long-standing foreign policy strengths, combining them with greater
flexibility and pragmatism, while taking into consideration -in the mean 
time- the mounting impact of public opinion. The new Egyptian regime
on the foreign policy level thought about increasing and broadening the 
country’s global options, as Egypt has a longstanding history of tackling
the varying configuration of the international system in a way that 
enhances its own interests.
421 Sisi talks counterterrorism at UN Security Council,’ Mada Masr, September 24, 2014,
http://www.madamasr.com/news/sisi-talks-counter-terrorism-un-general-assembly)
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On the foreign policy level, it is worth to mention that Sisi when 
came to power has reassured Israel over his commitment to the 1979 peace
treaty between Cairo and Tel-Aviv, especially with the current security
challenges in the Sinai penninsula. In this context, it is important to note 
that Egypt has deployed military troops close to the border with Israel, in a
technical breach of the treaty, a matter which was approved by Israel to 
secure its national interest from the jihadist groups in Sinai422. 
Underpinning Tel-Aviv confidence in Sisi is his attitude towards Hamas, 
whose close relationship with Morsi and the muslim Brotherhood was a
source of constant Israeli unease.
In addition, President Al-Sisi has sought to engage constructively
with Ethiopia and the other upstream Nile countries to reach an agreeable 
solution to the dilemma of sharing the river’s water resources. The 1959 
Nile Water Agreement between the Sudan and Egypt entitles the latter to 
55.5 billion cubic meters of the annual flow of the Nile; though, the 
development projects upstream, especially Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam 
project, threaten this agreement. Cairo is understanding and considerate to 
Ethiopia’s argument that such projects are crucial for the growth of its 
economy, but in the meantime it will not put up with any agreement that 
would negatively affect its current share of the waters. In this respect, 
Ethiopia’s declaration in September 2014 that the dam is intended for
power generation rather than irrigation may provide hope that Sisi can 
secure agreement in the future423. 
More recently, the rise of Islamic state (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq 
has brought Egypt and the West closer again as the U.S. endeavored to 
establish an international and regional coalition to launch a war against the 
joint terrorist enemy. From its part, Cairo at a certain point agreed to join 
the alliance, if it would not focus exclusively on combating Islamic state in 
422 (http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Israel-okays-Egypt-request-to-deploy-more-military-forces-in-Sinai­
380970)
423 Sisi’s reformed foreign policy could restore Egypt as major regional power, 4 June 2015. projects21.com/
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Iraq and Levant (ISIL), or ISIS -as mentioned in some narratives-, but 
would work to fight against other terrorist organizations in the whole
region as well.
On the other hand, and owing to his awareness that the country’s 
domestic opportunities are closely coupled with its international 
reputation, the current Egyptian regime had to prioritize stabilizing the 
Egyptian economy in an endeavor to re- adjust the perception of the 
foreign investors and tourists towards the country economic and financial 
situation. In this context, he has been helped by the substantial aid 
provided by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as Kuwait, to restore some 
of the confidence that has been deteriorated by the effect of the economic
crisis.
Moreover, the new Egyptian regime managed to launch a series 
of mega infrastructure projects, for instance, the North Coast development 
project to increase Mediterranean tourism; the one and half million acres 
land reclamation project, and the nuclear project with the Russia, as well
as the new Suez Canal project, which is considered the most important 
infrastructure plan in the country. Egyptians succeeded in one year in 
completing the initial step for developing the Suez Canal region, through 
the drilling of a new channel with a length of 35 kilometers, with the 
deepening and expansion of the original canal areas up to 72 kilometers, as 
well as updating and adding advanced equipment in all sectors of the 
canal. The new canal helps in the direct non-stop transit of 45 vessels in
both directions, and the transit of 97 ships per day, which increases canal 
revenues by 259% in 2023 to be 13.226 billion dollars compared to the 
current revenue of $ 5.3 billion, resulting in a direct positive impact on 
Egypt’s hard currency income. The project reduces the waiting time for
ships to be 3 hours instead of 8 to 11 hours, which reduces the cost for ship 
owners, as well as raising the value of the Suez Canal, contributing to the 
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increased demand for the use of the canal as a major international 
waterway424. 
The project goes in parallel with the Suez Canal Area
Development axis Plan, as it will make it the route of choice for ship 
owners all over the world, putting any alternative routes out of 
competition. In addition, The project will have quite a positive impact on 
the Egyptian national income, as it will increase the hard currency
revenues and provide more job opportunities, as well as developing new 
urban communities. he project provides a million jobs upon the completion 
of its initial phases, which is a leap forward for the national economy, 
where economists expect project revenue to reach $ 100 billion annually
upon its completion. This project will play a major role in the re­
urbanization and the geographic distribution of the population through 
integrated urban projects aimed at reclamation and cultivation of about 
million acres425. 
What is more, Repairing the country's image in the international 
arena is a priority of Sisi’s foreign policy as he wanted to change the 
perception of the world towards Egypt, and export a new image of the 
country not as a religiously oriented revolutionary state, but as a civic, 
democratizing, and reforming nation. An important step in this direction is 
for Cairo to conclude an agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which could be considered as a vote of confidence in the country's 
capabilities a matter that would attract foreign investors and tourists back 
to the country(426).
Likewise, there is an important element of this endeavor to restore
the country's image, which is the alteration in the public discourse that Sisi
has pioneered. Over the past six decades, this discourse in Egypt has been 
focused on two main themes, the management of poverty and the 
424https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=69.
425http://www.sczone.eg/english/aboutsczone/Pages/factsandnumbers.aspx)
426 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/08/11/09/49/pr16375-Egypt-IMF-Reaches-Staff-Level­
Agreement-on-a-Three-Year-US$12-Billion-Extended-Fund-Facility.
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management of external, regional, and international relations. Fears and 
insecurities have guided and motivated Egypt’s political conversation, as 
well as its political behavior, both internally and externally. To this public
discourse, Sisi has advanced three new ideas: at the outset, that the 
concern of Egyptian politics is the management of the country’s human 
and material wealth, not just its poverty; next, that instead of taking up an 
isolationist position, Cairo should actively seek a stable and peaceful 
regional environment that leans on a more stout Egyptian-Gulf alliance
and that includes the creation of a “regional security system.” And lastly, 
that Egypt
should halt its obsessive dwelling on its past and should instead 
fix its sights on the future(427),(428). 
Another important aspect of the Egyptian government’s
efforts to mend its image involved changing the existing opinions and 
awareness about the Egyptian economy which was perceived as a “basket 
case” in other words hopeless case. This was reflected in the return back of 
the Egyptian stock market to its pre-January 2011 levels, for instance, in 
May, 2014, the stock market’s EGX 30 index went up to 8,728 points, 
which is considered the highest level since August 2008(429). 
Additionally, the economic indices witnessed a reduction of the 
10%(430)budget deficit to in the increase in the country’s foreign currency
reserves from $13 billion in 2013 to $17 billion in 2014, and in two 
stimulus packages that resulted both in the resumption of work on 
427“The Investment in the Time of Revolution,” March 2, 2013 Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper; “
Some Like It Barren,” May 19, 2013; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper; “
“Getting Out of the Historical Failure,” May 26, 2013; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper; “
“Hard Wear and Soft Wear,” June 2, 2013; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper
428“Only Three Files and Nothing More,” July 7, 2013; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper
“Egypt`s Wealth and Poverty,” September15, 2013; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper
“Rich and Poor,” April 5, 2014; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper
“From the River to the Sea,” May 8, 2014, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper
429 http://www.egx.com.eg/get_pdf.aspx?ID=2508&Lang=ARB.
430 “Budget Deficit Contracted by the End of April 2014 to EGP 163.3 Billion, or About 8% of the Budget,” Al-
Ahram, May 31, 2014, in Arabic.
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infrastructure projects, and in increased industrial productivity(431). These
indices were achieved owing to a package of economic reform decrees 
initiated by interim President Adly Mansour before Al-Sisi coming into 
office. They involved the long sought-after introduction of a capital gains 
tax; amending the Investment Law; prohibiting third parties from 
challenging government contracts in court; and a reduction of subsidies on 
energy products(432). 
Sisi's foreign policy:
Since the new Egyptian regime under Sisi came to office a far 
higher degree of congruence between the country's foreign and domestic
policies. Therefore, even as the current president has given Egypt’s 
internal development top priority, he has been working to create a
favorable external environment for this agenda by putting emphasis on 
maintaining Egypt’s peace with Israel and by strengthening his country’s 
ties with the Gulf Arab states. The primary focus of Egypt’s foreign 
policy is consolidating the alliance with the Arab Gulf countries, as they
are considered as the key to furthering Egypt’s national interests in a
variety of fields: not only meeting the country’s developmental needs, but 
also remodeling or reforming its relations with the West and even with 
Africa(433). 
Relations with the Gulf:
When president Al- Sisi came to power, he sought to take many
measures to re-orient his country’s foreign policy, hence he has restored 
Egypt’s alliance with the Gulf states, particularly its traditional allies, 
431 “Mid-Year Economic & Fiscal Review,” Ministry of Finance, Arab Republic of Egypt, February, 2014, p. 10.
 
432 Mansour’s Presidential Decrees,” Daily News Egypt, June 3, 2014.
 
433deciphering abdel fattah el-sisi: president of egypt’s third republic, Abdel Monem Said Aly Middle East Brief
 
No. 82, July 2014, crown center for middle east studies, brandies university
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Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been 
damaged during the Muslim brotherhood presidency. During Morsi’s rule
Cairo failed to secure a 4.5 billion $ loan from the IMF, both Riyadh and 
Abu Dhabi refused to supply financial aid at a level that could replace the 
same amount to support the struggling Egyptian economy. Furthermore, 
Qatar’s granting of big loans to Morsi instead of Saudi and UAE only
served to further irritate both capitals, worsening the already tense
relations between Doha and its other GCC partners. 
As previously mentioned Sisi’s election as the president of Egypt 
after the end of the transitional period of the head of the constitutional  
court president Adly Mansour has been warmly welcomed by all the Gulf 
monarchies who granted the new Egyptian regime financial assistance and 
in return, Cairo has promised to pursue its defense for the Gulf security
and it supported the Saudi-led military coalition  intervening in Yemen(434). 
Rebuilding the above mentioned Egyptian-GCC alliance with the 
financial and political assistance provided to Egypt by Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, followed by that of Kuwait and Bahrain, in the aftermath of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s overthrow has put the country’s ties with the Gulf 
states once again a topmost precedence. They were swift enough to grant 
Egypt direct economic assistance totaling some $20 billion in 2013– 
2014(435) , and are considering the establishment of a Free Trade Zone with 
Egypt(436) . 
Consolidating these bonds is on Egypt’s top priority and has
become a fairly high priority for the Gulf countries as well. In this regard, 
it is worth mentioning that Cairo has opened its doors to the Gulf investors 
to pump their investments in the mega projects in the country. 
434Al Sisi: protecting the arab and Gulf National security, in Arabic, Al Sisi: hemayet 
alamen alkawmi al araby wa al khaliegy ,Al-Arabiya, 20 May 2014: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/egypt/2014/05/20/-.html.
435 Gulf Aid to Egypt Since June 30 More Than $20 Billion: El Sisi,” Ahram Online, May 6, 2014.
436Nigle Wilson, “Egypt Seeks Free Trade Zone Talks with Gulf States in Bid to Boost Economy,” International
Business Times, August 29, 2014.
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Furthermore, the Egyptian government granted a Saudi company 75,000 
feddans (1 feddan = 1.038 acres) for land reclamation at the Toshki 
project, it allowed Saudi/UAE companies to produce 4,000 megawatts of 
electricity(437). 
From its side, Abu Dhabi has kicked off 12 developmental 
projects in Egypt and granted Cairo $8.7 billion worth of oil products(438) 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has called on convening a big international  
conference that was supposed to be held in February 2015, under the 
slogan of “Partners for Development”; during which Egypt should have
presentenced 145 development projects(439). Sisi is looking beyond such 
grants and conceiving of an Arab Marshall Plan for Egypt, hoping that 
much-needed investments will be forthcoming on account of the 
successful track record of previous Arab investments in Egypt’s the 
promising sectors as the real estate, banking, insurance, transportation, and 
communication sectors. 
In addition to their financial and economic assistance in the 
fulfillment of the Egyptian developmental requirements, these countries 
as well did their best to change the mindset of the U.S. and the EU in 
regard to the changes that took place in Egypt. As the Egyptian-Gulf 
relations were being restored to their pre-January 2011 levels, the two 
sides attempted to combine their forces in a wide range of fields. In this 
context, they coordinated their diplomatic activities, not only in the Arab 
League, but also the other international and regional forums, likewise they
began to cooperate in dealing with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood 
group and its much more radical associates, and in tackling the crises in 
Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq(440). 
437“Saudi Arabia and UAE companies submit a proposal to the Egyptian government to produce 4,000 megawatts
 
electricity,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 31, 2014 [in Arabic.
 
438 “UAE supplies oil materials to Egypt valued at 8.7 billion,” Al-Masry AlYoum, August 31, 2014 [in Arabic])
 
see also (UAE aid to Egypt: 12 development projects,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 31, 2014 [in Arabic.
 
439 Mohamed Abdel Aati, “145 Projects for the ‘Partners for Development’ Conference in February 2015,” Al-

Masry Al-Youm, August 31, 2014 in Arabic.
 
440post-revloution Egyptian foreign policy, Abdel Monem Said Aly, middle east brief,
 
No.86, November 2014, crown center for middle east studies, Brandeis university.
 
309 | P a g e 
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
   
   
    
   
    
 
 
    
 
    
    
       
                                                           
 
The return of the Egyptian role in the African arena:
Egypt and the African Union:
In the wake of the Peace and Security Council decision of the 
African Union to suspend Egypt's participation in the activities of the 
Union until the restoration of the constitutional situation in the country- as 
mentioned earlier-, the Egyptian government has made relentless effort to 
rectify its image, in order to ensure the return of Egypt to its normal status 
in the African continent.
Hence, the Egyptian diplomacy carried on its endeavors to 
connect with all the African states through the Egyptian embassies in the 
countries of accreditation to stir up support for the positions and interests
of Cairo in both regional and international forums, and to clarify the nature
of the June 30th revolution, as well as the defies that faced the Egyptian 
people during the period that preceded the eruption of the revolution. 
Therefore, Egypt managed to regain its membership in the African Union 
in the June 17th, 2014, yet, in this framework it is worth noting that the 
African Union participated in monitoring and inspecting the Egyptian
presidential elections in May 2014, with a delegation headed by the former
Prime Minister of Mauritania, also, the Union participated in the 
inauguration ceremony of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on June 8th, 
2014.
Egypt's keenness to return back of the African circle,  
accentuates not only its belonging to its African roots, but also its interest 
and the non- separation from the problems of the African continent. 
Consequently, Egyptian-African relations witnessed a big leap since the 
30threvolution of June , based on the principles of unity and achievement 
of common goals without harming the interests of any side. Those norms 
and values reflect the strategic re-orientation of Cairo towards the Africa, 
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accordingly, the restoration of the Egyptian role for its vitality in the 
continent has been welcomed by all the African nations(441). 
Egypt's membership in the Council of the African Union Peace and Security:
Egypt won the membership of the peace and security council for
three years, after its election for the first time as the representative of north 
Africa region, in the elections that took place during the meeting of the 
African foreign ministers that was held in the Ethiopian capital Addis 
Ababa in January 2016. Cairo obtained 47 vote of total of 52 votes of the 
States that are entitled to take part in the elections. This Egyptian victory
came in the framework of its historical leading role within the African 
continent, especially in issues related to the peace and security, as well as 
stability promotion, in addition to resolving and preventing conflicts in 
Africa(442). 
Moreover, Egypt's membership in the Council of the Peace and 
Security of African Union which goes in parallel with its membership in 
the UN Security Council(443), a matter which would entitle Cairo to 
represent the linkage between the African continent and the Security
Council, in regard to issues that jeopardize the Peace and Security of the 
continent. Similarly, this nexus would positively help out in resolving the 
continent's impediments within the UN Security Council, specially that 
approximately 70 % of the work of the Security Council is related to 
African topics, as well as the close relationship between the peacekeeping
operations of the United Nations, and the agenda of peace and security of 
the African Union.
441the African parliament, peace and cooperation message, October 2016, state information service, in Arabic,
 
alparlman alafriky ,resalet salam wa taawon, http://sis.gov.eg/Story/129010?lang=ar.
 
442 Egypt Elected to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
 
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Minister/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-
859eee26ce851de8&newsID=a2b17ea2-bfe8-4238-8779-d20e43aa69ba)
 
443 Egypt Wins Non-Permanent Security Council Seat, 20th October 2015, http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/97001.
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Egyptian activity on the level of the African summits and bilateral level:
30thSince the of June revolution Egypt has been keen on 
enhancing its relations with the various African countries and reinforcing
its involvement in the joint African action, a matter that has been reflected 
in the participation of President al-Sisi in the African summits, as the 
African Union summit that was held in Malabo, capital of Equatorial 
Guinea in June 2014(444), and the summit which was held in Addis Ababa
on January 2016, as well as other summits and meetings. Those Egyptian 
efforts are derived from its longstanding and deep-rooted belief in the 
common destiny among all the African States, and the importance of 
making the necessary efforts to achieve peace and stability, along with 
fostering the economic and social development, as well as seeking to 
settle disputes in the continent.
Likewise, Egypt was handed the position of the coordinator of 
the Committee of Heads of State and Governments of the African 
concerned climate change (CAHOSCC) during the African Union Summit
that was held in January 2015 for two years until the end of 2016, along
with Egypt's presidency of the Conference of African Ministers of 
Environment AMCEN for two years from the year 2014 till 2016. 
Moreover, during the 32nd session of the steering committee of NEPAD in 
Addis Ababa in January 2015, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi was re­
elected to the post of vice chairman of the steering committee for a second 
and final, for two years ending in 2017. Likewise, Egypt hosted summit of 
the three regional economic communities (COMESA-SADC-EAC) in 
Sharm El-Sheikh in June 2015, with the participation of heads of states 
and governments of 26 African countries, which stand for a market tha t 
represents more than 58% of GDP of the continent, that worth about 1.3 
trillion $, and 57% of the total population of Africa. 
444 The Report: Egypt 2014, Oxford Business Group, Dec 2, 2014 – page. 22.
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What is more, one of the most important results of the Sharm el-
Sheikh summit, was the signing of the "Tripartite Free Trade Area" also 
known by the "Sharm El-Sheikh agreement," by the Heads of States and 
Governments of the member states of the three communities, which will 
assist in enhancing in the inter trade movement between those countries, 
and increasing the investment flows, beside opening more markets, and 
promoting competitiveness, as well as, supportingthe infrastructure
development process, a matter which will put the region forward to be a
pioneer in the fields of economic and commercial integration in the 
continent(445).
The relations with the Nile basin countries under Al-Sisi:
Tackling the Nile issue and the impacts of Ethiopia’s 
establishment of the Great Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile 
presents a clear and present danger on the Egyptian national security. 
From its part, the current Egyptian regime through its foreign policy
apparatus, statred to get support for Cairo’s position and for the steps that 
would need to be taken to protect its interests. 
In this framework, during president Sisi first participation in the 
African Summit in Equatorial Guinea, he hinted at his foreign policy
priorities. Thus, he attained an accomplishment when he managed to reach 
a seven-point agreement with Ethiopia’s prime minister to form a Bilateral 
Joint Commission to resolve the dispute(446). Thereafter a series of 
technical and political meetings took place between the two sides. From 
his part, president Al- Sisi was geared up to visit Ethiopia to reach an 
settlement that would avoid a reduction in Egypt’s share of Nile 
445a year after the tripartite, june 20th, 2016, Dr. Sherif Fahmy,http://www.egypt-business.com/News/details/1625­
A-year-after-the-Tripartite-Agreement/42018
 
446 Joint statement By the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, June 28th, 

2014.
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(447)In water response, Ethiopia promised that the renaissance or in Arabic
Nahda Dam would not be used for irrigation(448).
Ethiopia has gained big importance in the Egyptian foreign policy
owing to its plans to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
and its negative effects on Cairo. As soon as the plan for the dam was 
announced in 2011, tensions began to mount between the two countries, 
culminating with a reunion of Egyptian politicians and leaders from all
spectrums led by former president Morsi aired live on Egyptian TV
without their knowledge, as they suggested arming Ethiopian rebels to 
destroy the dam(449).
Yet, under Sisi, the tension has started to ease, as he declared that 
a new era between Egypt and Ethiopia will be inaugurated(450). Moreover, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan held their first set of Tripartite National 
Committee talks, which came right after the Egyptian -Ethiopian 
negotiations that took place in Sudan, and failed for three rounds. Hence, 
the tripartite committee signed a “Declaration of Principles” which  
paved the way for further negotiations(451). This declaration involved a
pledge among the three countries to realize their own interests, but without
causing any harm to the other parties, and to respect the results of studies 
on the effects of dam renaissance on the downstream countries. 
Moreover, the negotiations about the Renaissance dam is 
currently underway to continue on two tracks, the scientific and technical 
one, through the tripartite national technical Committee and the political 
447 Bassam Ramadan, “Minister of Irrigation: Sisi Is Ready to Travel to Ethiopia More Than Once,” Al-Masry Al-
Youm, August 30, 2014, in Arabic.
448 Goma Hamadallah, “Foreign Minister of Ethiopia: We Are Not Going to Use the Nahdha Dam for Irrigation,”
Al-Masry Al-Youm, September 6, 2014, in Arabic.

449 With Cameras Rolling, Egyptian Politicians Threaten Ethiopia Over Dam, LIAM STACK, June, 2013,
 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/with-cameras-rolling-egyptian-politicians-threaten-ethiopia-over­
dam/?_r=0). A few months later, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry refuses Egypt’s request to halt construction on
the dam.
450 one year of foreign policy under Sisi, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?id=24610:one-year-on-foreign-policy­
under-sisi.

451 Full text of 'Declaration of Principles' signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, march 2015,
 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/ News/125941.aspx.
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path through the Six-Party Committee, which aims at implementing the 
recommendations of the international experts studies on the effects of the 
dam on the downstream countries. All these steps are taken to defend 
Egypt's water interests and security, as well as to find alternative tracks to 
guarantee that. additionally, these movements continue to follow-up the 
hydro projects that are established by the Nile basin countries on the 
course of the river, in order to ensure the inviolability Egypt's share of 
water or harm its rights in this regard, as well as to promote cooperation in 
the field of water resources with the Nile basin countries through 
providing its expertise. This cooperation aims to advance the Egyptian 
presence within these State in order to revise their water policies and push 
for further collaboration to save the water losses to increase the revenues 
of the river in the interest of the basin countries.
On the political level President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi paid a visit to 
Addis Ababa in the beginning of 2015, the first at the bilateral level on the 
presidential level in 30 years, during which he held a number of meetings 
with both the president, the Ethiopian prime minister and the patriarch of 
Ethiopia, besides the Chairman of the Supreme Council Islamic Affairs, as 
well as the delegation of the Ethiopian public diplo macy, and a number of 
businessmen. During this visit a decision to upgrade the joint bilateral 
Committee to become a high joint committee under the chairmanship of 
president and prime minister. Alternatively, Egypt in coordination with 
the Ethiopian government, managed to secure the release of twenty-seven 
Ethiopians who were kidnapped in Libya(452).
On the other hand, The Ethiopian Public diplomacy delegation 
visited Egypt in December 2014 under the chairmanship of the President 
of the Ethiopian Parliament, this delegation included 65 of the Ethiopian 
public figures in different fields, such as culture, commerce, and politics as 
well as art and press. they met a number of Egyptian officials on top of 
them President Abdel Fattah Al- Sisi, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign 
452 Egyptian army forces free Ethiopians held in Libya, May 2015,http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-libya­
ethiopia-idUKKBN0NS18M20150507.
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Minister, as well as the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, and His Holiness Pope
of Alexandria. Moreover, his holiness pope Matthias patriarch of Ethiopia 
visited Cairo in January 2015, where he visited Alexandria and a number
of monasteries and churches in Cairo. also, he met with the Egyptian 
President and Prime Minister as well as Pope Pope of Alexandria and the 
Grand Imam of Al-Azhar. In addition, the Ethiopian Prime Minister
visited Egypt in August 2015 to attend the inauguration ceremony of the 
new Suez Canal. 
Tense relations with Turkey:
Since Morsi’s ouster, however, Egyptian –Turkish relations have
soured. Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan has been the most
outspoken foreign leader critical of the removal of the Muslim
Brotherhood president, and has condemned the international community
for not taking a similar stance (Turkish PM calls for U.N. Security Council
(453)to convene on Egypt,’ Reuters, August 15, 2013, available at : have
only worsened, with Erdogan describing the Egyptian leader as tyrant.
Moreover, Turkey refused to recognize the government set up 
after the 2013 coup, insisting that Morsi remained the legitimate president. 
Since November 2013, Cairo had expelled the Turkish ambassador and 
downgraded ties with Turkey to the level of charge d'affaires. Erdogan’s 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world has two important 
motives. First, Erdogan’s Islamist supporters continue to admire Morsi and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. (Senem Aydın-Düzgit. July 24, 
2014(454). Second, Erdogan’s policies of depoliticizing the Turkish military
to protect his rule from military coup, necessitates a strong stance against
any military coup against an elected government(455).
453 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/15/us-egypt-protests-turkey. 
454 “The Seesaw Friendship Between Turkey’s AKP andEgypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/24/seesawfriendship-between-turkey-s-akp-and-egypt-s-muslim­
brotherhood)
455 Soner Cagaptay. “Erdogan's Empathy for Morsi,” September 2014, The Washington Institute: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/erdogans-empathy-for-morsi. 
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The continuity of the current Turkish government hostile foreign 
policy attitude implies that restoring relations with Egypt will not be
possible in the near future. This has made Ankara a home or safe haven to 
the Egyptian Brotherhood opposition which is assured of continued 
support from Turkey(456) .
Meanwhile, The current Egyptian regime has sought to neutralize
Ankara's threat with the anti-Turkey alliances in the Middle East and 
beyond. In this regard, Cairo hosted a trilateral meeting that was attended 
by Cyprus and Greece, to set up a new energy cooperation deal that was 
announced between the three parts. The deal defies the Turkish claim on 
gas deposits in the East Mediterranean that are claimed by Cyprus. Thus, 
in a joint “Cairo Declaration”, the three countries called on Ankara to 
respect the “sovereignty of Cyprus over its exclusive economic zone.” (Oil
reserves in the Mediterranean open new front between Cairo and Ankara,’ 
Alakhbar, November 12, 2014(457): 
Although Turkey joined the anti-Assad forces in Syria, Turkey’s 
support has been grasped by Saudi Arabia and UAE as support for the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the country. Through “losing” Egypt, Turkey has 
become rather isolated, suffering more difficult relations most of the arab 
capitals namely, Baghdad, Damascus, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi, not to 
mention being at odds with Iran over Syria and Iraq. Likewise, Israel's 
relations with Turkey have become more strained after Erdogan alleged 
that Tel- Aviv was behind the military takeover in Egypt. (Israel behind 
coup to oust Morsi, Turkish PM Erdoğan says,” Hurriyet Daily News, 
August 20, 2013(458): 
456The Egyptian brotherhood, between the generation divisions and the Turkish exile demands, September,
 
2016,http://www.alhayat.com/ m/story/ 17469986.
 
457 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/ 22437.
 
458 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/israel-behind-coup-to-oust-morsi-turkishpm-erdogan­
says.aspx?PageID=238&NID=52876&NewsCatID=338. 
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The ties with the  United States:
Traditionally, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. 
national security interests for reasons attributed to its geography, 
demography, and diplomatic position. From a geostrategic perspective, 
Egypt have power over the Suez Canal, through which 8% of all global 
maritime shipping passes annually. Furthermore, the country expedites the 
passage of U.S. Naval vessels through the Canal, providing a strategic 
advantage or benefit to the American forces deploying to the 
Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean basin for time-sensitive 
operations. Demographically, Egypt, with a population of 83 million, is by
(459)far the largest Arab country , Besides, Cairo still has its significant soft 
power owing to the presence of Al Azhar University, which claims to be
the oldest university still functioning and has symbolic importance as 
mentioned in previous parts. 
From this perspective and owing to these reasons, not only United 
States is aware of the importance of the country, but Cairo as well is 
sentient to the significance of the relations between the two countries. 
Thus, Egypt has succeeded to stabilize its ties with Washington, though 
still remains some intangible residue of skepticism and wariness. The west 
in general, especially the united States and the European Union are critical 
and nit- picking about the country’s domestic political environment. Yet, 
Washington is in need of allies to support its efforts to face the threat of 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or (Daesh). Thus, from his part 
Al-Sisi pledged Egyptian collaboration and assistance in combating other
regional terrorist groups, such as those in the Sinai.
Since Morsi’s ouster and prior to Sisi’s election many significant 
milestones in the course of the relations between the two countries took 
place that reflects the instability of the relationship pathway between both 
Cairo and Washington that lasts till this moment. For instance, in April
459 The Too Fertile Crescent,” The Economist, June 6, 2015.
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2014, Washington designated Sinai-based Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis as a
foreign terrorist organization(460). Afterwards, The State Department
communicated the American government concern over Egypt’s Muslim
(461)Brotherhood supporters mass death sentences . Moreover, Several 
months before the election of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, and for the 
first time in over thirty years, the United States suspended military aid to
Egypt(462). While the United States supplies $1.3 billion in military aid to 
Egypt annually, in October 2013, the US suspended the delivery of certain 
large-scale military systems and cash assistance to the government 
pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected 
civilian government through free and fair elections. President Sisi himself 
after being elected and with the continuation of this military suspension
expressed frustration, arguing that it sent a “negative indication to the 
public opinion that the United States is not standing by the Egyptians.(463)” 
On the occasion of Sisi’s inauguration in June 2014 The White
House welcomed the chance to advance the US-Egypt strategic 
partnership, and it aspired that the president Sisi will move reform 
towards sustainable democracy(464). Moreover, the American president 
Obama called Sisi to congratulate him on his recent election and reaffirms 
US commitment to a strong US-Egypt relationship. Afterwards, the 
American administration decided to emancipate $575 million in military
aid to Egypt from the FY14 budget, mainly, to pay the existing defense
contracts. The release of the Apache helicopters was promised as well. 
While, the remaining $728 million of aid was available for dispersal until 
September 2015.
460Terrorist Designation of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/224566.htm.
461 Egyptian Court Sentencing Recommendations, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225273.htm.
462 Armin Rosen. ‘The U.S. and Egypt Sure Look Like Allies, at Least on Military Matters,’The Atlantic,
September 14, 2012. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-us-and-egypt-sure-look-like­
allies-at-least-on-military-matters/262411/.
 
463 Exclusive: El-Sisi urges ‘Arab ready force’ to confront ISIS, questions if US ‘standing by’ Egypt,”
 
Foxnews.com, March 9, 2015.
 
464 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/04/statement-press-secretary-presidential-election­
egypt.
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In September 2014, both presidents Sisi and Obama met for the 
first time on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, 
where the Egyptian president explained to President Obama the real 
situation in the country since the June 30 Revolution. Couple of months 
later the State Department sent a US Chamber of Commerce business 
delegation visit to Egypt including more than 150 US executives 
representing over sixty companies.
Moreover, by the end of the year 2014 the FY15 Appropriations 
Bill passed by Congress includes $1.45 billion in aid to Egypt, broken 
down into $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $150 
million for the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The FMF amount is the 
same as the FY14 budget, but the ESF amount has been reduced by $100 
million and American Apache helicopters are delivered back to Egypt. in 
March 2015, the American administration announced its participation in 
Egypt’s Economic Development Conference on the level of Secretary of 
State(465). Furthermore, the United States decided release military aid to 
Egypt citing national security concerns. The Egyptian government was 
officially notified that an executive hold has been lifted on twelve F-16 
fighter jets, twenty missiles and up to 125 tank kits(466) 
Ties with Russia: 
In an effort to counter US and EU pressure over its domestic
politics, Al- Sisi tried to diversify his foreign policy options through 
intensifying the relationship with other world powers as Russia. Hence, he
welcomed the Russian President Vladimir Putin in Egypt in February
2015(467) A 2$ billion deal to purchase 46 MiG-29 multi-role fighter jet 
from Moscow was discussed by the two presidents had been agreed(468).
465 Secretary of State John Kerry to Travel to Egypt and Switzerland, March 2015,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/238681.htm.
466 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/readout-president-s-call-president-al-sisi-egypt
467 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policyanalysis/view/how-to-judge-putins-trip-to-egypt.
468 http://www.defenseworld.net/news/13027/Egypt_To_Buy_46_Russian_MiG_29_Fighter_Jets_For__2_Billio 
n.
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Moreover, Al-Sisi has already visited Moscow twice, once when 
he was a defense minister and again after he became president in his first 
visit to a non-African, non-Arab country. Both presidents reached a
decision on founding a Russian industrial zone in the new Suez Canal 
Project(469). In these visits he concluded a wide range of agreements, 
(470)including a $3.5 billion framework agreement for arms supplies This, 
however, should not be interpreted as ignoring the other focuses of 
Egypt’s foreign policy, as the United States and the European Union. 
undoubtedly, the current Egyptian regime is counting on this diverse
foreign policy to amplify the country’s options and to contend with 
pressures exerted by Washington and other Western capitals regarding its 
domestic affairs(471). 
For instance, In 2014, trade between Cairo and Moscow surged 
up to 3$ billion, which according to President Vladimir Putin, reflected a
50 percent rate of growth(472). That same year, 3 million Russian tourists 
visited Egypt. While a strengthening of ties has been seen between Russia
and Egypt, including a reported $3.5 billion arms deal.
In the first quarter of 2015 Putin visited Cairo where the two 
countries signed a preliminary deal to establish Egypt’s first nuclear power 
plant(473). 
469 Egypt and Russia to establish industrial zone in Suez Canal, August 2014,
 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/08/13/egypt-russia-establish-industrial-zone-suez-canal/.
 
470 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/108273/Egypt/0/ElSisi,-Putin-stress-close-ties,-near-arms-deal­
.aspx.
 
471 Barbara Slavin, “Fahmy: Egypt Will ‘Diversify’ Foreign Policy with Closer Ties to Russia,” Al -Monitor, April
 
28, 2014.
 
472 Russia-Egypt Nuclear Power Plant Deal: Why Ignoring Egypt's Needs Is Bad For The U.S, February2015,
 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annaborshchevskaya/2015/02/13/russia-egypt-nuclear-power-plant-deal-why­
ignoring-egypts-needs-is-bad-for-the-u-s/#8e1c5a72f1b8.
 
473 Russia's Putin, Egypt's el-Sisi agree on preliminary nuclear power deal, February 2015,
 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/10/middleeast/egypt-russia-talks/). Also, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
 
participated in Egypt’s Economic Development Conference.
321 | P a g e 
   
 
  
    
       
    
     
    
   
   
  
      
    
     
    
    
 
  
  
 
  
      
  
 
   
 
  
     
                                                           
         
  
The YEMENI Crisis:
As for the crisis in Yemen, it is worth to be noted that Egypt 
supported the intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in the 
operation called named Operation Decisive Storm (in Arabic Amaliyyat 
`Āṣifat Al-Ḥazm). this intervention at the outset consisted of a bombing
campaign and later a naval blockade target strongholds of the Houthis
militia and loyalists of the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
which are supported by Iran, in response to a request from the 
internationally-recognized but domestically opposed government of 
President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi(474). 
The Egyptian backing for this military operation might be
referred to a number of reasons explained by its domestic and regional 
environment. President Sisi had to face a wave of criticism from Western 
capitals concerning what they described as "undemocratic practices" when 
he overthrew Mohamed Morsi amid the mass protests against the latter’s 
rule. Furthermore, the Egyptian stance is based on its historical 
responsibilities not only towards the security of the Gulf region but also 
towards the Arab national security. As well the Egyptian economy was in 
bad condition and inflation was on the rise and unemployment had 
increased up to 13% (youth 33%, women 24%). As a result, the anti-
Brotherhood GCC states, acting as a deus ex machina or the saving power 
that offered substantial financial assistance to the new government. 
Back, the Egyptian President promised to help his GCC allies to 
resist Iran’s hegemonic aspirations and called for the creation of a joint 
Arab force to defend the Gulf and fight Islamic extremism. Although 
Sisi’s war against the Iran-backed Houthi militia brought back unpleasant 
memories of the Egyptian interference in 1962, yet it was a necessary
474 Gulf Coalition Operations in Yemen (Part 1): The Ground War, march 2016,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-coalition-operations-in-yemen-part-1-the-ground­
war .
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measure in order to eradicate the maritime security threat in the Red Sea
and to guarantee the safety of the Suez Canal’s traffic(475).
Al-Sisi regarded the war in Yemen as an additional opportunity to 
push for the country's “war on terror” domestically and to depict, 
internationally, the Egyptian state as a safeguard against extremism in the 
Middle East region. Furthermore, the controversial American consent of 
the operation contributed to a substantial amendment of the damaged 
relations between Cairo and Washington(476). In this regard, it could be
argued that Washington has a strong interest in assisting the Egyptian 
efforts in Yemen. The U.S. military relies on safe transit through the Bab 
al-Mandab Strait for supporting coalition efforts against the threat of 
terrorist groups, as well as maintaining its presence in the region more
broadly(477). 
Egypt has followed closely the developments of the Yemeni 
crisis, since the eruption of the February 2011 revolution and the 
deterioration of the security conditions and political stability that the 
country has witnessed since then, as one of the priorities of the Egyptian 
foreign policy in the light of the specialty of relations between the two 
countries, in which the strategic and security dimensions remains as 
essential elements in its structure. In this framework, Egyptian position has 
always relied on the support of the unity of the Yemeni territories and 
welcoming all United Nations and the Security Council resolutions on 
Yemen, as well as, advocating the peaceful settlement and national 
dialogue in order to reach consensual solution.
Form its part, the Egyptian government via the ministry of foreign 
affairs confirmed in many statements, the full support of Egypt for all the 
475 Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Sisi Reassures Sceptics of Military Intervention in Yemen,” (4/4/2015),
 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/126882.aspx.
 
476 Zenko, Micah, “Obama’s War of Choice: Supporting the Saudi-led Air War in Yemen,” Council on Foreign
 
Relations, (25/9/2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/09/25/obamas-war-ofchoice-supporting-the-saudi-led­
air-war-in-yemen/.
 
477 Egypt's Yemen Campaign, Eric Trager, March 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy­
analysis/view/egypts-yemen-campaign.
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legitimate institutions and symbols of the Yemeni state, and that its future
should be determined by consensus among the various political parties. 
Also, it stressed the importance of the commitment of all Yemeni political 
factions to pursue the dialogue under the auspices of UN, on the basis of 
the Gulf Cooperation council (GCC) initiative and its mechanisms of 
implementations, as well as the outputs of the national dialogue and the 
agreement for peace and national partnership(478), in addition to, the related 
Security Council resolutions, as the only way to resolve the current crisis  
in the country(479). 
Furthermore, with the worsening of the situation there, Egypt in 
August 2015 sent humanitarian aid to Yemen, which suffers from the 
escalation of armed clashes that resulted in the destruction of infrastructure
a matter that impeded the access of food and medical supplies, as well as, 
the dispatch of a number of Egyptian doctors to provide the necessary
medial help and health care for the Yemeni people(480).
In the same framework, Egypt supported the efforts made by the 
Kuwaiti government for hosting the negotiations between the Yemeni 
parties in order to reach a peaceful solution that ensures the return of 
security and stability to the country(481) .
478http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/darp/dv/darp20141204_05_/darp20141204_
 
05_en.pdf.
 
479 UN Documents for Yemen: Security Council Resolutions, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un­
documents/search.php?IncludeBlogs=10&limit=15&tag=%22Security%20Council%
 
20Resolutions%22+AND+%22Yemen%22&ctype=Yemen&rtype=Security%20Council%20Resolutions&cbtyp
 
e=yemen .
 
480 Egyptian president Sisi sends humanitarian aid to Yemen, August 2015,
 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/137095/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-president-Sisi-sends­
humanitarian-aid-to-.aspx
 
481 UN envoy urges 'definitive decisions' as peace talks continue in Kuwait,
 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54476#.WDIhi7J97IU)
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The SYRIAN Crisis: 
The Syrian crisis is complicated and demands more delicate 
handling. The Muslim Brotherhood held Egypt in tight embrace with 
Turkey and Qatar over their pro-Sunni and anti-Assad fury. That has been 
replaced by a more balanced approach under Sisi. Much to the delight of 
President Assad, Egypt now wishes that the Syrian state and army do not 
collapse in fear of the negative impact to regional stability and 
security(482). 
As previously mentioned, the June 30th revolution has managed 
to restore to a substantially the weight of Egypt in its regional 
environment, and in this regard Egypt is working hard as possible to 
support the peaceful settlement of the ongoing Syrian crisis, a matter 
which will regain back the security and stability to the Syrian territories 
and among all spectrums of Syrian people
Actually, the current Egyptian regime is more concerned with 
Sunni extremism in the region, which also spreads in the Sinai pennisula. 
Thus, Cairo's position on this ongoing conflict calls for the importance of 
finding a political solution that should include Al- Assad regime. 
However, the Egyptian choice to include Assad in Syria’s power game, 
even though it is just vocal one, has alarmed other parties(483). 
In this framework, the Egyptian government managed to provide
a platform for national Syrian opposition - led by the Syrians themselves­
through sponsoring group that attracts national moderate opposition, which 
seek a political solution for the ongoing conflict, to establish a civil Syrian 
state, that would maintain its territorial integrity. while at the same 
moment preserving the various social and religious spectrum, without any
482 Hatem, Abdullah, “Sisi’s Attempts to Rehabilitate Assad… A Different Tune to the Gulf,” Middle East 
Monitor,(28/8/2015),https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middleeast/20697-sisis-attempts-to­
rehabilitate-assad-a-different-tune-to-the-gulf.
 
483 a balance sheet for the ministry of foreign affairs 2014 and the Egyptian diplomatic strategy, Mahmoud Ali  

Al- Badel, December 29th , 2014, in Arabic, kashf hesab lelkharegia al masreya.
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impairment to the Syrian official institutions. In this context, Cairo hosted 
a conference for the Syrian opposition that was held in January 2015, 
which was followed by another one in June 2015, which issued two 
important documents, namely "the road map" and "the Syrian National 
Charter"(484). 
All the Egyptian efforts to resolve this ongoing crisis with all the 
concerned parties, either the regional or the international as well as the
Syrian national opposition, is grounded on its deep faith of the need to 
encourage positive interaction with the political process sponsored by the 
United Nations through the ongoing talks in Geneva. What is more, Egypt 
has actively participated in international support group for Syria, where its 
participation has reflected Egypt's attitude toward the crisis, which is 
based, on several principles, in the forefront of them, the rejection of the 
military solution for the crisis, the preservation of the elements of the 
Syrian state, and the fight against terrorism, as well as the contribution to 
alleviate the human suffering of the Syrian people.
Nonetheless, Sisi does not bother with the Turkish and Qatari 
hostile attitude against his regime and their policies in relation to Syria, 
since they have already been strong supporters to the Muslim Brotherhood
and other Islamist groups in the region. Saudi Arabia though could prove
to be at variance with Egypt on the Syrian issue, yet Riyadh and the major
powers of the GCC, such as Kuwait and the UAE, provided political and 
financial backing to the Egyptian government and they would wish to 
influence its important choices on the international arena. 
After all, in Sisi’s dream of a joint Arab force, the primary target 
would be the Islamists in Egypt’s proximity. (485).
484 (Towards a Syrian political solution, Doaa El-Bey, 11 June,
2015 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/12513/19/Towards-a-Syrian-political-solution-.aspx)
485 Chulov, Martin, “Arab States Plan Joint Middle East Force as Yemen Conflict 
Continues,”http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/29/arab-states-planjoint-military-force-to-combat­
common-middle-east-threats.
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The Libyan crisis:
Targeting terrorist groups was also the case with neighboring
Libya where the new Egyptian regime strongly supports the elected and 
internationally recognized government exiled in Tobruk against its 
Islamist opposition in Tripoli. After the Western-backed uprising in 
February 2011, to overthrow the longstanding regime of Al- Gaddafi who 
ruled the country for over 42 years. In the aftermath of these protests an 
ongoing civil war erupted and the country descended into chaos that lasts 
till this moment and increasingly became a major security threat for Egypt 
due to their 1,115 km shared border. 
The Libyan crisis comes at the forefront of the Egyptian foreign 
policy, given the depth of the historical and strategic relations between the 
two countries, thus it faces major threats towards its Egyptian national 
security from the situation in Libya, firstly, the transformation of eastern 
Libya into a regional incubator for jihadist groups. Owing to the fragility
of the post-revolutionary interim authority and its inability to disarm the 
militias, to develop new and efficient military and security agencies, and 
to establish its control over all parts of the country, militant jihadist groups 
proliferated, especially in the eastern part of country in borderline with 
Egypt. These groups were set up primarily of the second generation of 
Libyan jihadists who refused to engage in the post-revolutionary political 
process and who resurfaced as militia brigade commanders in Benghazi, 
Derna and other eastern cities. They are as well accused of assassinating
figures related to the former Gaddafi regime, targeting the Western 
interests in Libya, most notably the US Consulate in Benghazi, training
volunteers to fight in Syria and collaborating with jihadist groups in the 
Maghreb and northern Mali.(486).
Thus, Eastern Libya has become a good soil for jihadist
movements in the region, which has worked to generate a hostile
486 Egypt and the Libyan threat, in Arabic, Masr Wa Al Tahded Alliby, July 2014, Khaled Hanafi
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/6870/21/Egypt-and-the-Libyan-threat.aspx.
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environment towards Egypt across the border. There have been frequent 
indicators that the eastern part of the country become a safe transit point
for some wanted banned Muslim brotherhood group members who ran­
away  from Egypt after 30 June(487) . 
While the second threat can be realized in the rise of organized
crime in Eastern Libya. As a result of the laxity of the Egyptian security
agencies after the Egyptian revolution and the disintegration of the Libyan 
security establishment into militias in the aftermath of the fall of Gaddafi, 
there evolved a serious drop in the joint control over the border between 
the two countries. This was influential in the growth in various types of
illegalities, such as arms smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration which, in turn, generated an economic infrastructure for
jihadist groups both in Egypt and Libya. The smuggling of arms and 
materials used in suicide bombings is considered as the most dodgy and 
hazardous form of organized crime across the border from Libya to Egypt. 
moreover, the enormous weapons’ supplies that remained in the country
next to the fall of Gaddafi were assured a flourishing market in such a
chaotic and an unstable region. That market covered at least 12 
countries(488). Among these was Egypt into which flowed some 10 million 
pieces of weaponry, most of which came from Libya and Sudan.
Finally, the third challenge facing the Egyptian national security
because of the crisis in Libya is represented in the rise of attacks against
Egyptian workers and commercial interests in Libya. As a result of the 
backdrop of the security breakdown in eastern Libya, Egyptian workers 
have progressively become victims of kidnappings and murder by jihadist
militia groups. In the context of Egyptian labour the instability in Libya
following the revolution affected Egypt in two ways. At the outset 
between 300,000 and 600,000 Egyptian workers in Libya were forced to 
487 Egypt says it arrested 2 senior Muslim Brotherhood officials before they escaped to Libya,
 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/10/26/egypt-says-it-arrested-2-senior-muslim-brotherhood-officials­
before-escaped-to.html.
 
488 Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali and beyond: U.N. experts, April 2013,
 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-arms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409.
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return back to their country, a matter that put more domestic economic
pressures on Egypt during the post-revolutionary period. In this regard, it
is worth to mention that Prior to the revolution of 2011, an estimated 2 
million Egyptian expatriates were living in Libya. However, as of mid-
February 2015, the number by time has dropped to around 200,000. 
Secondly, the trade and investment between the two countries suffered. 
The volume of trade between Libya and Egypt plunged to nearly a half of 
its pre-revolutionary levels while the rates of Libyan investment in Egypt 
were affected by the issue of the Libyan authorities’ demands for the 
handover of former Gaddafi regime figures who reside in Egypt.
On the other hand, Qatar, Turkey and Sudan support the Islamist 
forces in Libya which is a similar situation to what transpires in Syria(489).
In contrast, Egypt supports the official government. Cairo is believed to 
have provided clandestine support to Khalifa Haftar, a Gaddafi-era
General, who was appointed Commander of the Libyan armed forces by
the exiled government(490).
In February 2015 the clashes in Libya witnessed a dramatic
incident when the Libyan branch of the Islamic State abducted and later 
beheaded 21 Egyptian Copts, ISIS or Daesh released a video allegedly
killing twenty Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya, consequently the 
Egyptian president Sisi vows to “punish the murderers.” In this context,
the Egyptian and Libyan air forces responded with multiple airstrikes in 
Derna and Sirte, killing at least sixty-four militants. The airstrikes are
carried out in coordination with Abdallah al-Thinni’s government. "Egypt 
reserves the right to respond in the method and timing it deems suitable for
489 the deterioration of the situation in Libya and its impact on the Egyptian national security, in Arabic,
tadahwor al mawkef fi Libya wa atharo ala al amn al kawmy al masry, Hossam sweilam, august 2014,
http://www.albawabhnews.com/742936.
490 Kirkpatrick, David D. and Schmitt, Eric, “Arab Nations Strike in Libya, Surprising U.S.,” The New York
Times, (25/8/2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/2 6/world/africa/egypt-andunited-arab-emirates-said-to­
have-secretly-carried-out-libya-airstrikes.html?_r=1 .
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retribution from these killers," Egypt calls on the US-led coalition 
fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq to expand its scope to include Libya(491). 
It was an opportunity for Sisi to get directly involved in the 
neighboring country and send a message of national unity to Egypt’s 
significant Christian community which mainly favors him. This time, the 
USA silently agreed and the Arab League, with the exception of Qatar, 
openly supported(492). 
On the political level, as mentioned before the Libyan crisis is 
considered as one of the most important Egyptian foreign policy priorities 
a matter which was confirmed by Cairo through its initiative, that was 
already launched by the Egyptian government, in which it expressed its 
firm and clear stance towards the developments of the situation in Libya. 
This position is based on three main principles, including, the respect of 
the unity and sovereignty of Libya and its territorial integrity, the non­
interference in the internal affairs of Libya, and maintaining the political 
independence, as well as commitment to a continue the comprehensive 
dialogue and renounce violence.
Egypt's commitment to its initiative and vision was reflected 
through its support for the role of the legitimate institutions of the state, 
especially the House of Representatives, with the emphasis on the need to 
rebuild the state institutions, including the army and police, as well as, its 
willingness to provide assistance to the Libyan government in its efforts to 
secure and control the border with neighboring countries in accordance
with comprehensive program. Additionally, the Egyptian government has 
stressed the importance of international support to Libya especially in 
terms of helping in the fight against terrorism and the rehabilitation of the 
state institutions in cooperation with neighboring countries.
491 Egypt bombs Islamic state targets in Libya after beheading video, February 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ egypt-bombs-islamic-state-targets-in-libya-after-brutal-beheading­
video/2015/02/16/3b32c50c-b5b6-11e4-9423-f3d0a1ec335c_story.html.
492 Tolba, Ahmed, “Egypt, Qatar Trade Barbs in Dispute over Libya Strikes,” Reuters, (19/2/2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/19/us-mideast-crisis-egypt-qataridUSKBN0LN07520150219.
330 | P a g e 
   
 
   
   
 
  
  
     
    
 
   
    
    
   
     
    
  
     
     
  
    
   
      
    
   
   
  
                                                           
        
  
 
           
      
          
    
Furthermore, The Egyptian diplomacy on several occasions
stressed that Egypt is doing its utmost to maintain the unity and stability of 
Libya, especially in light of the developments on the ground, that requires 
an action plan which includes taking steps in side Libya, and other steps 
between Tripoli and neighboring countries, as well as, the international 
community to preserve the unity of the Libyan territory and maintaining its 
capabilities, which could be represented in its participation in all stages 
of the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the political agreement 
among the conflicting parties in Libya, which was sponsored by the United 
Nations, and in the signing ceremony of the latter agreement in the 
Moroccan city of Skhirat in December 2015(493).
This agreement seeks not only to achieve the interests of the 
Libyan people, but also in attaining the stability of Libya and the whole
region, as well as enhancing the counter-terrorism efforts in the Libyan 
territory through coordination with both the Libyan government and  
military, to provide all kinds of support for them, to face threats and risks 
plaguing the country, as a result of the spread of terrorist organizations on 
its territory(494).
Cairo hosted a number of reunions with the leading Libyan 
political figures, notably the meeting between the Egyptian President Al-
Sisi with Fayez Al- Sarrag the head of Libya's Presidential Council in 
May 2016, and the reception of many parliamentary delegations. In 
addition, Egypt organized a conference of the leaders of the Libyan tribes, 
in order to reach a peaceful solution that supports stability and contribute
to the promotion of development and cooperation efforts in various fields, 
plus the fight against terrorism(495). 
493 Foreign Ministry Welcomes Security Council Resolution on Libya,
 
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Ministry/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993- 444a-859e­
ee26ce851de8&newsID=a5b02aa5-69ae-490b-8284-f19126ca00b9.
 
494 Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2259 (2015), Security Council Welcomes Signing of Libyan Political 

Agreement on New Government for Strife-Torn Country, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ sc12185.doc.htm.
 
495 (Egyptian diplomatic efforts to settle thelibyan crisis, may 2015, in Arabic algohod al diplomasia al masrya 

lelag alazma allibya, http://sis.gov.eg/section/125/6815?lang=ar)
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Also, Egypt has played an important role in the framework of the 
efforts of neighboring countries to find a solution to the Libyan crisis, 
through its active participation either by attending or organizing of 
regional meetings related to the discussion of the latest developments in 
Libya, especially the security ones, which have taken serious turns, in light 
of, the escalation of the armed clashes and the big expansion of the ISIS
organization throughout the Libyan territories, and the last one was the 
Egyptian participation in a meeting of Libya neighbors in Tunisia in 
March 2016.
Likewise, Egypt partaken in a number of international meetings 
that was held in Geneva and Vienna in 2016, that aimed at finding a
solution for the worsening situation in Libya, especially with the delay in 
the ratification of the House of Representatives on the formation of a new 
Libyan government, a matter which led to the expansion of terrorism, due
to the lack the capabilities to confront it and drying up its funding
institutions.
Egypt is currently seeking to reach a consensus among the 
various Libyan parties in order to recognize the government from the part 
of the House of Representatives, a matter which will give it legitimacy
according to the agreement Skhirat which was held in December 2015, so 
that it can exercise its functions effectively, and for the Libyan National 
Army to complete its role in the war on terrorism.
The Palestinian- Israeli cause under Sisi:
The 30th of June revolt stressed the Egyptian foreign policy
constants, in which the Palestinian cause occupies a top priority, as Cairo 
has always had this firm belief in the right of the Palestinian people to 
obtain their usurped legitimate rights and to establish their independent 
state on the 1967 borders with its capital East Jerusalem. On the political 
front, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi launched his call to resolve the 
Palestinian issue fairly, stressing the need to take all the necessary
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measures by the international community to end this conflict and enable 
the Palestinians to live in freedom and with dignity, and underscoring as 
well Egypt's readiness to exert all the needed efforts in this regard(496).
The current Egyptian regime has been active in trying to revive 
his country’s mediatory role in another thorn in the region, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. On the one hand, Sisi has been cooperating with Israel 
on security issues to combat the terrorist groups based in Sinai Peninsula, 
through the approval of increasing the Egyptian military deployments in 
the Sinai Peninsula to fight against the so-called “Sinai Province” 
(formerly Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis), an offshoot of the Islamic State. and on 
the other, he has isolated Hamas in favor of the Palestinian Authority.  
Thus, the current regime undertook an aggressive operation to destroy
more than 1200 smuggling tunnels from Sinai to Gaza along with a
widespread anti Hamas media campaign which castigates the Islamist 
group for meddling in Egypt’s domestic affairs during the Morsi era and 
maintaining links with the terrorists operating in the Sinai(497). After all, 
during the 2014 Israeli aggression on Gaza Strip, Sisi had to outmaneuver 
Turkey and Qatar, which coveted Egypt’s position as a negotiator between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis, before managing to broker a fragile and 
indefinite ceasefire(498). 
On the humanitarian level, following the above mentioned Israeli
aggression on the Gaza, Egypt has organized in cooperation with the 
Norwegian government, a big international conference on Palestine under 
the name of "the Cairo Conference on Palestine: the reconstruction of 
12thGaza", on October , 2014 to discuss the necessary means to alleviate
the suffering of the Palestinian people and eliminate the consequences of 
Israeli aggression, thus, the participating countries pledged about 5.4 $ 
496 Sisi urges more efforts to settle Palestinian issue, May 2016, http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/101564?lang=en­
us.
497 Court bans activities of Islamist Hamas in Egypt, March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-hamas-idUSBREA230F520140304. 
498 Khatri, Shabina S., “Israel and Egypt Unhappy at Qatar, Turkey Mediation Efforts in Gaza,” Doha News,
(19/7/2014), http://dohanews.co/israel-egypt-unhappy-qatar-turkey-mediationefforts-gaza/.
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billion as international aid to Palestine(499) . Furthermore, Egypt is making
great efforts to lift the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip and to allow the 
entire basic needs into the Gaza Strip, as well as ensuring the delivery of 
all the basic services needed by the population in order to improve their
living conditions and minimize the impact of humanitarian crises, which 
they are exposed. 
Egypt is still on the road towards the full and complete recovery
from its revolutionary upheavals, so its ability to play an active role in 
stabilizing other turbulent countries in the region, as Libya, Syria, and Iraq 
as well as Yemen, is yet relatively restrained. Nonetheless, the Egyptian 
government is trying to exert its utmost effort to deal with these pressing
issues. Meanwhile, the short term, then, Egypt is confining itself to 
cooperating with Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, as well as with the Arab League to help in 
managing the tragic circumstances in these countries. 
Yet even under existing limitations and restrictions, Egypt can 
still engage more significantly in the Palestinian - Israeli conflict. This was 
apparent in Egypt assistance for both Israel and Hamas to end their fifty­
one-day war. On the contrary to similar efforts during the Mubarak and 
Morsi presidencies, yet, Egypt at the moment found itself in rivalry with
both Turkey and Qatar. Unfortunately, while Israel accepted Egypt’s 
ceasefire proposal Hamas rejected it, a matter which resulted in further
bloodshed and destruction in Gaza. Cairo’s initiative was adopted at last, 
after the Egyptian government success in securing the negotiations 
between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority on the specific tips in the 
dealing with the crossing points between Gaza and both Egypt and Israel.
Despite the fact that Egypt-Hamas relations as mentioned before
were wholehearted during the Morsi presidency—not surprisingly, as 
Hamas as previously is the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian Muslim
499 http://www.mfa.gov.eg/gazaconference/default_en.html.
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30thBrotherhood, those ties cooled remarkably after the June revolution, 
as a result of the obvious interference of Hamas in Egypt’s domestic
affairs(500). Though, as the 2014 Gaza War escalated, Hamas had no 
alternative but to ask for Egypt’s help, especially when the Gulf states 
indicated that Cairo was the only address for negotiations. 
Moreover, the current Egyptian government under Al- Sisi
continued to adhere to his predecessors’ commitments to respect the peace
treaty with Israel and to seek at the same time a two-state solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. He added two new dimensions to the country’s 
relations with Tel-Aviv, which involved a suggestion to create a regional 
security system that would guarantee the security of the borders of all the 
region’s states; and a public acknowledgment that the depth of Egypt’s
peace with Israel had increased considerably, opening up the possibility of 
further understandings based on common interests. As an example of the 
latter, Sisi took note of Israel’s acceptance of increased Egyptian military
deployments in the Sinai (in excess of the limits stipulated in the Security
Protocol of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty) in response to the threat of 
terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula(501). Another sign of potentially much 
closer Egyptian-Israeli ties is the serious consideration given in Cairo to 
purchasing natural gas from Israel(502). 
Sisi also used the opportunity of the above mentioned Gaza
Reconstruction Conference, to call upon both the government and the 
people of Israel to accept the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. “It is high time to 
end conflict without delay and to give others their rights to establish 
justice so that prosperity and security could be achieved. I am confident 
that all of you share [with] me the call to every father and mother and 
every child and old man in Palestine and Israel to make this moment a 
500 A New Role for Egypt: Sisi’s Government and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Edyt Dickstien, January 2015,
 
Harvard international review, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-new-role-for-egypt-sisis-government-and-the-arab-israeli­
conflict/.
 
501 Interview on CBC TV a private Egyptian TV channel, May 6, 2014, in Arabic.
 
502 Shoshanna Solomon, “Israel Near Gas Sales to Egypt as the Mideast Unrest Flares,” Bloomberg, August 21,
2014; Christopher Coats, “Will Egypt Finally Embrace Israeli Gas?” Forbes, September 9, 2014.
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real launching point for establishing peace that guarantees stability and 
prosperity and makes the dream of joint coexistence a reality. This is the 
vision, which is outlined by the Arab peace initiative. That peace [whose
establishment] we all look for . . . and that should be our legacy for the 
coming generations (503) .” He also made it clear that though the Initiative 
should constitute the framework for peace, agreement would still need to 
be reached between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority(504) .
Security Council Membership:
On the multilateral level, Egypt’s election to a non-permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council in 2015, with wide support from the 
General Assembly, is one of the most important achievements of Egyptian 
diplomacy since January 25, 2011, reflecting the international 
community’s support for Egypt and its role in maintaining international 
peace and security and promoting African, Arab and developing world 
causes inside the Council. Moreover, Egypt has been recently selected to 
head three specialized committees in the Security Council, namely the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee and the UN Sanctions Committees 
Concerning both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. Egypt has 
become a partner among 15 states that carry the burden of preserving
peace and security at the international level. Egypt’s priorities are Arab 
and African issues, combating terrorism, and conflict resolution in the 
Middle East, as well as the Palestinian cause. Egypt is the only Arab state
in the council at a time in which the region faces difficult situations in 
Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen. Egypt will work through its membership in 
the council to protect Arab interests and present constructive solutions to 
African and Arab crises(505) .
503 Speech by H. E. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi at the Gaza Reconstruction Conference, State Information
 
Service, Cairo, October 12, 2014.
 
504 John Bell, “Egypt: Rebranding Sisi,” Al-Jazeera, October 14, 2014.
 
505 Egypt Wins Non-Permanent Security Council Seat, October 2015,
 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/97001?lang=en-us.
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Egypt elected member of the United Nations Human Rights Council
The year 2016 witnessed another victory for the Egyptian
diplomacy, which is the election of Egypt as a member in the United
Nations Human rights council a matter that illustrates the support it has at
the international level, Egypt was elected for the term 2017 - 2020, after it
received 173 votes. Egypt's accession to the UN Human Rights Council,
along with its membership of the United Nation Security Council and the
African Union Peace and Security Council is a display of its rise to global
prominence and the growing confidence it gained at the international level,
with its leading role in enhancing security and stability in the Middle East
and Africa, and in upholding the principles of International law and the
Charter of the United Nations.
Egypt's membership of the Human Rights Council reflects the
international appreciation for its political trajectory, as it moves ahead with
steady steps towards the establishment of a modern state that upholds the
values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, despite the difficult
regional situation and the challenges it imposes at the internal and regional
levels. Furthermore, Cairo looks forward to effectively enhancing the
working mechanism of the council and promote International Human
Rights through a holistic approach that goes beyond political and civic
freedoms, which ought to be developed, to encompass other aspired
economic and social rights. Also, it seeks for the alleviation of the
negative consequences of the conflicts raging in the Middle East and
Africa, with its human rights violations and humanitarian repercussions on
innocent civilians(506).
506 Egypt wins membership in UN Human Rights Council for 3 years, June 2016,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/226683/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-wins-membership-in-UN-Human­
Rights-Council-.aspx.
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Egyptian Diplomacy in Three Years after the June 30th Revolution:
The Egyptian government intensified its diplomatic efforts 
through its ministry of foreign affairs, therefore it started via the various 
official channels, represented in the Egyptian embassies abroad, to get in 
contact with executives and parliamentarians in the countries of 
accreditation, in orders to clarify the reality about the popular revolution 
that took place in Egypt to the outside world, and to respond, at the same 
moment, to the false allegations ab out it, as well as, correcting the 
erroneous image that the international media used to promote or show. 
Moreover, the foreign ministry fortified its links with the media
circles to achieve this target by writing articles in foreign newspapers, and 
making up interventions in the most important talk show that are aired in 
the major international news channels, besides maintaining continuous 
communication with the correspondents of foreign newspapers and 
channels in Egypt, and on top of this the shuttle visits done by the 
consecutive Egyptian foreign ministers during that period conveying the 
true image of what is happening in their country.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a major role
in facilitating the visits of the public diplomacy delegations that went to a
number of countries to clarify the facts about the situation in Egypt 
through communicating with various official and non-official circles in 
those countries. These persistent diplomatic efforts resulted in the change
of the conservative positions of many countries and international 
organizations towards the 30th of June revolution. In that contest, it is 
worth to be mentioned that Egypt has returned to the African Union after 
its membership had been suspended in it after the ouster of president 
Morsi, while the United States retracted its stance concerning the cessation 
of military aid to Egypt.
Also, and at the same time, various capitals all over the world 
started to open its doors to Egyptian officials, especially, when they
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realized the seriousness of the new government and Egyptian people in 
implementing the steps of the road map, which embraced, three main 
steps,. For instance, the adoption of one of the best Egyptian constitution 
ever, if compared to the previous ones, followed by the organization of 
presidential elections, then finally the convention of legislative elections, 
to complete the institutional structure of the country after the revolution. 
These steps managed to prove to everyone that it was a "real popular
revolution" during which the majority of the Egyptian people decided to 
side with the revolution to defend democracy and national institutions, 
renouncing claims of discord and division and violence.
To wrap up, Egypt’s foreign policy priorities during the current 
era will concentrate on two main elements. Firstly, reviving and boosting
the institutions that play a central role in its formation, namely the 
intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially that they in 
contrast to the pre-January 2011 era, will now be increasingly influenced 
by Egyptian media and public opinion. And secondly, rebuilding its 
relations with the West and even with Africa, without ignoring the main 
focus of the Egyptian foreign policy which is consolidating the alliance
with the Arab Gulf states, as they are the key to furthering Egypt’s 
national interests in a number of fields not only the country’s 
developmental needs.
Egypt under President Sisi appears to be much more active in the 
international arena compared to the last years of the Mubarak era while 
promoting different policies and alliances than those pursued by Morsi. 
The bilateral relations with the U.S. have not returned to full regularity or 
normality, yet Washington realizes the importance of Egypt for the 
region. on the other hand, After Sisi exchanged multiple visits with the 
Russian President, giving the impression that Egypt is ready to pursue a
more independent and multilateral foreign policy, the U.S. resumed their
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military aid and adopted a much more balanced tone towards the Egyptian 
(507)government .
Even though the Egyptian and American standpoints seem to 
converge on some issues as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the war in 
Yemen, but Cairo did not think twice to overtly advocate the Russian 
stance on the Syrian issue and to push its own agenda in Libya. After a
short break down, during the Muslim Brotherhood rule, the Egyptian-GCC
relations became even deeper than before, with the exception of Qatar, and 
the oil countries saved the Egyptian battered economy, regardless their
difference over the Syrian criris. Then again, Turkey and Qatar, even after 
the Saudi-led efforts to reconcile Cairo and Doha, remain the bitterest and 
toughest critics against President Sisi since they actively promote the rise
of political Islam in the region(508).
507 The White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with President Al-Sisi of Egypt,” (31/3/2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/readout-president-scall-president-al-sisi-egypt.
508 The MENA Foreign Policy of Egypt under Sisi, Evangelos Diamantopoulos, Middle East Flashpoint, Centre 
for Mediterranean, Middle East & Islamic Studies, University of Peloponnese, No. 68, October 27th ,2015.
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Conclusions
 
In the aftermath of a precise examination of the Egyptian foreign 
policy after two consecutive revolutionary waves, the most important defy
that can really occupy any new Egyptian regime is trying to build a new 
democratic; economically prosperous country, a way which, could get the 
country out of its economic crisis and support its internal stability. In this 
regard, the Egyptian state can maximize its benefits from its enormous 
resources as the unprecedented location in the heart of the world, the huge
demographic and military power in region and on top the soft power with 
its cultural model that has always influenced the entire Arab world. These
resources if used correctly Egypt could be a real power capable of 
confronting the regional challenges.
Regardless of the wars, isolations, and setbacks that the country
has suffered throughout its history, no other state or power in the Arab or 
Middle East region has been able to take the lead of the region or fill the 
place of Egypt that has always been the leader for the region or a core
country or else pivotal state. In this regard, it is worth to note that since
the conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979; Egypt has 
faced many rivals from its neighboring countries who wanted to replace
its role in the region, or to become major regional powers as, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Qatar as well as Turkey and Iran. 
Resorting all the Egyptian cultural, political, and social 
inheritance to create a role model in the light of the dramatic changes that 
had happened in the Egyptian character and society during the last years, 
especially after the two consecutive revolutions since the Arab spring in 
2011 should always be the first priority of any Egyptian regime.
Thus, this model could be luxuriated to either build on it or 
develop it to reinforce the domestic policies that are considered the main 
pillar or backbone of the Egyptian foreign policy. In a few words, the 
revolutions that Egypt has witnessed could be positively used as a catalyst 
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for change and development of the country as the great Egyptian historian 
Gamal Hemdan has mentioned in his famous book the character of Egypt   
“evolution by revolution”.
The recent Egyptian revolutions represent a great momentum for
the foreign policy system of a country gifted by its geographical location 
in the middle of the world between the three continents. Consequently, 
these revolutions could immensely contribute to the elimination or 
confiscating of the traditional traits that have always labeled the 
consecutive Egyptian regimes throughout the country's modern history
since the establishment of the first republic and restricted to a certain 
extent their chances of maneuvering in respect to foreign policy.
In other words, consolidating Egypt’s role and status in its region 
by building its capacity to protect its national interest and security, through 
using all its resources namely its hard, soft, and smart powers which 
means the ability to mix both soft and hard powers in the best way
possible to achieve its targets. In this regard, the Egyptian state in the 
aftermath of the recent changes should work so hard to implement this 
strategy, through maximizing the use of the resources that Egypt has. 
Firstly, geography has always played an important role for Egypt as it is 
considered the secret of uniqueness of this country and source of power as 
it act as a conjuncture between three continents Africa, Asia and Europe
which facilitates a wider range of geopolitical movement. 
Secondly, the civilizational and cultural harmony of Egypt, 
which is considered one of the regional powers in the international system, 
if not the only power that is situated in homogenous geographical and 
cultural zone among mostly Arab countries who speak the same language
which is the Arabic as well as taking the same religion which is Islam. 
Whereas previous Egyptian regimes conducted foreign policy
absent concern for public opinion, the current or any upcoming regimes 
must increasingly consider popular sentiment when formulating foreign 
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policy positions. In the post-revolution period, no Egyptian government 
can ignore the demands of an empowered population. In this regard, it
could be argued that the consecutive revolutions have created a situation 
where the public opinion would pressure the decision-making process. 
Before the revolution, the margin of maneuver of the Egyptian authorities 
was much wider. Pressure now emanates from the media and people 
defending their demands. The Egyptian public who were emboldened by
the revolution will remain a potent political force whose demands must
be carefully taken into account. 
Foreign policy in the present day is conducted as double-edged
diplomacy. It is a two-way relationship between foreign policy and the 
domestic politics. In other words, internal developments affect the foreign 
affairs and vice versa. from this perspective, Egypt needs to include and 
ensure the public participation in establishing a new foreign policy
discourse. This is crucial for a new and coherent vision simply because in 
the last decades there has been a sharp divide between the governing elite 
and the arab streets in understanding and approaching the key foreign 
policy issues in the Middle East. Currently, the governing elite face a huge
legitimacy crisis in the eyes of its public and therefore, most of the time 
use harsh measures to keep itself in power. That is why democratization 
waves did not have any influence in the Middle Eastern countries and 
Egypt.
Domestic issues are so important for the behavior of pivotal 
middle power that can define the scope of, or limit, its approach to any key
issue in its region. Domestic stability of a pivotal middle power can be as 
influential as their economic and military power in their policies, 
projection and leadership role in their regions.
25thEgyptian popular revolutions that took place in the January , 
30th2011 and then on the of June 2013, crafted a number of changes in 
society and politics in Egypt. These changes will withdraw necessarily ­
sooner or later- on Egypt's foreign policy orientation, practice and 
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organization, including increasing the chances of Egypt in the return of its 
regional role again for the exercise of its duties in its sphere of influence
and its traditional circles as well as in other circles. 
Certainly, the change that will be attached to Egypt's role will not 
be radical, as far as it will be pragmatic as the limitations in Egypt's 
regional role during the last decade was not related to its foreign policy
orientation. However, these shortcomings namely involved the 
independence of the foreign policy decision, and the extent of the exercise 
of its role, as well as, the nature of the institutions that play this role.
In light of the fall of the former regimes after two revolutions, it
is expected that the foreign policy will be characterized by some openness. 
Thus, the diplomatic engagement will take the primacy over other tools of 
policy making and implementation, in the redistribution of roles among the 
concerned foreign affairs institutions. 
The independence of the Egyptian decision will be directly proportionate to 
the developmental democratic transformation. The most prominent factor that will
keep the pressure on the independence of the Egyptian foreign policy decisions will
be the economic pressure in the first place, given the disappearance of the variable 
of the legitimacy of the regime of the foreign policy equation, especially that the 
current regime enjoys a popular complacency in the equation of the Egyptian 
domestic arena.
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ANNEXES
 
Annex I
 
Interview with His Excellency Ahmed Aboulgheit the former
foreign minister of Egypt and the current secretary general of the
league of Arab states (conducted in Arabic and then translated to 
English)
Q1: The anti- imperialist and the Egyptian rising power of 
Nasser's foreign policy vision, was it realistic in relation to its self-
perception of resources, instruments and power?
A: I think that the Egyptian foreign policy after the 1952 
revolution developed but before the regime was really able to really
consolidate or firm up its power or control domestically, a matter that led 
23rdfor sure to some mistakes. The Egyptian leadership after the of July
uprising was not able to either grasp or realize the true discrepancies and 
variances between this newly born leadership and the world powers at that 
time, and so Nasser's regime didn’t work to establish ties and relations
with these players.
President Nasser committed this serious error when he failed to 
secure his nation and new regime internally, in such a way that would 
enable him to formulate a successful foreign policy. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning that regardless of the reforms that he implemented to 
assist the poor and middle classes as much as possible, yet this really help 
a lot in improving the economic and social status of the population, 
particularly the middle class. This middle class was not reinforced enough 
as it used to be over three decades before the 1952 revolution.  
Nasser involved himself in an unnecessary war in Yemen in 1961 
during which Cairo was spending about one million sterling; as well, he
went through a miscalculated confrontation with Israel in 1967,which 
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ended with a weighty defeat not only for his army but also for the 
Nasserism with all the notions of pan- Arabism and anti - colonialism.
All these factors and reasons negatively affected Egypt and led to 
a gradual regression and relapse of its pivotal role the Middle East and 
Arab region that extended for many decades until these days.
Q2: After the decline of the Egyptian regional role, what was the 
impact of Sadat's pragmatic vision on the Egyptian foreign policy?
A: in my book "Eyewitness of War and Peace", I mentioned in 
the end of it that a big part of Egypt's importance during the 1950's and 
1960's lies in its noteworthy role in fighting Israel, thus the Arab nations 
perceived Cairo as their leader. Moreover, Cairo's strategic weight 
increased during the period between the years 1955 and 1973, when the 
Soviet Union at the wanted to use Egypt in their ideological battle with the 
west and the United States. Therefore, all the parties realized the 
significance of the country including the Americans.
Yet, after the October 1973 victory over Tel-Aviv which was 
followed by the conclusion of the Egyptian –Israeli peace agreements the 
whole situation was completely altered with the boycott of the Arab 
countries to Egypt and its isolation in its traditional sphere of influence
and its rapprochement with the United States and the west.  
In my opinion, the Egyptian foreign policy failed to develop itself 
in accordance with the new variables as the Egyptian state was not able 
seize the chanced to play its role because of downfall of its soft power and 
the lack of any vision from the part of the leadership to improve and 
progress the country. Thus, Sadat's foreign also was not capable to trigger 
any change to the country a matter that lasted during the whole period of 
Mubarak.
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Q3: Did Camp David peace agreements led to Egyptian isolation 
in the region, which weakened Mubarak's foreign policy?
A: From my opinion the I think that the former president 
Mubarak as an eyewitness of the 1967 defeat decided never again to drive
or thrust his country anymore in any unbalanced and unnecessary battles 
that would be so costly for it. Hence, he chose not to re-do Nasser's 
tragedy again, and he made his decision to open up diplomatic relations
with the most of the world's countries.
He added that Mubarak did not have a real ruling philosophy, as 
he did not put any effort in investing in the Egyptian citizen himself and 
his education, but he rather preferred to invest in other consumer sectors, 
as the communications for instance. This led to the accumulation of many
problems as the slums and lack of awareness as well as the spread of the 
unemployment and the poverty, which were the main causes that 
contributed to the eruption of "the January outburst" or "the revolutionary
condition or status" -according to his definition- that took place in Egypt in 
2011.
Q4: Despite that, the foreign policy was not a priority for the 
25thJanuary revolution's demands, yet both presidents Morsi and his 
successor Al- Sisi mentioned previously that their foreign policy will 
witness a major re-orientation in its paths. How do you perceive this? 
A: I think that The Egyptian foreign policy will never change
either before or after the revolution, as this country has always been 
governed or determined by many factors and elements namely, geography, 
history and its geopolitics as well as its resources. Nonetheless, from their
part the Muslim brotherhood when they came to power in Egypt in 2012, 
they were planning to plant their Islamic ideology not only on the foreign 
policy, but also, on the whole country's identity. 
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However, in my opinion this would not have been applicable on 
the real ground as it runs against with basic policies and nature of a
country like Egypt. the country's future under the Islamic regime would 
have taken it back to the middle ages. On the other hand, the current 
president Al-Sisi understood quite well the international and regional 
variables, thus he will not pull Egypt to any uncalculated external 
adventures.
Egypt during Al-Sisi rule and after two consecutive revolutions in 
less than three years will seek to restore or regain its influence in the 
region by all necessary means. For instance, it can play a pivotal role in 
resolving the crisis in Libya as per the geographical proximity.
Q5: what strategy will president Sisi embrace as he attempts to 
return Egypt to a leading regional role? In addition, in the context of the 
new world order and the American strategic shift towards Asia pacific, 
which is creating a power vacuum in the Middle East region, how can the 
country face this challenge?
A: Egypt is a big country that has always played a leading role in 
the whole Arab and Middle East regions, yet it is facing many challenges 
and problems that would need quite a long time to be solve them. For 
instance, Cairo is passing through a critical economic situation, so it will
have to reach certain compromises and deals with the Gulf countries to 
assist it to overcome this crisis.
On the other hand, Egypt is encountering a noteworthy threat that 
endangers the whole region which is the terrorist groups namely ISIS or 
Daesh, that became so close to its western borders, thus, Cairo will have to 
improve more its military capabilities to the extent that would enable it to 
defend its national security.
30thThen again, the Egyptian state after the June revolution will
have to work on two important tracks to rebuild itself properly through 
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enhancing its economic and military powers. In this context, the Egyptian 
society will have to reunite to face its crisis and challenge of limited 
resources that affect or hinder its capability to expand its expenditure. 
Thus, the current Egyptian government should work hard on restoring the 
foreign tourism back to the country and in the same moment to make good 
use of the new oil and natural gas explorations for the benefit of the 
country and its people.
Furthermore, there should be a new strict and legal way or 
method to perfectly manage the funds allocated for the subsides of the 
poor classes to guarantee that these subsides would reach those who are
really in need for it.
On the other hand, the Egyptian state has to work hard to improve
the efficacy of its media apparatus, a matter that could be easily done
through, for instance, the establishment of a new satellite channel capable 
of addressing the international public opinion in several languages to 
project the real situation in Egypt.
Yet, this idea of course would be of a very high cost, as it will
need around 150 million dollars per year, a matter that means that the 
Egyptian economy should be strong enough to provide the necessary funds 
for this channel.
In brief, the economy is the engine for the development of any
nation in the world, if Egypt have had enough money and resources; our 
economic and political situation would have dramatically changed. 
Egypt is an ancient country with a great civilization of more than 
7000 years, a matter that should encourage any Egyptian government to 
improve the use of the soft power as it used to be in the past to restore
back the leadership role of the country. Additionally, the issue of 
improvement the quality of life in the country after two consecutive
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revolutions should be seriously, revised and tackled, by the current 
government, or any upcoming governments.
The External position is a reflection of the internal situation, and 
this was the real dilemma or problem that former president Mubarak faced 
for years. Then again, the new Egyptian foreign policy aftermath the 
revolutions should be a realistic policy motivated and prompted by the 
domestic public opinion, but in the meantime shouldn’t be Impulsive and 
reckless.
The secretary general of the Arab league and the former minister 
added that there is also another important element or factor that would 
play an effective role in the formation of a new efficient Egyptian foreign 
policy which is the development of the ministry of foreign affairs. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning that the Egyptian diplomats should be
trained very well to be able to play their roles or perform in such a way
that help them to serve the interests of their country.
Thus, written clear assignments should be handed over to both the 
ambassadors and the young diplomats as well so when they are assigned to 
a certain task they are able to do it in a right way. In addition, the ministry
of foreign affairs has to establish a unit or center to evaluate the 
performance of the Egyptian embassies abroad through the related or 
concerned assistant foreign minister and university professors as well as 
think tanks.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should also play a role or 
participate in conducting its own studies and researches alongside and in 
cooperation with the think tanks and research centers in Egypt and in the 
Arab world.
To conclude, I think when it comes to Egypt there is nothing that 
could be called a revolutionary foreign policy, which means that there will
be no change in the Egyptian foreign policy after the revolutions because
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this foreign policy has always been determined or controlled by certain 
aspects or determinates as mentioned before for instance geography, 
history and resources. For these reasons or factors the Egyptian foreign 
policy will not witness any dramatic changes after both January and June
revolutions.
Q6: how the relations with the United States could be assessed in your 
opinion?
A: in my opinion the relationship with Washington under President Al-
Sisi will continue to be in tension, yet cooperating with any American 
administration is a must especially in the security issues namely
combatting ISIS (Daesh). 
During the period of the Muslim brotherhood regime the ties with 
the united states seemed weird. In spite of their hatred to the Americans 
and the refusal to all its policies and orientations, yet the Muslim
brotherhood were never able to reveal this extreme dislike, yet they
opened the links with Washington which used them as the Muslim
brotherhood used the religion to reach the power.
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ANNEX II
 
Interview with his Excellency Minister Mohamed Al-Orabi
the Former Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Current President of
the External Relations Committee in the People's Assembly “the 
Egyptian parliament”. conducted in Arabic and then translated to 
English)
Q1: The anti- imperialist and the Egyptian rising power of Nasser's 
foreign policy vision, was it realistic in relation to its self-perception of 
resources, instruments and power?
A: firstly if we want to discuss this point then we have to have a deep look 
over the situation not only in the region but on the international arena at 
that point of time, especially with the establishment of a new country in 
the region, which is Israel in 1948, a matter which played an important 
role in the shaping of the Egyptian foreign policy during Nasser’s era.
Moreover, the whole world at that period was totally polarized 
between two main camps the western under the leadership of the united 
states and the eastern under the leadership of the soviet union. For these
reasons, the world and the region were dramatically different from what 
they look like now.
Additionally, being a military officer who led the revolution that 
toppled the king of Egypt in 1952, this also created a negative perception 
or image about Nasser in front of the whole world, a matter which 
produced or formed a status of doubt and lack of confidence that lasted 
over quite a long period of time. In brief, the entire context or environment 
at that era was totally different from what it is right now.
From his part Nasser managed or succeeded in making radical 
changes in the political life or scene in Egypt. For instance, the country
under the monarchy used to embrace multiple or various political parties 
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and a well performing parliament. However, aftermath the arrival of 
Nasser on top of power in Egypt and the establishment of the first republic
in 1954, he erased all traces of the old regime including the parliament 
and the parties.
Consequently, the country gradually started to turn to be a
“centralized state”, that lacks a real political life a matter which certainly
affected our foreign policy in a negative way. Then again came that key
change in the Nasser’s foreign policy with his rapprochement towards the 
eastern camp led by the Soviet Union, especially after the conclusion of 
the Czech arms deal, a matter which worsened the relations with the 
western camp countries namely the United States and Europe.
All these factors could be easily used to evaluate and assess 
Nasser’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the 1952 revolution. This 
policy was characterized by hatred towards the west, a matter that 
deepened the worries and suspicions between them.
As for the Arab countries, Nasser managed to extend good 
relations with the Arab countries as he succeeded to gather them under the 
auspices of his notions of “nationalism” and “pan Arabism” which 
overwhelmed the whole Arab world during the fifties and sixties of the last 
century. Also, he had quite a strong influence on the African and Asian 
countries and he helped most of them to gain their independence at that 
period of time, a matter which mounted the worries and concerns of the 
west towards him as mentioned above. 
Nasser’s foreign policy was mainly connected or related to his 
character and the surrounding environment and circumstances at that time. 
For instance, if another person had ruled Egypt during this era, its foreign 
policy would have taken another direction.
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Yet, the charisma that Nasser possessed was not available for
anybody during this epoch of time. In brief and in my opinion Nasser’s 
foreign policy was realistic as Egypt is sum of history and geography.
In spite of that Nasser’s regime committed some fatal mistakes 
and pushed his country into uncalculated adventures as the Yemen war 
which consumed a big amount of the resources of the country at that time, 
as well as the 1967 war against Israel that led to a heavy thrashing and the 
occupation of the Sinai peninsula. Hence, the whole middle east region 
aftermath this defeat witnessed major alterations and retraction back to 
extremism.
Q2: After the decline of the Egyptian regional role, what was the impact of 
Sadat's pragmatic vision on the Egyptian foreign policy?
A: in my thinking former president Sadat inherited a heavy inherited a
heavy burden when he came to power after the death of his predecessor 
Nasser. Hence, he succeeded with his high political talents and with 
proficiency to manage the foreign policy of the country during that critical 
period of time, especially with the historical and most dangerous decision 
in the modern history of Egypt of fighting against Israel in October 1973 
to restore back his country’s occupied land which ended with the victory
over Israel, that opened the door to the signing of the peace agreement 
with Tel-Aviv.
Despite the lack of a similar charisma just like Nasser’s, but he
was intelligent enough to take Egypt out of the occupation crisis. Sadat 
was courageous enough to take the war decision which is considered the 
most difficult choice that any president can think about it. Moreover, the 
peace preference or pick also was very hard and difficult for him as it is 
still has its impact on Egypt maybe till this very recent moment. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning that until now some countries as well as a
part of the Egyptian society itself still against or not totally convinced with 
the peace with Israel. 
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To conclude the foreign policy during Sadat era was utterly
geared to serve the peace and war issues at that time, he decided to take
the hard path which made him lose the majority of the Arab countries and 
its consequences of the expulsion from the Arab league, however on the 
other hand he gained the relations with the west and especially the united 
states, thus there was no real approach or manner to make breaks and 
intervals between the gains and the losses during this very critical moment 
in the history of the country. 
Q3: Did Camp David peace agreements led to Egyptian isolation in the 
region, which weakened Mubarak's foreign policy?
In my opinion it didn’t really have a big impact or influence as 
expected, because I think that the Arab countries felt strange and 
threatened without Egypt, and also because at that time Cairo had a very
huge momentum in its relations with west, a matter which the Arab states 
wanted to take advantage of in the same time to improve their relations
with the west. As a result, the reconciliation with Egypt took place after 
Mubarak came to power and it was a very important step that he decided 
to take also from his side.
The situation in the whole region was really complicated during
the eighties at the beginning of Mubarak’s rule, especially with the 
emergence of other regional powers and rivals namely turkey and Iran. 
Hence, I think that the Mubarak’s foreign policy was not a failure as  
described by some people, because the country at that period of time was 
economically exhausted and as a consequence it was very hard to restore
back its role in the region.
During Mubarak’s era and owing to the stressing economic
situation, the foreign policy was more oriented towards reinforcing ties 
with states that could assist his country economically and financially to get 
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out of its crisis on the expense of strengthening the political relations with 
these countries or the others that will not help Egypt to overcome the 
critical moments.
Q4: Despite that, the foreign policy was not a priority for the January 25th 
revolution's demands, yet both presidents Morsi and his successor Al- Sisi
mentioned previously that their foreign policy will witness a major re-
orientation in its paths. How do you perceive this?
A: 	 the foreign policy was not a priority for the demonstrators during the 
25thJanuary revolution, as the internal issues dominated their demands, 
not only but these domestic causes were the main reasons behind the 
eruption of this revolution, therefore there was a real consensus about it. 
From his part president Morsi wanted to consolidate and strengthen his 
legitimacy as well as the Muslim brotherhood rule in the country in front 
of the whole world, for this reason the foreign policy was an important 
issue for him.
The west was happy and satisfied with Morsi's rule and helped 
him to consolidate this legitimacy, and the Muslim brotherhood
themselves used the foreign policy to export the idea that Morsi could be
an Egyptian Muslim leader who would control tightly the Muslim world, 
yet they didn’t have a real vision or strategy for the foreign policy.
In brief, the one year rule of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt 
could be considered as a period of a struggle to consolidate and solidify
their legitimacy in the country. Moreover, this trial in my opinion was a
total failure as it was not institutionalized because it was limited only to 
the movements of Essam Al- Haddad the councilor of the president for the 
foreign relations.
The president councilor started to extend ties with a number of 
the pivotal world countries for instance, the United States and Germany, 
away from the ministry of foreign affairs only through his office and his 
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assistants, as well they worked hard to promote for the Muslim
Brotherhood  rule in the country in this manner.
Q5: what strategy will president Sisi embrace as he attempts to return 
Egypt to a leading regional role? In addition, in the context of the new
world order and the American strategic shift towards Asia pacific, which 
is creating a power vacuum in the Middle East region, how can the 
country face this challenge? 
A: in my point of view I think it is still too early to assess or judge the 
situation in Egypt or how it will go especially after two major
revolutionary events, as the country now is still in a period of arranging
the house from inside. Yet, until now president Abdel Fattah Al-sisi 
managed or succeeded to open new strategic axes that would allow him to 
balance the country’s relations with the different world powers.
In this context, he is trying to maintain equilibrium Egypt’s 
relations with the Western powers namely the United States and European 
union from one side and the relations with other powers as china and 
Russia. It cannot be denied that this trend or approach has always been 
found in the Egyptian foreign policy especially in the last 30 years. 
Nowadays, for example the country is trying to diversify the sources of its 
armament through purchasing arms from Russia and France again after a
long period of stoppage during Mubarak’s era, who depended mostly on 
the American armament. 
Q6: how the relations with Iran and the United States could be assessed in 
your opinion?
A: as for the relations with Iran, I think it is not going to be improved or 
consolidated in the near future, and the old trend that has been taken 
during Mubarak will continue, because the Egyptian regime of Al- Sisi
will still put its relations with the Arab countries of the gulf as a priority
over the deployment of relations or ties with the Iranian  regime.
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On the other hand, and as for the relations with the united states, I
think I will remain as “love and hate relationship”. From its part 
Washington thought that the Islamic current would dominate the whole
region and they considered Tunisia as an “inclusive model”, but this did 
not happen with Egypt. 
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ANNEX III
 
An Interview with his Excellency the current Egyptian
Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, this interview was published on the
blog of the ministry of affairs. It was conducted by Al- Ahram
newspaper, December 19th, 2015, and translated by the office of the
spokesperson of the ministry.
Q: Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry…. we are approaching the end of 
2015 and all the external challenges it held for Egypt… regionally and 
internationally…. Overall, are you satisfied with the performance of 
Egyptian foreign policy during 2015?
A: In general, I can say that there is satisfaction with Egypt’s ability to 
meet the many foreign policy challenges it faced over the past year. The
challenges were formidable and multi-dimensional, and many of them 
were directly linked to Egypt’s national security.
There is no doubt that facing these challenges required the 
confrontation of a number of internal challenges as an initial step, given 
that foreign policy and its ability to achieve its objectives is directly
related to the internal situation of the county. In my assessment, internal 
achievements – in terms of the fight against terrorism, the start of the 
implementation of major economic and investment projects, and the 
successful completion of the internal constitutional framework and the 
political roadmap with its different stages – have greatly contributed 
towards strengthening Egypt’s ability to confront external challenges and 
achieve its foreign policy goals over the past year. This has certainly
required considerable diplomatic effort to inform the international 
community of the reality of the situation in Egypt and the size of the 
challenges confronting the Egyptian state. Diplomatic efforts were
necessary to explain each stage of the political roadmap and to mobilize
international support for Egypt, both bilaterally and within the framework 
of various international organizations.
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Q: In your view, what are the most important challenges Egypt faced 
externally in 2015?
A: The biggest challenge has been the extent of Egypt’s ability to navigate 
the storm the Middle East is passing through and to maintain internal 
cohesion and stability. Amidst this storm, proceeding at a steady pace on 
the path to economic and social development, while simultaneously
enhancing Egypt’s political, economic and security infrastructure was the 
main challenge.
Numerous factors contributed to instability in the region in 2015. 
These included turmoil in Egypt’s direct geographical vicinity, such as in 
Libya, Gaza (particularly control of the border with Gaza and its impact on 
stability in the Sinai), the political crisis in South Sudan, the continued 
instability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, the escalation of terrorism in 
Africa’s Sahel region, and challenges to the security of the Red Sea. If we
add to this the security and existential challenges facing the Middle East, 
whether in Syria, Yemen or Iraq, we will find ourselves facing immense
challenges that Egypt was able to confront. This allowed us to maintain 
cohesion, steadfastness, and stability while continuing to effectively
contribute to addressing these crises by offering practical and realistic
solutions.
Q: From the perspective of Minister Sameh Shoukry…. What were the 
most important Egyptian diplomatic achievements over the past year?
A: The word “achievements” is not the most accurate terms to evaluate the 
performance of Egypt’s foreign policy over a year. Perhaps it is more
suitable to say “reviewing what has been achieved towards the realization 
of national goals.” This allows for a more accurate and objective
assessment of the extent to which Egypt was able to achieve its foreign 
policy goals over the past year.
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To begin with, I would like to point out that President Sisi’s 
“Summit Diplomacy” and his numerous visits throughout the past year 
have paid off. The diversity of these visits, and the President’s direct 
communication with other world leaders, show Egypt’s desire to open up 
to the world. Along with my visits to Africa, Europe, Asia, the United 
States and South America, these Presidential visits clearly indicate that 
Egypt has been able to set the foundations for solid and diversified foreign 
relations in 2015.
Through such efforts, Egypt was able to build bridges for
strategic relations with a number of countries, such as Russia and China, in 
addition to enhancing bilateral relations with Ethiopia (which have
witnessed a significant transformation since President Sisi made a historic
visit to the country), as well as relations with the Sudan. Moreover, in the 
context of Egyptian-US relations, 2015 witnessed the resumption of the 
strategic dialogue between the two countries. This is not to mention 
relations with Europe and the resumption of the technical committees 
established under the Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement.
Another milestone for Egyptian diplomacy in 2015 has been 
Egypt’s success at promoting the issue of combating terrorism to the top of 
the international community’s list of priorities. The numerous terrorist
incidents witnessed in the region throughout the past period attest to the 
soundness and accuracy of Egypt’s vision; we have consistently placed 
utmost importance on fighting terrorism, and not distinguishing between 
terrorist groups, or terrorism taking place in one country as opposed to 
another. Egypt also placed utmost priority on fighting extremist and 
radical ideas throughout the different stages in which they are propagated, 
from their very formulation, through to their dissemination, and finally to 
the recruitment of extremist elements.
In addition, Egypt has consistently emphasized the need to dry
up sources of terrorist financing, increase border control, combat illegal 
immigration and border infiltration and counter illicit trafficking in 
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arms. I believe that that we have successfully placed all of these issues at 
the top of the international community’s agenda.
Egypt’s election to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security
Council, with wide support from the General Assembly, is one of the most
important achievements of Egyptian diplomacy in 2015. It reflected the 
international community’s support for Egypt and its trust in Egypt’s ability
to assume its responsibilities in the area of international peace and security
as well as to promote African, Arab and third world causes inside the 
Council. Another accomplishment is Egypt’s recent selection to head three
specialized committees in the Security Council, namely the Counter-
Terrorism Committee and the UN Sanctions Committees Concerning the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. There is no doubt that this 
required tremendous diplomatic efforts by Egypt’s embassies overseas, as 
well as the Foreign Ministry and the Egyptian state as a whole. This 
ultimately led to Egypt being able to garner the huge support it received in 
these international fora.
Q: How do you perceive Egypt’s ability to maintain the balance between 
its relations with the United States and Russia, especially in light of an 
increasingly polarized world?
A: Egypt’s foreign policy is not based on the idea of axes and alliances. It 
is a balanced policy that is open to all and seeks to benefit from the 
comparative advantage of each and every party and international partner. It 
is based on the principle of strategic partnerships with the countries that 
have special ties with Egypt.
A: The positive and notable development of Egyptian-Russian relations
over the past year does not come at the expense of Egypt’s strategic 
relations with the United States. This has been proven in a multitude of 
ways, whether through convening the strategic dialogue between Egypt 
and the US, after being on hold for five years, or through measures taken 
by the American side to lift previous limitations on military aid to Egypt.
403 | P a g e 
   
 
          
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
    
  
    
   
  
 
    
     
   
Thus, we are talking about a foreign policy methodology based 
on communication, and an understanding of how Egypt can best achieve
its interests through its foreign relations. This is pursued through a holistic
approach that maintains the dignity of both Egypt and its citizens while 
protecting Egypt’s national security.
Q: How do you evaluate the strategic dialogue with the US?
A: The strategic dialogue is based on a number of dimensions, 
some of which relate to bilateral relations in their different aspects, while 
others relate to regional issues and challenges that require coordination 
and consultation between different countries. Finally, some dimensions 
focus on multi-lateral relations within the framework of relevant 
international organizations.
When it comes to the bilateral dimension of the Egypt-US 
Strategic Dialogue, we can say that there has been progress in the military, 
economic and development fields. There is also communication between 
the two sides on matters related to democratic transition and freedoms, 
which are strongly linked to increasing awareness by the US of the 
dangers and challenges Egypt currently faces. There is no doubt that 
reaching this stage was the result of huge efforts on Egypt’s part in its 
communication with the US administration and different US policy­
making circles to clarify the internal situation and challenges.
There has also been notable progress in the regional dimension. 
The past period witnessed intensified communication at the foreign 
ministers’ level, as well as visits by the US Congress. This all reflects that 
the US realizes that Egypt is a true partner in the region – a partner whose
assessments it needs, regarding crises in the region. The US takes into 
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account Egypt’s vision and assessment of the situation in Libya, as Egypt 
is a neighboring country that is directly involved in the situation there. The
US also makes sure to maintain close coordination on the Palestinian 
issue, due to the communication channels Egypt possesses with different 
Palestinian parties as well as with Israel. This is not to mention Egypt’s 
ability to present new ideas, long-term solutions and a serious and realistic
vision for the future to activate the peace process.
The same applies to the crises in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, 
especially with regard to having a strategic vision towards Arab national 
security and how best to consolidate and safeguard it. Egypt addresses 
these challenges from a long-term and comprehensive perspective, and not 
from a narrow view that seeks to achieve parochial, short-term interests. 
Egypt’s perspective is comprehensive and seeks to safeguard the security
of the region, its stability and its ability to meet the aspirations of its 
people during the coming years.
Q: With Egypt having taken its first step towards joining the world’s 
nuclear club, how do you view the Middle East as a region free of nuclear 
weapons? Also, how do you perceive concerns regarding dangerous 
material potentially falling into the hands of extremist groups in Syria and 
Libya?
A: Egypt’s position on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD’s) in the Middle East, and the threat they pose to Egypt’s national 
security is clear and unchanging. Egypt has consistently led efforts to 
establish a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East. This policy was manifested 
in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held in May 2015. During this 
conference Egypt proposed its vision as to how to implement the 
1995 NPT Review Conference Middle East resolution [on establishing a
weapons of mass destruction free-zone in the Middle East], so as to 
prevent the spread of WMD’s in the region.
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Egypt has also continuously called for the universality of the 
NPT. This is in addition to its active role in the issue of combating
terrorism and confronting the dangers of weapons of mass destruction 
falling into the irresponsible hands of terrorists, who view the whole of 
humanity as their enemies. In this realm, the dangers increase
exponentially. It is for this reason that we constantly reiterate our position 
regarding the need to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from 
reaching terrorists, including through increased border control, as well as 
the importance of adhering to adequate safety standards in established 
facilities. All these issues are interrelated.
As for Egypt’s peaceful nuclear program, we are talking about a
different matter altogether. Egypt seeks a peaceful program for the 
production of electricity that can be used to power development projects, 
particularly since nuclear and renewable energy are clean, low cost and 
produce low pollution. This represents a qualitative change that reflects 
Egypt’s determination to achieve sustainable development and implement 
the newest technologies. Egypt is committed to benefiting from the best 
international experts in this field and is set on carrying out this program at 
the lowest cost and the highest standards of nuclear safety. Egypt made
sure that this was explicitly included in the agreement signed with Russia.
Q: What about Iran? How do you see Egypt’s interaction with Iran?
A: Egypt has clearly stated that its assessment of the Iran nuclear deal will
depend on the extent to which the deal contributes towards the goal of a 
nuclear-weapons-free Middle East and the extent to which it can influence
Iran’s position towards the region and its countries. If the deal achieves 
these two goals, then Egypt will appreciate its importance.
This matter requires close technical follow up by the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the countries signatory to the Iran nuclear deal. It also 
requires that Arab and Gulf countries follow up on Iran’s policies to 
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determine whether they have witnessed a positive transformation or still
remain dubious.
Q: In light of Egypt’s chairmanship of the Arab Summit.. what is your 
vision for inter-Arab relations and how to consolidate regional action, 
particularly since most problems in the region are a result of inconsistency
in Arab policies?
A: One must look at inter-Arab relations realistically. The Arab region is 
filled with crises and challenges that threaten the very existence of some 
states. Since current circumstances are exceptional, they must be addressed 
in a manner that is equally exceptional, rather than the traditional approach 
to the issue. 
This was President Sisi’s approach from the outset, since he proposed the 
initiative of establishing a Joint Arab Force, through to his close 
engagement with the regional centers of power such as Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, and his communication with Jordan. There is a
strategic vision in place that aims to awaken the region to face up to the 
grave challenges we face.
Egypt’s vision is that, as individual states, we will not be able to 
overcome these challenges, which include terrorism, state failure, armed 
conflicts, foreign interventions, designs and interests in the region, as well
as humanitarian disasters including the refugee and IDP crisis. Such 
challenges cannot be confronted by any single state alone; however, we
must work on coordinating our policies in order to benefit from each 
state’s unique capabilities and comparative advantage. This is what Egypt 
hopes we can achieve and that the region will focus on in the upcoming
period. of course, we expect the Arab League to play an important role in 
this regard.
Q: In light of this, how does Egypt view the Turkish invasion of Iraq?
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A: Egypt refuses and condemns outright any foreign intervention in the 
affairs of Arab states or infringement of their sovereignty. Iraq is a pivotal 
state in the Middle East; the preservation of its sovereignty is essential.
The challenge that we face as Arab States is how to act in 
solidarity against these interventions, which take place under different 
pretexts. We are in need of a strong and unified Arab stance, and a vision 
for the future that can envisage what the region will look like in 10 years. 
We must set our priorities in moving forward, build on our strengths and 
address our problems and challenges. This requires a long-term vision and 
enhanced coordination between Arab countries.
Q: The events in Jerusalem are a negative development in the year 2015. 
How does Egypt believe this matter should be addressed in 2016?
A: In 2015, Egypt’s approach to the Palestinian question has developed 
substantially. Egypt has adopted a vision that calls for the final settlement 
of this conflict; we are not prepared to entertain any proposal or idea that 
does not aim for a final settlement, on the basis of international law and 
the two-state solution. What is required is to see the end goal and aim for
it, within an agreed time-frame. We are beyond wasting time on 
procedural matters and discussions with no objective. It is no longer 
21stacceptable for an entire people to live under occupation in the century. 
It is also no longer tolerable to accept the daily infringements against a
whole nation’s heritage. We are now focused on a few specific points: how 
to afford protection for the Palestinian people, how to reach a real truce on 
the ground, how to take specific measures towards confidence building
that will launch an actual peace process, leading to a lasting peace with a
clear objective in sight. A number of confidence-building steps must be
taken, including: first, an end to all settlement activity that is swallowing
up Palestinian lands day-in-day-out, in a manner that threatens to leave no 
land to negotiate on. Secondly, an end to the daily escalation that helps to 
fuel anger and a thirst for revenge. 
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Finally, there needs to be a serious approach from the United 
States, supported by other global powers in order to put in place the 
cornerstones for meaningful and effective negotiations between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis.
Q:There are signs of a breakthrough in negotiations on Syria. The Syrian 
opposition has met in Riyadh to unify their positions. There are increased 
talks of the possibility of a Syrian/Syrian dialogue at the beginning of the 
new year. Howe does Egypt see the chances of a settlement, after years of 
devastation for the Syrian people?
A: In 2015, the Syrian situation was, indeed, catastrophic. The Syrian 
crisis was exacerbated in all its aspects, particularly the humanitarian 
suffering of the Syrian people and Syrian refugees. This was a warning
sign for us all that it was no longer possible for the international 
community to bear this humanitarian crisis any longer.
The Egyptian position on this matter has had clear goals and 
objectives from the start, namely the following: first, the importance of 
putting an end to the suffering of the Syrian people; second, finding a
political, rather than military solution to the crisis; third, counter-terrorism
efforts must progress hand in hand with the political settlement; fourth, the 
importance of preserving the Syrian state and preventing its collapse and 
finally, the need to make the Geneva I Communiqué the basis of any
dialogue between the Syrian parties. Egypt has remained committed to this 
position from the beginning and has maintained it despite the changing
circumstances. Hence Egypt has supported UN envoy de Mistura and has 
hosted Syrian opposition conferences that ended with the issuing of a
national charter and a road map to implement the Geneva Communiqué.
Egypt has also taken part in the meetings in Vienna and New 
York and has supported all anti-terrorism efforts in Syria. We hope to see
a real breakthrough in Syria in 2016 that leads to Syria’s transition to a
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new phase that achieves the aspirations and hopes of the Syrian people to 
live in peace and prosperity.
Q: With respect to confronting terrorism, there are also signs that France is 
preparing a military strike in Libya. How do you see developments on the 
Libyan front?
A: The Egyptian position on Libya is a very cautious one as the challenge
for Egypt there is huge, given the possibility of a complete collapse of the 
situation and the spread of terrorism, due to the lack of a central 
government. For these reasons, from the very start of the crisis in Libya, 
Egypt has been one of the most affected countries. 
Egypt is therefore heavily invested in the Libyan case and has, 
from the start, supported the UN envoy and his role in hosting the dialogue
between various Libyan parties. Egypt also participated closely in all
rounds of dialogue between Libyan parties, in order to offer support to our 
Libyan brothers and the UN envoy, and sponsored a number of meetings 
of Libyan tribes. This is part of an overarching effort that aims to have
Libyans overcome their internal differences and rise above their different 
affiliations; to put the Libyan nation first and foremost. We hope that in 
the coming days the Libyans can form a national unity government. This 
would be the starting point to move forward on the correct path.
As for the French moves, the growing threat of terrorism in Libya
caused by instability there, and the recent horrific acts of terror that have
affected everyone, mean that it is no longer possible to confront terrorism
with leniency. We will find more and more attention from global powers 
that want to combat terrorism in Libya, but the most important matter now 
is the formation of the national unity government.
Q: You have just come back from the six-party talks in Khartoum for the 
Foreign and Irrigation Ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan. The
Egyptian people are increasingly worried about the fate of the talks on the 
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Great Ethiopian Renaissance Ram (GERD) and its potential effects on 
Egypt’s water resources from the Nile. What is your assessment, since you 
have been a main party in these talks from the very beginning?
A: To begin with, it is important for us to realize the strategic nature of the 
relationship between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Any assessment of the 
challenges these relations face must be based on a complete understanding
that the three states have true common interests that they seek to achieve
and preserve through cooperation. In Egypt’s quest to achieve these
interests, it is keen to avoid any harm to any other party. There is no doubt 
that there is a legacy of negative Egyptian-Ethiopian relations. Both parties 
agree that this is based on years of lack of communication and relying on 
negative perceptions of the other, although the River Nile has, and will
continue to, tie the destinies of these two states together.
The GERD is among various issues that represent an important 
challenge to relations between these three states, as it directly affects the 
interests of all three parties. Ethiopia wants to generate energy from its 
Blue Nile resources, while Sudan would like to benefit in terms of its 
agriculture from a regulated water flow as a result of the dam’s 
construction. Egypt also has legitimate fears regarding the dam’s potential 
effects on its uses of the Nile waters. For these reasons, the three states 
agreed to enter into a negotiating mechanism known as the Tripartite 
Committee, which aims to prepare the studies recommended by the 
International Panel of Experts, to assess the real effects of the dam on the 
two downstream States (Egypt and the Sudan). These studies pertain to the 
potential effects on water resources, the economy and the environment, 
and include proposals to avoid harm.
What I would like to say clearly is that the specific effects of the 
dam and how to avoid them cannot be apparent unless the required studies 
are concluded, and their results used as a benchmark to reach a permanent 
and lasting agreement between the three states on the optimum mechanism
for the dam’s filling, operation and reservoir capacity.
411 | P a g e 
   
 
   
 
    
     
    
   
   
     
    
   
  
  
     
      
   
    
    
  
   
 
   
 
  
  
    
    
    
 
We also must not forget that the three states, with direct orders 
from their political leadership, successfully reached an important 
declaration of principles last March in Khartoum. This agreement is the 
first legal instrument on cooperation to be concluded by all three states 
regarding the issue of the Nile waters. The real importance of this is that it
is a new and unique practice of cooperation regarding the operation of a
dam in one state in coordination with dams in other states, in order to 
guarantee the utmost benefit to all states involved and to avoid harm to any
of them. In other words, there is an interest for all three parties involved to 
make this experience succeed, as a model for cooperation in an 
international river as important as the Nile. Such cooperation can lead to 
mutual benefits and can transform a river into a source of cooperation 
rather than tension.
With regard to the current negotiations, there is no doubt that we
are currently at a cross roads. The technical side has been delayed due to 
the inability to choose a consultancy firm that will undertake the studies. 
This is because the two firms initially chosen failed to agree on how to 
work together. This is a matter that has required the three states to sit down 
once again in order to agree on certain issues and other firms to be used in 
order to come up with the requested studies. This is not an easy matter as 
the way in which both the French and Dutch firms were chosen was a
complicated and time consuming process, which took into consideration 
many technical details. Repeating this process would consume much time. 
Simultaneously, the construction of the dam is proceeding on the 
ground. It is therefore important to reiterate the provisions of the 
declaration of principles and the time-frame it put in place, to guarantee
that after finalizing the required studies the three states will be able to 
reach clear rules on operating the dam and filling up its reservoir in a
manner that preserves their mutual interests, as well as implementing all
the study’s recommendations and conclusions.
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In conclusion, I would like to affirm that we are in the midst of a
very complex and exacting cooperative process and that all those involved 
must be patient. Egyptian citizens must trust in the capacity of their state
and negotiators to protect their water rights. Under no circumstance can 
any Egyptian official compromise Egypt’s water security.
Q: What about Egypt’s Work Agenda in the Security Council for the year 
2016?
A: Egypt’s membership of the Security Council marks a new phase
whereby Egypt is considered a partner in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and not just responsible for protecting its own interests. 
This means that Egypt has become a partner among 15 states that carry the 
burden of the preserving peace and security at the international level. 
National interests cannot be the only force that moves Egypt in the 
Security Council. Our priorities are definitely Egypt’s interests as well as 
maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and Africa, and 
supporting conflict resolution in the Middle East.
Egyptian society and public opinion should view Egypt’s role
from the perspective of the responsibility placed on it as an international 
partner entrusted with maintaining international peace and security. There
is no doubt that our priorities are Arab and African issues, combating
terrorism and the Palestinian cause. Egypt prioritizes all these issues, as we
will play an important role in developing the Security Council’s approach 
to them, in light of our role as a state affected by these issues and 
challenges.
There is also big opportunity for us to enhance our relations with 
other countries in our regions, whose interests we will be representing. 
There will definitely be opportunities for closer cooperation with our 
African brothers, especially when it comes to promoting African issues in 
the Council. The same applies to Arab issues, seeing as we are the only
Arab state in the council at the present time. We will carry the 
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responsibility of the situations in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen, as well as 
combating terrorism. We will talk about all of these issues and will adopt 
progressive positions in this regard. We will communicate our thoughts 
and concerns to the members of the Council and the Council will be keen 
to hear our assessment, seeing that we are part of the region and we know 
how to take on these challenges and how to resolve them.
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